Battleships and Dividends: The Rise of Private Armaments Firms in Great Britain and Italy,

c. 1860-1914 by MARCHISIO, GIULIO
Durham E-Theses
Battleships and Dividends: The Rise of Private
Armaments Firms in Great Britain and Italy, c.
1860-1914
MARCHISIO, GIULIO
How to cite:
MARCHISIO, GIULIO (2012) Battleships and Dividends: The Rise of Private Armaments Firms in Great
Britain and Italy, c. 1860-1914, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses
Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/7323/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
Battleships and Dividends: The Rise of Private Armaments Firms in Great Britain and Italy,
c. 1860-1914
Giulio Marchisio
This thesis analyses the rise of private armaments  firms in Great Britain and in Italy from
mid-19th century to the outbreak of the First World War, with a focus on naval armaments and
military shipbuilding.
During  this  period,  the  armaments  industry underwent  a  radical  transformation,  moving
from being based on public-owned arsenals and yards to being based on private firms – the system
of  military  procurement  prevalent  today.  The  key  reason  behind  this  transformation  was  the
increasingly rapid evolution of military technology which started in the late 1850s and which was
especially marked in naval ordnance and warship design. Guns and vessels, which previously could
have been used for decades, were now outdated in a few years. Rapid technological change forced
governments to constantly re-equip their  armed forces, thus creating the opportunity for private
firms  both  to  supply goods which  government  arsenals  did not  make,  and to  supplement  their
production  when  this  was  not  sufficient.  It  also  favoured  the  expansion  of  the  international
armaments  trade  because  advanced  technologies  were  difficult  to  replicate.  By  1914,  private
armaments firms had become the leading suppliers of crucial military hardware and the driving
force  behind technical  innovations.  Moreover,  armaments  firms  now ranked among the  largest
private companies in many economies.
This research casts  fresh  light on this development  through a comparative analysis of the
Italian  and  British  cases.  Both  countries  experienced  a  similar  trend,  despite  very  different
economic, strategic and political conditions. Analysing the evolution of their armaments industries
thus highlights both the common long-term changes and the differences, notably in the relationship
between private companies and governments, and the level of competition inside the industry.
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Quis fuit, horrendos primus qui protulit enses?
Quam ferus et vere ferreus ille fuit!
Tum caedes hominum generi, tum proelia nata,
Tum brevior dirae mortis aperta via est.
An nihil ille miser meruit, nos ad mala nostra
Vertimus, in saevas quod dedit ille feras?
(Tibullus, Elegies, I, 10, vv. 1 – 6)
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Introduction
This thesis analyses  the growth and  evolution of the private armaments industry in Great
Britain and Italy from the middle of the 19th century to the First World War. In these decades, the
armaments business underwent a radical transformation: it moved from being predominantly based
on publicly-owned arsenals and shipyards, to being dominated by a handful of large private firms. 
From the 16th century until the mid-19th century, European governments steadily increased
their role in the armaments sector:  after asserting their legal monopoly of violence, governments
became the dominant purchasers of heavy military hardware,  and, at the same time, thanks to the
network of plants and yards they owned, also the major  producers of armaments.  Until the 1850s
artillery technology progressed at a slow pace. Technical obsolescence was a negligible problem: as
William McNeill states: “[the] gun design developed … between 1465 and 1477 lasted until the
1840s with only marginal improvements.”1 Technological stagnation meant that warships and guns
were kept  in  service  for  decades.  In  case  of  protracted  warfare,  private  firms  were  sometimes
integrated into the military procurement system to meet short-term peaks of demand. However, as
soon as the need for additional military hardware ended, governments stopped buying from private
suppliers and reverted exclusively on their arsenals and yard, whose output was sufficient to meet
the demand of peacetime. 
Starting in  the 1860s,  the armaments industry moved in a different  direction,  towards  a
situation in  which  private  firms  acquired  a  much  larger  role  than  before.  What  caused  this
transformation was the increasingly rapid evolution of military technology which, after centuries of
slow, incremental, cumulative progress, entered into a phase of radical change. This evolution was
especially evident in naval ordnance and warship design:  guns and vessels which previously  had
been used for decades, if not centuries,  now became obsolete in  just  a few years. Rapid technical
change disrupted traditional procurement patterns in three ways. First, it created the opportunity for
private  firms,  not  just  during  military  crises,  but  also  in  peacetime,  to  supply  goods  which
government plants did not make. Governments had to constantly re-equip their armed forces with
up-to-date hardware to keep pace with the evolution of military technology. Second, it favoured the
expansion of the international armaments trade because  many governments,  especially the ones
1 W. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), 88.
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which did not  own modern arsenals  and plants,  were eager  to  purchase the  most  sophisticated
military hardware, given the high cost of not modernising their armed forces. This meant that firms
capable of producing competitive military technology had now access to a much larger potential
market  than  before.  Third,  by  highlighting  the  growing  role  that  technology  and  technical
innovation played in modern warfare, it made governments more willing to interact with private
firms able to develop and produce cutting-edge military goods. As a result, by 1914, in near all the
advanced countries  private  armaments  firms  had  grown into  being leading  suppliers of  crucial
military hardware (in some areas completely displacing government arsenals' production), and they
had also become the driving force behind many new technical innovations. 
The focus of the thesis is on the production of naval artillery and warships because it was
exactly the demand for naval armaments which mainly stimulated the growth of private armaments
firms before 1914. In the years 1850-1914, naval warfare was much more capital intensive than land
warfare.  For example, in the decade before the outbreak of the  First World War, European navies
spent  on average between 35% and 55% of their budgets  to purchase military hardware such as
guns, warships and  ammunitions;  a value much higher than that of the land forces (5-12%).2 In
addition to this, there was also a qualitative difference: naval military hardware tended to be more
sophisticated and expensive. As a consequence, private firms had an incentive to focus on satisfying
the needs of navies rather than those of armies which still  largely relied on government  factories.
For example, between 1909 and 1914, 80% of the British army's orders for guns and shells were
placed with the Royal Ordnance Factories  and 20% with the private industry; in the case of the
Royal Navy the proportions were exactly the opposite.3
This work does not address the production of and trade in small and light weapons. Because
of the very different commercial and technological conditions prevailing in the two markets, the
production  of  small  and  large  armaments  systems  was, and  still  is,  undertaken  by  different
companies. Thus, too little is shared by these two groups of firms to justify a common analysis. 
Three main  reasons justify this  research.  First,  in the decades before 1914  the private
armament industry became a significant part of the industrial sector in many European countries,
with  armaments firms  ranking amongst the biggest national companies.  For instance,  in 1907
Armstrong and Vickers, the two major British armaments firms, were the second and third largest
private employers in Great Britain, not counting  railways companies. John Brown, another firm
which was involved in  warship-building  and ordnance making,  ranked seventh.  All  these firms
2 D. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of the War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford, 1996), 10.
3 H. Strachan, The First World War, vol. 1, To Arms (Oxford, 2001), 1066.
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employed more workers than the Royal Ordnance Factories. In Germany, Krupp was the single
biggest private industrial employer.4 In 1911 Ansaldo and Vickers-Terni – both deeply involved in
armaments production – ranked second and seventh among Italian manufacturing companies, using
a company's  total  assets rather than its number of workers as a yardstick.5 In addition, armaments
companies played a crucial role in terms of technological evolution,  both through the activities of
their  own research departments, and by purchasing advanced technological goods from other
companies –  the big steel-made vessels produced before 1914  were the most sophisticated and
complex technological products ever made up to that time.6 Consequently it is important to study
the evolution and the market organization of the armaments sector per se.
Second, the current procurement system, based on government contracts awarded to private
firms, has its roots in the period covered by this thesis. As already stated, the shift from a public- to
a private-based system of producing military hardware reversed the previous secular trend toward a
greater  role of governments in the broad sphere of “military and security”.  Since the sixteenth
century,  European governments (and also some non-European ones, such as the Japanese
government during the Tokugawa Bakufu period) had struggled in order to assert their primacy in
military affairs. One of the most effective way governments used was to gain a quasi-monopoly in
the manufacturing of the most important “tools of violence”,  such as guns and warships.7 The
central position enjoyed  by government-owned establishments started to be eroded in the last
decades of the nineteenth century by a  growing private armaments  industry.  Therefore,  such a
crucial turning point deserves to be fully investigated.
Third, despite its peculiarities, the armaments industry is characterised by features (e.g. high
entrance barriers, substantial learning costs for new entrants, the need for huge capital investments,
etc.) which can also be found in other industrial sectors, such as the petroleum and heavy chemical
4 P. Wardley, ‘The Emergence of Big Business: The Largest Corporate Employers of Labour in the United Kingdom, 
Germany and the United States, c. 1907’ Business History 41 (1999), 102 and 108.
5 IMITA.db, Archivio Storico delle Società per Azioni Italiane, http  ://  imitadb  . unisi  . it  / index  . asp   (accessed 15 August
2012).
6 C. Trebilcock, ʻ“Spin-Off” in British Economic History: Armaments and Industry, 1760-1914’ Economic History
Review 22 (1969), 474-490; id., ʻBritish Armaments and European Industrialization, 1890-1914’ Economic History
Review 26 (1973), 254-272.
7  The literature on this topic is enormous. See for reference: G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation
and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1988); J. Black,  A Military Revolution? Military Change and
European Society, 1550–1800 (London, 1991); C. Rogers,  The Military Revolution Debate (Oxford, 1995);  P. Del
Negro, Guerra ed Eserciti da Macchiavelli a Napoleone (Roma-Bari, 2001), 3-121. J. Glete, Warships, Navies and
State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860 (Stockholm, 1993) offers an overview which stresses the role
played by battle fleets,  and their  construction  cost,  in state  building.  The case of  the Tokugawa Japan is very
instructive:  in 1615, at the end of a bloody civil war which saw extensive use of fire arms, the Tokugawa family
gained  political  supremacy  in  the  country.  The  new  government  was  able  to  exercise such  an  unchallenged
monopoly of violence that it  reduced, and then virtually eliminated, the use and production of fire arms  in the
country,  see N. Perrin,  Giving Up the Gun (Boston, 1979),  and D. L.  Howell,  ʻThe Social  Life of Firearms in
Tokugawa Japanʼ, Japanese Studies 29 (2009), 65-80.
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industries. This research, thus, by contributing to a better understanding of the dynamics and trends
shaping the armaments industry, has the potentiality to also benefit research in adjacent areas.
Whereas the current military procurement system has its roots in the decades covered by this
thesis, there is a significant difference between the pre-1914 and the post-First World War periods
which needs to be mentioned. Starting from the Great War, armaments production and trade became
highly  regulated  activities.  National  laws  and  international  treaties  have  been  introduced  by
governments with the aim of controlling this strategic sector. In contrast, before 1914 governments
tolerated free trade of armaments and also free flows of information and technical expertise while
participating in naval arms race. Even Great Britain, which, as the major naval power before 1914
might have had an interest in limiting the sale of naval armaments and warships, did not regulate
these activities. As the report of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading
in Arms appointed in 1935  reported,  before  the Great War the only legal provision  specifically
devoted to regulating the armaments trade was the Exportation of Arms Act 1900 which gave the
power to the government “to prohibit the exportation ... of arms, ammunition, military and naval
stores ... to prevent [them] be used against Her Majesty's subjects and forces.”8 However, before
1914 British governments do not appear to have exercised this power.
The main reason why before 1914 governments generally adopted this light-touch attitude
was the nature of naval warfare. Until the First World War, governments expected to fight relatively
short wars. Hence, what mattered was the size of a navy at the beginning of the hostilities: a conflict
was expected to terminate before large numbers of warships could be built to reinforce the warring
fleets.  Therefore Great Britain had nothing to fear so long as the Royal Navy maintained its large
numerical supremacy over the fleets of the other powers. Moreover, if a conflict was to last more
than just a few months, having a well developed private armaments industry – which could thrive
exactly because it had the possibility to sell abroad when internal demand was stagnant – might be a
crucial asset:  the capacity of private companies could be added to that of the government-owned
arsenals to rapidly escalate production.  This idea of the private armaments industry as a potential
strategic asset which governments could tap in case of conflict was often propagated by armaments
firms  themselves:  for  example,  the  editorials  published  by the  British  trade  journal  Arms  and
Explosives routinely stressed that only if British firms were left free to sell their wares abroad, and
thus  maintain  their  production  facilities  up-to-date  and  competitive  thanks  to  these  profitable
exports, could they play a valuable role in case of conflict.  For every warship or gun sold abroad,
8 HCPP, Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms (1935-36). Report, p. 69.
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the British government could easily order twice as many to its own arsenals  and to the private
industry.
The same line of reasoning justified the governments' lack of strict control over the flow of
technical information. Given the state of military technology before 1914, it was hardly possible for
a company to maintain a consistent technological lead for many years. For instance, in the case of
armour plates the various improvements which were developed in the course of the 1890s were
basically the result of a “trial-and-error” approach. Under these circumstances, as will be explained
in  more  detail  in  chapter  VI,  it  was  rationale  for  firms  to  purchase  the  rights  to  use  foreign-
developed patents, rather than embark on autonomous investigations, and for governments to allow
this to happen, in order to obtain rapid access to any technical advance. As a consequence, no navy
made  the quest  for  technological  superiority  the  linchpin  of  its  strategy (with  the  partial  brief
exception of the French Jeune École). Numerical advantage, better tactical leadership and superior
organisation  were  generally  regarded  as  the  crucial  factors which  would  have  decided a  clash
between fleets made up of broadly similar vessels.
In addition to this “strategic” rationale, other more mundane reasons justified the light-touch
policy  adopted  by  governments.  Armaments  sales  could  cement  political  and  economic  links
between countries. The Italian government, for instance, supported Ansaldo's efforts to sell warships
to  Southern  American  republics  because  it  thought  it  was  a  way to  enhance  Italy's  role  there.
Moreover, sales of armaments played a positive role in the balance of payments of a country, a
central preoccupation for governments under the gold standard system. Finally, as will be more fully
explained in the following section on historiography, it was only after the First World War that the
armaments industry started to be generally regarded as an activity which, for its nature, needed to be
more carefully supervised and monitored. 
This research adopts a comparative approach, analysing the British and Italian experiences.
The rationale for this comparison is twofold. 
The first reasons is that, during the entire period covered by this thesis, the links connecting
the Italian and British armaments industries were numerous and deep, more so than that among the
armaments industries of other countries (only the association between British firms and Japan was
similar for magnitude, but  it spanned a  much  shorter period of time).  From the establishment of
Armstrong, the Italian government was among its most important and loyal customers, and it kept
patronising the firm and it the 1880s it was able to convince the British company to create a plant in
Italy,  at Pozzuoli – the single largest and longest foreign direct investment ever undertook by  a
European armaments firm before 1914. In addition to this, in 1903 Armstrong acquired a large stake
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in the capital of Ansaldo, the major Italian armaments firm, even though it sold its shares after a few
years.  During the early 1900s Vickers, the other major British military company,  also  entered the
Italian market.  It  signed an agreement  with Terni,  a  steel  and engineering conglomerate  which
owned the second largest private yards for warship construction in the country,  to establish a new
artillery making plant in Italy. These intense and protracted connections thus justify a side-by-side
analysis.
The  second  reason is that a comparative approach has the potentiality to  result in a more
complete and nuanced reconstruction of the activities of the Italian and British armaments industries
both  by emphasising the common features  and by contrasting the differences, between the Italian
and British experiences.  The armaments industry in both countries went through a similar general
trend  favouring the growth of private firms. As a result, at the beginning of the First World War
private armaments companies were well established in both Britain and Italy, and after some initial
difficulties  they  proved  able  to  supply  their  governments  with  a  constant  stream  of  military
hardware.  This development happened notwithstanding the very different economic, political and
social conditions prevailing in the two countries – Great Britain  being the leading power in the
world whereas Italy “the least of the great powers”, as it has been called by Richard Bosworth9. At
the  same  time,  Italian  and  British  armaments  industries differed  in  some  crucial  aspects.  For
instance, British firms were more prone to collaborate among themselves than were those in Italy;
the relationship between firms and governments was also distinct, with the Italian government being
much more active in promoting industrial ventures than the British one. The impact and significance
of these specific features can only be assessed if compared with a different case. Finally, this thesis
will  also fill  a gap in  the literature.  There are few comparative studies of the evolution of the
armaments sector in Europe before 1914, and none with an Anglo-Italian perspective.10
Space and gaps in the sources do not allow a complete reconstruction of the performance of
every company operating in this field, or consideration of every technological innovation. The focus
of the thesis is, on the contrary, on the overall development of the armaments industries in the two
countries,  the relative positions of the various manufactures,  their strategies and the impact that
technological innovation had on governments' policies and on private actors. This approach has the
potential to better emphasize the long-term changes which occurred in the period 1860-1914. 
9 R. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War (Cambridge,
1979).
10 Anderson,  Armaments,  18-40; and L. Segreto,  ‘Parter e  Rivali  nell'Industria degli  Armamanti’,  P. Hertner (ed.),
Storia dell'Ansaldo. Vol. 3, Dai Bombrini ai Perrone, 1903-1914 (Roma-Bari, 1996), 111-115, offer surveys of the
European armaments industry in the decade before the First World War. Both overviews, however, are exclusively
based on few secondary sources and are not intended to offer a comparative analysis of the evolution of armaments
firms in different countries.
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Historiography
The first works dealing with private armaments companies appeared in Britain in the decade
before the First World War.11 The huge and growing amount of money which the governments of
the major powers of the time were devoting to military spending could not go unnoticed. Especially
after the introduction of the new dreadnought battleships  in  the early 1900s,  scholars,  journalists,
intellectuals and political activists started to wrote extensively about armaments spending. Various
naval  arms  race,  of  which  the most  famous was the one between Germany and Great  Britain,
stimulated further interest in the topic. 
The  publications  which  appeared  in  this  period  can  be  divided  in  two  groups.  Works
belonging to the first group questioned the value of governments' spending on armaments; those in
the second group concentrated on criticising the activities and operations  of private  armaments
companies. Works in the first group often focused on the  absolute  level of military spending.12
Tracing their intellectual origins to Richard Cobden, their authors advanced what might be called
“the economic argument against military spending”.13 For them military spending was inherently
wasteful; free trade and commerce were the most effective means to enhance international security,
while  armaments  spending  generated  uncertainty  by  causing costly  armaments  races,  and,
especially, diverted precious resources which could be used to achieve other, more useful, goals, or
simply returned to the citizens as lower taxes. While there was no doubt that armaments firms were
handsomely profiteering from the opportunities generated by defence spending, the key issue for
these  authors  was  governments'  decision  to  spend  taxpayers'  money  on  armaments.  The
fundamental problem was therefore political,  one of priorities.  This criticism,  however, could be
more easily applied to expenditures for armies than for navies: the latter, in fact, were  the key
instrument used to maintain sea lanes open and safe, therefore helping trade and prosperity.14
The second group of works, which  started to appear in the last few years before 1914,15
firmly concentrated  on the activities  of  private  armaments  firms.16 The authors  of  these works
11 The aim of this literature review is that of assessing the most significant works offering an analysis of the activities
of private armaments firms. Mapping the development of anti-armaments ideas goes beyond its scope.
12 Among the many: Cobden Club,  The Burden of Armaments: A Plea for Retrenchment  (London, 1905), and G. H.
Perris, For an Arrest of Armaments. A Note for the Second Hague Conference (London, 1906).
13 R.  Cobden,  The  Political  Writings  of  Richard  Cobden,  2  volumes  (London,  1903),  passim; E.  P.  Stringham,
‘Commerce, Markets, and Peace. Richard Cobden Enduring Lessons’, The Independent Review 9 (2004), 105-116.
14 G. Jordan,  ‘Pensions not Dreadnoughts:  the Radicals and Naval Retrenchment’, A. J. A. Morris (ed.),  Edwardian
Radicalism, 1900-14 (London, 1974), 162-179.
15 C. Trebilcock, ‘Radicalism and the Armament Trust’, Morris (ed.), Radicalism, 181.
16 For instance, G. H. Perris, The War Traders (London, 1913), P. Snowden, Dreadnoughts and Dividends: Exposure
of the Armaments Ring (Boston, 1914), H. R. Murray, Krupp and the International Armament Ring (London, 1915),
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arrived at the same conclusions as the authors of the first group, that is, that armaments spending
was  a  waste  of  taxpayers'  money.  The difference  was they  stressed  the  role  played by private
armaments firms: they argued that private companies were shaping government policies to their
own advantages.  Thanks  to  exchanges  of  favours,  political  and  financial  support,  and  outright
bribery  a small,  close-knit  group  of  greedy  armaments  entrepreneurs  had  gained  a decisive
influence upon government spending. Competition between armaments firms was only apparent:
companies actually belonged to international cartels and trusts designated to fix prices and divide
markets. Rivalries and disputes between countries were exploited, if not artfully created by the same
armaments companies,  to  stimulate sales. The result  was a thriving business for the armaments
companies, but a heavy burden for the public, and a growing level of international tensions. 
Also in Italy the amount of resources absorbed by defence spending generated controversies,
although the fact that military affairs firmly belonged to the sphere of influence of the king limited
the scope for  open  criticism.  The most  relevant  contributions  came from liberal  and free trade
economists such as Edoardo Giretti, Antonio de Viti de Marco, Vilfredo Pareto and Luigi Einaudi,
who from the pages of the  Giornale degli Economisti  or the  Corriere della Sera denounced the
special relationship which existed between the government, on one side, and a handful of private
firms involved in armaments production, on the other.  They accused private firms to unlawfully
profit from government contracts  by inflating costs, and the government to be unable to properly
supervise  how such a large part  of its budget was spent.17 In general,  a problem which all  the
authors  writing  on  the  armaments  industry period  faced  in  this  was  the  limited  amount  of
information they could rely on. Data on government spending were usually available, although with
varying degrees of completeness; but private companies disclosed little financial information apart
from final years' results. On the contrary, technical details circulated quite freely on newspapers and
trade journals. 
At the end of the First World War, and for the next two decades, armaments remained an
important  topic  of  public  discourse.  This  occurred  for  two  reasons.  The  first reason  was  that
excessive armaments spending was regarded as one of the crucial causes of the First World War, if
not the major one. As the former British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey wrote: “The enormous
growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them – it was these that
made war inevitable.”18 Hence, it is not surprising that the fourth of President Wilson's fourteen
J. T. W. Newbold, The Armament Trust Exposed (London, 1916).
17 For example, E.  Giretti, ‘La  Società Terni, il  Governo e il “Trust”  Metallurgico’,  Giornale degli Economisti 12
(1903), 309-364,  and  L.  Einaudi,  ‘L’Odierna  Crisi  di  Borsa  ed  i  suoi  Insegnamenti’,  Corriere  della  Sera 20
November 1906, 1.
18 E. Gray, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (London, 1925), vol. 1, 90.
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points dealt with armaments: “Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be
reduced to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety.”19 The Covenant of the League of
Nations explicitly endorsed this view stating that: “The Members of the League recognise that the
maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent
with national safety."20 As a consequence, during the 1920s and 1930s various political meetings –
the Washington Naval Conference in 1922, the Paris conference resulting in Kellogg-Briand Pact in
1928  and  the  World  Disarmament  Conferences  in  1932-34  –  were  organised  with  the  aim  of
limiting armaments spending.
The second reason was the occurrence of polemic on “war profiteering” in more or less all
the  major  belligerent  countries  after  the  conclusion  of  the  conflict.  In  wartime  armaments
companies (and other private suppliers) had obtained large profits on the unprecedented amount of
orders they had received from governments.21 These war profits generated much controversy both
during the conflict and,  especially, after  it.22 For example, special parliamentary committees were
created in Italy (Commissione d'Inchiesta  Parlamentare sulle  Spese di  Guerra, 1920-1923), in the
United States (Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, or Nye's Committee
from the  name  of  its  chairman,  Senator  Gerald  Nye,  1934-1936)  and  in  Great  Britain  (Royal
Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in  Arms, 1935-1936) to investigate war
profits, how  government contracts  had been handled during the conflict,  and also what practical
limits could be imposed on  armaments trade  and production.23 These committees collected  vast
amount of documents and testimonies which, even though they mainly focus on the war period, also
offer useful information  about the pre-war years – the records of the British Royal Commission
have been especially valuable for this research.
19 The text  of  Wilson's  fourteen points  is  available  on the website  of  the Avalon Project  of  the  Yale University,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.
20 The text of the Covenant is  equally available online:  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. On the
impact of this article on the League's activities: Z. Steiner, The Lights that Failed. European International History
1919-1933 (Oxford, 2005), 372-73.
21 For an analysis  of how accounting practises impacted on war  profits: A. Loft,  ‘Accountancy and the First World
War’, A. G. Hopwood and P. Miller (eds.), Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice (Cambridge, 1994), 116-
137.
22 J. S. Boswell and B. R. Johns,  ‘Patriots or Profiteers? British Businessmen and the First World War’, Journal of
European Economic History  11 (1982), 423-446;  and also E. A. Molander,  ‘Historical  Antecedents of Military-
Industrial Criticism’, Military Affairs 40 (1976), 59-63.
23 The final  report of the Italian committee and all  the materials it  assembled have been recently republished: C.
Crocella and F. Mazzonis (eds.),  L'Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle  Spese di  Guerra (1920-1923), 3 volumes (Roma,
2002). On the Nye Committee: J. E. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Enquiry, 1934-1936 (Baton
Rouge, 1963). On the British Royal Commission: D. G. Anderson,  ‘British Rearmament and the “Merchants of
Deaths”: The 1935-36 Royal Commission on the Manufacture and Trade in Armaments’, Journal of Contemporary
History 29 (1994), 5-37; on the British government attitudes towards this problem, N. Rollings,  ‘Whiteall and the
Control of Prices and Profits in a Major War, 1919-1939’, The Historical Journal 44 (2001), 517-540.
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The experience of the First World War stimulated a new series of publications restating the
criticisms  which  had  already  been levelled  against  armaments  firms  before  1914.24 The  most
influential work was Merchants of Death published in 1934 in the United States by Engelbrecht and
Hanighen.  The book's arguments were the same as  those which had been advanced twenty years
before: armaments firms exercised a powerful influence in public life, and used it to enrich their
managers and shareholders. Fomenting war scares, paying journalists to excite jingoistic feelings,
selling  armaments  to  countries  fighting  each  other,  offering  money and  well-paid  post-service
employments  to  influential  officers,  bribing  politicians  and bureaucrats –  all  these  were means
which private armaments firms allegedly used to increase their profits.25
Two things, however, differentiated Merchants of Death from earlier works. First of all, its
length:  the  first  edition  of  Engelbrecht  and  Hanighen's  book  run  for  more  than  250  pages,  a
significant difference from the works which appeared before 1914, which in the majority were
pamphlets longer no more than few tens of pages.  Second, the length of the book allowed the
authors to offer a more systematic and articulated analysis of the history of the armaments industry.
While the pre-war literature was mainly focused on contemporary and specific events, Merchants of
Death covered more than a century of history (opening with the story of Irénée Du Pont setting up a
gun powder mill in the United States at the beginning of the 19th century), spanning the entire
world, from Europe to South America to Japan. The breadth and scope of the volume, which was
enriched with photographs and diagrams, do not cover the fact, however, that it also suffered from
the fact  that  the authors did not  enjoy access  to  business  archives and hence relied mainly on
previously published anti-armaments materials and  newspapers articles. The  impact the book  had
can be gauged, however, from the success enjoyed by the expression "merchants of death" ever
since.26
 Another book written in the inter-war period was Eckart Kehr's  Battleship Building and
Party Politics in Germany, 1894-1901.27 Kehr  examined  how different social groups and vested
interests interacted inside and outside the Reichstag to build up the momentum for the approval of
laws  financing  German  naval  rearmament. The  book,  which  does  not  focus  on  the  internal
24 The most relevant books published in this period were: A. F. Brockway, The Bloody Traffic (London, 1933), P. Noel-
Baker,  The Private Manufacture of Armaments (London,  1936),  and H.  C.  Engelbrecht  and  F.  C.  Hanighen,
Merchants of Death. A Study of the International Armament Industry (New York, 1934).
25 T. H. Tooley, ‘Merchants of Death revisited’, Journal of Libertarian Studies 19 (2005), 37-78, offers a stimulating
evaluation of the book.
26 Using Google Ngram Viewer (http://books.google.com/ngrams) to investigate the corpus of digitalised books in
Google Books it is possible to verify that the collocation “merchants of death” had virtually no occurrences before
1934, while there was a marked increase in its use in the second part of that decade.
27 E.  Kehr,  Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany, 1894-1901.  A Cross-Section of the Political, Social,
and Ideological Preconditions of German Imperialism (Chicago and London, 1973), originally published in 1930.
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operations of armaments firms, but on a broader political perspective, relied on a much larger body
of primary sources. Kehr’s major contribution was to stress the importance of internal political and
economic factors in shaping the defence policy of the German state, in contrast to the scholars who
saw the external and diplomatic events as the crucial factors behind armaments spending.  Kehr's
work went unnoticed during his lifetime (he died in 1933), however, and was rediscovered only in
the 1960s, in the context of a new wave of academic interest for armaments industry.28
At the end of  the Second World War, unlike  after the First,  armaments companies  did not
rank high on the academic research agenda because they were not regarded as having played a role
in the outbreak of the conflict.  As a result,  for more than a decade, no significant study about the
armaments industry was published.
During the second half of the 1950s economic and political events again  raised interest in
the armaments business. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1951, the defence spending of the
United States, the Soviet Union and several European countries started to expand. A major reason
which was advanced to explain the growth of military spending in peacetime was the influence of
what President Eisenhower labelled in his farewell address in 1961  “the military-industrial
complex”,  that is, the notion that  there  exists  a  web  of  relationships involving  government
bureaucracies,  armed forces and industrial producers aiming  to  gain  approval for  programmes
financing the production and maintenance of unnecessary military hardware – programmes which
end with huge profits for the private companies, a growing role for the military bureaucracies, and a
larger place for the government inside the economy.29 The result is a combination of interests and
influences which could threaten democracy. It is immediately clear that the concept of military-
industrial  complex owns a lot  to  the “merchants of death” theory.  The major difference is  that
proponents of the military-industrial complex regard the political, military and industrial groups as a
single, unified body, rather than as separate groups. The military-industrial complex proved to be a
very popular concept.30 Hundreds of books and articles about this topic have been published since
the 1960s,31 the majority about the experience of the United States after the Second World War, a
28 On the academic  impact of Kehr'  works,  see A. Wehler,  ‘Kehr,  Eckart’, L.  Boia (ed.),  Great Historians of  the
Modern Age: An International Dictionary (New York, 1991).
29 S. Melman, Pentagon Capitalism: the Political Economy of War (New York, 1970) is a good analysis of the impact
that military spending had on the American economy.
30 The popularity of the expression “military-industrial  complex” can be  gauged once again  using  Google Ngram
Viewer. It started to be used in 1961 and it had enjoyed a growing popularity ever since, with pecks in the early
1970s, late 1980s and late 1990s.
31 Using Worldcat (a website indexing the catalogues of around 72,000 libraries around the world) for volumes with
the words “military-industrial complex” in the title returns 760 entries. Among the most relevant publications are: S.
Rosen,  Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington, 1973); S. Lens,  The Military-Industrial
Complex  (Philadelphia, 1980); P. A. Koistinen,  The Military-industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective  (New
York, 1980); R. T. Robin,  The Making of  the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Industrial
Complex  (Princeton, 2003); S. T. Brandes,  Warhogs. A History of War Profits in America  (Lexington, 1997); S.
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natural consequence of the fact that the American military budget has been the largest in the world
since the 1940s.32
Armaments  was a popular  research topic for scholars of different disciplines, among them
sociologists and economists. For instance, the sociologist C.  Wright Mills had anticipated some
features of the military-industrial complex in his book Power Elite on the structures of power inside
the United States. He pointed to the special relationships and interconnected interests which existed
between  military,  political and business groups.  He saw these  three groups at the head of
hierarchical structures (the  army,  the  government,  the  large  corporations)  characterising the
activities of the  modern centralised bureaucratic state.  These groups,  according to Wright Mills,
were able to shape governmental policies to their own benefit because of their unity of purpose,
whereas mass society, fragmented and divided, was impotent to reverse their actions. Large defence
appropriations were then used by the dominant elite to reinforce their position.33
Armaments manufacturing equally  had  a significant  role in the analysis of the modern
capitalist economy proposed by the prominent Marxist economists Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran.34
According  to  them, the economic surplus produced inside the capitalistic economy was  only
partially  absorbed by consumer spending.  The remaining share was used by the government to
finance military  spending which was used to keep industrial capacity employed.  In Sweezy and
Baran's model, therefore, the armaments industry plays the central role in the continued functioning
of a capitalist economy.
These works, though, focus primarily on general trends and offer theoretical insights, rather
than  empirical  analysis.  Although they show that there are (and were)  links between private
companies and public bureaucrats,  they do not clarify  the direction of causality.  Do private
entrepreneurs dictate the government policies,  or do  public bureaucracies enjoy the upper hand?
Whatever their findings these works had the merit of considering the armaments industry in terms
of its relevance in the economy, rather than just in moralistic terms.
Both the “merchants of death” hypothesis and the “military-industrial complex”, however,
are inadequate to provide an historical interpretation of the rise and evolution of private armaments
Lieberson, ‘An Empirical Study of the Military-Industrial linkages’, American Journal of Sociology 76 (1971), 562-
584; B. Baack and E. Ray, ‘The Political Economy of the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex in the USA’,
Journal of Economic History 45 (1985), 369-375; W. Adams and W. J. Adams, ‘The Military-Industrial Complex: a
Market Structure Analysis’, American Economic Review 62 (1972), 279-287; B. F. Cooling,  Grey Steel and Blue
Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex,  1881-1917  (Hamden, 1979);  S. C.
Sarkesian (ed.), The Military-Industrial Complex: A reassessment (Beverly Hills, 1972).
32 The  fact  that Enterprise  & Society devoted  a  special  issue,  published in  March  2011,  to  a  reappraisal  of  the
American military-industrial complex is a further testimony of the continuous popularity of the topic.
33 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York, 1956).
34 P. Sweezy and P. Baran, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (London, 1968).
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firms before 1914. First of all, they cannot explain why a private armament industry started to grow
in the  mid-19th century.  Second, they cannot account for the varied  performance of armaments
firms: if all of them adopt the same strategy, why were some more successful than others? Third,
they do not give enough consideration to the differences  which existed between the armaments
industries in different countries. 
Another  scholar  who  contributed  important  insights  on  armaments  was  Alexander
Gerschenkron. Gerschenkron never actually interested himself in the armaments industry, or in the
dynamic  of  military spending.  His  major  contribution  was  to  offer  a  model  of  economic
development which stressed the importance of  the state's activities.  He focused on  the economic
performance  of  the  European  countries,  such  as  Italy,  Germany  and  Russia,  whose  industrial
development he claimed occurred in the last decades of the 19th century.35 Gerschenkron advanced
the idea that in these countries governments and the universal, German-style banks played a crucial
role as agents of development.36 According to his analysis, second comer countries suffered from
the  absence  of  several  of  the  prerequisites  of  economic  development  which  Britain  or  France
enjoyed  during  their  industrialisation:  management  capacity,  planning  and business  skills  were
especially in short supply. To overcome these problems, governments and banks coordinated and
supported  industrial  sectors  and  individual  firms  to  achieve industrial  growth.  Tariffs,  public
spending,  mergers,  interlocking  directorates,  were all means  used  to  promote  economic
development and catch up with the most advanced economies. The importance of Gerschenkron's
model was that it opened a new perspective on the role and importance of military spending. The
purchase of military hardware rather than being unproductive and wasteful, provided a significant
contribution to the economic take off of  second-comer  countries  by stimulating industrial
development and technological advanced productions.
During the 1960s Clive Trebilcock published the first of  his  many  contributions  on the
history  of  the  British  and  European  armaments  industries before  1914.37 Trebilcock's works
exercised a  profound and lasting influence on subsequent scholars approaching the same topic.
Three major novelties characterised Trebilcock's work: first, he reassessed the relationship between
governments and private armaments firms; second he looked at  armaments companies first  and
foremost as business ventures; third, he advanced a model of the industrialisation of second-comer
35 Gerschenkron based  his  views  on  the  economic  statistics  he  had  at  his  disposal  or  which  he  produced.  New
historical series on the Italian industrial sector, for instance, cast doubts on the real magnitude of the “great spur”
which, according to Gerschenkron, characterised the  Italian economy in the  last years of the 19th century: see S.
Fenoaltea, L'Economia Italiana dall'Unità alla Grande Guerra (Roma-Bari, 2005), 11-76.
36 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: a Book of Essays (Cambridge, Mass, 1962).
37 C.  Trebilcock,  ‘A “Special Relationship”.  Government Rearmament and the Cordite Firms’, Economic History
Review 19 (1966), 364-379.
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European states in which armaments firms played a major role.
According to Trebilcock, the idea of governments being manipulated by private armaments
firms is wrong. On the contrary, Trebilcock offered historical evidence of the significant leverage
which  governments  enjoyed upon private companies.  Firms manufacturing  armaments  totally
depended on governments'  defence expenditure, whose  level they had little power to influence.
Orders followed an erratic pace, with periods of burgeoning sales followed by phases of depression.
Moreover,  governments played manufacturers against each  other  to gain better prices and
conditions, and their chief preoccupation was always keeping government-owned factories busy. In
addition, spending decisions could take years to materialise, while firms had to invest large sums to
maintain their plants up to date to satisfy the military bureaucracies' never-ending demands for new
and improved technical features. The armaments market was oligopolistic both on the demand (the
number of purchasers was limited) and on the supply side (there were few firms able to produce the
largest and more complex armaments), and it was characterised by very high levels of information
asymmetry: armaments firms could not easily forecast future armaments trends, but governments
equally had limited means to verify the congruence of the prices paid for armaments. Clearly, all
these facts did not prevent private firms from obtaining large profits,  but Trebilcock convincingly
dismissed the idea that  governments were  puppets in the hand of armaments firms.38 Indeed,  the
mutual interdependence of the government demand for armaments, and private companies’ reliance
on government spending, made their relationship much more complex and nuanced.
 Trebilcock equally stressed the fact that the arms manufacturers were first and foremost
entrepreneurs. Consequently, their behaviour can best be understood as essentially based on profit-
seeking entrepreneurial logic and on the existence of an autonomous sphere of business decision
making.  Armaments  firms,  like  all  companies,  responded  to  market  incentives.  Therefore  it
becomes crucial to understand the dynamic of their internal operations, their strategies, rather than
to investigate the links between the armaments industry and the government (a relationship which,
as already stated, was more complex than previously thought). Thus historians have to approach the
study of the armaments companies using the standard tools of business history and economics,
focusing especially on the accounting records and other internal documents. In the 1970s this had
become possible because business records for the pre-1914 period started to become available to
researchers. Trebilcock himself employed these techniques in writing his book on the history of
Vickers.39 In The Vickers Brothers he focused on the internal decision making process of the firm,
38 Id., ‘Legends of the British Armament Industry 1890-1914: A Revision’, Journal of Contemporary History 5 (1970),
3-19.
39 Id., The Vickers Brothers. Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914 (London, 1977).
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stressing the management's  capacity to  foster  technical  innovation,  control  the operations of an
expanding firm and rapidly adapt the firm's strategy to the external environment. For the first time,
an armaments firm was studied “from inside”.
The third idea that Trebilcock advanced was that the armaments sector had played a positive
role in the industrialisation process. Trebilcock claimed that the positive impact that armaments had
on the economy was not so much quantitative (additional demands for semi-finished goods or raw
materials) but qualitative, through a process of technological transfer between civil and military
sectors –  a process tracing its roots at least to the 18th century, although it mainly displayed its
effects in the last decades of the 19th century.  Trebilcock concluded that armaments companies
played a crucial and positive role in the British economy: “the energy and efficiency of the arms
firms were not restrained in an industrial enclave but, rather, were partly "spun-off" into general
industry.”40 Trebilcock, however, considered the role of armaments companies still more relevant in
the second  comer countries  of  continental  Europe,  praising  the  contribution that the private
armaments  companies made to industrial growth.41 He claimed that  in  countries  such as  Italy,
Russia and Spain, the armaments industry played the same role that railway construction had in
Britain, stimulating economic growth and technological development. Trebilcock's assessment was
influenced by the  Apollo Programme and other contemporary  military-oriented industrial
programmes which were playing a crucial role in the development of new far-reaching technologies
which also  started to be employed in non-military sectors.  Although Trebilcock's findings can be
criticised (for example, his assessment of the role of armaments industries in the  development of
second  comer  countries  seems  too  positive),42 his business-based,  nuanced and non moralistic
approach to the subject has had a lasting influence in stimulating studies on the same topic both in
Great Britain and abroad.
Trebilcock's work and the opening of  various business archives stimulated a new wave of
interest in the history of individual armaments companies and of the armaments industry in general.
Subsequent works can be divided into two groups: the first group, which can be labelled “political
economy analysis”, is composed of works which return to investigating the nexus of armaments,
40 C. Trebilcock,  ‘"Spin-Off" in British Economic History: Armament and Industry, 1760-1914’,  Economic History
Review 22 (1969), 490; and id., ‘"Spin-Off" and the Armaments Industry: Rejoinder’, Economic History Review 24
(1971), 464-468.
41 C.  Trebilcock,  ‘British Armaments and European Industrializations 1890-1914’, Economic History Review 26
(1973), 254-272; and id.,  ‘British Armaments and European Industrialization, 1890-1914: The Spanish Case Re-
Affirmed’, Economic History Review 27 (1974), 625-631; and id., The Industrialisation of the Continental Powers,
1780-1914 (London, 1981).
42 For example, Giovanni Federico and Jon Cohen reviewing the literature on the Italian economic history downplay
the role of large firms in the development of the country in the years before the First World War, G. Federico and J.
Cohen, The Growth of the Italian Economy, 1820-1960 (Cambridge, 2001), 46-47 and 67-68.
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governments  and military elite.  Despite  the limited heuristic  value of  the concept  of “military-
industrial complex”, historians of modern European history could not ignore the role played by the
armament  industry  inside  many European  countries  in  the  decades  before  1914.  Among  these
works,  Germany and the Approach of War in 1914  by Volker Berghahn should be highlighted.43
Berghahn claimed that Germany pursed its ambitious naval plan despite the government struggled
to  finance  it,  and  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  maintained  a  decisive  lead  in  naval  construction,
because of a “path dependency” effect. Too many economic and political interests had come to
depend on the naval programme; consequently, notwithstanding its costs and lack of success, it was
not stopped. Although this hypothesis is convincing, Berghahn focused largely on political sources.
The business side of the problem received only scant attention and the book lacked references to
business records.
Another  important  work  in  this  group  is  Peter  Gatrell's  Government,  Industry  and
Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914.44 Gatrell assessed the links between the Russian government
and the country's armaments industry in the decade before 1914. According to Gatrell, Russia failed
to develop an effective working relationship with private armaments firms, despite the rearmament
policy implemented after the ruinous war with Japan which had forced the government to rely more
on the private sector. Deep-rooted defects in the economic and political life of the country led to
confusion and incoherent policies which resulted in a dramatic shortage of rifles, shells, artillery
and other military hardware during the First World War. One of the major limitations was the deep
suspicion which  many bureaucrats  and official  harboured  towards  private  enterprises  and their
activities – something which obviously damaged their operations. Gatrell thus presented a picture of
a  complex  and  confrontational  relationship  between  the  Tsarist  government  and  the  private
armaments  industry,  one  in  which  collusion  and  cooperation  was  mixed  with  suspicion  and
diffidence.
The Italian cases has been analysed in the works produced by two scholars: Luciano Segreto
and Paolo Ferrari. Luciano Segreto published his volume Marte e Mercurio in 1997.45 The book is a
collection of several previously published essays on the Italian economy after 1914, to which a new
introductory chapter was added. It is in this new chapter that Segreto offers a general overview of
the Italian armaments  industry and its  relation with the government.  He highlights the specific
43 V. G. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (London, 1973). Other books dealing with the role of
the armaments programmes in Imperial Germany are J. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent. Tirpitz and the Birth of the
German Battle Fleet (New York, 1965) which focuses on the parliamentary approval of the First Navy Law in 1898;
H. Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918 (Leamington Spa, 1985), 146-170, offers a more general overview.
44 P. Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914. The Last Argument of Tsarism (Cambridge,
1994).
45 L. Segreto, Marte e Mercurio. Industria Bellica e Sviluppo Economico in Italia 1861-1940 (Milano, 1997).
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characteristics of the Italian armaments industry: a dependence upon foreign technology, a lack of
vertical integration, the impossibility of obtaining several important intermediate goods inside the
country, strong links with the military and bureaucratic structures. However, he concluded that the
sector, as a whole, played a positive role on the economy. This work is, to date, the best account of
the development of the armaments sector in Italy; but it is not wholly satisfactory, because there is
little use of either business or governmental primary sources, and, given its  short length, many
issues and questions which it raises are not addressed.
Paolo Ferrari's  Verso la  Guerra is another collection of essays which mainly deal with the
armaments industry in Italy in the decades before 1914.46 The majority of the articles focus on the
activities of the Italian ministry of marine: Ferrari analyses the ministry's budget and calculates the
amount of resources which were spent buying from armaments firms, the differences between the
army’s and the navy's involvement with private suppliers, and the power, or rather powerlessness, of
the  parliament  in  scrutinising  the  defence  spending.  Other  articles  deal  with  the  impact  of  the
Libyan  War.  Though  Ferrari's  essays  are  the  result  of  meticulous  research  in  government  and
parliamentary records, they lack a strong unifying framework.
A book which, despite its title, does not directly deal with the evolution of Italian armaments
industry, but which is still  relevant is Fabio Degli Esposti's  Le  Armi  Proprie.  Spesa  Pubblica e
Sviluppo  Industriale nell'Italia  Liberale.47 In this book Degli Esposti offers a detailed analysis of
Italian military budgets in the period 1861-1900. The volume focuses chiefly on the parliamentary
debates inside the chamber of deputies over military expenditures, and, by offering the first proper
examination of the notoriously opaque budgets of the military ministries, it represents an essential
starting point for any analysis of the Italian armaments sector.
The second type of work on armaments companies published from the 1970s onwards is
made up of business histories aiming at reconstructing the activities and operations of individual
armaments  firms  where  large  holdings  of  documents  have  survived.48 Trebilcock  published  a
history of Vickers down to the First World War. The Armstrong company has been the subject of
two volumes. The first is Kenneth Warren's Armstrongs of Elswick49 – a rather traditional business
history which  focuses  exclusively on  the  internal  dynamics  of  the  firm,  and  especially  on  the
discussions inside the board,  without giving much consideration to the external environment  in
46 P. Ferrari, Verso la Guerra. L'Italia nella Corsa agli Armamenti 1884-1918 (Valdagno, 2003).
47 F. Degli Esposti, Le Armi Proprie. Spesa Pubblica e Sviluppo Industriale nell'Italia Liberale (Milano, 2006).
48 Several firms had already published official histories. These works offer limited critical analysis, but, usually, useful
information. See, for example, J. D. Scott, Vickers. A History (London, 1962), and Sir A. Grant, Steel and Ships. The
History of John Brown's (London, 1950).
49 K. Warren, Armstrongs of Elswick: Growth in Engineering and Armaments to the Merger with Vickers (Basingstoke,
1989).
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which the firm operated. Some important topics, such as the Italian activities of Armstrong, are
covered  in  a  very  limited  and  unsatisfactory  way.  Warren's  volume,  though,  offers  a  detailed
account of the evolution of the firm, and it is the only book which covers the entire life span of the
company.
The  second  book  is  Marshall  Bastable’s  Arms  and  the  State.50 Here  the  author's  main
interests  are  the  social  and  cultural  implications  of  technology.  Consequently  the  predominant
theme is how the technological dilemmas face by the British Navy (e.g. fast lightly-armed cruisers
or slower but heavily protected battleships) were solved, and what impact these choices had on
Armstrong.  Bastable  documents,  consequently,  the  role  that  the  military bureaucracy played in
shaping the decisions of private contractors; but he is not interested in offering a general assessment
of  Armstrong's  activities  and  operations.  Another  relevant book  is  Henrietta  Heald's  recent
biography of Lord Armstrong, published for the two hundredth anniversary of  Lord  Armstrong's
birth. The focus of the book is not on the businesses career of Armstrong, but it does offer several
insights on his entrepreneurial capacities.51
Kenneth Warren has also published a volume on the history of Cammell Laird,  another,
smaller British firm involved in armaments and shipbuilding, adopting the same approach.52 The
history of Beardmore,  a Scottish firm  equally involved in  armaments  production  has  also  been
investigated. Apart from these books, there are a few articles about specific aspects of the activities
of British armaments firms which will  be referred to in the course of the thesis. Finally,  Hugh
Peebles's  Warshipbuilding on the Clyde  needs to be highlighted,53 an investigation of the naval
shipbuilding cluster of firms based in the Clyde area from the mid 19th century to the beginning of
the Second World War. Peebles assesses not just the performance of individual firms, but also the
trends shaping the entire industry.
Italian armaments firms too have been subject to historical scrutiny. Franco Bonelli's book
on Terni  is  still  regarded as  a  prime example  of  business  history research  and is  the  standard
reference work on the history of the firm.54 Ansaldo, the major Italian armaments firm before 1914,
is,  together with Fiat, the most studied firm in Italian history: a nine-volume history detailing its
evolution  from the  mid  19th  century to  the  late  1990s  has  recently been  published.55 Luciano
Segreto and Maria Luogo have written articles respectively on Vickers and Armstrong's investments
50 M.  Bastable,  Arms and the State.  Sir William Armstrong and the remaking of British Naval Power, 1854-1914
(Aldershot, 2004).
51 H. Heald, William Armstrong: Magician of the North (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010)
52 K. Warren, Steel, Ships and Men: Cammell Laird, 1824-1993 (Liverpool, 1998).
53 H. Peebles Warshipbuilding on the Clyde (Edinburgh, 1987).
54 F. Bonelli, Storia di una Grande Impresa in Italia. La Terni dal 1884 al 1962 (Torino, 1975).
55 Storia dell'Ansaldo (Roma-Bari, 1994-2003) 9 volumes. The first three volumes cover the period of time relevant
for this thesis.
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in Italy.56
Finally, a publication which offers some important insights is Keith Krause's Arms and the
State: Pattern of Military Production and Trade.57 In it  Krause develops a theoretical model of
armaments trade based on a three-tier production system. At the top there are countries with the
most advanced armaments industries  which can manufacture the most sophisticated weaponry. In
the  middle,  there  are  countries  whose  demand  for  armaments  is  mainly  satisfied  by  domestic
producers.  These  producers,  however,  rely for  the  most  up  to  date  know-how on  technologies
coming from countries belonging to the first group. The group at the bottom is made up of countries
whose  defence  industries  can  only  manufacture  basic  and  unsophisticated goods,  and  which,
therefore, need to import a large share of their armaments from the first and the second group of
countries.  The  book is chiefly concerned with armaments trade after 1945, but, Krause's model,
notwithstanding being static,  and therefore unable to capture evolutionary processes, it is a useful
heuristic tool to describe the armaments trade even before 1914. 
 
This thesis will contribute to this debate by first and foremost offering a reconstruction of
the development of the Italian and British private armaments sectors before 1914. The business-
oriented works have increased our understanding of the industrial experiences of many armaments
firms but, as this review of the historiography has shown, there is no work which has tried to offer
such a general assessment.  This thesis  will  focus especially on the business side of the rise of
private armaments firms in the two countries. These are other aspects of the rise of the private
armaments  industry  (technological  dynamics,  relationships  with  bureaucracies,  etc.),  but  they
cannot be fully investigated before a better understanding of business practice. This thesis aims to
clarify two fundamental points which still have not been satisfactorily elucidated. The first is why a
private armaments industry developed in both countries, supplanting to a large extent the production
of public establishments in the process. The second is the degree of similarity between the Italian
and the British experiences.
Sources
This thesis makes use of a variety of sources. They can be divided into four categories:
56 M. Luongo ‘Lo Stabilimento Armstrong di Pozzuoli’, Revue d'Histoire de la Banque 34-35 (1987), 128-263, and L.
Segreto, ‘More trouble than profit: Vickers' investments in Italy 1906-39’, Business History 27 (1985), 316-337.
57 K. Krause, Arms and the State: Pattern of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge, 1992).
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business records, government documents, journalistic reports and technical publications. 
Before 1914 armaments firms were among the largest firms in  almost every big European
state. This, together with the fact that many armaments firms which operated before the First World
War are still active, although usually under different brands and often as part of conglomerates,
facilitated the preservation of their archives.58 In Britain, Armstrong's and Vickers's records have
been well preserved and they are fully accessible to scholars. Armstrong's records, held in the Tyne
& Wear Archives in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, have been preserved quite integrally. Vickers's archive is
hosted  by  the  Archives  of  the  University  of  Cambridge  Library.  For  the  years  before  1914
documentation is more fragmented than for Armstrong, but the surviving material is large enough to
allow a reconstruction of the firm's activities before the Great War. The records of other armaments
firms – John Brown, Cammell Laird, Beardmore, etc. – are all less rich and in some cases missing.
In Italy the  level of  preservation of the records of the major armaments companies varies
considerably. Ansaldo's records have been carefully preserved by the Ansaldo Foundation,  a  body
set up by the company with the aim to safeguard them for  the  use  of  scholars.  The Ansaldo
Foundation has decided to maintain the  documents  in  the order in which they  were originally
organised by the Perrone family, the major shareholders of Ansaldo in the period 1903-1921. As a
result, browsing through the papers is not always an easy task, given that the Perrone usually put in
the same box documents about different topics (also not connected with Ansaldo) and without any
precise chronology. The Ansaldo Foundation, however, has created a detailed multi volume paper
catalogue which is very helpful, although it is not easy to navigate. Terni's records are preserved in
the Archivio di Stato of Terni. They suffer from two problems: the first is that many records have
simply  disappeared, the second that the Archivio di Stato has not managed to produce a decent
paper catalogue of the surviving ones. These facts hugely complicate research. The records of some
other firms, such as Orlando and Odero shipbuilding firms, have been preserved only in minimal
amount.  In the case of some other companies,  such as Armstrong's Italian branch,  the relevant
records are simply missing (apart from a commemorative volume published by the firm in 1911).59
Government records are the second category of documents which have been used. British
military budgets – the annual  naval  and army estimates  – are  rich sources  of  information.  For
instance,  they usually break down the cost  of  military hardware  among its  major  components.
Documents produced from the War Office and the Admiralty have been also used.  In addition,
reports produced by select committees or parliamentary commissions which investigated specific
58 For example, the armaments business of Vickers, which merged with Armstrong in the late 1920s, now belongs to
BAE; the military assets of Ansaldo, Terni and Vickers-Terni are now part of Finmeccanica.
59 Lo Stabilimento Armstrong di Pozzuoli dal 1886 al 1911 (Bergamo, 1911).
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aspects of the armaments business or of the British government's procurement policies have been
consulted. The fact that many British official documents have been digitalised is a considerable
advantage.
By comparison the equivalent Italian records are less  rich  and  far  less  accessible.  The
relationships which existed between the executive, the military administration and the parliament in
Italy were different from those in Britain. The Italian parliament did not have the right to be fully
informed on the military and strategic decisions taken by the king, the government and the armed
forces. The Savoy kings strongly resisted the idea that the armed forces might be treated as any
other  piece  of  the  state  organisation.  Indeed,  a  special  bond existed  between the  king  and the
military, which made the armed forces the final guarantor of the stability and unity of the country. It
is noticeable that all but a  few ministers of the army and of the navy in office between 1861 and
1914 were generals or admirals. The Italian parliament was required to approve the yearly military
budget, but little information was disclosed in the process. The only occasions on which MPs and
the country gained a better understanding of the organisation of the procurement system for the
armed forces, was when a parliamentary inquiry on naval expenditures (1903-05) – whose records
are extensively used here – and a parliamentary inquiry on the army (1907-1908) were created. The
second problem is that many documents produced by the Italian military ministries have not been
sent to the Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rome. At the same time documents which have been
sent there have only partially been reorganised. The catalogues listing these records do not provide
much help, because they generally report only the title of the first document inside each box. Given
that there are hundreds of boxes, each containing up to tens of files, this is a significant stumbling
block.60 Luckily, the documents produced by the general direction for armaments of the ministry of
the navy in the 1880s, a crucial period for the development of the Italian armaments industry, have
been  recently  reorganised  and  are  therefore  much  easier  to  use.  Parliamentary  documents  are
starting to be digitalised. However, access is relatively easy to gain, and the level of preservation is
very good.
The third category of sources is made up of journal and newspapers articles. The digitalised
archive of  The Times  is very useful. Many articles, often very detailed, were published on new
warships, improvements in artillery, etc. Similarly, the archives of other publications such as  The
Financial Times and The Economist have been used. By contrast, in Italy, before 1914, there was no
newspaper which enjoyed national circulation. Moreover, only  La Stampa, a newspaper based in
Turin, has digitalised its pre-1914 archive. The Corriere della Sera's archive, for example, is still
60 On the  difficulty of  using these  records  see  F.  Degli  Esposti,  ‘Stabilimenti  Industriali  o  Falansteri?  La  Lunga
Parabola degli Arsenali (1800-1930’, N. Labanca and P. P. Poggio (eds.), Storie di Armi (Milano, 2009), 51-56.
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not accessible.
Trade  journals  are  the  fourth  category  of  sources.  In  Britain  the  monthly  Arms  and
Explosives covered the armaments industry, although it was especially focused on small arms and
sporting guns. In Italy the relevant publication is the Rivista Marittima, the official journal of the
Italian navy.
Finally, technical details and data on warships come from the most authoritative works on
vessels launched before 1914: Oskar Parkes's book on British battleships, Conway's All the World
Fighting  Ships,  Jane's  Fighting  Ships,  and  Giorgio  Giorgerini  and Augusto  Nani's  volumes  on
Italian vessels.61 To avoid multiple references, data sources are reported in footnote only when they
do not come from one of these volumes.
Chapter synopses
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter I explores the evolution of the British armaments
industry from the late 1850s to 1880. The Crimean War  and the introduction of ironclad vessels
generated a new interest for the design of more effective artillery. William Armstrong, a Newcastle
businessman, gained government approval for an innovative prototype he devised. Production of the
new guns was carried out both in the Royal Gun Factories and at a private plant specifically created
in Elswick. When Armstrong's contract with the government was prematurely terminated, Elswick
found itself in the position of having to look for new markets. For the next two decades government
arsenals  and yards supplied the British armed forces  with most  of  its  armaments,  buying from
private suppliers only armour plates. Armstrong, which was the firm mostly involved in armaments
making, relied quite exclusively on foreign markets. Its high-quality production was sought after by
countries which were in no position to manufacture sophisticated artillery at home.
Chapter II investigates the Italian armaments industry during the same period. Immediately
after political unification, Italy wanted to rapidly modernise its armed forces. Government arsenals
and domestic firms, however, were in no position to produce the most complex goods such as large
guns and armour plates. Crucial military hardware and also entire vessels were therefore purchased
61 O. Parkes,  British Battleships from “Warrior” to “Vanguard”. A History of Design, Construction and Armaments
(London,  1957);  Conway's  All  the  World  Fighting  Ships,  1860-1905  (London,  1976);  Conway's  All  the  World
Fighting Ships, 1906-1921 (London, 1985); F. T. Jane,  Jane's Fighting Ships of World War I  (London, 1990); G.
Giorgerini, G. and A. Nani,  Le Navi di  Linea Italiane. 1861-61 (Roma, 1962); id.,  Gli Incrociatori  Italiani 1861-
1964 (Roma, 1964); id., Almanacco Storico delle Navi Militari Italiane (1861-1995) (Roma, 1996).
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abroad. It was only in the course of the 1870s that a small group of Italian firms was able to secure a
more stable position as suppliers of components to the navy, although the country still relied heavily
on imports for all key components.
Chapter III deals with the development of the British armaments industry in the period from
the early 1880s to 1897.  These years saw the private sector gaining a  larger role in the supply of
armaments to the British  government. This change was caused by new  political and economic
circumstances. Naval scares in 1884 and 1888 led to a rapid expansion of the British naval budget.
The demand for new vessels could be satisfied only thanks to contracts awarded to private firms. At
the same time, the impact of the negative business cycle  led several firms,  chiefly the Vickers
Company, to enter the armaments business.
Chapter  IV  analyses the Italian armaments industry in the period 1800-1900. During the
1880s the Italian naval budget grew remarkably, resulting in large orders for national producers as
well as for foreign suppliers. A group of entrepreneurs created the Terni company, with the financial
backing of the navy, in order to start domestic production of armour plates. In contrast, the 1890s
saw stagnating naval  budgets. This fact had  a  negative  impact on Italian armaments  companies
which,  however,  at  the end of the century,  was able  to enter  the international  armaments trade
selling cruisers to Argentina, Spain and Japan.
Chapter  V  details the creation of the Armstrong's  Italian branch in  Pozzuoli.  Armstrong
decided to create it to avoid losing the important Italian market: the Italian navy had made clear its
desire that the firm started its production in Italy. Pozzuoli's results remained satisfactory for years,
but this venture was probably the largest foreign direct investment made by any British armaments
firms before 1914, and thus it deserves to be studied.
Chapter VI presents the evolution of the British armaments industry in the period 1897-
1914. While many scholars saw in the introduction of dreadnought battleships in 1906 a turning
point, the British private armaments industry did not change its internal organisation because of
that. It was the wave of mergers and acquisitions which occurred in the late 1890s which had a
lasting impact on the industry.
Chapter  VII deals with the Italian armaments industry in the period 1900-1914. In these
years, Italian armaments firms pursued strategies of vertical integration. To start some productions,
however, external help and know-how was required. Terni created a joint-venture with Vickers for
the production of guns, while Ansaldo entered into a temporary alliance with Armstrong.  In the
early 1910s,  Italian armaments  firms  eventually acquired the capacity to produce all  the major
components of warships: hulls, armour plates and guns.
The Conclusion summarizes the main findings of the work and considers their  broader
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implications.  The combination  between the  rapid  evolution  of  military technology  and specific
historical events resulted in the growth of large private armaments companies in both countries. At
the same time, however, the conclusion highlights how the Italian and British experiences were
different  in  several  important  aspects,  that is  the relationship between governments and private
companies, the different technological capacities, and the amount of competition between private
armaments firms.
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Chapter I
The Beginning of the British Armaments Industry,
c. 1850s–1880
This chapter deals with the development of the British armaments industry from the 1850s to
the early 1880s. By the mid-19th century, ordnance production in Britain was a virtual monopoly in
the hands of the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich. The mixed performance of British guns during
the  Crimean  War,  and,  subsequently,  the  introduction  of  the  first  ironclad  vessels generated  a
demand for better artillery. William Armstrong prevailed among the many engineers and inventors
who submitted their designs to the War Office, and his revolutionary gun was temporarily adopted
by the British armed forces.  In  the early 1860s,  however,  after  various disagreements  with the
government, Armstrong left public service and set up his own ordnance firm in Elswick, Newcastle.
The foundation of Armstrong's  company signalled the beginning of a new phase in the history of
British armaments industry,  a phase characterised by the growing role of private companies. It is
therefore necessary to analyse in depth the circumstances surrounding Armstrong's decision to enter
the armament business. 
 From the early 1860s to the beginning of the 1880s navies around the world completed their
transition from wooden vessels to ironclads. There was a lack of uniformity in design, however, and
warships of  various  sizes  and  shapes  were  built.  Technology  evolved  rapidly,  but  without  a
generally  agreement  over the  direction  in  which naval design  should  move.  What  was  clear,
however,  was that thicker armour plates were needed to  withstand the shots of guns  which were
becoming larger and more powerful. Improvement in artillery, in turn, stimulated improvements in
ship's protection.
In  the two decades  covered here, the British naval budget remained at a constant  level, at
little more than £10 million a year: the absence of any significant long-term external threat limited
the pressure for additional spending. The largest share of the part of the defence budget devoted to
armaments procurement was spent to patronise the government establishments: Woolwich supplied
the  artillery,  and the Navy-owned arsenals built  the majority of warships  (but the engines  were
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bought from private firms, as it  had happened since the introduction of steam). At the same time,
however, a small number of private firms involved in armaments production  started to emerge.
These firms can be divided into two groups:  on the one side there was Armstrong which sold
artillery predominantly to foreign governments;  on the other  side,  two Sheffield-based iron firms,
Cammell and John Brown, formed a duopoly which supplied armour plates for the Royal Navy as
well as to foreign governments.
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section explores the motives and circumstances
behind Armstrong's decision to move into gun manufacturing.  The  second considers  the  British
naval budget and the evolution of naval technology in the years 1860-1880. The third deals with the
creation of the Armstrong Company and its growth from being a firm with no domestic market in
the early 1860s,  to  be  the leading private  maker  of naval  armaments in  the world.  The  fourth
considers the evolution of the Sheffield iron companies making armour plates. 
1.1 The foundation of Armstrong and the private armaments industry (1854-1863).
By 1850,  artillery  production  in  Britain  was  mostly  undertaken  at  the  Royal  Ordnance
Factory at  Woolwich, which was supervised by the Board of Ordnance,  a government department
independent from both the War Office and the Admiralty – although it was mainly manned by Army
officers – which was in charge of supplying guns to the Royal Navy and the Army. 
After  1815,  cast  iron  smoothbore  muzzle-loading guns  remained the  standard  pieces  of
ordnance  of  the  British  armed  forces,  as  they  had  been  for  centuries.  This  fact  might appear
surprising in light of the rapid technological innovation which, in the same period, characterised so
many  fields,  such  as  rail  engineering,  iron  metallurgy  and  steam propulsion.  Several  reasons,
however, explain this stasis. In the period from 1815 to the Crimean War British armed forces were
not tested in any serious conflict. The Army was chiefly occupied in colonial “small wars”, and the
Navy enjoyed  the  superiority  which  she  had  gained at  Trafalgar  –  a  superiority  not  based on
technology, but on better organisational capabilities.1 In these decades the Royal Navy fought just
one significant naval engagement, the battle of Navarino in 1827, and that was against the inferior
Turkish fleet.2
1 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), 49.
2 C. M. Woodhouse, The Battle of Navarino (London, 1965), 70. 
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In addition,  during this period military hierarchies were conspicuously conservative.  The
Army was dominated by the Duke of Wellington who maintained virtually unchanged the Army's
organisation  and  structures  of the  time  of  Waterloo.  The  Royal  Navy  was  more  keen  on
investigating novelties, but her interest was chiefly focused on the use of steam power, rather than
in artillery. The Royal Navy was quite happy with larger and refined versions of old smoothbore
guns. British governments were quite happy with their defence establishment, military preparedness
not ranking among the most pressing issues of the day. Thus, during the period from the end of the
Napoleonic Wars to the Crimean War, there were neither external nor internal pressures toward
radical technical innovation.
This is illustrated by the adoption of the practice of “reaming-out” old guns,  that is  the
process of reboring old smoothbore guns to enlarge their barrels up to a larger calibre.  This made
the guns more powerful because they could fire larger cannon balls. Old pieces of ordnance could
then be retained in service, reducing the need to cast new guns and, consequently, limiting defence
expenditure.3 The only innovation which occurred in  these years was the adoption of explosive
shells. Shot by mortars, shells had been in use for centuries in siege warfare. Mortars' bell-shaped
trajectory, however, made them totally unsuitable for naval fighting. At the beginning of the 1820s
the French general  Henri-Joseph Paixhans designed an explosive shells  which could be shot from
guns, notwithstanding their flat trajectory.4
The catalyst of change was the Crimean War. In 1853 Britain, France and Piedmont allied to
support  the Ottoman Empire against  Russia.  Britain wanted to  check Russia's  ambitions in  the
Balkans and  to prevent its access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish straits.5 The Crimean
War  highlighted the British military's  many problems.6 The logistics was especially poor:  80% of
British casualties died from sickness or disease.7 What is relevant  here is the performance of the
British  artillery.  The  correspondent  of  the  Times vividly  described  how,  during  the  battle  of
Inkerman (5 November 1854), the British forces avoided being routed by the Russians thanks to the
intervention of two 18 pound guns. However, because of their massive weight, it took three hours
for one hundred and fifty men to drag the guns in position.8 After the Crimean War the Board of
Ordnance was merged with the War Office and a Naval Ordnance Department was created inside
3 H. Douglas, A Treaties on Naval Gunnery (London, 1853), 181-184.
4 J. Boudriot, Vaisseaux et Frégates sous la Restauration et la Monarchie de Juillet (Vinçennes, 1987), 65.
5 A. J. P. Taylor The Struggle of Mastery in Europe (Oxford, 1954), 60-82.
6 T. Royle, Crimea: the Great Crimean War (New York, 2000), 502-504; W. Baumgart, The Crimean War, 1853-1856 
(London, 1999), 78-81.
7 O. Figes, Crimea. The Last Crusade (London, 2010), 467.
8 The Times 7 November 1854, 6; 4 December 1854, 7-8.
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the  War  Office  to  take  care  of  the  artillery  need  of  the  Royal  Navy.  Thus  the  Army became
responsible for the supply of guns for the Navy until, in 1891, a bureaucratic reorganisation led to
the creation of an autonomous Ordnance Department inside the Admiralty.
It was the journalistic reports coming from Crimea which led William Armstrong, a brilliant
solicitor-turned-engineer,  to design of a better kind of ordnance.9 William Armstrong was born in
Newcastle in 1810. His father was a rich merchant involved in the grain trade and in the political
life  of  the  community.  Armstrong  was  trained  in  the  law in  London,  but  he  was  much  more
interested in engineering.10 He improved his technical skills  by spending hours in the mechanical
shop owned by his father-in-law.
Armstrong's  first  entrepreneurial  venture  started in  1847  when,  together  with  several
partners, he established the W. G. Armstrong & Company to manufacture cranes. He had recently
patented a system to lift weights using hydraulic force that exploited a device he had invented, the
“accumulator”,  which  multiplies  the  hydraulic  power.  The  enterprise  was a  very  successful:
Armstrong's cranes were soon sold to mining companies, railways, ports and yards, and were also
exported.11 This technology could be used in many fields, and it was applied to bascule bridges and
movable platforms (and, later on, gun mountings).
Two important features of Armstrong's first industrial venture need to be highlighted because
they subsequently had an impact on his artillery business. First, the role of export markets. Cranes
and  guns  are  obviously different  products.  Guns  are  purchased  mainly  by governments,  while
cranes have a much larger market. Both cranes and artillery, however, share a key feature: they are
goods whose technology and reliability are  more important than their  initial price.  Armstrong's
cranes were a technologically advanced product  and customers were happy to pay handsomely,
given their superior performance. Thus, it is not surprising that part of production was exported:
European  countries  were  entering  a  period  of  rapid  growth  and  their  industrial  plants  and
infrastructures  were  being  modernised  and  upgraded.  This  fact  meant  that  Armstrong  and  the
company’s management (the majority of whose members – people like George Cruddas and George
Hutchison  –  later  joined Armstrong in the armament business),  came into contact  with foreign
customers. This experience proved useful when in 1863, as explained below, William Armstrong
9 S. Rendel, The Personal Papers of Lord Rendel (London, 1931), 269.
10 H. Heald, William Armstrong, Magician of the North (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010), 25.
11 The Venice Arsenal acquired a crane which is one of the few exemplars still surviving nowadays, see C. Menichelli,
A.  Lionello and  A.  Bovolenta,  ‘La  Gru  idraulica  Armstrong dell’Arsenale di  Venezia’, paper published on the
website of the office for the preservations of artistic monuments in Venice
http://www.soprintendenza.venezia.beniculturali.it/soprive/restauri/Cantieri/la-gru-idraulica-armstrong-
dell2019arsenale-di-venezia (accessed 3 August 2011).
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would find himself with a fully equipped gun factory but without a domestic market.
Second,  the  hydraulic  technology  itself  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  initial  success  of
Armstrong's armaments business. Starting from the 1870s, naval artillery underwent a period of
radical redesign: larger guns were introduced and the gunners'  time-honoured task of physically
moving and pointing became impossible to perform. Armstrong's past  experience proved decisive
because his firm developed highly effective gun mountings based on hydraulic technology as those
of the  cranes.  Whereas  manufacturing  gun barrels  was  relatively  straightforward,  making  gun
mountings  was  much  more  complex  and Armstrong  retained  for  decades  a  competitive  edge
precisely because of its ability to produce superior mountings.
In  1854  Armstrong  was  persuaded to  apply  his  engineering  skills  to  the  challenge  of
designing a better kind of artillery by his friend James Rendel, an expert in hydraulic engineering.12
Armstrong noted that “it was a scandal that the military engineers are some thirty or forty years
behind the civil engineers”.13 Armstrong and Rendel had worked together for the enlargement of the
port of Grimsby, Armstrong  devising the hydraulic system used to  power the lock gates and the
cranes of the port.14 The connection between the Armstrong and Rendel families was strong and
three of Rendel's sons would later join the management of Armstrong's armaments company and
one of them, Stuart Rendel, eventually became, after the death of Armstrong, one of the largest
shareholders of the firm.
Armstrong  was  not,  however,  the  only  engineer  who  tried  to  design  a  better  piece  of
artillery: the Crimean War generated a wave of interest, and the War Office received hundreds of
proposals by inventors who claimed to have devised revolutionary new ordnance.15 The War Office,
recognising the limits of the current British artillery, offered grants to support further studies of the
most promising designs. Armstrong submitted his own “Armstrong gun”, which had many features
which made it revolutionary. First, it was breech-loading. This was not in itself an innovation since
the first pieces of artillery used in Europe were breech-loading. For centuries, however, muzzle-
loaders were preferred because it was impossible to built a breech mechanism strong enough to
withstand ignition. Innovations  in metallurgy and engineering allowed a return to breech-loading.
Armstrong designed a new mechanism to seal the breach: a vertical sliding block, called “vent-
12 M. R. Lane, ‘Rendel, James Meadow’, ODNB.
13 Rendel, Papers, 269-70
14 The 61 meter tall Grimsby dock tower which hosted the hydraulic reserve needed to generate the pressures still
exists today.
15 M. J. Bastable,  Arms and the state. Sir William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 1854-1914
(Aldershot, 2004), 26
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piece”, to which a conical plug was attached to seal the breech. The vent-piece was kept in place by
a screw which needed to be tightened before firing.16
The second key feature was the rifled barrel. As a consequence of rifling cannonballs had to
be replaced by elongated projectiles able to “travel” along the grooves inside the barrel. A rifled
barrel  made the gun more precise because rifling stabilized  the projectile,  giving it a gyroscopic
spin, and improving its aerodynamics and accuracy. In addition, rifling also gave the gun a longer
range  because  the  elongated  projectile  faced  less  air  resistance.  Rifling  was  not  in  itself  an
innovation: rifled barrels had been used in portable firearms for more than a century; but rifling had
proved to be difficult to introduce in artillery.  Because of its brittleness,  cast iron was difficult to
rifle,  often  breaking in  the  process.  Rifling,  however,  offered  so  many advantages,  that  many
prototypes of rifled guns were developed from the 1820s onwards, but none proved good enough to
be adopted.17 Armstrong solved the problem, rifling a steel tube which formed the inner part of the
barrel.
Third, the gun was manufactured using a combination of steel and wrought iron to achieve a
satisfactory mix of resistance and  toughness. The internal rifled barrel was made in steel. Then a
second tube of a smaller diameter made of wrought iron was heated to make it expand and it was
forced  around  the  steel  barrel.  Cooling  down,  it  shrank  around  the  internal  tube  exercising a
pressure towards the core of the gun which compensated for the pressure generated by the explosion
caused by firing the gun. Additional wrought-iron tubes were shrunk, especially around the breech,
where the force of the explosion was stronger (in this period gunpowder was still in use which burnt
instantly, thus the strength of the explosion was not uniform along the entire length of the barrel, but
was  stronger  at the  breech  and  weaker  at  the  muzzle),  to  reinforce  the  gun.  Thus  guns  built
according to this “Armstrong construction system” had a peculiar telescopic shape caused by the
fact that additional layers of iron were used to reinforce the breech.
Fourth, Armstrong's design was “universal”, in the sense that the basic idea behind it could
be replicated for guns of every sizes. Armstrong initially built a small 3 pounder gun but the same
principles allowed for the design and manufacture of artillery of much larger calibre, as in fact
occurred.
Fifth, Armstrong did not  just  offer the War Office a  project, but submitted a complete and
16 Armstrong himself described his gun in a document prepared for the War Office: N.A., W.O. 33/11 Report on the
Construction of Wrought Iron Field Guns, 14 July 1855.
17 F. Taylor,  Rifled Field Pieces. A Short  Note of  What is  Known of the New Field Artillery of Europe (Washington,
1862), 7-32.
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perfectly  functioning  prototype.  This  made  a  positive  impression:  instead  of  having  to  devote
months to refining, implementing and, afterwards, improving a project which existed only on paper,
the War Office  could examine  the  finished article. This was another  advantage that  Armstrong
gained from his previous business career: he had unlimited access to a mechanical plant and could
rely on the technical skills of his workers and on his own personal fortune to prepare and refine his
gun.
The Armstrong gun was a  remarkable technological  feat,  and an impressive example of
entrepreneurial  ingenuity.  Armstrong's  breakthrough was  to  combine  novelties  which  he  had
devised, with innovations which other people had proposed, in order to design a new product. The
new gun was easy to handle, because it was lighter than a comparable bronze one, more precise and
with a longer range than a cast iron smoothbores, and its elongated shells had a higher penetration
power than cannonballs. The gun's performance in trial was remarkable in terms of accuracy, power
and range – so much so that Armstrong's was soon asked to submit designs for several larger guns.18
Among the projects submitted to the War Office, there was one other which attracted good
reviews: Joseph Whitworth’s. Whitworth was already famous for his work on precision machine
tools.19 It is no coincidence that the two best designs came from established entrepreneurs had the
experience and the resources to pursue  their  projects.  Whitworth's  project had some features in
common with Armstrong's, but  was quite different  in other respects.  Whitworth  too proposed a
breech-loading gun with a rifled barrel, but in his design the rifling had a hexagonal shape. Another
major  difference  was  that  Whitworth's  gun  was  made  using  exclusively cast  iron.20 The  two
inventors  soon  developed  a  fierce  rivalry  and  undertook a  series  of  trials  which  were  widely
reported in the press to try to demonstrate the superiority of their own gun.21 Eventually, in 1858,
Armstrong's design was approved by the War Office. The Army adopted Armstrong’s guns with a
variety of calibres as its field artillery, while the Navy adopted an 110 pound gun to replace the old
smoothbore 68 pounders.
18 Confidential Report W.O. 33/9.
19 N. Atkinson, Sir Joseph Whitworth: ‘The World's Best Mechanician’ (Gloucester, 1996) is a general biography. A. E.
Musson, ‘Joseph Whitworth and the Growth of Mass-production Engineering’ Business History 17 (1975), 109–49,
is a more business-oriented assessment of Whitworth's activities.
20 All other cast iron guns were rejected, Report of Ordnance Select Committee on Competitive Rifled Cast-iron Guns,
HCPP (1863).
21 M. J.  Bastable,  ‘From Breechloaders  to  Monster  Guns:  Sir  William Armstrong  and  the  Invention  of  Modern
Artillery, 1854-1880’, Technology and Culture 33 (1992), 213-247.
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Figure  1  .1  : Armstrong's 20 pounder gun.
Source: A. L Holley, A Treatise on Ordnance and Armor (New York, 1865), 21.
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A new potential military threat gave urgency to the rearmament process. Relations between
Britain and France soured after the Crimean War. In 1858 the French Navy launched La Gloire, the
first ocean-going ironclad vessel to enter into service: the aim was that of nullifying overnight the
Royal Navy's quantitative superiority in vessels  by gaining a qualitative superiority.  La Gloire's
wooden hull was covered by iron plates of  4.5 inches,  a  protection thick enough to withstand the
shots of the 68 pounder smoothbore gun, the largest and more powerful piece of ordnance the Royal
Navy had then at its disposal.22 Overnight, Britain seemed in danger of losing its naval superiority.
With the benefit of  hindsight, the French threat was less serious than it appeared: France did not
have the industrial resources to build a fleet of ironclads faster than Britain. Still, the introduction of
ironclads revolutionised naval warfare by suddently making wooden vessels obsolete.
The British response came in the shape of HMS Warrior which entered into service in 1861,
just one year after La Gloire had been commissioned. HMS Warrior was even more revolutionary
than La Gloire, because it was not just protected by metal plates, but its hull was also made of iron.
It outclassed its French counterpart in speed, displacement, armour and gunnery.23 To decide with
what guns to  arm the  Warrior, in September 1858 the War Office set up a Special Committee on
Rifled Ordnance, whose secretary was artillery captain Andrew Noble. Two years later he left the
Army to join  Armstrong's  firm.  The Special  Committee compared once  again Armstrong's and
Whitworth's guns. Armstrong's prevailed for a second time: HMS Warrior was to carry a mix of old
68-pound guns and 10 new rifled 110-pound Armstrong guns.
In order to re-equip both the  Army and the  Navy swiftly  with the new rifled artillery, the
government followed its traditional pattern of procurement in moments of crisis: it enlisted the help
of the private sector to maximize production. Armstrong's partners in the Elswick Engine Works –
George Cruddas, Richard Lambert and George Rendel –  had already  set up a  different firm,  the
Elswick Ordnance  Company (EOC)  to  undertake  the  manufacture  of  guns.  Armstrong  and the
government arrived at a compromise: Armstrong would donate the patent covering the gun's design
to the country, hence renouncing the right to exploit it commercially.24 In exchange, the government
guaranteed the money spent on establishing the Elswick Ordnance Company for up to £50,000,25
and signed a ten-year contract for the supply of guns from it. Orders for the guns were split between
Woolwich and Elswick.  In addition, Armstrong was knighted  and  – a more  material reward  –  he
22 J. P. Baxter, The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge, 1933), 123-126.
23 W. Brownlee,  Warrior:  the  First  Modern  Battleship  (Cambridge,  1985) offers  a  detailed description of  it.  The
Maritime Trust saved the vessel from being scrapped, and now HMS Warrior is a museum ship in Portsmouth.
24 The text of this document is in Report of the Committee on Military Organization, HCPP (1862), 663.
25 Id., 664.
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was nominated Engineer for Rifled Ordnance – later Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory – a
newly created senior managerial position at Woolwich, with an annual salary of £2,000.26 Figure 1.2
below shows the percentage of orders divided according to the place of manufacture for a selection
of guns representing more than 90% of the entire production in the years 1858-1863.
Figure  1  .2  : orders for guns received by Elswick and Woolwich, for different calibres (1858-1863).
Ordnance Elswick  Woolwich Total number
300-pound gun 66% 33% 12
110-pound gun 24% 76% 1021
40-pound gun 70% 30% 848
20-pound gun - 100% 319
12-pound gun 10% 90% 691
9-pound gun - 100% 194
6-pound gun - 100% 94
Source: Return of the Numbers of Armstrong's Guns Supplied to the Government from Elswick and
Woolwich, HCPP (1863), 2-3.
Woolwich built all the small calibre guns – the cheapest and easiest to manufacture – and a
prominent share for the 110-pound breech-loading guns, the new Royal Navy standard gun. Elswick
specialised in the medium calibre guns (the 40 pounder) and in the very large ones, such as the
experimental  300 pounder.  Table  1.2,  however,  does not tell  the  whole story.  Elswick supplied
almost all the trial guns of various calibres which were tested. Each of these pieces was, obviously,
more costly than a standard piece of. For instance, a single prototype for a very large 600 muzzle-
loading  gun  cost  £4,000.  It  seems  possible  to  detect  a  pattern:  Elswick  devoted  itself  to  the
development and refining of guns, and to the  manufacture of the  most complex  ones, Woolwich
manufactured the pieces that had already been tested. The second field where Elswick was pre-
eminent was in the production of shots, shells and fuses. Up to May 1863 the EOC had delivered
material  valued  at £414,194,  whereas  Woolwich's  output  was  equal  to  £142,930.  In  general,
economy of experience and more refined production processes contributed to a reduction of the
26 Id., 662.
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costs, for instance, the price for the 110-pound guns halved from around £1,200 to near £600 in few
years. To summarize, during the period 1858-1865 Woolwich's various departments produced about
£1,785,000 worth of material. The total payments received by Elswick was £1,113,417. Figure 1.3
shows payments according to the years they were received.
Figure  1  .3  : Payments received by Elswick in the period 1858-1865.
Year Amount (£) % of total
1858-59 7,868 0.71%
1859-60 31,551 2.83%
1860-61 398,327 35.78%
1861-62 397,785 35.73%
1862-63 188,782 16.96%
1863-64 11,097 1.00%
1864-65 78,007 7.00%
Total 1,113,417 100.00%
Source: Report from the Select Committee on Ordnance, HCPP (1863), 527, and Return of Expenses
Incurred on all Class of Armstrong's Gun, HCPP (1865), 2.
Figure  1.3 shows how the payments Elswick received peaked during a  two-year period.
Because the company was paid after the guns were delivered and successfully tested, payments
tracked production, with only a limited temporal shift. The bulk of the production – 86% of the total
–  occurred in the period from 1860 to 1862.  From 1859-60 to 1860-61  production increased  by
more than ten times. This put huge pressure on Elswick which had to rapidly increase its facilities,
buy new machineries and recruit more workers.
In 1862 the government terminated the contract with Elswick and, consequently, payments
plummeted. From 1863 onwards, Elswick was delivering only guns and other materials which had
been ordered before 1863. Why did the British government, so eager to modernise its artillery, end
the  contract  with  Elswick  in  advance?  The  first  reason was  that  British  relations with  France
improved after the signature in 1860 of the Cobden-Chevalier agreement. This did not mean the end
of the  re-equipping of the armed forces,  but reduced the  scope for additional  orders.  A second
reason was that Armstrong and his guns started to attract a good deal of criticism. Critics focused on
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two separate points: the performance of the new guns, and the agreement signed by the government
with Elswick. The ability of Armstrong guns' breech-loading mechanisms to withstand explosions
was questioned. The vent-pieces employed in the smaller guns worked perfectly, but, in the more
powerful 110 pounders, the same mechanism, after several detonations, was  prone to break and,
sometimes,  to  blow out.  Armstrong responded with a  letter  published by  The Times  on the 27
November 1861, but rumours persisted. It was undeniable,  however, that handling breech-loading
guns required more attention and care than muzzle-loading. Moreover, the 110 pounder was not
able to penetrate the 4.5 inches of  the  protective plates of  La Gloire. This criticism  was unfair,
though, given that the 110 pounder had been developed before the French ironclad had entered in
service.
Another line of criticism was over the contract signed with the Elswick Ordnance Works.
Critics pointed to the fact that Woolwich could manufacture guns more cheaply than Elswick and
thus the government was wasting money by awarding a contract to the private company. The fact
that Armstrong was a government employee while, at the same time, a group of his friends was
making  money  thanks  to  his  invention,  made  his  position  somewhat  suspicious.  Moreover,
Armstrong's position was  likely resented by  many  inside Woolwich, who disliked the fact that a
civilian was holding such a prominent position. This can be inferred from the fact that documents
which seemed to point to Elswick's excessive prices were leaked from the War Office.27 A careful
examination of the numbers found in these documents, however, points to a different conclusion or,
at least, significantly reduces the extent of the alleged overpricing. Figure 1.4 shows data about the
cost structure of the 110 pounder guns made in Elswick and Woolwich.
A simple numerical comparison would be misleading, because it is not possible to ascertain
the accounting practices followed by the two different plants. Woolwich's habit of not considering
depreciation and capital disbursements among its costs gave a misleading impression of its costs.
Moreover, price comparison does not account for any qualitative difference,  and evidence  about
that is contradictory. Like for like comparison is therefore only possible for the first two categories
of  costs.  Labour  and  materials  cost  at  Woolwich  were  7.8  % higher  that  in  Newcastle.  This
difference, however, is easily explained by the fact that the salary was higher in London than in the
North East. Both Elswick and Woolwich had to purchase steel on the market, hence it is unlikely
that they paid very different prices for it.  Also if  data  are taken  at face value, Armstrong's profit
would be equal to 7.6% of the contract price, not an especially large margin. 
27 See for instance data from Report from the Select Committee on Ordnance, HCPP (1862), 151.
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Figure  1  .4  : Cost data for 110 pounder gun made in Elswick and Woolwich (in current pound).
Costs Elswick Woolwich
Labour and materials 268 289
Contingencies  of  proofs  and
other charges 134 136
Depreciation (10% of the value
of machineries) 37 -
Interests  on  capital  employed
per gun 23 -
Total costs 462 425
Contract price 500 -
Profit 38 -
Source: Report from the Select Committee on Ordnance, HCPP (1862), 152
The decisive blow which weakened Armstrong's position, however, was technological. In
1862 major William Palliser patented a system to transform old muzzle-loading smoothbore guns
into muzzle-loading rifled guns.28 Palliser's system was based on the same principle as Armstrong's
construction  method: a wrought iron rifled barrel was inserted into the old cast iron smoothbore
guns, which had been heated to expand. The result was that the large stock of smoothbore guns
could now be transformed into more effective rifled guns and return to service, saving the War
Office  a  good  deal  of  money.  Eventually,  in  1868,  citing  high  maintenance  costs  and  uneven
performance, the War Office retired all breech-loading guns used by the Royal Navy and the Army,
issuing only muzzle-loading rifled guns.29 Such a decision resulted in plenty of work for Woolwich:
the demand for war stores during the Crimean War had resulted in a much enlarged Royal Arsenal,
and the government was pleased to find a way to keep the large investments made during the 1850s
productive.30
The  contract  with  Elswick  was  thus  cancelled  and  in  January  1863  the  government
liquidated Elswick with £85,000 as compensation for the premature termination of the agreement.31
Armstrong's position at Woolwich become then untenable and on 5 February 1863 he resigned from
28 E. M. Loyd rev. G. Hudson, ‘Palliser, Sir William’, ODNB.
29 E. M. Spiers, The Late Victoria Army, 1868-1902 (Manchester, 1992), 241.
30 O. F. G. Hogg, The Royal Arsenal (London, 1963), 771-786.
31 Report from the Select Committee on Ordnance, HCPP (1863), 599.
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his  position.32 Later  the  same year,  the  Elswick Ordnance  Company merged with  the  Elswick
Engine Works to create the Sir W. G. Armstrong Company. The new company faced a difficult
moment. The artillery business had lost the only customer it had ever had and there was no prospect
that  the British Government  would reverse its  decision in the near  future.  The only chance of
survival for the artillery business was to find new customers abroad.
Despite  its  difficulties,  Elswick was  well  equipped  to  enter  successfully into  foreign
markets. First, it was in  a position to offer a technologically advanced product which, moreover,
had already been tested in  war and whose performance reports  were,  in  the majority of cases,
enthusiastic. Second, the fact that Armstrong's guns had been deployed by the Royal Navy was a
very good form of  advertisement:  what  the most  powerful  Navy in the world used  was worth
considering. Third, competition was very limited. In Britain only Whitworth could manufacture
guns of comparable quality; but it could not boast a plant as large and well equipped as Elswick
which had  now manufactured guns for more than six years. Abroad only Krupp was a potential
competitor,  but  the  German  company  had  limited  experience  in  making  naval  guns.  Elswick,
moreover, could rely on the contacts made selling cranes abroad and on the knowledge of foreign
markets  it  had  thereby developed.  Finally,  the  profits  from civil  business could  help  keep the
armaments business afloat in the short-term, while new customers were sought.
1.2 British naval spending in an era of technological uncertainty, 1860-1880.
British naval spending in the period 1860-1880 was more or less constant. Figure 1.5 shows
the annual naval estimates voted by Parliament.  In the late 1850s the naval scare  caused by the
laying down of La Gloire had pushed the British naval budget up. The trend, however, was rapidly
reversed, and naval estimates were cut each year from 1860 to 1867, after which spending increased
for two years. After  such temporary and expansion, however, estimates declined again until the
budget in 1870-71 fell to well below £10 million. In the first half of the 1870s naval spending grew
again, although at a slow tempo, but declined in the second half of the decade so that in 1880-81
naval appropriations were lower than in the early 1860s. 
32 A copy of  the letter is in  Correspondence  Between Her Majesty Government and Sir William Armstrong, HCPP
(1863).
44
Figure  1.5  : British naval spending, 1860-1880 (in current pound).
Source: Naval Estimates (HCPP), various years.
The key reason why British naval spending  remained flat was that,  notwithstanding that
other countries laid down or ordered ironclads, Britain did not face any significant naval threat in
this period.  In the course of the 1860s France became more and more concerned with the rise of
Prussia and it  focus on  strengthening  its land forces.33 In addition to this,  France,  because of its
limitations in iron production, kept building vessels with composite hulls – that is made of iron and
wood – for much longer than Britain. At the same time French artillery was regarded as generally
inferior to  its British counterpart.34 The defeat in 1870 had an immediate impact on  the  French
naval budget, which felt from three-quarters of the British budget in 1870, to half  of it  in 1872.35
Naval construction restarted in 1873 when Redoutable, the first capital ship  mainly built in steel,
was laid down. Still, France did not pose a serious threat to British naval power well into the 1880s.
A country which pioneered ironclad design was the United States. During the Civil War, the
Union built  an impressive fleet  which,  at  its  peak, numbered 49 ironclads.36 It  was during this
conflict that the first encounter between ironclads occurred, when USS Monitor and CSS Virginia
33 L. Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914 (London, 2001), 88-89.
34 J. Campbell,  ‘Naval Armaments and Armour’, R. Gardiner (ed.), Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The Steam Warship
1815–1905 (London, 1992), 159.
35 J. F. Beeler, Naval Policy in the Gladstone–Disraeli Era, 1866–1880 (Stanford, 1997), 193 and 205.
36 W. N. Still, ‘The American Civil War’, Gardiner (ed.), Steam, 61.
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engaged in an inconclusive fight at the battle of Hampton Roads.37 After the war, however, the fleet
was starved of funds. By 1869 only 6 ironclads were still in service, all others having been either
scrapped or sold to other countries. In the 1870s the size of the American fleet kept dwindling. The
Russian and Italian fleets were too modest to pose a serious threat, although, as will be explained in
the next chapter, some Italian battleships caused temporary alarm in Britain.
Furthermore, the Royal Navy spent the majority of the resources for new constructions in its
own yards. Figure 1.6 shows data on British naval construction in the period 1860-1880, listing the
total warship tonnage started each year, divided between Royal Dockyards and private shipbuilders.
Nearly 60% of the tonnage started between 1860 and 1880 was built by the Royal Dockyard, and
40% by private  firms.  Counting  only  vessels  with  a  displacement  bigger  than  5,000 tons,  the
percentages are slightly more in favour of the Royal  Dockyards (63% versus 37%). One thing
should  be  noted,  however: when  the  transition  to  ironclads  in  the  late  1850s  and early 1860s
occurred, the Royal Navy had to rapidly find a way to counteract French naval building. The Royal
Dockyards, however, were not equipped to built iron-hulled vessels, only wooden warships. While
the Dockyards were modernised, the Admiralty contracted the construction of its first ironclads to
the private yards which had already had experience building iron hulls.38 Therefore, a third of the
entire tonnage built by private yards in the period 1860-1880 started in just three years: 1859-60,
1860-61  and  1861-62.  In  addition,  for  political  reasons  the  Royal  Navy  sometimes  purchased
vessels which private yards were building for foreign countries. For example, in 1863 the British
government seized two ships ordered by the Confederate government to avoid an infringement of
the country's neutrality. In 1878 the ironclad Independencia for Brazil was purchased during the war
scare caused by the Russian victories against the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans as part of a rapid
reinforcement of the Royal Navy.  Finally,  the Admiralty always  safeguarded its own yards: when
construction budgets contracted, it was orders to private firms which were sacrificed. Moreover, it
does not seem that the admiralty built strong connections with private firms. For instance, Napier,
which had built several of the first ironclads, received few orders after the early 1860s. In general,
even the private companies which received the most orders (such Palmer in Jarrow) were awarded
no more than a handful  of contracts.  Therefore,  despite  the contribution of private  yards  being
decisive in some periods (the early 1860s), in general, it was overshadowed by the activities of the
Royal Dockyards. 
37 W. C. Davis, Duel Between the First Ironclads (Doubleday, 1975).
38 J. A. Hass, A Management Odyssey: the Royal Dockyards, 1714-1914 (London, 1994), 103-105.
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Figure  1.6  : British naval construction, 1860-1880 (in tons).
Year
Tons built
by Royal
Dockyards
% built by
Royal
Dockyard
Tons built
by private
contractors
% Built by
private
contractors
Total tons
ordered
1859-60 18,741 37.98 30,607 62.02 49,348
1860-61 10,710 44.38 13,420 55.62 24,130
1861-62 9,829 23.46 31,074 76.54 41,903
1862-63 0 0 3,687 100 3,687
1863-64 26,804 100 0 0 26,804
1864-65 3,122 25.35 9,192 74.65 12,314
1865-66 19,486 100 0 0 19,486
1866-67 18,425 70.35 7,767 29.65 26,192
1867-68 14,446 34.41 27,534 65.59 41,980
1868-69 18,054 42.8 24,126 57.2 42,180
1869-70 20,379 100 0 0 20,379
1870-71 26,185 65.29 13,920 34.71 40,105
1871-72 5,200 100 0 0 5,200
1872-73 15,467 74.34 5,340 25.66 20,807
1873-74 30,030 100 0 0 30,030
1874-75 8,180 25.75 23,583 74.25 31,763
1875-76 29,015 91.31 2,260 8.69 31,775
1876-77 10,770 42.99 14,280 57.01 25,050
1877-78 3,390 10.6 28,580 89.4 31,970
1878-79 17,830 100 0 0 17,830
1879-80 23,770 100 0 0 23,770
Total 329,833 58.2 235,370 41.8 566,703
Source: Conway's All the World Fighting Ships, 1860-1905 (London, 1976), passim, S. Pollard and
P. Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 1870-1914 (Harvard, 1979), 217-219.
Until the 1880s, naval technology evolved mainly in two fields: ordnance and ship design.
Artillery evolved along an incremental, path: the basic design of muzzle-loading rifled guns did not
change,  but  the  size  of  the  largest  pieces  of  ordnance  increased  markedly,  making  them more
powerful.  For  instance,  the  wrought iron  plates  which  protected  the  hull  of  La  Gloire could
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withstand at 200 yards shots from the smoothbore 68 pounder (with a calibre of 8.12 inches).39 A
few year later, however, the newly introduced 9 in. rifled guns could penetrate up to 12 inches of
wrought iron plates with their projectiles weighting 250 pounds at a distance of up to 1000 yards. In
the early 1880s 16.25 in. guns firing shells weighting 1800 pounds could penetrate 32 in. of armour
at more then 1000 yards. To withstand the explosion generated by the larger amount of gunpowder
required, guns shooting bigger shells required thicker barrels, thus  driving up the weight. At the
same time, this increase in weight represented a challenge for ordnance makers who had to design
adequate mountings to move them into position. Figure 1.7 shows the calibre, weight and cost  of
some of the larger muzzle-loading guns used on British vessels 
Figure  1.7  : Data on the larger muzzle-loading guns mounted on British ironclads in the 1860s and
1880s
Year of design Calibre(in.)
Weight
(tons)
Price
(pound)
Muzzle
velocity (feet
per second)
Maker
1866 12 25 1,715 1,300 Woolwich
1867 11 25 1,315 Woolwich
1871 12 35 2,154 1,300 Woolwich
1874 12.5 38 1,575 Woolwich
1874 16 80 10,000 1,590 Armstrong
Source: T. Brassey, The British Navy: its Strength, Resources, and Administration, vol. 2 (London,
1882), 38 and 95; Treatise on the Construction and Manufacture of Ordnance in the British Service
Prepared in the Royal Gun Factory (London, 1879), 284; Conway's All the World Fighting Ships,
1860-1905 (London, 1976), passim.
A clear trend is  evident:  guns increased in weight and cost more.  In less than 10 years,
between 1866 and 1874, there was an increase in weight of more than 50%, from 25 to 38 tons. The
introduction of the 16 in. Armstrong guns represented a still more pronounced advancement, with a
weight increase of more than 100%. In addition, the 80 ton gun cost four times more than the
previous ones. The reason behind the escalation in size was that larger, more powerful artillery was
39 From March 1863, the official nomenclature of British artillery changed: guns started to be defines by their calibre
(in inches) instead by the weight of the shoots (in pounds).
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required to pierce armour plates which were becoming thicker: while HMS Warrior was covered by
4.5 in. plates, by the end of the 1870s, ironclads boasted  protection of up 18 in., an increase of
400% in twenty years. The deployment of thicker armour plates stimulated the production of larger
guns which generated demand for stronger armour plates, and so on. 
The  field  in  which  most changes  occurred  during  the  1860s  and  1870s  was  naval
architecture. While this topic strictly speaking lies outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to
stress the major developments which had an impact on armaments production. The introduction of
ironclads made wooden sailing vessels obsolete overnight.40 But ironclad design did not stabilise
and many different designs were tried in the subsequent decades.41 Part of this variety came from
the  fact  that,  until  the  1880s,  naval  thinkers  were  still  uncertain  how a  possible  confrontation
between  ironclad fleets would unfold.  The only significant naval battle which happened in this
period – the battle of Lissa between the Italian and Austrian fleets in 1866 – seemed to point to the
fact  that  ramming could  still  play a  role  in  naval  warfare  (an  Italian  ironclad  sank after  been
rammed). Guns, according to the supporters of the ram, were useful to immobilize and weaken the
adversary, but it was the ram which had the task of finishing off enemy vessels.  Design reflected
these tactical uncertainties.42
Initially, broadside ironclads, such as HMS Warrior, were built. Guns were deployed along
the two sides of the  hull, as they had been for  centuries in wooden sailing warships. This was a
logical development based on the design of wooden steam vessels which had been built until then.
The broadside vessels, however, faced a problem. Guns on board had a limited range of fire: they
could only fire against enemies which were in front of them. An ironclad thus risked engaging an
enemy vessel with only half  its  guns. This problem had been known for centuries, but it acquired
new relevance  because  the growing dimensions  and weight  of  the  new rifled  artillery (and of
armour plates) meant that fewer guns could be placed on board. Thus, the fact that only a proportion
of the new guns could be used represented a waste of potential destructive power.
To solve  this  problem  two configurations  were  developed.  The first,  called  the  “central
battery ship” or “casemate ship”, had a heavily armoured structure amidships, the “citadel”, where
guns  were  placed,  while  the  rest  of  the  vessel  was  more  lightly  defended.  Because  all  major
40 The transition did not happen overnight, though. The last wooden vessel of the Royal Navy, HMS  Rodney, was
retired from service in 1870: B. Lavery The Ship of the Line – Volume 1: The Development of the Battlefleet 1650-
1850 (London, 1983), 190.
41 For the evolution of military naval architecture during this period: S. Tucker, ‘The Period of Experimentation, 1865-
90’, id. (ed.) Handbook of 19th Naval Warfare (Stroud, 2000), 134-162.
42 M. Allen,  ‘The Deployment of Untried Technology: British Naval Tactics in the Ironclad Era’,  War in History 15
(2008), 269-293.
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components were concentrated at just one point, armour plate' thickness could be maximised in a
limited place, and vessels could be built shorter and easier to handle. Central battery ships started to
be introduced around the mid-1860s, supplanting broadside ironclads. The second design was called
the “turret ship” because the main guns were placed in independent structures called turrets which
could rotate, offering  the maximum arc of fire for each gun. Despite some of the first ironclads
having turrets, it took more than ten years to produce successful ocean-going turret vessels (the first
British turret ironclad was HMS Devastation, laid down in 1869).  Until then the fact that vessels
were built  with steam engines  as  well  as  sails  complicated the possibility  of  deploying  turrets
because masts  limited  their arc  of  fire.  The  introduction  of  more  efficient  compound  engines
allowed  navies to dispense with  masts and use turrets more effectively.43 These  different designs
emphasize the  importance  of few but very large guns. While the first ironclads were armed with
tens of guns (HMS Warrior had forty), later vessels seldom had more than 4 or 6 major guns, plus a
few small calibre pieces.
1.3 The rise of Armstrong, 1863-1882.
This  section  examines  the  evolution  of  the  newly  created  Sir  William  G.  Armstrong
Company  from 1863  until 1882, when Armstrong merged with Mitchell, a shipbuilding concern.
The sources used should first be noted, however. From 1864 to 1882 the Sir William G. Armstrong
Company was a partnership.  For a partnership,  legal obligations in  terms of book keeping and
balance sheets publicity were limited. This makes a systematic analysis of the company and of its
activities problematic.44 Letters exchanged between the partners, newspaper articles and personal
memoirs  need to  be used  to  supplement  the  limited  official  records  available.  The relationship
between Armstrong and Italy, one of the firm's major customers, is analysed in the next chapter.
In  1864  the  newly  established  company  faced  difficult  circumstances:  the  gun  making
business, which had grown rapidly in the previous 4-5 years, had lost its only customer. In order to
survive, the gun factory needed to  find new customers quickly.  Three events helped Armstrong
achieve  this  objective.  The  first  was  the  structural  shift  in  naval  design.  The  introduction  of
43 D. Griffiths, ‘Warship Machinery’, Gardiner (ed.), Steam, 174-175.
44 It is testimony of this that Kenneth Warren devotes less than four pages to the period 1864-1882 in his book on the
history of Armstrong.
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ironclads inaugurated a new era in naval construction. Governments all over the world were now
scrambling  to  replace  their  wooden vessels  with  modern ironclads.  Old  smoothbore guns were
ineffective against the newly protected vessels. As a consequence, ironclads generated a demand for
artillery which could smash iron plates. Armstrong  thus had  the chance to obtain orders for guns
which could do that. In addition, the introduction of rifled artillery was not a “one-off” innovation,
but naval ordnance technology kept  evolving rapidly in a way which had never happened before,
generating additional demand for armaments  by countries which wanted to keep up with further
improvements. Moreover, the fact that the Royal Navy deployed guns built using the “Armstrong
method”, if not directly manufactured by Armstrong, was good publicity which helped Armstrong
to become a household name in naval circles.
The second  factor was that Armstrong’s entry into this market  coincided with a period of
intense military confrontations: the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865, the German-Danish war
in 1864, the Austro-Prussian War and the Third Italian Independence War in 1866, the War of the
Triple Alliance in South America from 1864 to 1870, and the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. While
Armstrong, as will be shown below, sold armaments to some of the governments involved in these
confrontations, these military encounters had another indirect beneficial effect: they increased all
governments' awareness about the need to deploy modern armaments, hence increasing the appeal
of Armstrong's products.
The third favourable circumstance was that the firm faced very limited competition during
its first twenty years of operations, something which changed significantly in the following decades.
In 1863, only a few companies in Europe were geared up to manufacture large guns: the two British
rivals, Whitworth and Armstrong, and Krupp, in Germany. All of these companies had large and
successful civil engineering departments which helped the companies to weather the ups and downs
of military demands. Their relative position, however, was not equal. Whitworth could claim to be
the first British gun maker to sell modern artillery abroad: in 1862 he received a small order for
guns from Brazil.45 Whitworth's armaments business, however, never took off. After Armstrong's
guns won the competition for the new rifled ordnance, Whitworth continued to pursue his studies of
artillery. His efforts to find a way to increase the strength of steel barrels resulted in an important
discovery: a way to produce high quality ductile steel through the application of high pressure to the
metal when it is on fluid state.46
45 G. A. Gratz,  ‘The Brazilian Imperial Navy Ironclads, 1865–1874’, A. Preston (ed.),  Warship 1999–2000 (London,
1999), 140-162.
46 Whitworth published a description of his artillery system and of his innovations in steel production, J. Whitworth,
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However, the business side of Whitworth's ordnance business was much less successful: few
Whitworth  guns  were  sold.47 A combination  of  elements  explains the  different  trajectories  of
Armstrong and Whitworth.  First,  Whitworth's  personality:  he  was a  talented engineer,  but  “the
unfortunate  treatment  to  which  he  was  subjected  was  due  in  part,  no  doubt,  to  his  plain  and
inflexible determination. Whitworth always refused to modify a model which he knew to be right
out  of  deference  to  committees  whom he  regarded  as  incomparably  his  inferiors  in  technical
knowledge. Whitworth appears to have become increasingly irascible and domineering as he grew
older.”48 In  other  words,  Whitworth lacked the  flexibility which Armstrong displayed when he
decided to stop producing breech-loading guns when they proved  unsatisfactory; and he was not
able, as Armstrong did, to build up a successful team of collaborators and partners.
A second fact was that Armstrong had a much deeper experience of actually making guns.
He had supervised production in Woolwich when he was superintendent  there for a  few years.
Whitworth, on the other hand, had limited experience of large scale gun manufacturing. In addition
Armstrong could count on a fully equipped plant – and a trained workforce – which had produced
guns and mountings for years. Armstrong, thus, did not face the problem of having to fund large
new plants and equipment to start producing. The fact that he could start making guns overnight
certainly helped him to secure the first customers.
A last factor was that Armstrong's successful beginning – explained by the fact that he could
rely on a working plant, personal experience, good collaborators, etc. – made it ever more difficult
for Whitworth to secure large orders – irrespectively of the quality of his products. Every sale made
by Elswick  provided  additional  publicity  for Armstrong's  guns  and it  enlarged  the  network  of
contacts the firm could rely on, and, above all, locked in the client to Armstrong's technology. After
a navy adopted guns from a certain producer, it became more complex for it to shift its artillery to
the design of another producer (the case of  Italy, examined in the next chapter, provide a clear
example of this “technological path dependency”).
Whilst Armstrong’s  and Whitworth's interest in artillery dated only from the years of the
Crimean War, Krupp had a much longer expertise in manufacturing armaments: the first member of
the Krupp family associated with the armaments trade was Anton Krupp in the 17th century, at the
time of the Thirty Years War.49 During the first half of the 19th century, however, the results of
Miscellanious Papers on Mechanical Subjects. Guns and Steel (London, 1873).
47 Also the laudatory profile of Whitworth in W. T. Jeans, The Creators of the Age of Steel (New York, 1884), 213-268,
does not mention any order for guns other than that coming from Brazil.
48 T. Seccombe, ‘Whitworth, Joseph’, ODNB.
49 W. Manchester, The Arms of Krupp (Boston, 1968), 43.
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Krupp's involvement in armaments trade were mixed. Alfred Krupp, who was at the helm of the
business  for  sixty  years  and  the  driving  force  behind  the  company's  venture  in  ordnance
manufacturing, regarded cast steel as the most suitable material for gun manufacturing.50 He started
experimenting  with it  during the 1840s and submitted a 6 pounder prototype for the 1851 Great
Exhibition. But  Krupp's view about the advantages of steel guns was not shared by the Prussian
military hierarchy. The explosions of several of Krupp's cast steel guns reinforced their suspicion.
Eventually Krupp's  guns were adopted by the Prussian army in the late  1860s.  Ultimately,  the
superior performance of German artillery during the 1870 war with France, whose army was still
equipped with old fashioned muzzle-loading bronze guns, dispelled the last suspicions and provided
Krupp with a publicity coup.51 However, land armaments, rather than naval ordnance, represented
the main market for Krupp, with Russia and the Ottoman empire as its major customers.52 The small
size and limited budget of the German navy provided little incentive for Krupp to focus on this kind
of production.53
Armstrong was well aware of the potential threat represented by Krupp. In August 1863,
The  Times reported  that  the upper  echelons  of  the  British military,  during  a  visit  to  the  Royal
Arsenal, had inspected several cast steel Krupp guns which “had been submitted for trial and fired
successfully”.54 In December 1863, Armstrong wrote joyfully to Rendel that a Krupp steel gun had
exploded “and that too with a vengeance, flying into a thousands pieces. All the fragments were
sound so that the failure was purely due to the intrinsic unfitness of the material. I have had this nice
piece of news conveyed to Lord de Grey [the Under Secretary for War].”55 What Armstrong feared
was not that Britain would start to buy from Krupp (the British government was not buying from
Armstrong any more), but that it would endorse the idea of cast steel guns. Armstrong's reputation
rested  on  Armstrong's  building  system  which  used  wrought  iron  coils.  Hence,  if  another
manufacturing  process  came  to  be  preferred,  this  would  represent  a  significant  blow  for  the
fledgling firm.
Thus, in this period, Armstrong faced more competition from government-owned  arsenals
than from other  private  companies.  Governmental  arsenals  were not geared to manufacture for
50 R. Köhne-Lindenlaub, ‘Krupp, Alfred’, NDB.
51 Manchester, Krupp, 141 and 156.
52 On Krupp's export of artillery, J. A. Grant, ‘The Arms Trade in Eastern Europe, 1870-1914’, D. J. Stoker Jr. and J. A.
Grant (eds.) Girding for Battle: the Arms Trade in Global Perspective, 1815-1940 (Westport, 2003), 30-34.
53 Until the late 1870s, the majority of the guns of the Prussian Navy came from the Royal Foundry in Spandau: L.
Sondhaus, Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power before the Tirpiz Era (Annapolis, 1997), 73.
54 The Times 3 August 1863, 9.
55 J. D. Scott, Vickers. A History (London, 1962), 32.
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export, but the size and quality of their output had a direct impact on the demand for guns  from
private suppliers. In general, tradition-minded military hierarchies remained cold towards the idea
of relying for armaments  manufacturing on private enterprises.  Until  1914, public arsenals and
dockyards remained deeply involved in armaments manufacturing despite their relative decline. In a
market  which  started  to  be  characterised  by  endless  technological,  innovation,  however,
Armstrong's ability to innovate rapidly meant that the company was able to gain a large share of the
world market for naval ordnance and mountings.
The ability to design gun mountings became crucial after the introduction of heavier guns.
Armstrong's position in this area was especially strong, because of its expertise in gun mountings.
For instance, in a letter dated 15 March 1878 sent to the French Ministry of marine, the company's
management complained that the French navy had only ordered the hydraulic mountings and not
also the guns for them. What is more, Elswick deplored the fact that the French navy had ordered
“high  pressure  pumping  engines”  from  other  companies,  and  that  it  planned  to  use  them  in
combination with its mountings. Armstrong pointed that the less than perfect compatibility between
these pieces and its mountings could hinder the performance of the latter, and therefore suggested
that  the French minister  should purchase  them directly from it,  in order to  “allow a satisfactory
performance of the carriages”.56 Both Armstrong and its customers were well aware of where the
firm's technological superiority lay.
It is not surprising that, in the period from the 1860s to the early 1880s, Armstrong's major
clients were small and medium powers, countries which desired to modernise their naval forces, but
which could not rely on arsenals for the manufacture of up-to-date equipment, as Britain did.  By
contrast, during the first fifteen years of Armstrong's activity British orders were worth in average
just  £1,654 per  year.57 While  the precise number is  disputable,  the order  of magnitude cannot:
British government's orders represented a very small share of the firm's total sales. Figure 1.8 shows
the main orders the company received during its first five years of activity. 
These figures highlight how many governments  were Armstrong's customers even  in the
first years of its activities. Divisions among the various buyers is immediately clear, though. Three
different groups can be identified. The first was made up of buyers  such as Italy, Spain and the
Ottoman Empire,  which placed large orders.  These countries had  regional political  and military
ambitions and thus they needed to rapidly modernise their armed forces, equipping them with hard-
56 T&W, Rendel Papers, 31/4622.
57 Scott, Vickers, 34. 
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Figure  1.8  : Armstrong major armaments sales, 1864-1867.
 
Country Year Amount order
Denmark 1864 Several 150-pound guns
USA 1864 £ 5,000*
Turkey 1864 £ 150,000 in guns and ammunitions
France 1864 A few experimental guns
Egypt 1864 More than £ 4,000
Italy 1865-66 £ 100,000 worth of guns
Austria 1866 Guns for five ironclads (£ 30,000-50,000)
Spain 1867 £ 65,000
Norway 1867 Guns and ammunitions
Holland 1867 Guns and ammunitions
Russia 1867 One 300-pound gun
* eventually, only half of the agreed sum was paid.
Source: T&W Rendel Papers, 31/3375-3561.
ware that their own arsenals could not supply. Their only alternative was to turn to private suppliers.
These buyers remained good clients of Armstrong for decades.  Moreover,  it  is  noteworthy that
Armstrong ended up being involved, although in different ways, in the management of production
facilities in all of these states.
The second group was composed  of  small  states like Holland and Norway  which had
modest  military  needs  and,  in  some  case,  limited  financial  means.  Orders  coming  from these
countries were sporadic and small in size. While governments belonging to the first group kept
ordering new hardware to avoid technical obsolescence, the ones of the second group did not.
Finally, great powers such as France and Russia constituted the third group. For strategic
and political reasons these countries  clearly could not  rely on British companies  for  their  own
armaments in any significant way. This would have meant becoming dependent on the good will of
the British government which could stop exports at any time. This was obviously unthinkable for
governments which,  until  the  beginning of the  20th century,  saw Britain as  their main strategic
competitor. At the same time these countries had large, if not always efficient, public arsenals which
supplied the bulk of their artillery. The reason why they bought Armstrong's products was that they
aimed to gain a first-hand knowledge of the more advanced technologies and designs of the firm's
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products. To do this, they just needed to buy a limited number of guns.
At  the same time as  the British government ended its contract, the American Civil War
seemed to promise sale opportunities to Armstrong. The British government had forbidden national
companies to supply belligerents;58 but Armstrong and Whitworth were both able to provide guns to
the Union and the Confederation, using legal loopholes and sales to third parties.59 This first venture
proved,  however,  to  be  a  source  of  much  disappointment  for  the  newly established  company.
Armstrong had originally been approached by John Scott Russell, a brilliant naval engineer who
was working in Britain as Union agent commissioned to purchase military goods.60 Russell hinted
that Massachusetts wanted to purchase several large calibre guns for the protection of Boston's
harbour. Soon, however,  controversy erupted: Russell had apparently embezzled the money and
Elswick resorted to legal action to recover  what was due for the guns. Eventually, the company
obtained compensation of £2,500, half of the original price.61 This experience taught Armstrong a
lesson:  from that time on, the company became more cautious  in dealing with agents acting on
behalf  of  foreign  governments.  The  company  preferred  developing  its  own  network  of
representatives and agents around the world, trusted people whose personal connections, technical
knowledge, and experience could secure orders.
Stuart Rendel was at the helm of the commercial operation of Elswick until 1880, when he
was elected MP for  Montgomeryshire.62 He was  the  son of the late James Rendel,  Armstrong’s
friend who had interested  him in ordnance. When James died  in 1856, his eldest son, Alexander,
inherited the family’s engineering business.63 All his brothers ended up working for Armstrong. The
third son, George Rendel, worked as  an  apprentice at Armstrong's crane firm, before becoming a
partner in the Elswick Ordnance Works in 1859. Five years later he was among the founders of the
Sir William Armstrong Company, where he was in charge, together with Andrew Noble,  of the
ordnance business. George involved himself  in two main  activities. The first  was the design of
ordnance and mountings. He improved the hydraulic system used to move guns which was later
58 As a result of a1861 Cabinet Order in Council.
59 The Times  reported  that  “Armstrong's  guns  had  been  sold  to  the  Confederates”,  but  the  company denied  this
allegation, see The Times, 21 January 1864, 9. More than fifty years later, however, Stuart Rendel stated that the firm
supplied both sides and that he was unable to remember what side placed its order first, see Rendel, Papers, 277-
278.  Armstrong was not the only firm involved: for instance, in October 1863 the British government seized two
vessels which Laird of Birkenhead was building for the Confederate Navy, W. F. Spencer, The Confederate Navy in
Europe (Tuscaloosa, 1983), 111.
60 D. K. Brown, ‘Russell, John Scott’, ODNB.
61 T&W 31/204.
62 J. Grigg, ‘Rendel, Stuart’, ODNB.
63 The company is still active in engineering consultancy nowadays under the name of High-Point Rendel Ltd.
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universally adopted on British battleships in the 1880s and 1890s. George  was also interested  in
naval engineering: he designed many of the first warships built by Armstrong. At the same time, he
was often consulted by the  Admiralty,  and in  1882 left  the firm to become a civil  lord of  the
Admiralty,  a technical advisory post. In 1885  he moved to Italy where, as will be explained in
chapter V, he became involved in supervising the activities of Armstrong's local branch.64 Finally,
Hamilton, the youngest brother, managed the civil engineering business of the company for  five
decades. His most famous achievement was designing the hydraulic machinery used to move the
bascules of London’s Tower Bridge.65
Stuart Rendel did not purse an engineer career like his brothers, but became a barrister. He
was first  employed by Armstrong in the late  1850s  when he became a member of  the Special
Committees  which  were  created  in  the  early 1860s  to  investigate  the  benefits  of  new artillery
designs.66 His  brief  was  to  defend  Armstrong's  reputation  from  the  attacks  of  Whitworth's
supporters. After Armstrong left Woolwich, Stuart became the chief commercial representative of
Elswick in London, receiving a commission of 5% on the orders he acquired.67 In addition, in the
course of the decade Armstrong sold him for £19,600 a 4% interest in Elswick, a price which valued
the entire firm  at £490,000.  The  Armstrong Company did not develop a sales office, a structure
separated from the rest of the company, with a staff trained in sales techniques; but examining the
letters exchanged among themselves by the people at the top of the firm, it is possible to detect a
division of tasks  between them. The management in Elswick was chiefly involved in designing,
improving and manufacturing the products. The London office under Stuart Rendel was in charge of
sales and promotion. London was the key diplomatic hub in the pre-1914 period, where scores of
foreign ambassadors and military attaches regularly met. Many of them routinely visited the Royal
Arsenal, and attended armament trials and ship launching.68 
The first challenge Armstrong faced was that of monitoring foreign markets in order to be
well placed to exploit any possible sales opportunity. When Armstrong entered the world market for
armaments, telegraphic cables were just starting to be rolled across the seas and the technology was
not  yet  completely  reliable.69 This  meant  that  while  European  markets  could  be  quite  easily
64 M. R. Lane, ‘Rendel, George Wightwick’, ODNB.
65 M. R.  Lane,  The Rendel  Connection: a  Dynasty of  Engineers  (London,  1989) traces  the history of  the family
business.
66 See for instance, The Times, 4 November 1864, 7.
67 T&W, Rendel Papers, 31/3433.
68 See among the many cases, the articles appeared on The Times 25 January 1858, 10, about the visit of Albert, Prince
of Prussia, to the Royal Arsenal, and  21 June 1873, 9, about the tour of the same facility offered to  the Shah of
Persia.
69 The first successfully operating oceanic cable was installed in 1866.
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monitored from London, this was not the case for Asia and South America. Thus the company had
to employ agents in these overseas regions. Selling armaments, however, was no ordinary business.
The peculiar nature of the armaments trade made traditional sales techniques less useful. It was after
governments had decided to purchase new artillery that armaments companies could start courting
generals, ministers and bureaucrats in the hope of obtaining orders, but not before.70 Hence the main
task  of  agents  was  twofold.  On  the  one  side  they  had  to  promote  their  products.  Technical
brochures,  pictures  and  invitation  to  live  trials  were  all  means  used  to  advertise  the  superior
performance  of  Armstrong's  artillery.71 On  the  other  side,  they  collected intelligence  and
information about military plans and possible tenders, and then forwarded them to the company's
headquarters. Subsequently, when a government had committed itself to a rearmament plan, it was
the agents'  ability to navigate  civil  and military bureaucracy which became crucial  in  securing
contracts. Agents needed to have some understanding of both military technology and commercial
practice,  as well  as a good knowledge of the country where they operated.  Few possessed this
combination of skills and knowledge, and so it is not surprising than many of the offers to become
agents were turned down by Armstrong.72
The company records for China offer interesting material for an analysis of the possibilities
and limits of this model. China represented a potential market for Armstrong. After the end of the
Taiping rebellion in 1864, a groups of politicians in favour of “self-strengthening” policies gained
power in Beijing. One of their aims was to reinforce the country vis-a-vis foreign powers through
the  modernization  of  Chinese  armed  forces  and  the  development  of  indigenous  armaments
industries.73 One of the first steps was ordering eleven flat-iron  Stauch-class gunboats in Britain
(see Figure 1.9).74 Armstrong manufactured their guns, while the hulls were built by the Walker
shipyard on the Tyne and one by  the  Laird yard in Birkenhead.75 Sir Robert  Hart,  the General
Inspector of the Chinese Imperial  Maritime Customs Service, worked to facilitate the purchase,
which  was  made  possible  by  the  revenues  collected  by  the  Service  on  behalf  of  the  Chinese
70 On the demand-driven nature of armaments trade see C. Trebilcock,  ‘Legends of the British Armament Industry
1890-1914: A Revision’, Journal of Contemporary History 5 (1970), 3-19.
71 Materials of this nature can be found in the archives of all the armaments companies.
72 See, for instance, T&W, Rendel Papers, 31/3437, 31/2787, 31/6155 and 31/3260.
73 For the military aspects of the “self-strengthening” movement see Kwang-Ching Liu and R. J. Smith, ‘The Military
Challenge: the North-west and the Coast’, J. K. Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, D. Cr. Twitchett (eds.) The Cambridge
History of China, vol. 9, Late Ching 1800-1911, Part 2, (Cambridge, 1980), 202-272.
74 J. L. Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge, 1967), 69.
75 P. Brook,  Warships for  Export: Armstrong  Warships 1867-1927  (Gravesend, 1999), and R. Wright,  The Chinese
Steam Navy, 1862–1945 (London, 2001) offer detailed descriptions of these vessels.
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government.76 This was a promising beginning (each gunboat cost between £23,000 and £33,400,
the whole sale totalling more than £250,000, but it was not followed by other significant orders.77
The  company's  agent  in  China  from  the  early  1880s  onwards was  Jardine  & Matheson,  the
renowned trading  firm.78 Jardine had an excellent  grasp of the Chinese market,  a sophisticated
network of contacts and plenty of commercial capabilities.79 Although Elswick kept receiving long
reports detailing the activities carried out on behalf of the firm, orders did not materialize.80 After
the 1884 war with France, the Chinese leadership turned to Germany,  which had limited colonial
interest in China, in contrast to Britain, to modernise its navy. It ordered two 7,000 tons battleships
from the AG Vulcan Shipyard in Stettin and their guns from Krupp.81
Figure 1.9: Gunboat Staunch. The size of the gun is highlighted by the limited displacement.
Source: The Engineer, 1 May 1868, 321.
76 F. H. H. King, ‘Hart, Sir Robert’, ODNB.
77 Only other two small vessels were ordered in 1885, T&W, Rendel Papers, 31/2650.
78 Id., 31/3120.
79 See C. M. Connell,  ‘Jardine Matheson & Company: The Role of External Organization in a Nineteenth Century
Trading Firm’, Enterprise and Society 3 (2003), 99-138.
80 T&W, Rendel Papers, 31/2974, 31/4667, 31/4192, 31/5277. For a detailed overview of the activities of several of
Armstrong's representatives in Asia, Bastable, Arms, 146-154.
81  Chia-Chien Wang, ‘Li Hung-chang and the Peiyang Navy’, Chinese Studies in History 25 (1991), 52–66.
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A major development which occurred in these years was the connection which Armstrong
developed from 1867 with Charles Mitchell's shipyard in Low Walker, a suburb several miles east
of Newcastle. During the early 1860s Charles Mitchell worked in Russia for the Tsarist government
where he designed and supervised the construction of four ironclads, the first to enter service for the
Russian  Navy.82 As  pointed  to by  David  Saunders,  it  was  exactly  the  experience  in  military
shipbuilding which Mitchell had acquired which convinced Armstrong to pair up with him. In the
years 1868-1885, before a new yard was opened in Elswick near the ordnance plant, 29 warships
totalling  25,013  tons  were  built  at  Low  Walker,  the  great  majority  of  which  were  Staunch
gunboats.83 The contribution of Armstrong was decisive:  these  warships were in fact designed by
George Rendel around the powerful guns which Armstrong supplied. The collaboration between the
two firms, which was limited to naval shipbuilding, was a first step in the direction of vertical
integration which Armstrong completed only in 1897. The appeal of the Staunch gunboat was the
combination between a powerful gun, similar in calibre to the ones deployed on the large ironclads,
and a shallow draft (they were less than 30 meters long, with a displacement between 200 and 500
tons) which allowed them to be used in coastal waters.  These ships could not venture  into open
seas,  but  they were cheap and very powerfully armed,  making them perfect  for  small  or  poor
countries. Apart from the ones bought by China, the Royal Navy acquired three gunboats, and the
Dutch navy two. In the late 1870s George Rendel designed also three small cruisers: one for Chile,
which sold it to Japan; and  two for China. These vessels anticipated the deeper involvement of
Armstrong in naval shipbuilding which came after the 1882 combination with Mitchell.
In  the  years  1864-1882,  Armstrong  grew  from being  a  firm  with  no  market,  to  one
supplying governments around the world with guns, mountings and warships. The limited sources
prevent investigation of many aspect of the firm's development, but it is evident that Armstrong was
a profitable venture. The crucial fact was that Armstrong in this period relied  chiefly on  export.
Britain could count on its arsenals, but scores of small and medium governments could not, and,
therefore, eagerly purchased from Elswick the military hardware they needed.
82 On Michell's Russian activities D. Saunders, ‘Charles Mitchell, Tyneside and Russia's First Ironclads’, in Northern
History 48 (2011), 75-95.
83 Brook, Warships, 11.
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1.4 Sheffield armour makers, 1860-1880.
This  section deals with the activities of the two Sheffield firms John Brown and Cammell
which emerged from the early 1860s as the major maker of armour plates in Britain. The evolution
of these two firms followed similar patterns of growth and thus they can be analysed together. John
Brown  and  Cammell  were  established  in  Sheffield  in  the  late  1830s  as  small  family  firms
manufacturing steel products.84 Like the entire steel industry of Sheffield, the impetus behind their
initial growth came first from crucible steel, which was used for tools and cutlery, and later from the
railway industry. John Brown and Cammell were the first firms to adopt the Bessemer steel process
for purely commercial reasons in, respectively, 1860 and 1861.85 While crucibles produced steel of
very  high  quality, it  was  the Bessemer  converter  which allowed  to  rapidly  escalate  output,
revolutionising  the  entire  Sheffield  steel  industry.86 The  combination  of  an  early  start  with  a
booming demand for steel rails, allowed John Brown and Cammell to grow fast. Whereas in 1857
John Brown employed around 200 men, in 1867 it employed nearly 4,000.87 Cammell followed a
very similar pattern of growth and by mid-1860s employed almost the same number of workers.
The first Sheffield firm involved in the armaments industry was Thomas Firth & Sons which
in the late 1850s supplied Elswick, Whitworth and the Royal Arsenal with steel forgings for guns.88
But  it  was  the  introduction  of  ironclads  which  opened  up  a  potentially  very large  market  for
wrought iron armour plates. Attracted by this possibility, several firms attempted to enter armour
production by submitting prototypes for trial.89 John Brown initiated armour plate  production in
1858  and,  by  1862,  it  was  a  well-established  producer.  John  Brown's  success  rested  on
technological superiority. In 1863 the Admiralty organised a trial at Portsmouth between an armour
plate supplied by John Brown and one produced by the Royal Dockyards (the only attempt made by
any government  plant  to  produce it).  The plate  made by the Royal  Dockyard was obtained by
hammering and welding together iron sheets to form a plate of the required shape and thickness. By
contrast, John Brown adopted a more complex production process, made possible by the industrial
and  technical capacity  it  had  developed  in  the  previous  years  in  its  modern  plant.  It  rolled  a
84 G. Tweedale, ‘Brown, John’, ODNB, and id. ‘Cammell, Charles’, ODNB.
85 The first firm to use the Bessemer process was the Bessemer Steel Works in Sheffield founded by Henry Bessemer
himself. Bessemer's aim, however, was “not to work my process as a monopoly, but simply to force the trade to
adopt it by underselling them in their own market.”, H. Bessemer, An Autobiography (London, 1905), 175-176. 
86 G. Tweedale, Steel City. Entrepreneurship, Strategy, and Technology in Sheffield 1743-1993 (Oxford, 1995), 61-70.
87 A. Grant, Steel and Ships: the History of John Brown's (London, 1950), 21.
88 P. J. Nunn, ‘Firth, Mark’, ODNB.
89 In 1864 the Admiralty tested plates made by Cammell, John Brown, Mersey Steel and Iron company, Milwall Iron
Works and Beale and Company, see The Times 19 February 1864, 12.
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succession of 1 in. thick bars, cut them into short lengths, then piled and welded them into slabs
which were rolled to make armour plates.  The trial  demonstrated the clear  superiority of John
Brown's plate.90
The technical advantage secured John Brown consistent orders. To keep up with the demand,
the firm built a new rolling mill specifically designed for armour plates at a cost of  £200,000.91
Aware of John Brown's success, Cammell entered into armour production the same year. Cammell
hired technicians and skilled workers from firms which had already  tried to make armour plates
and, after several experiments, obtained plates which satisfied the Admiralty's requirements and in
1864 Cammell received the order for the armour plates of HMS Royal Alfred and HMS Lord Clyde,
establishing itself as the other major British producer.92 Cammell and John Brown's technological
leadership was confirmed in  a trial of plates submitted by private firms  occurring in 1864:  their
plates were the only ones which received the highest mark.93
Cammell  and  John  Brown  were  then  able  to  supplement  their  civilian  operations  with
production of war-like stores. They entered armour plates production because of both demand-led
and supply-led reasons. When the Admiralty committed itself to ironclads, it immediately generated
a  large  and  relatively  stable  demand  for  armour  plates.  Ruling  out  production  carried  out  by
government  arsenals  (this  does  not  seems  to  have  been  an  option  seriously  considered),  the
government  could  only  rely  on  private  firms.  At  the  same  time,  government  contracts  were
attractive as a hedge against the ups and downs of the market for civil goods (the early 1860s, for
example, were a period of great uncertainties because of the American civil war).
The success of John Brown and Cammell was rooted in a mix of factors. Technological
capacity  was  certainly  paramount: their  wrought  iron  plates  scored  very  successfully  in  trials.
Another  factor was  that  their  management  teams,  under,  respectively,  the  leadership  of  John
Devonshire Ellis and George Wilson,94 were willing to invest large sums for the machinery required
for large scale armour production. This was certainly facilitated by the fact that, already before
entering armour making, John Brown and Cammell were the largest steel firms in Sheffield. In
1864,  for  instance,  Cammell  employed  around  3,500  workers,  and  John  Brown  3,300,  while
90 A. D. Stacey, A Historical Survey of the Manufacture of Naval Armour by Vickers Sons & Co., and their Successors
1888-1956, VA, f. 1153, 12. 
91 Grant, Steel, 21.
92 VA, f. 401.
93 The scores  were reported on The Times 10 March 1864, 14: John Brown obtained 3 A1 and one A2 for a curved
plates  (the  highest  score  ever  obtained  for  this  kind  of  armour  until  then),  Cammell  one  A1,  Mersey one  A3
“inferior”, Millwall one A3, and Beale one B1.
94 G. Tweedale, ‘Ellis, John Devonshire’, ODNB.
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Vickers, whose activities were limited to non-military productions, despite being the single largest
producer of crucible steel in Sheffield, employed only around 1,000 workers.95 Given their size,
John  Brown and  Cammell  felt  less  the  financial  and  organisational  strains  of  undertaking  the
investments required, they could afford to spend time and money to refine and improve plates and
preserve their technical leadership. In 1864 both firms took advantage of the 1862 Company Act to
restructure themselves as public limited companies and raise additional capital.  Cammell issued
capital  for £800,000 and John Brown for  £750,000. As a comparison, in the same year Vickers
issued capital for £155,000.96
Furthermore,  the  fact  that  both  firms  were  located  in  the  same  place  facilitated  the
circulation of informal knowledge and technical know-how relevant for armour plate production,
increasing the firms' capacity to innovate. A final advantage resulted from being “first movers” in
armour  production,  a  dynamic  which  replicated  itself  several  times  in  the  capital-intensive
armaments industry (for example,  the case of Armstrong highlighted above). Armour making was
costly, therefore any new entrant required large investments. The price tag for an armour plate plant
was estimated to be at least £250,000.97 Such large investments could be undertaken only if there
was a realistic chance of obtaining orders big enough to cover the large fix costs, something which
was unlikely to happen when naval expenditures were flat or growing only at a modest rate. At the
same time, the Admiralty, while being theoretically in favour of enlarging the number of suppliers
for economic (driving down prices) and strategic reasons (the more firms making armour, the easier
it was to  escalate production in case of conflict) had to take into consideration the quality of the
final  products.  Subsequent technical innovations exacerbated this  fact,  reinforcing the dominant
position that Cammell and John Brown had acquired in the course of the 1860s  and which they
retained unchallenged until the early 1890s. It was not by chance that the firms which subsequently
successfully entered armour production were already large (to finance the investments required),
with a good reputation for quality (reducing the level of uncertainty for customers) and that they did
so at a time of growing naval budgets.
While the focus  here is on military production it must be stressed that John Brown and
Cammell  remained steel  firms  with  a  foot  in  armour  making,  and that  military goods  did  not
displace  civil  production  as  the  major  business.  For  instance,  figure  1.10 shows  John Brown's
armour plate sales and general turnover in the period 1865-1874.
95 Id., Steel City, 65.
96 Id.
97 Iron and Coal Trade Review 8 June 1883, 665.
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Figure  1.10  : Turnover of John Brown, 1865-1874 (in current pound).
1865 1866 1867 1868 1869
Total turnover 404,072 511,215 584,081 585,716 663,279
Armour plate 223,498 119,178 95,064 148,175 110,950
Total 627,570 630,393 679,155 733,891 773,229
% of Armour
plate on total
turnover
55.31 23.31 16.28 25.3 16.73
1870 1871 1872 1873 1874
Total turnover 751,719 797,358 1,159,999 1,353,021 1,055,011
Armour plate 177,436 152,721    251,691    212,513    211,245
Total 929,155 950,079 1,411,690 1,565,534 1,266,256
% of Armour
plate on total
turnover
23.6 19.15 21.7 15.71 20.02
Source: Calculation based on data from Tweedale, Steel City, 74.
Armour-making generated  on average between 15% and 25% of the  firm's total turnover.
What  actually  increased  substantially  in  the  period  1865-1874  was  the  total  turnover  of  John
Brown, rather than the proportion contributed by armour plate production.
Until the introduction of compound armour in 1879-1880, armour plate technology did not
change significantly,  but the  Admiralty ordered thicker and thicker  plates  to counterbalance the
growing power of artillery. Then John Brown and Cammell needed to invest continually to deliver
plates of the thickness  required.98 Armour plate was a  profitable  business, and it was essential to
preserve the leading position of the firm in it. As the board of Cammell concluded in 1868:
In this country [John Brown] and ourselves are the only two houses now in the
books of the Admiralty and War Office … it is of vital importance we preserve
this position in order to maintain the good prices we are now getting … To do this
there is no alternative, but to meet the demands made upon us by adopting the
means of finishing our armour as we are able to roll it, and then keep faith with
98 K. Warren, Steel, Ships and Men: Cammell Laird, 1824-1993 (Liverpool, 1998), 44-46.
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our  deliveries,  for  unless  this  be  done,  the  Admiralty  will,  we  are  assured,
immediately proceed to encourage others to re-enter  this  trade and thus create
anew a competition as will again result in loss and almost unremunerative prices.
Again with such governments as Russia,  Austria,  Greece,  Turkey,  Holland and
Denmark, from all whom we have good prospects of business, our established
position with the English government is of paramount importance to us.99
A policy of heavy investment reduced the short-term return of capital, and generated plenty
of organisational and financial issues, but it had the positive side effect of reinforcing the relative
position of John Brown and Cammell against that of potential competitors because he large sums
required to set up an armour plate mill complicated the entrance of new firms in the market.
This is, for instance, what happened with Beardmore of Parkhead (in East Glasgow). This
firm, established in the late 1830s as an iron forge, produced wrought iron plates in the early 1860s
for several ironclads which were built in the yards on the Clyde. 3-4 in. wrought iron plates were
relatively  easy  to  make,  and  the  proximity  of  a  source  of  demand  stimulated  production.
Beardmore, however, did not invest to adapt its plant to the production of thicker plates and left the
market to John Brown and Cammell.100 More than twenty five years passed before Beardmore,
under very different circumstances, ventured again into armour plate production.
Despite  the  absence  of  precise  accounting  data,  armour  plates  seems  to  have  been  a
profitable trade, offering  good margins. In its first twenty years of activity as a public company
between  1864  and 1884,  Cammell  paid  in  average  a  dividend  of  near  8%.  It  is  not  possible,
however, to calculate how much resulted from armour production and how much from non-military
production.101 Because different prices can be found in journal articles and documents, it is difficult
to assess what was the average price paid for wrought iron plates. Prices between £35 and £45 a ton
seems,  however, to have been the norm. In addition to orders from the British Admiralty,  John
Brown and Cammell received orders from several foreign governments. The fact that they supplied
the Royal Navy was regarded as an important endorsement of the quality of their production.  To
advertise their  productions,  both firms sent trial  plates to commercial  and industrial  exhibitions
around  Europe  (for  instance,  in  Vienna,  Moscow,  and  Berlin)  and  to  the  offices  of  their
99 WAS, Cammell, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board, 5 September 1868.
100 J. R. Hume and M. S. Moss, Beardmore. The History of a Scottish Industrial Giant (London, 1979), 7-10.
101 Colliery Guardian, 28 March 1884, 508.
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representatives abroad.102 In addition, it is likely that John Brown and Cammell colluded to keep
prices high. There is no direct evidence of this, but it would be very surprising if the managements
of two firms operating a few miles from each other and with evident common interests (maintaining
profitability  and  blocking  new entrants,  for  example)  did  not  communicate.  It  is  important  to
remember, however, that armour plate production represented only part of the business of John
Brown and Cammell. During the 1870s, for example, the production of steel rails for the American
market was their major business.103
In the mid-1870s two trends weakened John Brown’s and Cammell's position. The first was
the emergence of strong competitors in civil production. Firms based in the North East and in South
Wales could count on cheaper coal and better connections than Sheffield. Because steel technology
had moved to high-scale,  low-margin production methods (e.g. open hearth furnaces), these were
crucial advantages.104 At the same time Belgian and German companies increased their operations
and sales in foreign market and also in Britain.105 The second was the introduction in 1876 of steel
armour plates by Schneider. The French firm claimed that all-steel plates were lighter and stronger
than wrought iron plates of the same thickness. Such a development could seriously threaten John
Brown’s and Cammell's leadership in armour making, a business which was becoming more and
more crucial to them because of the growing competition in non-military steel.
John Brown and Cammell replied by investing in research in order to innovate their products
since wrought iron plates were now obsolete. To add urgency to the efforts of the firms there was
the fact that the uncertainty about the best course of action in armour plates manufacturing was
resulting  in  smaller  orders  from  the  admiralty.106 Therefore,  from  1877,  Cammell  started  to
experiment with casting and rolling iron and steel plates of different composition, thickness and
shape.107 John Brown (whose records are less well preserved) presumably did the same because
both John Devonshire Ellis and George Wilson registered patents for the production of compound
102 Stacey, Survey, 12.
103 Warren, 57-75.
104 Data of total steel production (both Bessemer and Open heart technology) of various British regions coming from
the Annual Report of the British Iron Trade Association of 1886 (49) and 1887 (23-32):
Scotland Sheffield North East North West
1878       – 293,000   74,000 230,000
1886 245,000 278,000 523,000 493,000
105 U. Wengenroth,  Enterprise  and Technology:  The  British  and German Steel  Industries,  1865-1895  (Cambridge,
1993), 113-114.
106 Grant, Steel and Ships, 34.
107 Stacey, Survey, 13.
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armour plates, that is plates with a face of hard steel backed by wrought iron. From 1879 compound
plates became the standard on all British vessels  and were also adopted by many foreign navies.
Steel was regarded as theoretically superior, but plates of uniform quality were difficult to obtain.
The first generation of all steel plates was too prone to brittleness and cracking.108
The introduction of compound plates demonstrated the responsiveness and adaptability of
John  Brown  and  Cammell.  Facing  the  sudden  disappearance  of  their  armour  business,  the
managements of both firms rapidly innovated and retained a leading position in the armour plate
market. Cammell, for instance, sold  the rights to use its patents to several French firms (among
them Marrell Freres). The increased level of complexity in producing compound plates translated
into higher prices. During the 1880s compound plates fetched up to £100 a ton, were 19 in. thick
and weighted around 50 tons each.109 Despite the price varying according to size, treatment, etc., it
was far superior to that of ordinary steel plates for shipbuilding which sold for £ 4-5 a ton. An
example helps to understand the large profits which armour making could generate. Each of the
seven vessels of the pre-dreadnought Royal Sovereign class, laid down in 1889 and 1890, required
around 2,500 compound armour plates.110 Putting the average price for armour at £ 80 (lower than
the price of the largest and thickest plates because not all the parts of a ship were equally protected),
a contract for supplying the plates for just a single vessels generated revenues of £200,000.
The drawback was that making compound armour was a more complex process than making
wrought iron ones, and both firms had to undertake large investments which, in turn, resulted in a
high levels of fixed costs. The growing complexity of armour making made impossible for firms to
revert the same plant to different production in the short-term. For armour-making firms, therefore,
it became more and more essential to secure a constant stream of orders to keep their works busy
and cover fix costs.
1.5 Conclusions.
This chapter analysed the evolution of the British private armaments industry in the period
1860-1880. In just two decades the British armaments industry evolved from being virtually non-
108 See the article on a trial of iron, compound and steel plates carried out in Portsmouth on The Times of 20 December
1876.
109 Stacey, Survey, 15-16.
110 The Times, 30 December 1889, 3.
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existent to be made of three large and successful firms. The first section was devoted to the analysis
of Armstrong's  entry into the armaments business,  demonstrating how the  such a  move was the
result of a mix of old  government policies and new realities. In dealing with  Armstrong, British
governments followed a traditional  pattern. Facing military crises – first in  the Crimea, then with
France – they enlisted the help of private entrepreneurs to step up armaments production. In the late
1850s, Britain did not face a traditional military crisis, however, one during which more of the same
armaments  needed to be field; rather it  faced a qualitative one,  that is one when new kinds of
armaments  were  required  to  be  designed  and  produced.  The  new  rifled  artillery  devised  by
Armstrong drastically reduced the operation value of the old guns. The pressing need to re-equip the
country's armed forces pushed governments to use short-term expedients to maximize production. It
was in this context that the contract with the Elswick Ordnance Company was signed. However, in
1863, after the emergency terminated, the British government decided to cancel the agreement with
Elswick and to reserve to Woolwich the production of its artillery.
What is surprising is that Armstrong's  artillery business did not  collapse. By contrast,  as
showed in section three, Elswick thrived despite losing what had been until then its only customer.
For all the technical ingenuity of Armstrong and the business acumen of Elswick's managerial team,
what kept the company afloat  was the introduction of ironclads which created a  very  favourable
environment for  the new company to prosper.  Many countries,  unlike Britain, could not count on
large and modern arsenals. Latin American republics, small and medium European powers, Asian
governments,  all  needed to equip their  own navies and armies,  however  small  and weak,  with
modern armaments if they wanted to have even a chance of winning any military confrontation. 
Starting in the 1860s military technology entered a period of rapid evolution which has been
summarised in  section  two.  Armour  plates,  rifled  guns,  screw  propellers,  explosive  shells  all
contributed to radically change naval warfare. Such evolution favoured Armstrong in two ways: on
the one hand, the rapid escalation of size and dimensions of artillery reduced the effective expected
life of warships. Hence, the demand for new ordnance was sustained by the unprecedented rate of
obsolescence. On the other hand, the average growing sizes of guns increased the difficulties which
potential  competitors  faced to  enter  the  market,  thus  strengthening  Armstrong's  position.  A
comparison  between  the  experiences  of  Armstrong  and  Whitworth  points,  however,  to  how
favourable external circumstances are not sufficient to explain the success of Elswick. Armstrong's
success rested  on a combination of technical ingenuity, business acumen  and a growing pool of
potential foreign customers. Armstrong thrived in a period characterised by the absence of conflicts
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between powers, but rapid innovation generated the opportunity, for the first time in history, to
make  private  armaments manufacturing activity a promising  long-term business.  What is  more,
Armstrong prospered despite, at least until the late 1880s, selling very little in its domestic market,
that is Great Britian.
At the same time, the growth of John Brown and Cammell followed a very different pattern,
which has been highlighted in section four. While Armstrong thrived thanks to foreign orders, it was
the domestic market which represented the largest source of demand for these firms.  The British
government did not own any plant able to manufacture armour plates, so it had to rely on private
firms for them. John Brown and Cammell were able to innovate their production and, thanks to their
early entrance, retained well into the 1880s a virtual monopoly in the supply of armour plate for the
British Navy.
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Chapter II
Armaments for a New Country: Italy, 1861-1880
This chapter analyses the  development of  the armaments sector in Italy from 1861 to the
early 1880s. 
In the early 1860s rapidly building up the country's armed forces was a major preoccupation
of the Italian governments: in the course of few years both the army and the navy were significantly
enlarged and modernised. The rapid evolution of military technology, however, posed an additional
problem to the Italian Navy: the introduction of ironclads and rifled guns was radically transforming
naval  warfare.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Italian industrial  sector was  not  sufficiently
developed to be able to  autonomously produce them. the solution which was adopted in the early
1860s was that to import modern armaments from abroad. From 1861 to 1865, Italy went through a
buying spree:  artillery and even entire ironclads were ordered in  France,  Great  Britain and the
United States.
In 1866 the Italian Navy suffered a  defeat  at  the battle  of Lissa,  a defeat which deeply
affected its reputation. The Navy saw its budget substantially cut and its duties limited. Only in the
course of the 1870s Italian naval budget started to expand again. This time, however, the growing
resources were employed in a different way than in the early 1860s: while at that time it had relied
mainly on foreign yards and suppliers, now the Navy either directly built vessels in its own yards,
even though still making ample recourse to foreign-made components, or, in the case of small and
medium vessels, it  awarded contracts to Italian  private  firms, among which Ansaldo and Orlando
were the most important. 
The chapter is organised as follow: the first  section deals with the trend of  Italian  naval
budget; the second discusses the relationships between the Italian Navy and private suppliers in the
1860s; the third  reviews the changing  circumstances of the 1870s, and the new  role  played  by
private suppliers.
70
2.1 Italian naval spending and the evolution of Italian fleet in the 1860s and 1870s.
Political unification transformed Italy from a mosaic of small states into a major European
power. Geography dictated that the country could not be indifferent to naval affairs: at the centre of
the Mediterranean Sea, Italy is at the junction between its Eastern and the Western halves. The
governments who ran the country for its first fifteen years,  however, faced an awkward situation.
The wars of unification of the 1850s had squeezed the public finances and the stock of debt was
perilously high: Epicarpo Corbino calculated that in 1862 revenues accounted for only half of the
total government expenditure.1 The new kingdom, however, faced new huge expenditures: the Third
Independence War of 1866 (which gained Italy Veneto),  the move of the capital  from Turin to
Florence in 1865 and then, in 1871 – after the collapse of the French Empire and the seizure of the
Papal States – to Rome. Moreover, the government financed a large infrastructure programme to
expand the network of railways and roads, and to modernize ports, aqueducts and other public
works. In 1870, public debt peaked at around 92% of national GDP.2 
Italy faced also a strategic problem. Since the late 1840s Piedmontese foreign policy had
been anti-Austrian, the natural consequence of the fact that Austria directly controlled a large chunk
of the Padana Valley and exercised a dominant hegemony over the country.3 All the crucial military
encounters of the Independence Wars were fought in the Po Valley, meaning that the Piedmontese
navy played a limited role in comparison with the army. Italy's geographical position,  however,
forced governments to carefully  reconsider the  country's strategic priorities. After the  entire
peninsula had been united, and Italy had suddenly became a major Mediterranean power, how many
resources should be devoted to the Italian navy? And what aims should the new navy pursue?
Italian governments had two choices in front of them. They could decide to limit their involvement
in naval affairs, and then confine the fleet to little more than coastal defence duties, or they could
embrace a more assertive policy in the Mediterranean and, thus, build a powerful navy.
Figure  2.1 shows the sums which the parliament voted  for the Naval budget  in the years
1861-70. Two things needs to be underlined. The first is that usually actual expenditures were 5%-
15% less then the authorised amount. This occurred for many reasons: contracts were signed later
than expected, ministerial bureaucracy took more time to draw spending plans, etc. These residuals,
however, were not taken back by the Treasury, but they remained at disposal of Ministry of the
1 E. Corbino, Annali dell'Economia Italiana, 1861-1870 (Città di Castello, 1931), 37. 
2 Id., 281.
3 G. Candeloro, Storia dell'Italia Moderna. Vol. 3 La Rivoluzione Nazionale 1846-1849 (Milano, 1960), 1-132.
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Navy to be spent.4 The choice of using the authorised sums instead of the effective expenditure is
justified by the fact that, by adopting this yardstick, it is easier to gauge the intentions of the policy-
makers. In addition, the correlation between authorised and effective expenditures is very high.
The second, is  the difference between “ordinary”  and “extraordinary”  parts of the naval
budget (the same division occurred also in the army budget). Ordinary expenditures represented the
cost of keeping the  Navy operative. all recurrent and routine expenditures generally ended in the
ordinary part of the budget: payments to seamen and officers, purchases of coal, food, clothes, etc.
Extraordinary  expenditures,  by  contrast,  were  made  up  of  non-recurring  items.  Rearmament
programs, the erection or enlargement of arsenals and yards, and similar expenditures were usually
financed  by  the  extraordinary  part  of  the  budget.  The  difference  between  the  two  parts  was
theoretically clear, but in practice there were exceptions which aggravated the general complexity,
sometime bordering on outright mystification, of Italian military budgets.5 
Figure  2  .1  : Italian Naval expenditure, 1861-1880 (million of current Lire).
Source: Leggi e Decreti del Regno d'Italia, various years.
Immediately after the unification, large sums of money were devoted to the navy. In the first
Italian national government, the position of Minister for the Navy was personally held by the Prime
4 F. Degli Esposti, Le Armi Proprie. Spesa Pubblica e Sviluppo Industriale nell'Italia Liberale (Milano, 2006), 34.
5 G. Rochat and G. Massobrio, Breve Storia dell'Esercito Italiano dal 1861 al 1943 (Torino, 1978), 75.
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Minister Cavour, a sign of the importance that he attached to naval affairs.6 The rapid expansion of
the budget was a consequence of the  ambitious modernization programme of the armed forces
pursued by Italy  between 1861 and 1865.7 In this period the  Navy was thoroughly re-equipped:
large resources  were  used to  rapidly transform it from a force based on wooden vessels to one
equipped with ironclads and modern ordnance: the governments in office had clearly decided that
Italy needed a large and powerful Navy. This was very much a decision coming from the political
and military elite: the first naval budget was presented in front of the Parliament only in 1863, after
large sums had already been spent.8 A future confrontation with Austria was certain, and a powerful
Navy could  be decisive  in  the  Adriatic  theatre.  In  the  period  1861-65,  therefore,  it  was  the
extraordinary part of the budget which grew at the highest rate: in both 1862 and 1863 they totalled
more  than  30  million  Lire, around  40%  of  the  total  budget.  Modernisation  equally impacted
ordinary spending because more resources were  needed to  maintain operative a larger fleet. By
1865 the modernisation process was  to a large extent  concluded.  The following year  the naval
budget felt to 40 million Lire, a sum which was seen as appropriate for the routine maintenance of
the fleet.
The defeat suffered by the Italian navy at Lissa shocked the country and it undermined the
country's confidence in the  navy:  a vast amount of money had apparently been spent to no avail.
The nominally superior Italian navy had been defeated by the smaller Austrian navy which could
field only half the ironclads Italy had.9 The war caused a large increase of public debt. To deal with
the deteriorating public finances, governments resorted to deep cuts in public expenditures and tax
hikes. With the Navy's prestige at an all time low, the naval budget was severely cut and the Navy's
duties restricted  to  coastal  defence.  Ordinary  expenditures  were  halved buy  a  third,  and
extraordinary expenditures were virtually eliminated. By 1870, the naval budget had fallen to little
more than 26 million Lire.10 The major consequence of this combination of fiscal retrenchment and
military  rethinking  (helped  by the  fact  that,  with  the  seizure  of  Veneto,  Austrian naval  threat
appeared less worrisome) was the virtual standstill in constructions: between 1865 and  1872, the
6 A. Viarengo, Cavour (Roma, 2010), 497; R. Romeo, Cavour e il Suo Tempo, vol. 3, 1854-1861 (Roma-Bari, 1984),
901.  M. Battaglieri, La Politica Navale del Conte di Cavour (Livorno, 1942)  offers  a  general,  but  outdated,
assessment of Cavour's naval policy. 
7 On the Italian Navy from 1861 to 1866,  M. Gabriele, La Politica Navale Italiana dall'Unità alla Vigilia di Lissa
(Milano, 1958), and id.  La  Prima Marina d'Italia (1860-1866). La  Prima  Fase di un  Potere  Marittimo (Roma,
1999).
8 Degli Esposti, Armi Proprie, 69-71.
9 A. Iachino, La Campagna Navale di Lissa 1866 (Milano, 1966) is the standard history. 
10 T. Ropp ‘The Modern Italian Navy’, Military Affairs 5 (1941), 38.
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parliament  did  not  approve  any law  financing new constructions.  The  only  ships  which  were
completed were the ones which had already been started before Lissa.
The newly established Italian Navy was the result of the merger between the Piedmontese
and the Neapolitan fleets. The unification of the pre-unitarian fleets happened in a moment when
naval technology was rapidly evolving with  the  introduction  of rifled ordnance and ironclads.
Sailing and steam paddle vessels were rapidly becoming obsolete and needed to be replaced.11
Extraordinary expenditures were thus used to finance the fleet modernisation, and the creation of a
new naval arsenal in Spezia which was intended to replace Genoa as the major base of the Navy:
Spezia was easier to defend, and moving the fleet away would free spaces for expanding Genoa as a
commercial port.12
The Navy had to choose how to spend the money appropriated for the modernisation of the
fleet. It had two options. The first was to buy vessels abroad, the second was to build new units in
Italy,  either  in  its  arsenals  or  in  private  yards. The  navy  owned  yards  in  Genoa,  Leghorn,
Castellammare di Stabbia (near Naples), and,  after the annexation of Veneto,  also  in Venice. The
arsenals of La Spezia and, later Taranto (whose construction started in the 1880s as the main base of
the fleet in the South), were also equipped to undertake shipbuilding. In the early 1860s, however,
Italian arsenals, as the British ones, had no experience in the construction of iron-hulled ships. Time
and significant investments were required to modernised them. At the same time, relying on Italian
private yards was unrealistic: immediately after the unification, the Ministry of the Navy created a
special committee to investigate if the productions of the mineral, engineering, and iron industries
in Italy could be used by the Navy. The assessment was that Italian private yards were too backward
to undertake any major naval construction.13 By contrast, three reasons were in favour of purchasing
ironclads from abroad. The first was that some foreign yards had already build ironclads, therefore
they  could  produce better  vessels  than  inexperienced  Italian  yards.  Second,  because  of  their
experience,  foreign shipyards could manufacture faster,  something crucial  in  a  period  of  rapid
11 On Borbonic naval construction see  A. Formicola e C. Romano, L'Industria Navale di Ferdinando II di Borbone
(Napoli, 1993). On Piedmontese warships: F. Degli Esposti, Le Fabbriche di Marte, vol. 2, Gli Stabilimenti Liguri
(San Marino, 2000), 86-97. On the difficult transition from  the pre-Unitarian fleets to the new Italian Navy, C.
Randaccio, Storia delle Marine Militari Italiane dal 1750 al 1860, e della Marina Militare Italiana dal 1860 al
1870 Vol. I (Roma, 1886), 281-83.
12 G. Galuppi, ‘L'Arsenale della Spezia nel Centenario della Sua Inaugurazione’, supplement to Rivista Marittima
(1969); Battiglieri, Politica Navale, 98-99. On the impact of the arsenal on Spezia, P. G. Scardigli, 1849-1902 Con
l'Unità d'Italia la Marina Militare nel Golfo e le Prime Istituzioni Imprenditoriali Spezzine (La Spezia, 2011).
13 F. Giordano, Industria del Ferro in Italia. Relazione dell'Ingegnere Felice Giordano per la Commissione delle
Ferriere Istituita dal Ministero della Marina (Torino, 1864).
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technological change to avoid vessels becoming obsolete even before entering service. Third, the
Italian  Navy needed a large number of vessels  to immediately  reinforce the fleet. By awarding
contracts to multiple yards, it was possible to build a modern fleet of ironclads in just few years.
Hence, for both strategic –  reinforcing the fleet as soon as possible –  and technological
reasons –  the inability to undertake the most innovative productions in Italy –  the first Italian
ironclad fleet was built abroad. As Giacomo Martorelli wrote in an article published in 1911 which
analysed the evolution of  naval  construction in  Italy since 1861,  “until 1866 all iron hulls for
military and commercial vessels, were built abroad”.14
French shipyards secured the bulk of the orders: the French contribution had been decisive
in the Second Independence War and favouring French yards was a way to preserve the alliance.
The Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterranée, at la Seyne,15 built six  ironclads (Terribile,
Formidabile, Maria Pia, San Martino, Palestro and Varese),  the Chantier et Atelier de l'Océan at
Bordeaux one (Ancona) as the Guin and Guibert yard at St. Nazare (Castelfidardo). One vessel was
ordered in Britain (Affondatore, built by Milwall Iron Works in London)16 and two from the Webb
shipyard in New York (the armoured frigates Re d'Italia and Re di Portogallo).17 In total, from 1861
to 1866, the Italian navy purchased ironclads abroad  worth more than  36  million Lire,  to which
should be added other 2,600,000 Lire spent for two small wooden vessels equally ordered abroad.18
Data on the total salaries of arsenal workers make evident that the substantial orders placed abroad
did not translate in a demise of the arsenals. This is certainly a less-than-perfect yardstick to assess
the arsenals'  operations, but, in absence of  better data, it  offers a way to gauge their  activities.
Figure 2.2 shows the sums voted for arsenals' workers salary between 1861 and 1870.
 In contrast with the general trend on naval spending, the post-1866 period registered higher
values than the previous one. This was because arsenals were involved in maintaining the fleet and
14 G. F. Martorelli, ‘L'Industria delle Costruzioni Navali in Italia (1861-1911)’, Rivista Marittima 50 (1911), 12.
15 For a description of La Seyne shipyard, J. Tugan, Le Grandes Usine. Ètudes Industrielles en France et à l'Étranger
(Paris, 1868), 305-320.
16 A description of the ship is in The Times 10 February 1865, 9. The Millwall Iron Works and Shipbuilding Company
was established in 1863 by a group of businessmen linked to Overend, Gurney & Company. For a short period of
time it ranked among the largest shipbuilders in Britain, employing more than 4,000 workers and undertaking also
the production of  iron  plates and other components. The firm collapsed after the panic over Overend, Gurney &
Company and was liquidated in 1871. H. Hobhouse (ed.),  “Southern Millwall: Drunken Dock and the Land of
Promise”,  Survey of London: volumes 43 and 44: Poplar, Blackwall and Isle of Dogs,  (London, 1994), 471-472
offers a description of the works. P. Barry, Dockyard Economy and Naval Power (London, 1863), 209-215 presents
several pictures of the yard. See also S. Pollard, ‘The Decline of Shipbuilding on the Thames’, Economic History
Review 3 (1950), 72-89, who reports  that Millwall  likely financed a  press  campaign for the closure of the Royal
Dockyards and the transfer of all works to private companies.
17 Technical notes on each ship are in G. Giorgerini and A. Nani, Le Navi di Linea Italiane. 1861-61 (Roma, 1962).
18 G. Maldini, I Bilanci della Marina d'Italia (Roma, 1884), vol. 1, passim.
75
building new vessels. In the years 1861-1867 seven ironclads and two corvettes (all with wooden
hulls) were  laid  down in  the  Navy's  yards,  but  only  three  vessels were  finished  before  1870.
Keeping  the  arsenals  working  remained a  paramount  preoccupation  for  the  government  which
feared disturbances by unemployed men.19 The yard in Genoa, for instance, built Venezia and Roma,
Figure  2  .2  : Total salary of arsenal workers, 1861-1870 (in thousands of current Lire).
Source: Degli Esposti, Armi Proprie, 73.
two large and expensive battleships (each costing around 6,500,000 Lire).20 However, comparing the
performance of the Italian arsenals with those of the yards abroad highlights the backwardness of
the Italian establishments.  Each ironclad bought abroad took no more than  24-30 months to be
completed, while, for example, Roma took six years to enter into service and the Venezia, ten.
The rapid re-equipment of the navy was no mean feat, at least in financial terms, considering
the many commitments faced  at  the same time  by the Italian governments. Militarily speaking,
however, the naval build up was less fortunate. On the surface, the Italian Navy had become a force
19 The records of the Presidenza del Consiglio preserve many letters of prefects, mayors, and businessmen – from both
the South and the North of the country – begging the government of the day to provide orders to the yards, arsenals
and companies based in their city. See, for instance, ACS, Pcm, 1879/80, b. 23, f. 842, for a letter from the prefect of
Naples on the naval yard of Castellammare, and ACS, Pcm, 1879/80, b. 32, f. 219 for from prefect of Genoa in
support of Ansaldo.
20 Bargoni, Navi, 21-22. The costs of the vessels built by arsenal are estimates which should then be treated carefully,
they are useful more to provide an order of magnitude, rather than precise numbers.
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to be reckoned with. While in 1861 it was composed of 79 units, by 1866 the number had grown to
84. Qualitatively changes had been even more profound. In 1861 the Italian fleet was made up only
of steam-powered wooden vessels and sailing ships armed with smoothbore artillery. In five years it
had  been  transformed into a force whose core was  now  composed  of eleven ironclads mounting
large  rifled  guns,  making  it  among  the  strongest  navies  in  the  world.21 Installed  steam power
doubled,  from  12,160  HP  to  21,450  HP;  guns  increased  from  745  to  1,125  and  the  total
displacement of the fleet from 77,031 to 133,526 tons.22 
Figure 2.3: The American-built Italian broadside ironclad Re d'Italia, circa 1865.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Notwithstanding the large investments, the Navy suffered from a lack of standardisation. The
Ministry ordered ships wherever it thought they could be satisfactorily built. The imperative was to
rapidly enlarge the fleet  so  to acquire a decisive superiority over Austria. Coming from so many
different yards, however, Italian  ironclads differed significantly  in terms of designs, size  and
protection. This lack of uniformity  complicated operations. What is more, rearmament occurred
while naval technology was still rapidly progressing. The result was that the Italian ironclads were
21 L. Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914 (London, 2001), 93. 
22 G. Maldini, Bilanci, passim. 
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of the broadside kind and so they were doomed to become obsolete in a few years, when the central
battery design, which increase the range of fire of artillery, was introduced. 
In  the  course  of  the  1870s,  Italian  naval  budget  returned  to  grow.  Foreign  policy
preoccupations  pushed  Italian  governments  to  increase  military  spending:  the reactionary
governments which ruled in  France during the first years of the republic antagonised Italy by
supporting Pope Pious IX, who still refused to recognise the Italian seizure of Rome.23 By contrast,
the seizure of Veneto in 1866 had reduced the relevance of the Adriatic theatre and, in the course of
the 1870s, the Austria fleet  declined, starved of funds and, after the death of Admiral Tegetthoff,
lacking leadership.24 The growing hostility with France meant that now the Western Mediterranean
would be a major theatre of operation in case of war. The fact that the major Italian ports (Genoa
and Leghorn) were on the Western coast of the country made essential their protection from naval
bombing.  In addition, the beginning  of industrial development of Italy underlined how much the
country relied on imports of raw materials, the majority of which came by sea, and the opening of
the Suez Canal gave new importance to the Mediterranean Sea as a strategic and commercial route.
Under these new circumstances, the role of the Italian  Navy could  hardly be limited to coastal
defence. The Navy, however, was made of of the vessels which had fought at Lissa, which, by the
standard of the early 1870s, were utterly outdated. 
The first step was to replace the outdated broadside ironclads with modern warships. More
powerful guns had appeared and thicker armour plates were now required to protect vessels. Until
1876, however,  governments were fully committed to  balancing the budget, thus the additional
resources voted for the naval budget were quite limited, notwithstanding the lobbying of the Navy.25
The need to built a more powerful Navy under financial constraints had an impact on the design of
the vessels and on the nature of hardware which the Italian Navy purchased from Italian and foreign
private suppliers.
Figure  2.1 shows the  Italian naval spending in the 1870s. Two things are  noticeable.  The
first is that, between 1871 and 1878 there was a steady growth until, by the late 1870s, it reached
23 G. Spadolini, L'Opposizione Cattolica da Porta Pia al '98 (Milano, 1994), 12-18.
24 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 111-112.
25 To increase the interest for the Navy, Carlo Rossi, an employee of the Ministry of the Navy, published in 1872 an
adaptation of the British novel The Battle of Dorking by George Tomkyns Chesney. To adapt the text to the Italian
reality, the German invaders were transformed into French. See C. Rossi (but published anonymously), Il Racconto
di un Guardiano di Spiaggia. Traduzione Libera della Battaglia di Dorking (Roma, 1872). On  the  “invasion
literature” see I. F. Clarke, ‘Forecasts of Warfare in Fiction 1803-1914’, Comparative Studies in Society and History
10 (1967), 1-25; and id. ‘Before and after the Battle of Dorking’, Science Fiction Studies 24 (1997), 33-46. 
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53-54 million Lire,  the same level of the early 1860s.  In 1879 there was a temporary reduction
which was immediately reversed in 1880. The second is that the growth was driven by increases in
the  ordinary  share of  the  budget,  rather  than  in  the  extraordinary.  This  was  because  resources
devoted to new constructions were now included into the ordinary part of the budget, while, in the
1860s, they had constituted the largest component of the extraordinary expenditures. 
The Italian navy decided to make the most of the additional resources it received  by
adopting a different approach from that which had characterised the early 1860s. First, it adopted
the policy of building few, but powerful vessels, rather than investing to acquire a larger number of
weaker ones. The Navy stressed the need to acquire innovative ships: Italy could not compete with
France  in  the  number  of  vessels,  but  could  exploit  technological  innovation  to  gain  military
superiority based on quality.
The second change was the drastic  reduction  of the  number  of  vessels  purchased from
foreign yards. Before Lissa  Italy bought abroad 41,174 tons of ironclads, while only the ironclad
Principe di Carignano of 3,446 tons had been built in Italy, in the arsenal at Genoa. By contrast, in
the 1870s the Italian navy bought abroad only a torpedo boat, Nibbio, which was ordered from the
British firm Thornycroft. Instead, the bulk of naval  constructions was undertaken in Italy, in the
majority of cases in the Navy-owned arsenals which built 43,502 tons, equal to 76,5% of the overall
displacement of new battleships and cruisers (56,838 tons). The remaining 23,5% was made up by
the battleship Lepanto, built by the Orlando yard in Leghorn. The special circumstances of the early
1860s had forced Italy into a spending spree abroad to rapidly rebuilt its Navy. As soon as its yards
were reorganised to make iron hulls, though, the  Navy moved shipbuilding there, so to enjoy  a
higher degree of control on the design and characteristics of  vessels.  For instance, the battleship
Venice was laid down as a broadside ironclad, but during construction  it  was transformed into a
central  battery ironclad.  It  was  also  strategically  essential to  have  the possibility  of relying on
domestic shipbuilding capacity.  To save money and concentrate production  some of the smallest
state-owned arsenals and yards were sold, as those in Genoa and Leghorn.26
Hull construction, however,  was only  a step in the process of building a warship,  and the
simplest one. Italy was still fully dependent upon foreign suppliers for two key components: armour
plates and ordnance. Sometimes, naval engines (especially in the case of the largest ones) were also
bought abroad. Building vessels in Italy represented an important step as it gave to the Italian Navy
26 On the sale of Leghorn yard, see below; on the  one in  Genoa,  G. Doria,  Investimenti e Sviluppo Economico a
Genova alla Vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale, vol. 1, Le Premesse (1815-1882) (Milano, 1969), 73-74.
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more freedom to develop vessels  which were coherent with its strategic and tactical needs  and
increased, at least partially, the country’s military security, although the still limited experience of
the Navy's yards in iron construction meant  longer construction times. The crucial role of foreign
suppliers is highlighted by data showed in figures 2.4 on the purchases of hardware and components
(excluding shipbuilding contracts) made by the Navy in the period 1870-1880.
Figure  2.4  : Purchases from Italian and foreign private companies, 1870-1880 (in current Lire):
Year Purchase from Italian private companies
As 
percentag
e of total 
purchase
Purchase from foreign 
private companies
As 
percentage
of total 
purchase
Total 
1870 817,249 29.1% 1,990,930 70.9% 2,808,179
1871 1,081,808 71.2% 438,169 28.8% 1,519,977
1872 3,133,063 29.5% 7,496,821 70.5% 10,629,884
1873 972,095 45.7% 1,157,139 54.3% 2,129,234
1874 707,458 10.3% 6,157,828 89.7% 6,865,286
1875 1,410,606 60.7% 911,774 39.3% 2,322,380
1876 3,442,044 31.6% 7,438,888 68.4% 10,880,932
1877 1,500,786 12% 11,000,188 88% 12,500,974
1878 1,353,281 67.5% 651,789 32.5% 2,005,070
1879 894,536 34.2% 1,722,209 65.8% 2,616,745
1880 2,775,118 27.8% 7,224,620 72.2% 9,999,738
Source:  Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile  (1881-1882),  vol. 1 (Roma, 1882), 450-
465.
The above figures make evident two things. First that the Navy still bought abroad a large
amount  of supplies.  In  qualitative  terms,  the  predominance  of  foreign  firms  was  still  more
accentuated, because they supplied the totality of the most high technology components – guns and
armour plates  – which were not manufactured in Italy. Second,  that the purchases made in Italy
were irregular: few “good” years (1872, 1876 and 1880) were followed by “poor” ones. In general,
additional  resources  appropriate  to  the  Navy did  not  necessarily  translate  into more orders  for
Italian firms.
At this point it is interesting to underline the different situation between the Navy and the
Army. If the Italian navy wanted to play a role, it had to adapt itself to technological evolution.
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Naval warfare was becoming more and more capital intensive: the penetration power of guns, the
strength of armour plates, the endurance and speed of engines were now decisive factors in case of
conflict.  Therefore  the  Italian  navy  was  pressed  to  acquire  modern  materiel,  or  to  slip  into
irrelevance. If the most advanced  technology was manufactured abroad, it had no option but to
purchase it from foreign suppliers. In contrast, land warfare was much less capital intensive and not
so dominated by the impact of continuous technical improvements, and innovation in field artillery
but did not occur at the same speed as in warship design and naval armaments. The materiel of the
Italian Army, therefore,  was not subject to the same level of technical obsolescence of that of the
Navy. Therefore the Army was still able to rely to a large extent on public arsenals, which supplied
it with rifles, bayonets and guns.  Foreign hardware was imported, as it  happened in 1872, when
several large rifled guns were purchased from Krupp,27 but until the early 1900s the army remained
to a large extent indifferent to the private armaments industry.28
The trends described above started under  Admiral Simone Pacoret De Saint-Bon,  Minister
for the Navy from 1873 to 1876.29 Saint-Bon appointed as his chief adviser the naval engineer
Benedetto Brin, a brilliant technician, possibly the best Italian naval architect before 1914. Brin was
trained at the school of the French Genie de Marine and throughout his career he remained in
contact with the leading naval engineers of his time. In 1871, for instance, he delivered a paper on
hydraulic  propellers  at  the Royal Institute of Naval Architects  in London.30 He  designed  the
majority of Italian battleships until the 1890s. Saint-Bon and Brin agreed that the Italian fleet, given
the constraints  on its  budgets,  should focus on  few, but  powerful  and technologically superior,
warships to counterbalance the quantitative advantages of other countries. 
The result of this strategy were the warships Duilio and Dandolo, the first battleships in the
world  which  relied exclusively  on  steam,  lacking masts  and  sails  to  provide  for  auxiliary
propulsion. Duilio  and  Dandolo  were much bigger than the  warships of the previous generation:
they displaced more than 11,000 tons, while the average ironclad of the 1860s less than 6,000 tons.
Both vessels was designed to carry  just  four very powerful guns. A single ship could  thus gain
decisive tactical superiority over an entire enemy fleet made up of smaller and less armed vessels.
Given  their  size,  their construction  represented  a challenge  to the  navy's  shipyards  of
27 Camera dei Deputati, Documenti, ‘Provvista di Materiale d'Artiglieria da Campagna di Grosso Calibro’ (2 February
1875), 1-3.
28 Rochat and Massobrio, Esercito, 122.
29 Waiting for the DBI to arrive at the letter “S”, E. Prasca, L' Ammiraglio Simone de Saint-Bon (Roma-Torino, 1906)
offers the only (complimentary) biography.
30 A. Capone, ‘Benedetto Brin’, DBI. A more recent biography is M. Gabriele, Benedetto Brin (Roma, 1998). 
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Castellammare di Stabia (which laid down Duilio) and La Spezia (which built  Dandolo), tooking
longer than expected: eight years elapsed before the vessels were commissioned. Initially,  Duilio
and Dandolo had to be armed with Armstrong's 38 ton rifled guns, but because the construction of
the ships took longer than planned, the Italian Navy decided to acquire the larger ML 50 ton (355
mm) rifled guns,  which Elswick had started to manufacture. Eventually, the ships were equipped
with the still larger 100 ton (450mm) ML guns, the largest ever produced up to that time, capable of
throwing a shot weighting near a ton.31
Figure 2.5: Portrait of Benedetto Brin wearing the uniform of General Inspector of the Italian Naval
Engineering Corp.
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons.
The two warships achieved their major aim, that of transforming the Italian Navy again into
a proper fighting force. Suddenly, with just two vessels, the Italian Navy regained a leading position
in the Mediterranean: there was no vessel which could withstand unscathed a salvo of their massive
31 P. Brook, ‘Armstrongs and the Italian navy’, A. Preston (ed.), Warship 2002-2003, 112. A detailed description of the
100 ton gun is in The Times 24 October 1876, 4. 
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100 ton  guns.  The launch of  the  Duilio created headaches in Paris and London.32 The British
Admiralty decide to respond by launching HMS Inflexible, whose design was very similar to that of
Duilio although it mounted 80 ton guns instead of 100 ton ones, but the British Government bought
from Armstrong four 100 ton guns which were installed in Gibraltar and Malta.33
In 1876 the so-called “historical  right”, the agrarian and liberal coalition which had
governed Italy since 1861, collapsed after it finally succeeded in balancing the national budget.34
Benedetto Brin succeeded Saint-Bon as Minister in the new centre-left government. While in office,
Brin pursued the policy of building large and powerful battleships. The same year two additional
capital ships were laid down: Italia and Lepanto. Once again Brin  designed innovative ships: he
rejected side armour in favour of an internal cellular structure designed to minimize the risk of
sinking in case the vessels were hit. Brin calculated that  modern guns were so powerful  that no
armour plates could resist them. The reduction in weight allowed Italia and Lepanto to achieve 18
knots of speed; for years they remained the fastest battleships in the world. Large vessels were
obviously very expensive: Italia alone cost 24,108,963 Lire,  which was equal to two thirds of the
entire  naval budget of 1871.35 Notwithstanding the fact that the costs of the new battleships  were
spread on various years, their construction represented a significant financial burden. 
2.2 Italian and foreign armaments firms in the 1860s. 
The sudden increment in military expenditure caused by the 1859-60 military campaigns,
the persistent state of low intensity warfare in the South, the threat of Austrian aggression, and the
modernisation  of  the  armed  forces  represented  an  exceptional opportunity  for  business.  A
comparison between the activities of foreign and  Italian firms, however,  highlights the different
roles they played. 
Construction orders were not the only opportunities created by the Italian naval build up. For
instance, it  offered the first opportunity for Armstrong to sell  its guns to Italy: Italy needed rifled
ordnance to arm its new fleet  but, as in the case of naval construction, there  was no  Italian  firm
which could manufacture it. By contrast, Armstrong was in the position to offer exactly what Italy
32 The Times devoted fourteen articles to the Duilio in 1876 alone.
33 One of these gun is still visible at Fort Rinella in Malta. 
34 F. Cammarano, Storia Politica dell'Italia Liberale (1861-1901), (Roma-Bari, 1999), 74-76.
35  Brin, 313.
83
required. Stuart Rendel stated in his memoirs that Captain Augusto Albini, a naval officer who was
in London from 1862 to 1872, first supervising the building of the Affondatore, and then working as
military attaché at the embassy, had a key role in facilitating business with Italy.36 The links between
Albini and Armstrong's management developed over many decades. Albini was a very well
connected officer: his father had been a rear admiral in the Piedmontese Navy and his elder brother
was  also admiral.37 Albini, moreover, had  a  personal  interest  in technical matters:  he designed
several  gun  mountings  and  a rifle.38 Albini was, then, in the position of understanding the
technological innovations which were reshaping naval artillery and ship  design  and  being  in
London he could carefully follow these advances first hand, thanks to the many trials organised.39
The personal contact between Albini and Rendel facilitated  Armstrong. As a result, in  1865
contracts for a  large number of 150-pounder  worth more than £100,000 were signed.40 With war
with Austria looming, Albini tried also to buy the guns for a frigate which Chile had ordered from
Elswick.41 Because the Austrian government also  bought guns for five ironclads from Armstrong,
artillery for the two belligerents was, ironically, manufactured side by side (although the guns for
Austria were not delivered until after the end of 1866), not the only time Armstrong supplied at the
same time countries on the verge of fighting each other.
While Armstrong supplied the Italian Navy with up-to-date ordnance, the rearmament policy
offered domestic firms the opportunity to receive orders for less sophisticated goods. Among these
firms  Ansaldo  and,  later,  Orlando,  were  the  most  important.  In 1846 Fortunato  Prandi,  a
Piedomontese businessman active in Italy and in Britain, joined Philip Taylor, a British mechanical
engineer  who had created  what  later  became the  Forges  et  Chantiers  de  la  Mediterranée  at  la
Seyne,42 to establish an engineering company in Genoa. Their aim was to create a “great mechanical
establishment devoted to making various machineries and railways material, as well as the material
required by the Navy and the shipping merchant industry.”43 These words were pronounced in 1853
36 S. Rendel, The Personal Papers of Lord Rendel (London, 1931), 278. On Albini, see M. Gabriele, ‘Albini, Augusto’,
DBI.
37 Id., ‘Albini, Giovanni Battista’, DBI.
38 The rifle was known as Albini-Braendlin after Francis Braedlin, the English gunsmith who perfected Albini's design.
It was adopted by Belgium in 1867 and remained in service until the 1870s, D. Westwood, Rifles, and Illustrated
History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara, 2005), 50.
39 In 1868 Albini published an  article  which  offered  a  detailed  description  of  the  manufacturing  process  of  the
Armstrong guns, A. Albini,  ‘Informazioni sulla Costruzione dei Cannoni Armstrong’, Rivista Marittima 9 (1868),
599-614.
40 T&W, Rendel Papers, 31/152 and 31/153. 
41 Id., 31/163 and 31/164.
42 J. G. Alger, ‘Taylor, Philip’, ODNB.
43 Camera dei Deputati, Atti Parlamentari, Relazione del Ministro delle Finanze Camillo Benso di Cavour a Progetto
di Legge Presentato il 25 Febbraio 1853, 243. 
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by Cavour, at that time Minister of Finance. That Piedmontese government was so well informed
because it had, in fact, financially supported the creation of the plant offering Prandi and Taylor an
interest-free loan of half million Lire  which was decisive for the creation of the firm.44 As Marco
Doria writes: “the capital brought to the company totally came from the government; there was no
risk for Taylor and Prandi.”45 The government  had bee keen to offer its  backing  to Prandi and
Taylor's venture because the establishment of a firm which could make the railway material needed
for the planned Genoa-Turin line was coherent with its desire to strengthen the economic base of
the kingdom. Prandi and Taylor wanted to exploit the opportunities arising from the first railway
constructions, hoping to find a market for railway engines, carriages, and other machinery.
Moreover, the location of Genoa, one of the more economically dynamic areas of Italy could offer
additional opportunities for the  manufacture  of boilers, naval engines and other mechanical
productions.46
These hopes, however, did not translate into a substantial  stream of orders and, from the
limited records that survive from this period, it seems that the company mainly satisfied the local
demand for mechanical goods. Taylor and Prandi's plant produced many different goods: tanks for
the  Navy, steam engines for mills, railway engines, carriages  and small cranes. While the
government had offered tangible financial  support, neither it, nor the armed forces gave any
significant orders to the firm (the majority of the railway material was bought in Britain).47 The
heterogeneous demand and the lack of the technical know-how did not allow the firm to compete in
the most sophisticated markets or to specialise in any given field, so to gain the economies of scale
and experience needed to  lower its prices and increase  the quality  of its output and then become
able to compete with foreign producers.
In 1852 Taylor and Prandi, dissatisfied by the results, making use of a clause in the
agreement they had signed with the government, transferred the ownership of the Taylor & Prandi
to the government, which, in turn, immediately sold it to a group of businessmen from Genoa for
810,000 Lire.48 The firm was restructured as a limited partnership as Giovanni Ansaldo & Co., from
44 The text of the agreement between the government and Taylor and Prandi is in E. Gazzo, I Cento Anni dell'Ansaldo
1853-1953 (Genoa, 1953), 119-22. 
45 M. Doria, ‘Le Strategie e l'Evoluzione dell'Ansaldo’, V. Castronovo (ed.), Storia dell'Ansaldo.  Vol. 1 Le Origini
1853-1882 (Roma-Bari, 1994), 78.
46 G. Doria, Investimenti e Sviluppo, 25-46. 
47 Of the 1,296 railways engines bought by Italian railways companies between 1871 and 1884, only 231 were made in
Italy,  M.  Merger,  ‘Un  modello  di  Sostituzione:  la  Locomotiva  Italiana  dal  1850  al  1914’, Rivista  di  Storia
Economica 3 (1986), 66-106; and S. Fenoaltea, ‘Le Costruzioni Ferroviarie in Italia, 1861-1913’, Rivista di Storia
Economica 1 (1984), 27-57.
48 Camera dei Deputati, Atti Parlamentari, Relazione, 245.
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the  name  of  the  new general manager, the engineer Giovanni Ansaldo.49 The  most  important
shareholder was Carlo Bombrini, general director of the Banca Nazionale, the major bank in the
kingdom and the one enjoying the privilege of issuing banknotes.50 After Ansaldo's death in 1859,
Luigi Orlando, a Sicilian engineer who had emigrated to Genoa in the 1850s for political reasons,
became general manager until 1866, when he moved to Leghorn to supervise the shipyard which his
family had purchased from the government.  Orlando was replaced  by Mr. Wehrli, a foreign born
engineer of whom little is know, and by Pietro Peirano, an employee of the Banca Nazionale.
Figur  e 2.  6  . Value of contracts awarded by the Italian Navy to Ansaldo, 1860-1880 (in current Lire).
Source: Gazzo, Cento Anni, 162-166.
Data on contracts received by the Navy are shown in figure 2.6.  Only  in 1860  did the
Piedmontese navy start to award contracts to Ansaldo, when the firm received a contract for casting
shells (317,000 Lire) and one for the hulls of two gunboats (191,000 Lire). These were the first
military-related contracts Ansaldo received in its history. In 1861 a second contract for supplying
shells was signed (328,000 Lire).  In  1862 Ansaldo  was  selected  to  rifle old smoothbore  guns
(181,000 Lire), and to forge wrought-iron  armour plates (104,000 Lire). The following year the
49 F. Sirugo, ‘Giovanni Ansaldo’, DBI.
50 R. P. Coppini, ‘Carlo Bombrini Finanziere e Imprenditore’, V. Castronovo (ed.) Storia dell'Ansaldo Vol 1., 51-75.
See also M. Fratianni e F. Spinelli, A Monetary History of Italy (Cambridge, 1997), 61-64.
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company received a contract for casting one hundred 40 pound bronze guns for a sum of around
2,000,000 Lire.51 Additional smaller orders were also received. In the period 1861-62,  because of
these large orders, the company employed around one thousand workers, a number which was not
matched during the next two decades.
During the early 1860s the relationship between Ansaldo and the Italian  government
followed what  was the traditional pattern of military procurement for centuries:  when the country
faced a  military  crisis,  the demand for military hardware of every kind ballooned  and the
government had to enlist the help of private firms to rapidly expand production. Ansaldo, the largest
engineering firm in the kingdom, consequently received large orders until the mid-1860s.
An  analysis  of  Ansaldo's  productions,  however,  shows  the  precariousness  of  the  firm's
position  as  a  supplier  of  military hardware:  Ansaldo's  output was  hopelessly outdated  (bronze
cannons,  for  instance,  were  rapidly being abandoned)  and uncompetitive.  To adapt  to  the  new
technical paradigm, the Italian Navy decisively moved towards buying guns, plates and, sometimes,
entire ships from foreign firms selling up-to-date hardware. It is possible to speculate that, if in the
late 1850s technological progress had not kicked off a radical innovation of naval warfare, Ansaldo
would have been able to secure a leading position as supplier for the enlarged Italian armed forces.
Technical innovation, however, radically altered market conditions, awarding a significant premium
to the most modern products, while penalising firms which could not make them.
The business environment in which Ansaldo operated was also worsened by the drastic cut
of  Italian  military spending  after  1866.  From mid-1860s  to  the  early 1870s,  Ansaldo received
practically no orders from the Navy: Ansaldo was now competing in a much more limited number
of  fields – artillery and armour were  now bought abroad – and for a rapidly shrinking pool of
resources. The growth of naval budget in the 1870s had a positive impact on the orders received by
Ansaldo, but the peak  of activities  of 1861-62 was not matched for more than two decades. To
indicate how crucial naval orders were for Ansaldo, it must be underlined that in the period 1860-
1881 orders coming from the Italian Navy accounted for 55% of the company's turnover.52
The company's  response was to  shift  its  focus towards  steam engines,  boilers  and other
mechanical productions for the naval sector. From 1863 onwards, the lion's share of  the Navy's
orders was represented by these kinds of products.53 In 1863, Ansalso received the order for the 600
51 ACS, Ministero della Marina, Direzione Generale dei Servizi Amministrati, Divisione Affari Legali, Serie
‘Contratti’, various years.  The precise amount  of  the  contract  for  casting guns  is  an  unspecified  sum between
1,500,000 and 2,000,000 Lire. 
52 Gazzo, Cento anni, 285-86, 290-91 310-11. 
53 Calculations based on data from Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile (1881-1882) (Roma, 1882), vol. 1,
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HP engines of Conte Verde, a wooden frigate, for 825,000 Lire. A year later Ansaldo was awarded
the  contract for the  900 HP engines  of Palestro,  for 1,314,000 Lire.  Ansaldo,  however, did not
design these machines, butt built them on the basis of plans provided to it by the Italian navy, which
in turn had bought them from Maudslay & Sons of London.54
Ansaldo's position was weakened by the fact that, at the same time as its major customer, the
Italian  Navy,  was  cutting expenditures,  it was  unable  to  secure  significant orders  from private
customers.  The  Italian  shipping  industry  was  still  predominantly  based  on  sailing  vessels.55
Steamers were usually imported from abroad, especially Britain. Ansaldo obtained a few orders for
naval  engines,  but  the majority of  its  activities  for  private  customers was  made up by repairs,
maintenance and  sundry  small  engineering orders.  The late 1860s were  therefore a very difficult
moment for Ansaldo, whose workforce felt year after year. In 1871 it received no order at all from
the Italian  navy. As Andrea Saba points to, Ansaldo was squeezed between, on one side, foreign
competitors which, quoting lower prices and offering more advance products, limited the markets in
which it could compete, and, on the other side, by government arsenals, which, in times of financial
constraint tended to be favoured by the central administration.56
The building programme pursued by Saint-Bon and Brin  in the course of the 1870s had a
positive,  if  limited,  effect on  the  private  sector.  Among  the  firms  which  profited  from it  was
Ansaldo  which  received  some  much-needed  contracts  for  the supply  of  large  forgings  for  the
construction of Duilio and Dandolo, as well as orders for the engines of several smaller vessels. To
reinforce its position in naval engineering, Ansaldo's management decided to invest to modernise
the plant.  New machines were  purchased in Britain  and the company also  hired British skilled
craftsmen to train its  workforce. The results of these efforts were mixed, as was recognised in an
internal document which stated that Ansaldo's productions “might well compete with British goods
[in quality], but they are too expensive”.57 
In addition to this, Ansaldo ventured into shipbuilding. Two reasons explain this move. First,
it strengthened Ansaldo's  position  in  the market for  engines for  small  and medium vessels. By
offering to build hulls and engines together, Ansaldo could exploit the qualitative advantage it had
in  naval  engines  making,  which,  at  that  time, represented the  largest  component  of  Ansaldo's
450-465.
54 E. Bagnasco, ‘Le costruzioni Navali’, Castronovo (ed.), Storia dell'Ansaldo, 222. 
55 Until  1900,  the total  displacement  of  Italian  sailing ships  was  higher  (568,000 tons)  than  that  of  steam ships
(377,000 tons), B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics (London, 1981), Table G.4.
56 A. Saba, ‘Produzioni e mercati’, Castronovo (ed.) Storia dell'Ansaldo, 175.
57 AFA, Fondo Bombrini Parodi, b. 4, f. 2.
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activities. For this class of warships, engines represented a proportionally higher percentage of the
final cost than in the case of capital vessels, because they were not protected by armour plates and
were  lightly  armed.  Second,  the  ability to  offer  engines  together  with  the  entire  ship  allowed
Ansaldo  to  compete  in  the  market  for  merchant  ships,  where  it  was  rare  that machinery and
construction  were purchased from different suppliers.  Civilian orders could help Ansaldo  to deal
with the ups and downs of military expenditure. In general, the fact that Genoa had a long tradition
in shipbuilding  facilitated such a  move because  there  was a  large pool  of  skilled workers  and
widespread know-how  which  Ansaldo could  use.  In  1876 the  small  iron-hulled  reconnaissance
vessel  Staffetta (1,366 tons) was launched, the first ship built by Ansaldo, which also supplied its
engines. However, the location chosen for shipbuilding – the beach in Sampierdarena in front of the
engineering plant – was badly chosen because it lacked sufficient depth and all ships longer than
25-30 meters were in danger of running aground at the launch.58 
In the late 1870s Ansaldo strengthened its position in the market for naval engines, receiving
orders for more than 3,000,000 Lire in the period 1878-1880. In general naval engines, boilers and
engine reparations contracts represented 61% of the value of all the contracts Ansaldo received from
the Italian navy in the period 1855-1882, for a total sum of 10,063,411 Lire. The predominance of
engine making was still bigger in the period 1866-1882, when it accounted for 70,9% of the value
of all the Italian Navy's contracts.59
The  end-of-year  results  reflect the  difficulties  Ansaldo experienced,  notwithstanding  its
success in naval engine making and its new venture into shipbuilding. In the period from 1863 to
1882, Ansaldo did not post any profit. The company lost on average of 300,000 Lire a year.  As a
consequence,  by 1882 Ansaldo had accumulated  a  total  of  5,966,548 Lire  of loses.60 Ansaldo's
problems can be gauged also by the decline in the workforce, which fell from around 1,000 in the
early 1860s (admittedly a period of intensive activity) to around 300 in the late 1870s. Marco Doria
claims  that  during  the  first  two  decades  of  its  life  Ansaldo suffered from  “lack of  strong
entrepreneurship”.61 There is no doubt that the management was not above criticism. At the same
time,  the  firm's  major  shareholder,  Carlo  Bombrini,  was  too  involved  in running  the  Banca
Nazionale to  offer  much strategic  direction.  There is  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  single major
problem Ansaldo faced was a lack of constant demand.
58 See the article on the newspaper Il Caffaro, 23 June 1876, on the launch of the Staffetta, which went aground and
required five days of work to get afloat again. 
59 Calculation based on the list of contracts reported by Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile.
60 AFA, Fondo Bombrini Parodi, box n. 9, file n. 1, ‘Prospetti sullo stato patrimoniale dell'azienda.’
61 M. Doria, Ansaldo: l'Impresa e lo Stato (Milano, 1989), 32.
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Poor results  had an impact  on  the firm's investments.  The early 1860s were a  booming
period, but, after the reduction in military expenditure, Ansaldo  was not able to rapidly adapt  its
operation to the new technological paradigm in gunnery and armour plates.  At the same time, the
unfavourable market  conditions made  it  impossible for Ansaldo to gain the scale  of operations
required to turn into profits its expertise in naval engines.  Figure 2.7 shows investments in plants
and machinery: by 1866, Ansaldo had invested around 3,000,000 Lire in fixed assets. By contrast,
in the subsequent fifteen years, less than one million was invested.
Figure  2.  7  : Book value of Ansaldo's plant and machineries, 1854-1882 (in current Lire):
Source: AFA, Fondo Bombrini Parodi 9/1.
In these difficult circumstances, the financial support which the Banca Nazionale offered to
Ansaldo was decisive for the survival of the firm. By 1882 Ansaldo owned the bank more than ten
million  Lire.62 To  regard  the  bank's  behaviour  as  a  precursor  of  the  mixed  banks'  policy  of
supporting industrial  development seems wrong.  It was rather Bombrini's role  as general director
which  largely explains why the bank kept financing the struggling firm, although the records are
silent on this. Despite the quality of Ansaldo's products, the financial performance of the firm was
simply too  negative  to  motivate  such a  long standing  backing.  It  is  likely that,  in  addition  to
62 Id., 42-43..
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Bombrini's double role as  the  bank's director and  Ansaldo's  major shareholder, other motivations
strengthened the link between the firm and the bank: after Ansaldo had borrowed millions, the bank
faced the possibility, in case it stopped supporting the firm, of suffering huge losses on the sum it
had lent as well as large reputational damages. It is probable, therefore, that the bank kept lending
money with the hope that one day Ansaldo would be in the position to repay the loans.
Another Italian firm which received a significant share of orders from the Navy during the
same period was Orlando's shipyard in Leghorn. Luigi Orlando was born in Palermo in 1814.63 He
was forced to  emigrate to Genoa after the  failure of the  1848 revolution in Sicily  which he had
supported. In Genoa,  together with his three brothers, he  established an  engineering plant and a
small yard where, in 1855, they launched the merchantman Sicilia, the first iron-made Italian ship.64
In 1859, after the death of Giovanni Ansaldo, he became the general director of Ansaldo. Given his
past experience in shipbuilding, it is likely that it was Orlando's idea to push Ansaldo into naval
engine making. Orlando was at the helm of the company during the hectic period at the beginning
of the 1860s when, thanks to his political contacts, he helped secure orders for Ansaldo. In 1865 he
resigned to take over the Leghorn yard which the government had decided to sell. The small yard,
which the Italian government had inherited when Tuscany was annexed to Italy, was regarded as
unnecessary in light of the construction of the  much larger arsenal in Spezia  only  75 kilometres
away from Leghorn.65 The government leased the yard to Orlando for  only 3,200 Lire a year for
thirty years to encourage the venture.66 Orlando's company was later to become one of the major
shipbuilding firms in Italy.67
Figure  2.8 shows the  total  tonnage of  military and commercial  vessels  launched  at  the
Orlando's  shipyard  from 1866  (the  year  in  which  the  government  sold the  yard)  to  1880.  In
interpreting the trend for military construction it should be kept in in mind that the figures are based
63 No scholarly biography of Luigi Orlando exists. Some information on him can be found in the Archive of the Senate
to which he was appointed later in life.  Among the documents  kept there there is also the transcription of the
commemoration pronounced in 1898 by the President of the Senate Domenico Farini  after Orlando's death which
offer a brief synthesis of his life. The text is available on line:
     http://notes9.senato.it/Web/senregno.NSF/e56bbbe8d7e9c734c125703d002f2a0c/feff59989c832ea94125646f005df9
04?OpenDocument. In addition,  a commemorative volume sponsored by the Orlando family was  published soon
after his death: P. Levi, Luigi Orlando e i Suoi Fratelli per la Patria e per l'Industria Italiana. Note e Documenti
Raccolti e Pubblicati per Voto del Municipio Livornese e a Cura della Famiglia (Roma, 1898).
64 Id., 81.
65 On the sales of the yard in Leghorn, Degli Esposti, Armi Proprie, 111-12.
66 Camera dei Deputati,  Atti Parlamentari, Approvazione del Contratto di Affitto a Favore dell'Ingegnere Luigi
Orlando del Cantiere Militare Marittimo di San Rocco in Livorno, 5. 
67 A. Umile, ‘Gli Orlando e il Cantiere di Livorno: Considerazioni Intorno a una Vicenda Imprenditoriale tra Iniziativa
Privata e Impresa Pubblica’, Rassegna Storica Toscana 44 (1998), 335-350.
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on the year in which ships were launched. This  fact underestimates military construction because
warships took  longer to be built than merchant ships.  Consequently, the yard was actually busier
than it would appear at a first glance. For example, the battleship Lepanto was laid down in 1876,
but was launched only in 1883.  The peak registered  in 1867 represented the launch of the frigate
Conte Verde which had been started in 1863, before the yard had been leased to Orlando. After this,
the yard saw  just  a  few orders  coming  from the Italian navy which, as it has already been said,
moved its construction activities from abroad to its own arsenals.  The  years between 1869 and
1871-72 
Figure  2.  8  : tonnage of military and civil ships launched at Orlando's Leghorn shipyard, 1866-1880
(in tons).
Source: Gazzo, Cento Anni, 585.
 were especially bleak: the firm received only one order for a small gunboat in 1869. Starting in the
early 1870s the  more positive economic  trend enjoyed by the  Italian economy helped Orlando to
secure commercial orders which were essential  in keeping the yard in operation. During the same
period,  the  navy awarded  Orlando several  contracts,  the  most  important  of  which was  for  the
construction of the despatch vessel Rapido, a unit very similar to the Staffetta built by Ansaldo, but,
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as in the case of Ansaldo, they did not match the peak of the first half of the 1860s. 
It was the order for  Lepanto  which moved Orlando's yard to a leading position in naval
shipbuilding. This was the first time a contract for the construction of a capital ship was awarded to
a private Italian shipyard. If the aim was to speed up the construction of the vessels, this was not
achieved: the Lepanto entered in service in 1887, eleven years after works had began! The decision
to award the contract to a private yard resulted from a combination of different reasons. Certainly
there was the desire to help the development of warshipbuilding technical skills and capabilities in
the private sectors and it must be remembered that, by mid 1870s, Orlando's yard was the largest
yard capable of iron construction in Italy. At this time, the other private yards which subsequently
built major Italian warships (Odero and Ansaldo) were smaller. Considering how much Brin worked
in the course of the 1880s to reduce the Italian  Navy's  dependency on foreign imports,  and to
strengthen the  domestic  armaments  industry,  supporting the  private  shipbuilding  industry  fitted
perfectly  into  such strategy.  In  addition the  activities of  the  Navy's  yards  and  arsenals  was  a
controversial topic in parliament,  where many MPs were critics of their  inefficiency and of the
opacity of their administration.68 Awarding a large contract to a private yard was thus a way to
placate  critics.  However Brin's  decision was  strongly  criticized  by the  opposition  newspapers,
which called the vessel the “electoral ironclad”, because Leghorn was Brin's constituency. Thus in
1878 he was forced out of office, where he returned six years later. 
The position  enjoyed by foreign firms was completely different  from that  of the Italian
companies.  Abroad the Italian  Navy bought the high quality goods which it  was impossible  to
purchase domestically. An interesting example is that of naval engines. All the first Italian ironclads
were equipped with foreign-made engines. There were no Italian firms which could make them. In
the course of the 1860s and 1870s, however,  orders for naval engines  could be  divided into two
groups. On the one side, there were the engines equipping large vessels which were still purchased
from abroad, mainly in Britain. In the course of the 1870s, for example, well-known firms such as
John Penn & Sons and Maudslay,  Sons & Field  built the engines for  Duilio and  for  the other
battleships.69 On the other side,  national producers  secured orders  at the  other end of the market,
that is engines mounted on the small and medium-sized ships, often with a power of less than 1,000
HP. For the Navy it was cheaper to order this kind of engines from Italian firms than to order them
68 See, for example, the debate generated by the 1875 naval budget, Deputati, Discussioni, 2 March 1875.
69 The list of contracts is in Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile, 458-459.
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abroad.  National production progressed in  quality  over  the years,  as data  on engine production
carried on by Ansaldo made evident: in 1862 Ansaldo built a 200 HP engine, in 1863 it received an
order for a 600 HP one, in 1865 for a 900 HP one. The progress continued in the 1870s: in 1874
Ansaldo built a 1,400 HP engine, in 1878 a 1,700 HP, in 1880 a 1,500 HP and, in 1881, it received a
contract for a 5,000 HP one.70 
There is no doubt, however that the most crucial component which Italy bought abroad was
artillery.  As  said above, powerful artillery represented a  key component of Italian naval strategy,
and there was no domestic firm capable of producing it. The Italian Navy purchased from Elswick
the ordnance for all its major warships in this period: in 1870  Armstrong signed a contract for
supplying 1,559,295 Lire  worth of guns,  which was followed in 1874 by another, larger, contract
(4,553,160 Lire). Additional contracts were later signed for the guns of Italia and Lepanto.71 These
purchases reinforced Armstrong's position as the leading supplier of large guns for the Italian navy.
The reasons why the Italian navy kept purchasing from Elswick were threefold. 
First, Elswick was manufacturing exactly  what the  Italian Navy needed. The case of the
guns for the Duilio and Dandolo is illustrative: the concept behind these vessels was that they had
to be able to outgun any enemy ship. As soon as Armstrong was able to design a gun larger than the
previous, the Italian government bought it. Elswick was at the forefront of the development of
“monster guns”, hence the Italian Navy was dependent on it, if it wanted to pursue a strategy based
on few, but heavily armed vessels. 
While Krupp was also working to design large ordnance –  hence representing a potential
competitor for Elswick and a possible new source of guns for Italy –  there was a second factor
which helped to cement the links between Italy and Elswick: technological path dependency.
Switching supplier in the armament sector was difficult for a series of reasons. For instance, guns'
calibres differed between companies. Continental-wide standardization in armaments appeared only
later. Thus swapping supplier would have meant that the stock of shells and projectiles also had to
be changed. Deploying alongside guns of similar size, but of different calibres, would have been a
logistical nightmare. Moreover gunners were trained to operate specific types of guns. To shift to
Krupp would have entailed retraining crews to use a new system of artillery, based on different
designs. What is more, to fit different kinds of guns on ships could potentially require significant
works to accommodate them  on the same turrets. It was much easier to simply stick to just one
70 Doria, ‘Strategie ed evoluzione’, 86.
71 Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile, 455.
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supplier, so far its products were regarded of satisfactory quality. 
Finally, personal links between Elswick's management and the Italian military establishment
helped to preserve the exclusive connection between the firm and the Italian Navy. Augusto Albini
was at the centre of this relationship. In 1872 he was nominated to the position of General Director
of the Ordnance and Torpedo, that is he became the head of the office inside the Ministry of Marine
which dealt with the purchase of  guns. This was a  key position from which he could exert much
influence on procurement decisions. Albini was totally in favour of Elswick's guns. Armstrong's
records preserve many letters and messages exchanged between Albini and the management of the
company. The precise nature of the relationship between the naval officers and the British
businessmen is unclear:  he certainly lobbied in favour of Armstrong from inside the ministry, a
position much more effective that the one which any official agent could ever acquire. He also kept
Elswick informed of all the last developments of Italian politics and anticipated the details of new
contracts.72 It  is  not  clear,  however,  if  he  received  monetary  compensations  from  Armstrong,
although later on he entered into the firm's management. 
While each single factor could not in itself have been decisive, together they represented a
significant barrier against  replacing Elswick with some other gun manufacturer. Having gained
orders from Italy in the early 1860s – thanks to a combination of superior technology and the Italian
government's pressing needs for rapid delivery – Elswick retained its leading position as supplier of
artillery to the Italian navy for many decades. During the 1860s and 1870s, ordnance technology
was rapidly evolving, thus Italy, which could not rely on an indigenous industry, was a keen buyer
of Elswick's products. 
4.5 Conclusions.
Political unification transformed Italy into a European power. The first Italian governments
embarked on the construction of a large naval force which was regarded as essential to guarantee
national security and prestige. The problem was how to build and equip the new Italian Navy. This
task was complicated by the fact that, in the early 1860s, a cluster of technological innovations –
72 For instance, in 1878, after Brin was forced to resign, Albini had a frank discussion with Noble about how the
appointment of a new Ministrer could impact naval  construction plans; see T&W, 31/4626. The following year,
Albini privately wrote to Rendel to inform him that the State Council had approved a contract for the supply of new
artilleries before the news was officially notified to Elswick; see T&W, Rendel Papers, 31/4658.
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rifled ordnance, wrought iron plates, iron hulled vessels – reshaped naval warfare. 
The increased role played by technological know-how put at  a disadvantage Italian firms
such as Ansaldo, which in the  early 1860s  had been able to exploit the demands for armaments
linked  with  the  Second Independence  War.  The  inability  to  compete  qualitatively with  foreign
military  technology  made  Italian  firms unable  to  gain  orders  for the  most  sophisticated  (and
profitable) productions such as guns and armour plates. The Italian government, whose paramount
preoccupation was that of acquiring the most up-to-date  hardware, had no option but to rely on
purchases abroad. It is instructive to compare how the relationships between the Italian government
and Ansaldo and Armstrong evolved in the course of this period. Ansaldo had been substantially, if
irregularly, supported by the Piedmontese government during the 1850s. In the early 1860s, thanks
to the demand generated by the Second Independence War and by the creation of the national armed
forces,  Ansaldo had supplied projectiles,  bronze artillery and other  military hardware. Ansaldo,
however, rapidly  declined from being among the most important military suppliers  to the Italian
Navy to  be  on the  verge  of  bankruptcy.  Armstrong,  at  the  other  extreme,  became the  leading
provider of large naval ordnance to the Italian Navy. Armstrong's technological advantage allowed
it to  sell  to  a  long list  of  customers  and its scale  of  operations made possible  for the firm to
undertake the  large  investments  required  to manufacture the  “monstrous  guns”  of  the  1870s.
Ansaldo,  by contrast,  was unable to  reach the “critical mass” required to  escalate production.  In
itself,  the  absence  of  orders  was  the direct  consequence  of  the  fact  that  the  firm  lacked the
technological expertise required to produce advanced military hardware. As a result, Ansaldo ended
as a supplier of simple, low technology components. In this context, the ups and downs of military
spending put additional pressure on Italian firms  which, in addition  to foreign companies, had a
competitor in the Italian Navy's large network of yards and arsenals. 
The increasing sums allocated to military spending from the early 1870s onwards  allowed
Italian suppliers to improve their positions. However, while Italian firms had learnt to be reasonably
competitive in several  low-technology niches  such as small and medium-sized  naval engines and
shipbuilding, the Italian Navy still exclusively purchased abroad its most sophisticated and complex
hardware.
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Chapter III
A Growing Trade: the British Armaments Industry, 1880-1897 
This chapter analyses the development of the British armaments industry in the period from
the  early  1880s  to  1897.  This  period  opens  with  the  merger between  Armstrong  and  Charles
Mitchell's shipyard – a first example of a combination between an armaments firm and a shipbuilder
– and it closes in 1897, before a wave of mergers and acquisitions involving the major armaments
firms inaugurated a new phase in the history of the British armaments industry.
During the period covered by this chapter, the British armaments industry changed radically.
Three major trends reshaped it.  The first was the rise in naval appropriation.  The  Royal Navy's
budget increased by 50% during the 1880s, and doubled during the 1890s. Such an increase resulted
from a combination of  various factors:  the  growing costs  armaments,  recurrent  foreign policy-
motivated “naval scares” which pushed governments to escalate defence expenditure, and colonial
and imperial expansion. 
The second trend was a structural change in how the British government allocated its naval
budget, from a situation in which resources were chiefly devoted to finance the activities of arsenals
and yards,  to  one  in  which  a  significant  portion  of  the  budget was  spent  to  buy from private
companies. During the 1880s, artillery rapidly evolved, while during the 1890s it was armour plate
technology which  was revolutionised. These advances favoured  private  firms able to produce the
most up-to-date hardware. While public establishments retained a sizeable share of activity, British
governments could not afford to ignore private firms any longer. 
The third trend was the growing number of firms operating in the armaments industry. This
was  a  consequence  of  the  increasing  business  opportunities  generated  by  the  expanding  naval
appropriations. Whereas in the early 1880s, only a handful of companies made military hardware,
by the  end  of  the  19th  century,  the  number  of  firms  involved  in  this  sector had  substantially
increased. The result was that, by the end of the century, the British armaments industry had became
larger and more sophisticated than it was twenty years before. 
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The chapter is organised as follow: the first section analyses the British naval budget in the
1880s and 1890s; the second the technical evolutions which occurred in the same period; the third
the development of the British armaments sector and the strategies of the major defence firms.
3.1 British naval budget, 1880-1897.
In the last two decades of the 19th century British naval spending grew substantially. Figure
3.1 shows total naval estimates and several sub-total categories. 
Figure  3  .1  : British total naval estimates and several sub-total expenditures,  1879-1898 (in current
pounds).
Fiscal Year
Total amount
of Naval 
Estimates
Naval Store 
+ personnel 
(estimated)
Shipbuilding 
(personnel + 
materiel) 
Contracts Naval Armaments
1879-80 10,586,894 2,030,000 - 842,000 -
1880-81 10,702,935 2,011,000 - 769,000 -
1881-82 10,945,919 2,172,700 - 683,239 -
1882-83 10,945,919 2,320,000 - 767,153 -
1883-84 10,904,200 2,337,000 - 1,052,600 -
1884-85 11,255770 2,342,000 - 1,040,000 -
1885-86 12,704,900 2,544,500 - 1,962,000 -
1886-87 13,270,100 2,206,000 - 2,371,300 -
1887-88 12,476,800 2,377,000 - 1,911,000 -
1888-89 13,776,572 - 2,772,681 1,514,200 1,863,500
1889-90 14,361,810 - 3,318,900 1,565,000 1,463,500
1890-91 14,557,856 - 3,536,750 1,309,900 1,465,100
1891-92 15,210,620 - 3,865,020 1,300,400 1,595,310
1892-93 15,266,811 - 3,750,812 1,329,000 1,448,700
1893-94 15,267,674 - 3,719,706 1,305,600 1,365,200
1894-95 18,371,713 - 4,326,835 2,959,700 1,433,200
1895-96 19,613,821 - 4,627,995 3,455,640 1,742,711
1896-97 22,774,318 - 4,503,915 5,423,480 2,600,855
1897-98 22,780,473 - 4,195,915 5,248,100 2,709,687
Source: Navy Estimates, HCPP, various years. 
98
From 1880 to 1898 naval budgets increased at a considerable but not uniform rate. Until the
fiscal year 1884-85, naval estimates remain constant, at £10.5 to £11 million. Between 1884-85 and
1886-87,  there  was  an  increase  of  nearly 30%,  to  more  than  £13  million.  Naval  expenditures
remained around this level till the end of the decade (with a small reduction in 1887-88). The first
years of the 1890s saw a flat naval budget. Expenditures increased again from 1894-95 onwards,
but this time at a higher rate. By 1897-98, naval budget was 49% larger than it had been just five
years before. These trends can be gauged looking at figure 3.2. 
 Figure  3  .2  : British naval expenditures, 1879-98 (in current pounds).
Source: figure 3.1.
British naval budgets also changed in composition, with more resources devoted to buying
from private suppliers.  To some extent the activities of the Royal  Dockyards and of  private firms
were complementary,  rather than overlapping:  government plants never built  engines or armour
plates, but they carried out the bulk of repairs and maintenance activities.1 The entries “naval store +
personnel” and “shipbuilding (personnel + materiel)” – which from 1888-89 substituted for the first
– represented the resources devoted to finance Royal Dockyards' activities. In the period considered
here, these resources increased more than three times, from little more than 2 million to more than 6
million. For the period from 1879-80 to 1888-89, naval estimates do not add wages to the amount
1 S. Pollard and P. Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 1870-1914 (London, 1962), 213. 
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spent to purchase  stores  for “building, repair and outfit of the Fleet”. Wages  were included in a
different category, together with other expenditures.  Therefore,  the entry  “naval store” has been
increased by  £1,000,000 each year,  an estimation of the Dockyards'  total  wage bill  based on a
recalculation of other entries  in  the estimates. Additional resources devoted  to building, repairing
and outfitting  might possibly  be found  under  other  headings, but  they  are of limited amount and
difficult to attribute. Materiel and wages were by far the largest components of the total cost, and
therefore  their  sum provided  a good proxy  of the  amount  of  resources  received  by the  Royal
Dockyards. 
The  entry  “Contracts”  included the  costs  of  warships,  engines,  and  other  hardware
purchased  from  private  suppliers.  Naval  estimates  offer  just a  partial breakdown  of  these
expenditures.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  a  share  of  these  contracts  were  not  relevant  to the
construction and repair activities of the Navy. But even if the sum was to be reduced by a fifth, for
example,  the  general  upward  trend  would  not  be  altered.  From 1888-89  a new  entry  “Naval
armaments”  covered sums allocated to buy armaments  from private suppliers.  Until that year,  in
fact, the Admiralty did not directly purchase artillery but the War Office supplied it, relying heavily
on Woolwich. In 1888  a new  Directorate of Naval Ordnance  inside the Admiralty  took over  this
duty.2 The Admiralty, which had little say in the running of Woolwich,  favoured from the outset
private gun makers. Figure 3.3 shows the trends of contracts and naval armaments, that is resources
which  were  spent  to  award contracts  to  private  suppliers. It  shows how contracts  with  private
suppliers increased both in absolute and relative terms. In 1879-80 they accounted for less than
£1,000,000 (7.95% of total naval appropriations); in 1888-89 for more than £3,300,000 (24,5%); in
1897-98 for around  £8,000,000 including naval armaments  (34,9%). The growth, however,  was
uneven: there was a short-term rapid increase in the mid-1880s. From 1888-89 additional resources
were employed to buy artillery from private  makers (on average,  £1,500,000 a year), while the
value of  construction contracts diminished.  Large increases of both construction and  armaments
occurred from 1895-95 to the end of the century. 
Figure 3.4 shows the relative weight of dockyard versus contracts expenditures. It highlights
how it was at times of naval spending growth (the 1883-87 period and the years after 1893) that the
Navy's reliance on private firms increases as they could rapidly add their output to that of the Royal
Dockyards.  Figure  3.5 presents the relative rate of growth of total naval expenditures, dockyards
expenditures, and contracts (including that for naval armaments).  Given as  100 the value of each
2 The 1888 reform represented just the first step: in 1891 a Naval Ordnance Department was created to coordinate the
supply and custody of artillery components for the Navy. Finally, in 1908, the Navy took over from the War Office
also the responsibility of inspecting the quality of ordnance it purchased. 
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category in 1879-80, in 1896-97 naval spending was 215 (that is, it increased of 215%), dockyards
expenditures 222, and contracts and armaments 954 (an increase of more than nine times!). 
Figure  3  .3  : naval estimates for contracts and naval armaments, from 1879-80 to 1897-98 (in current
pounds).
Source: see figure 3.1.
In conclusion, between 1880 and 1897-98, British naval expenditures more than doubled. At
the same time,  the naval budget composition changed. Whereas in absolute terms all components
increased, in relative terms private contracts grew much faster, until, by the end of the century, they
absorbed a  third of the entire  budget.  Such a  growth was the result  of  two periods of  marked
expansion: one in the mid-1880s, and a second, more pronounced, starting in mid-1890s.
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Figure  3  .4  : Relative weight of Dockyards' resources vs. value of contracts for private firms. 
Source: see figure 3.1.
Figure  3  .5  : Relative rate of growth of naval budget, dockyards spending and contracts, 1879-1897
(in current pounds).
Source: see figure 3.1. 
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Foreign policy considerations determined to a large extent British naval spending. The Royal
Navy's aims were to protect  Britain from any threat of invasion and  to  secure the trade  between
Britain, its colonies and the rest of the world. Any time the Royal Navy was perceived as unable to
do so, naval expenditures increased. When British supremacy on the oceans was regarded as safe,
expenditures  were cut.  This  had been  the  pattern  since  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  For
instance,  British  naval  budget  jumped  from £6,500,000 in  the  early  1840s  to  little  more  than
£8,000,000 in 1846-47 because of the threat represented by the expanding American and the French
navies. When tensions subsided, naval expenditures were cut to £6,500,000, only to grow again in
1853 to £7,200,000 because of the threat of a French invasion.3
What changed in the last  years of the 19th century was that the upward trend of naval
expenditure was not substantially reversed before 1914. While previously periods of expansion had
been followed by periods of decline,  in the  years from 1884 to 1914, naval expenditures were
reduced in absolute values only in five years (the largest reduction year-on-year was of 8.5% in
1905-06). Four factors contributed to this.
The  first  was  technological  development.  Rapid innovation  in  many  fields  of  naval
technology – propulsion, design, artillery, armour plates, etc. – translated into rapid obsolescence. A
functioning  battleship  immediately lost the  majority  of  its  military  value  if  innovations  in
propulsion made it too slow in comparison with newer vessels. More powerful guns made useless
ships armed with older artillery. Rapid obsolescence meant that more resources were required just
to preserve the size of the Royal Navy over time. 
A second factor  were the growing costs of  military technology.  In these years,  warships
became larger  and faster (and thus more costly).  New kinds of vessels,  such as destroyers, were
devised and built. More sophisticated armour plates and long-range guns were introduced. Indirect
costs  added to the burden: larger  docks,  the recruitment  of additional seamen, etc.  As a result,
warships did not just have a shorter operational life, but they became more expensive to replace and
maintain.
A third trend was that more governments started to pursue expansionary naval policies.  In
the  1860s  and  1870s,  only  Britain,  France  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Russia  and  Italy,  financed
significant construction programs.  But in the last two decades of the 1800s, Japan, the USA, and
Russia all  adopted “strong navy” policies.  In addition to the main  powers, regional  ones such as
Spain,  Austria-Hungary,  China,  Brazil  and Chile  invested to  modernise and expand their  fleets.
Enthusiasm for naval affairs – testified by the creation of Naval Leagues in many countries – and
3 W. L. Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to 1900, vol.  6 (London, 1997), 191; F. Beller,
British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880 (Stanford, 1997), 58.
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the popularisation of Captain Alfred T. Mahan's ideas on sea power helped to create the momentum
for naval expansion.4 Whatever the contingent diplomatic realities, Britain had to spend more to
preserve the dominant position of the Royal Navy. 
A fourth factor was the enlarging of the  British overseas  empire and the reliance of the
British economy on international trade.  For example,  Britain depended on imported foodstuff, as
British agriculture was in relative decline.5 The country's free trade policy needed a strong navy to
maintain open and secure trade routes connecting the British islands with the rest of the world.
These structural factors started to operate in the course of the 1880s and they influenced
British naval policies until over 1914. While they explain why naval spending grew, some specific
events had an impact on the temporal dynamics  and allocation of naval budgets. Three political
decisions were crucial: the Northbrook programme (1884), the Naval Defence Act (1889) and the
Spencer Programme (1894). 
During the 1860s and 1870s British political life had been dominated by issues other than
naval affairs (e.g. social and electoral reforms, Irish Home rule). The Franco–Prussian War added
pressure  to  reform the  Army,  rather than  increasing  interest  in the  Navy.  This  resulted  in  the
Cardwell Reforms which modernised the  Army's administration and  created a more professional
War Office.6 The  Navy,  in  contrary,  was largely ignored.7 In early 1880s,  however,  occurred a
change. Disagreements with both Russia and France led to the possibility that they could combine
their  fleets  against  Britain.  This  was  a  serious  threat  because  in the  1870s  both  countries  had
invested to enlarge their  navies.8 The real capacity of the Royal Navy to protect Britain  became
reason for public anxiety. 
In September 1884 the Pall Mall Gazette ran a series of articles on the Royal Navy written
by W. T. Stead, editor of the newspaper, under the pseudonym of “One Who Knows”.9 The articles
stated that Britain and its interests around the world were in danger.10 The Royal Navy, because of
insufficient expenditures, was not able to protect them any longer.  In contrary, France and Russia
were investing to modernize their fleets, and their combined strength could prove too much for the
Royal Navy. Thanks to a display of data and information which several naval officers dissatisfied
4 H. Herwig,  ‘The battlefleet  revolution, 1885-1914’, M. Knox and W. Murray (eds.),  The Dynamics of  Military
Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge, 2001), 119
5 A point illustrated by A. Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1989). 
6 A. V. Tucker,  ‘Army and Society in England 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms’, Journal of
British Studies 2 (1963), 110-141. 
7 M. J. Bastable,  Arms and the State. Sir  William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 1854-1914
(Aldershot, 2004), 204. 
8 L. Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914 (London, 2001), 114-119 and 122-126.
9 J. O. Baylen, ‘Stead, William Thomas’, ODNB.
10 A point also made in 1879  by the Royal Commission on the  Defence of the British Possession and Commerce
Abroad, whose conclusions, however, were not divulged. 
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by what  they regarded as a limited commitment of the  Liberal government toward the  Navy had
supplied him with (among them there was Captain John Fisher, who played a crucial role inside the
Royal Navy in the two decades before 1914), Stead presented these ideas in a convincing way.11 
The issue was seized upon  by the Conservative party, which campaigned in favour of
rearmament. Business circles started to lobby  for increasing naval  spending  with  the  hope of
receiving orders.12 Armstrong, speaking at the shareholders' meeting of his company, described the
worries about the state of the Royal Navy as being “well founded”.13 Political agitation continued
until  Gladstone,  who  had  opposed  any increase  in  armaments  spending,  relented:  in  1885  the
government authorized the Northbrook programme which appropriated an additional £3,100,000 to
built two battleships, seven cruisers, and tens of torpedo boats.14 Both new battleships were ordered
from private yards, HMS Victoria from Elswick (the first battleship with triple expansion engines
entering service in the Royal Navy) and HMS  Sans Pareil  from Thames Ironworks. They were
armed with guns made by Armstrong. At the same time, five of the seven new cruisers were ordered
from private yards, while two were built by the Royal Dockyards. 
The sudden increase in demand could not be met in the short-term by government plants.
For  the  first  time,  a  significant  share  of  orders  was  given to  private  yards,  whose  output  was
required to rapidly complete the programme. Despite the fact that the Northbrook programme was
modest in comparison with the ones which followed, it  represented an important step  toward a
growing role for British armaments firms in the supply of the Royal Navy, a role which, until then,
had been, with the exception of armour makers, limited and sporadic. 
During  the  late  1880s,  the Royal  Dockyards  were  thoroughly  reorganised  under  the
supervision  of  George  Hamilton.15 Such improvements  temporarily limited  the  need to  rely on
private yards. Private yards built just 26% of the total tonnage authorised for the Royal Navy in the
period 1884-89.16 In the same years the absence of serious disagreements with continental powers
reduced the need to enlarge the Royal Navy. Therefore, naval expenditures remained on the same
level as in the 1880s and in 1887-88 were actually cut by around 6%. In 1887 Britain did not lay
down any new battleship.
11 S. R. B. Smith ‘Public Opinion, the Navy and the City of London: the Drive for British Naval Expansion in the late
Nineteenth Century’, War and Society 9 (1991), 29-50.
12 See, for instance,  the letter which Vickers, Cammell and  Firth jointly  sent to the chairman of the  Parliamentary
Committee  on  Army  Estimates  complaining that the government had  not  awarded the  orders  they  had  been
expecting since 1884, see HCPP, letter dated 9 August 1888.
13 The Times 2 October 1884, 2.
14 E. J. Grove, The Royal Navy since 1815 (New York, 2005), 71.
15 On Hamilton's reforms see D. K. Brown, A Century of Naval Construction: the History of the Royal Corps of Naval
Constructors, 1883-1993  (London, 1993),  62-64; Pollard and Robertson,  Shipbuilding, 205-211; and J. Hass,  A
Management Odyssey: the Royal Dockyards, 1714-1914 (London, 1994), 147-167.
16 Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905 (London, 1997), passim.
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In 1888 a new “naval scare”  erupted: the French fleet had gathered in the Mediterranean,
something which was regarded as a potential threat in both Italy and Britain. Despite the Admiralty
being confident about its ability to defend the  country's interests in the Mediterranean, there was
political agitation to reverse the reduction  in naval expenditures of the previous year.17 The result
was the adoption in 1889 of the Naval Defence Act which authorised additional expenditures worth
£21,500,000 over  the next  five years for the construction of 10 battleships,  42 cruisers and 18
torpedo boats.  Half  of  the money  was to  be spent  on four  battleships  and twenty-two cruisers
ordered from private yards.18 Once again, a sudden increase  in the demand for vessels (and the
consequent increase of the demand for guns, armour, etc.) could not be fully met by the government
establishments. Private  firms  then played a  decisive  role  in  supplying  vessels  and armaments.
Several new firms decided to venture into the armaments sector to exploit this opportunity.
The “two power standard” was formulated in the context of the debate on the 1889 Naval
Defence Act. in March 1889 Hamilton stated in the Commons that “the leading idea has been that
our establishment should be on such a scale that it should at least be equal to the naval strength of
any two other countries.”19 While the “two power standard” was never sanctioned  as an official
policy, it was informally upheld. The arithmetic of the “standard” pushed subsequent governments
to answer any foreign construction programme with increases in British naval appropriations. 
At the beginning of the 1890s, the British naval budget was around £15,000,000, 50% more
than ten years before. In the course of the 1890s, expenditure doubled. The growth was especially
strong in the period 1894-1900. The Naval Defence Act did not restrain France and Russia from
trying to  match  the British efforts.20 Britain responded by adopting  the  Spencer  Programme in
December 1893. This new programme allocated £31,000,000 for a new five-year naval construction
plan at whose core there were seven (later increased to nine) battleships of the new Majestic class.
Reflecting the sense of urgency, all the  nine vessels were laid down within fifteen months  from
when the Bill was passed.21 The difference between the various construction programmes was that,
while after the Northbrook programme and the 1889 Naval Defence Act, military expenditures had
been stable for a few years, after the Spencer programme expenditures kept growing, a trend which
was not broken until mid-1900s.
17 Grove, Royal Navy, 75.
18 J. T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston,
1989), 13.
19 Hansard, 7 March 1893, col. 1171
20 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 166-168.
21 L. Soundhaus, Navies in Modern World History (London, 2004), 18.
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3.2 Technological evolution.
During  the  1880s  and  1890s  artillery,  armour  plates,  torpedoes,  and  naval  design  all
improved. Competition between ordnance and armour, and between torpedo and guns, influenced
how ships were built and  naval strategy. The majority of  the innovations in ordnance and naval
architecture  occurred  during  the  1880s.  The  evolution  of  armour  plates,  at  the  opposite,  was
especially rapid during the 1890s.
Three major  innovations  occurred in  ordnance:  the  introduction  of  breech-loading steel-
made guns; improvements in the composition of explosives; and the  development of quick-firing
small calibre guns. In the 1870s naval artillery evolved in size but the basic muzzle-loading design
remained unchanged.  Breech loading,  however,  enjoyed a  clear  theoretical  superiority.  In  1872
Charles de Bange, a French artillery officer,  devised a  breech closing  mechanisms based on an
interrupted screw  which, with little modification, is still  used nowadays. In Britain the  return to
breech-loading was accelerated by an accident which happened in 1879 on HMS Thunderer: a 12
in.  muzzle-loading  gun  exploded  killing  eleven  seamen  and  injuring  many others  after  it  was
mistakenly double loaded.22 As The Times remarked, such a mistake “could not by any possibility
have happened if the gun had been a breech-loader.”23
A second innovation favouring breech-loading guns was the adoption of a new slow burning
explosives.24 To exploit the advantages of slow burning explosives, however, the length of the barrel
had to be at least 30 times its calibre, to give room to the explosive to burn.25 This made it difficult
to use slow burning explosives with muzzle-loading guns: the required length of the barrel would
have made cumbersome charging the gun from the muzzle. Brown powders – a group of explosives
with similar compositions – were the first  slow burning  explosives to be developed.  They were
introduced in the late 1870s, and by the early 1880s  it was widely  adopted  by navies around the
world.26 The slower rate  (in comparison with traditional black powder) at which they burned was
obtained by substituting charcoal with less reactive substances and by manufacturing  it in larger
grains.  The  use of slow burning  powder led to higher muzzle velocities  (the velocity at  which
projectiles leave the barrel: the higher it is, the more accurate and flat the trajectory) which jumped
22 A description of the accident and of the subsequent investigations is in T. Brassey, The British Navy: Its Strength,
Resources, and Administration, vol. 2 (London, 1882), 81-87.
23 The Times 31 March 1879, 9.
24 I. V. Hogg and J. Batchelor, Naval Gun (Poole, 1978), 78.
25 J.  Campbell,  ‘Naval Armaments and Armour’, R. Gardiner (ed.), Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The Steam Warship
1815–1905 (London, 1992), 161.
26 R.  Parkinson, The  Late  Victorian  Navy:  the  Pre-dreadnought  Era  and  the  Origins  of  the  First  World  War
(Woodbridge, 2008), 135.
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from 1,500-1,600 to 2,000-2,200 feet per second.27 Guns were redesigned to adapt to slow-burning
explosives: longer barrels were introduced, while the thickness of the breech was reduced, because
the violence of the explosion was no longer concentrated there. 
In mid 1880s, brown powders were replaced by nitrocellulose-based smokeless explosives.
While burning,  brown  powders  generated  plenty of  smoke  which  reduced  visibility,  making
protracted  engagements  possible  only  at  short  distances.  Smokeless  propellants  provided the
solution. Several propellants were developed before 1914, all based on nitrocellulose, also know as
guncotton.28 Nitrocellulose had been known for decades, after its invention in the late 1840s, but the
first nitrocellulose-based compounds were too unstable: nitrocellulose could be used in mines and
torpedo warheads, but not in firearms.29 The first smokeless  explosive  suitable for firearms was
“Poudre B”, invented in 1884 by the French chemist Paul Vieille.  French armed forces swiftly
adopted it,  even though it was still relatively unstable  (a problem which  persisted until the early
1910s).30 Other countries followed France  by adopting one of the  various types of nitrocellulose-
based compound  which  were patented  in those years.  For example,  the Italian  Army employed
“ballistite”, invented by Alfred Nobel, while the British armed forces adopted cordite, developed by
Frederick Abel, the chief chemist of the War Office, after a government committee headed by the
same Abel had rejected all other alternatives.31 Cordite offered a remarkable improvement in range
– which passed from 2,000 to 4,000 meters – and weight – because of its higher heat content 40 kg
of cordite produced the same muzzle velocity from a 12 in. gun of 130 kg of brown powder.32 
The  third  factor  which facilitated  the  reintroduction  of  breech-loading  guns  was  the
increasing availability of high-quality steel. In the late 1850s Armstrong had built prototypes using
a  steel barrel encapsulated in wrought iron hoops.  Armstrong,  however, ditched steel because he
was sceptic about the possibility to produce highly homogeneous steel. During the 1870s, however,
the introduction of the Martin-Siemems and Gilchrist-Thomas methods allowed the production of
large and homogeneous forgings which could be used for gun making. 
The new explosives  made breech-loading guns more powerful  than comparable muzzle-
loading artillery. Very large calibre guns – such as the Woolwich 16 in.  or Armstrong 17.72 in. –
27 P. Hodges, The Big Gun. Battleship Main Armament, 1860-1945 (London, 1981), 28.
28 This paragraph is based on T. L. Davis, The Chemistry of Powder and Explosives, vol. 2 (New York, 1943), chapter
6 ‘Smokeless Powder’.
29 The explosives properties of guncotton impressed Jules Verne who used it to launch a projectile in space in his novel
From the Earth to the Moon, published in 1865. 
30 R. Walser, France's Search for a Battle Fleet: Naval Policy and Naval Power 1898-1914 (New York, 1992), 153-
154.
31 Nobel sued Abel accusing him of patent infringement, but lost his case, R. Steele, ‘Abel, Sir Frederick Augustus’,
ODNB. 
32 P. Padfield, Guns at Sea (New York, 1974), 194-195.
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were discontinued in favour of smaller calibre which could, however, engage the enemy at longer
distances with a higher rate of fire. 12 in. guns became the main naval armaments: it remained the
standard on all the battleships from the early 1880s to the early 1910s (only Germany adopted the
slightly smaller 11.1 in. calibre). Over time, however, while the calibre remained the same, barrels
grew longer. In the early 1880s, the barrel of a 12 in. gun was 25 times the length of its calibre; by
1895, 35 times; by 1900 40 times. 
After the replacement of muzzle-loading with breech-loading guns,  ordnance evolved with
small, incremental improvements. The only major innovation was the introduction of wire-wound
guns. In these guns the internal hoops were replaced by steel wire tightly wound around the barrel
so to increased the radial strength of the gun. At the same time, however,  wire-wound guns were
slightly more  prone  to  droop  and  loose  their alignment.  Wire construction was  not  universally
adopted: only the British and the Japanese Navy (which bought guns in Britain) widely used them.33
These radical improvements in artillery had an impact on gun making, which became more
complex.  The best way to understand how  elaborate,  capital-intensive, and  time-consuming this
process was, is to describe how naval guns were made.34 The first step was to cast a steel solid ingot
and let  it  cool,  something which required four  or five days.  Then  the ingot was trepanned  and
subsequently reheated and forged by a hydraulic press (forging was used to give additional strength
to the metal). After this, lathes were use to rough-turn the exterior. Boring the ingot was the next.
Special horizontal boring machines  were used for the  longer barrels. At this point, the piece was
heated  again  and  immersed in oil  to strengthen it.  After  that,  metal samples where taken  to be
analysed. If the material had the required characteristics, the process continued. The next step was
wire  winding. For a 12 in. gun 117 miles of wire  were used. After  this,  lathes were employed to
smooth the external surface in preparation of the shrinking of steel hoops around the barrel. Hoops
were expanded by warming them, then they were  forced around the wire-wound tube.  After the
metal cooled down, the barrel  was rifled by  special cutting machines. This was one of the most
difficult  moments  of  the manufacturing process,  because the rifling  had to  be carried out  with
extreme precision.  Finally, the breech mechanism,  whose manufacture was in itself complicated,
was attached to the barrel. At this point the gun could be tested. The manufacture of a large gun –
9.4, 10 and 12 in. – took up to 10 months.
33 O. F. G. Hogg, Artillery, its Origins, Heyday and Decline (London, 1970), 91-92. 
34 This  description  is  based  on  A.  Richardson,  Vickers  Son and Maxim Limited:  their  Works  and Manufacturers
(London, 1902), 55-70, a special issue of the journal Engineering entirely devoted to Vickers's.
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Figure 3.6: lathing of barrels of large calibre guns, circa 1902.
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons.
 Improvement in ordnance had an impact on armour plates' development. In the late 1870s
compound armour replaced wrought iron plates, proving to be cheaper and of better quality that the
first all-steel plates. In the 1880s  new systems were devised to enhance armours' resistance. For
example, chilling the heated surface of plates using high-pressures jets of water improved their
strength (the so called Tressider  method).  In 1889 Schneider introduced nickel-steel plates. They
were a noticeable advancement over all-steel armours: nickel increased the strength while reducing
the metal's brittleness. With the same aim, oil quenching – the immersion of the heated surfaces of
plates  in oil for a short period of time – was  simultaneously introduced.  Trials in the USA and
Russia demonstrated the superiority of nickel-steel over compound plates.35
In 1890 the American engineer H. A. Harvey devised a new process to harden steel plates.
Plate  were heated  at  1,100°  for  three  weeks  with  one face  put  in  contact  with  finely divided
charcoal. By osmosis, carbon particles penetrated the metal altering the chemical composition of the
superface. The plate was then tempered by oil quenching, while additional steps – re-forging, water
35 W. Johnson,  ‘Some Conspicuous Aspects of the Century of Rapid Change in Battleship Armours, c. 1845-1945’,
International Journal of Impact Engineering 7 (1988), 271.
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chilling,  etc.  –  were  later added  to enhance  performances. The Harvey process produced plates
which were 50% more resistant than steel plates, and 20% than nickel-steel ones.36 Harvey plates
were rapidly adopted by all  the major navies  in the world  given their  “astonishing success” in
trials.37
In mid-1890s  Krupp devised a  system to produce plates  15% stronger than “harveyized”
ones.38. Building on years of investigations, Krupp found that a 4% nickel steel alloy to which 2%
of  chromium  was added  offered  the  best  starting  material.  Plates  were  then  hardened  using  a
process similar to Harvey's but charcoal was substituted by hydrocarbon gas, which allowed better
control  of the reaction. From mid 1890s to the First World War there were  no  breakthroughs in
armour making,  only small incremental improvements  slightly altering the alloy composition  and
the production process. In two decades armour making had changed beyond recognition. Plates also
became larger and thus more complex to produce. In the late 1880s armour plates measured in
average: 1800x1000x150 mm, in the late 1890s 2440x18830x267 mm.39 The manufacturing process
had  moved  from being  a  relatively  straightforward  one of  forging  and  rolling  iron  bars  to  a
sophisticated, time-consuming, activity based on a deep understanding of the chemical properties of
metals and other materials.
While armour was designed to withstand hits  from artillery, warships faced another threat:
torpedoes. The first self propelled torpedo was designed in the early 1860s by the British engineer
Robert  Whitehead  while  working  in  Fiume.40 Whitehead  soon  established  a  company  to
manufacture his invention. The new device attracted much attention: even though it suffered from
short range (below 1,000 meters) slow velocity (less than 10 nodes), poor stability and limited
explosive load, all major navies rushed to purchase it.41 To deliver them special torpedo boats were
developed: small ships which used their fast speed to arrive close to larger warships and then strike
them  with  a  salvo  of  torpedoes.  France  and  Russia,  always  looking  for  a  cheap  way  to
counterbalance British  numerical  superiority in  capital  vessels, demonstrated special  interest  for
torpedo boats.
A group of French naval thinkers known as the Jeune École advocated the idea of giving up
ironclads  altogether  in favour  of  torpedo boats and fast cruisers  which they regarded  as the most
36 Id., 273-274.
37 The Times 2 November 1892, 11.
38 Johnson, ‘Aspects’, 274.
39 G.  Papuli,  ‘Processi,  Prodotti  e  Immagini’,  Renato  Covino  and  Gino  Papuli  (eds.),  Le  Acciaierie  di  Terni
(Milano,1998), 35.
40 E. Gray, The Devil's Device: Robert Whitehead and the History of the Torpedo (Annapolis, 1991), 19. 
41 A. Casali e M. Cattaruzza, Sotto i Mari del Mondo. La Whitehead 1875-1990 (Roma-Bari, 1990); Whitehead is now
part of the Finmeccanica group as WASS – Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei.
111
effective way to confront Britain: torpedoes would sink ironclads, while cruisers would raid British
commerce, cutting Britain from its empire and starving the country. The cheapness of the solution
was especially alluring for a country such as France which had also to maintain a large army. In the
course of the 1880s the Jeune École gained control over French naval policy, and between 1883 and
1887, France did not lay down any ironclad, but just cruisers and torpedo boats.42 Only at the end of
the decade, after improved anti-torpedo armaments weakened the Jeune École strategy, the French
Navy returned to a more traditional approach based on battleships. 
Figure 3.7: Drawing of the internal mechanism of a Whitehead torpedo, from the French popular
science journal La Nature, December 1891.
Source: Wikimedia Commons
Quick-firing artillery was developed in the late 1880s as a response to torpedo boats. Large
guns  were not manoeuvrable enough to be used against fast moving targets, and  they lacked the
higher rate of fire required to engage large number targets. Quick-firing guns, at the opposite, were
highly manoeuvrable and achieved a  high rate of fire:  during a trial in Elswick in  1887, a 4.7 in.
42 A. Røksund, The Jeune École. The Strategy of the Weak (Leiden, 2007), 1-84. 
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quick-firing gun fired ten times in 47.5 seconds.43 Three features allowed this: the use of cartridges
containing both shell and propellant (which in large guns were separated to facilitate loading);  a
breech-closing mechanism allowing a rapid reloading (the blocking mechanism was designed to be
swung round to the side before it was fully withdrawn, rather than having to be fully withdrawn
before swinging);44 a mounting which, thanks to buffers, allowed the barrel to rapidly return to the
same position it had before firing. Since 1889, 4.7 in., and later 6 in., quick-firing guns started to be
mounted as anti-torpedo armaments on all British battleships. Quick-firing artillery rapidly became
a standard  component of  warships' armaments:  while  it did not penetrate thick armour plates,  it
damaged superstructures, hit seamen and was highly effective against torpedo boats.
Naval design was the last area where major innovations occurred. The first change was the
substitution of iron with steel as a construction material. Steel was lighter and more resistant. Using
it made possible the reduction in the weight of a ship while increasing the space left for machinery
and  cargo.  Until  the  late  1870s,  however,  steel  suffered  from two  limitations:  it  was  difficult
producing the large castings required for shipbuilding, and it was more expensive than iron: “from
1859 to 1875 steel plates and angles [used in shipbuulding] were generally some 75 to 100% above
the price of the corresponding iron products”.45 The widespread adoption of Bessemer converters,
the Thomas process, and Martin-Siemens open-hearth furnaces solved these problems.46 By 1890
the total displacement of steel ships was near twenty times  that of iron ships.47 The Royal Navy
ordered  its  first  steel  vessels  in  1875-76 and  by the  end of  the  decade  steel  became  standard
construction material. 
This change was accompanied by improvements in the design of engines and boilers which
raised efficiency  and speed.  As a result,  by  the  early 1880s ironclads which operated  in foreign
stations where coaling could be difficult started to be constructed without masts and rigs.48 During
the 1880s,  however,  as in the previous  two decades, there was remarkable inconsistency in  naval
architecture. In a period of rapid technological change and strategic uncertainty,  it was difficult to
find a satisfactory balance between the number of guns,  the thickness of armour,  and seagoing
performance.49 Limited naval budgets restrained construction activities to single vessels which were
introduced  one  after  the  other,  each  designed  under  peculiar  economic,  technical  and  political
43 Campbell, ‘Naval armaments’, 163. 
44 I. V. Hogg and L. F. Thurston, British Artillery Weapons and Ammunition, 1914–1918 (London, 1972), 35. 
45 J. C. Carr and W. Taplin, History of the British Steel Industry (Oxford, 1962), 110.
46 H. R. Schubert, ‘The Steel Industry’, C. Singer (ed.), A History of Technology, vol. 5, The Late Nineteenth Century
c. 1850 to c. 1900 (Oxford, 1958), 57-60.
47 D. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from
1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969), 260.
48 J. Beeler, Birth of the Battleship. British Capital Ship Design (London, 2001), 53-64. 
49 J. Roberts, ‘Warships of steel 1879-1889’, Gardiner (ed.), Steam, 95.
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circumstances, rather than making possible the construction of classes of uniform vessels. By mid
decade, the difficulty in opposing torpedoes seemed to prove the Jeune École right: battleships were
in danger of becoming relics of the past.
The combination of improved ordnance,  better  but lighter armour and quick-firing guns,
however,  provided  a  successful  mix which  led  to  what  has  been  labelled  the  “rebirth  of  the
battleship”. Technological developments reduced the risks from torpedoes and improved warships'
performances in every field. From the late 1880s, battleships re-acquired a central position in naval
strategy  – and governments' budgets – which lasted unchallenged until 1914.  At the core of the
1889 Naval Defence Act, for example, there were the eight Royal Sovereign battleships. Moreover,
Alfred Mahan's books on sea power in history offered arguments in favour of the adoption of naval
doctrines based on battleships: according to the proponents of this “deep water strategy”, a maritime
power's goal was that of acquiring naval superiority in high seas. For that torpedo boats and other
small vessels were useless. Only battleships could gain the command of the seas.
After three decades of lack of uniformity, during the 1890s naval design largely stabilised.
This process started with the  Royal Sovereign battleships. These vessels  were the first to display
several features – four major guns deployed in two centreline turrets fore and aft, a combination of
various small and medium calibre guns, triple expansion engines, high freeboard which allowed
oceanic operations – which  later  characterised all warships built around the world in the period
1890-1905 (the  so called  “pre-dreadnought” design).50 Battleships built during the 1890s were  on
average bigger (displacing 11,000-16,000 tons versus 6,000-12,000), longer (130-105 meters versus
120-85) and faster (17-18 knots versus 15-16) than the ones of the 1880s. The same occurred also
for first class cruisers (10,000-14,000 tons versus 8,000-6,000), and for all other classes of vessels.
Larger naval budgets helped navies to plan future construction programmes more carefully.
As a result,  instead of single vessels,  classes of  battleships with very similar specifications were
introduced.51 Uniformity facilitated operations because all vessels had very similar characteristics
and performances.  At  the  same time,  uniformity of  design  facilitated  increases  in  productivity,
economies of  scale,  and shorter construction times. While British ironclads laid down during the
1880s required  in average  7 years to be completed (and in other countries  it  took  longer), pre-
dreadnought usually entered service after half that time. 
 
50 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 160.
51 R. Burr, British Battleships, 1889-1904 (Annapolis, 1988) provides detailed descriptions of each class of British pre-
dreadnoughts enriched by numerous photographs. 
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3.3 The evolution of the British private armaments industry.
This section analyses the development of the British armaments industry from 1880 to the
late  1890s.  At the beginning of this  period, only  a  few firms were involved in the armaments
industry: Armstrong, which sold principally abroad; John Brown and Cammell, which monopolised
armour plate manufacturing; and a group of shipbuilding firms which sporadically received orders
for  warships.  In addition  John Brown, Cammell, and  Vickers supplied Armstrong and Woolwich
with the iron and steel forgings required for gun making.
Twenty years later, the British armaments industry had changed considerably. Three major
developments  occurred.  First,  the number of firms involved in  armament production increased.
Second, armaments firms became bigger, employing more workers, and enlarging their activities.
Third, the relationship between  the British government and a group of armaments firms moved
from being sporadic, to become more systematic.  These transformations were the results  of the
interaction between two factors. First, the ballooning naval budget. The sudden increase in defence
expenditure stimulated new firms to enter the armaments sector. The fact that the upward trend in
naval spending was not  reversed – although there were periods of stagnation – allowed firms to
undertake  the  investment  required to  carry  out military production.  Second,  technological
innovations favoured larger production units. This was in itself the result of various factors: search
for scale economies, increasing physical size of ordnance and vessels, more complex manufacturing
processes. 
By the end of the 1890s, the British armaments industry was composed of more firms, but it
was still  relatively fragmented. Not all firms  produced the same  hardware, or were involved in
armaments  production  in  the same degree.  Thus firms can be classified using two criteria:  the
relative importance of military production, and the nature of their military output  (figure 3.8). By
the late 1890s military production represented the core activity only for Armstrong. For Cammell,
John Brown and Vickers military and civilian productions were equally important. Finally there
were  shipbuilding  firms  whose  major  activity  was merchant  construction,  but  which received
contracts for warships from both the British and foreign governments. At the same time, figure 3.8
highlights the fragmentation of the British armaments industry. The number of firms were active in
each field was low, especially in the most complex ones such as gun making or amour plates. More
firms,  by  contrast,  were  active  in  shipbuilding  which  was  easier  and  required  less  capital
investments. The level of integration was also still limited (only Armstrong and Vickers were active
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Figure  3.8  : British armaments industry in the late 1890s.
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in more than one field). It was only from 1897 onwards that a  wave of  amalgamations created a
higher degree of integration.
The number of firms in the industry makes it difficult to detail the activities of all of them;
instead  four  representative  cases  are  analysed:  John Brown and Cammell  (jointly),  Armstrong,
Vickers, and the Clyde-based cluster of shipbuilding firms. Together,  they highlight the different
patterns of growth and development, the strategies and the results of the British firms active in the
armaments industry in this period. 
John Brown and Cammell
John Brown and Cammell  had  monopolised  armour  plates  production  Britain  since  the
1860s. They supplied the Royal Navy and also exported part of their production, either by directly
selling abroad armour plates  or by supplying armour for foreign vessels  ordered in Britain. The
major issue they faced in the 1880s and 1890s was that of keeping pace with the evolving armour
making technology. 
Since  the  late  1870s,  John  Brown  and  Cammell  had  large  operations  geared  towards
producing compound armour, which they had introduced as a response to the first steel plates. Any
improvements in  steel  armour  production,  however,  would  anticipate  the  demise  of  compound
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technology and force them to undertake large investments to adapt their plants (for instance, when
Cammell started producing steel plates, it purchased a new 5,000 tons hydraulic press for forging
them). The superiority of steel plates was decisively confirmed by a trial in Annapolis in 1890. Two
Schenider steel plates were tried side by side with a Cammell compound one, which was defined
“incapable of standing the fire” and “very inferior”.52 Both John Brown and Cammell,  however,
experienced problems in manufacturing good steel plates. Only in 1888 did Cammell submit a steel
plate for trial, twelve years after Schneider had first introduced them.53 
From the late 1880s John Brown and Cammell lost the technological leadership they had
enjoyed in the previous decades in favour of American and German firms. This was to a large extent
a consequence of  the British armour makers' early success. John Brown and Cammell's dominant
position in compound armour making discouraged them from investing in alternative technologies
that would have damaged their current business. Second, innovation in steel making was based on
two factors: sophisticated chemical knowledge, and a long manufacturing experience necessary to
learn how to apply theoretical insights. The increasing complexity of armour making magnified the
relevance of these two elements. Simply speaking, John Brown and Cammell suffered from having
a limited track record in armour steel making at a moment of rapid technical evolution. Their early
start, and leadership in compound technology put them in a relative disadvantage in comparison
with foreign competitors. It is important to highlight, however, that while John Brown and Cammell
did not produce innovations comparable to the ones obtained,  for instance, by Krupp,  they were
able to  maintain their  business success and thrive  by rapidly acquiring access to major technical
innovations. They were also favoured by their access to the single largest market for armour plates
in the world – Great Britain.  Finally, the fact that both ended up merging with naval shipbuilding
firms, provided them with secure outlets for their production.
After  successful trials  in America, Harvey,  who in 1891 took a British patent covering his
invention,54 tried to  sell  the rights  of his invention in Europe which  was the largest market for
armour plates  in the world.  According to a family memoir, John Brown, Cammell  and Vickers
(which had recently  entered armour  production) initially showed no interest  in Harvey's  patent,
something  hardly surprising,  considering  that  radical  innovations could weaken their  present
position.  When Harvey's agents threatened to create an independent  armour making company,  the
three British firms accepted to arrived at a compromise.55 It is important to analyse in some detail
this agreement because it was the first of a series involving the exchange and circulation of patents
52 Bulletin of the American Iron and Steel Association, 24 September 1890.
53 Id., 21 May 1888, 10.
54 British Patent n. 16544, ‘For the Carburising and Hardening of Armour’.
55 T. W. Harvey, Memoir of Hayward Augustus Harvey by His Sons (New York, 1900), 77-80.
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between armaments companies. 
Harvey's problem was that of maximising the return from his patent while, at the same time,
reducing  the  incentive  for  the  development  of  competing  technologies.  The  solution  was  the
creation of the Harvey Steel Company of Great Britain, with a capital of £ 180,000.56 This company
was an empty shell,  whose only activity was to acquire the rights of the Harvey patent for Great
Britain.  Initially John Brown, Cammell and Vickers were its only three shareholders. At the same
time  two  more companies  were  created:  the  Société  de  Precédés  Harvey  (capital  of  3,000,000
francs) combined the major French armour making companies (St. Chamond, Chatillon and Marrel
Frères, later joined by Schneider) and it owned the rights to use the Harvey patent in France, and the
Harvey Continental Steel Company  (capital of  £120,000) which acquired the use of the Harvey
patent  in  all  other  European countries.  Krupp  was  its  major  shareholder.57 These three  Harvey
companies operated in the same way:  every shareholder  who gained orders for  Harvey  armour
plates  paid  a  share of  its  profit  to  the  Harvey firm it  was associated with.  These  profits  were
distributed as dividends  to compensate the shareholders  who had gained  fewer orders. The result
was to stimulate each firms to acquire orders so as to increase their profits, while, at the same time,
the arrangement compensated the firms doing less well,  reducing the incentives for them to leave
and try to develop different technologies.
These three firms, nominally independent, formed, together with the Harvey Steel Company
of New Jersey, a syndicate for sharing armour technology.  When Krupp came up with  its  own
armour making system in mid-1890s, it did not exploit it independently, but, by contrast, it sold the
right to use  its patents to the various Harvey companies and  consequently to French, British and
American firms. At a first glance, this decision seems surprising. Two reasons, however, provide a
rational  justification.  First,  innovation  in  armour  technology was  very  much  a  trial-and-error
process. Krupp's patent could have been “rediscovered” by some other firm in a different country.
In that case it would have problematic for Krupp to gain legal protection for its patents. It was more
prudent to sell the rights for a lump sum and a share of dividends. Second, Krupp was certainly
aware that even though foreign navies were keen to buy the most advanced plates, countries such as
Britain or  the  France would not  have  bought  any plate  from it  for  both strategic  and political
reasons, but would have pushed national producers to come up with similar innovations. 
In the course of the 1890s John Brown and Cammell  enlarged their operations.  Growing
56 No records of the various Harvey Steel Companies survive. Luckily, Vickers produced a document (VA, f. 58) which
offers an overview of the various Harvey Steel Companies which it submitted to the Royal Commission on Private
Manufacture of and Trading in Arms in 1934-35. This document, which until now went unnoticed, forms the basis
of this paragraph.
57 Harvey, Memoir, 79.
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demand and the high returns offered by armour making (in 1894 Harveyzed armour plates quoted
between  £75-65 a ton, steel plates for shipbuilding sold  between £4 12s and £4 15s)58 stimulated
additional investments. In 1895, for example, John Brown purchased a 10,000 tons forging press, an
8,000 tons bending press and erected a new rolling mill.59 The total cost of these investments ran
into hundreds of thousands of pounds. The following year Cammell purchased a Whitworth press
and its ancillary plant for £30,000.60 However, judging from the minutes of Cammell's board, large
capital investments represented just a share of the costs incurred by armour companies. A constant
stream of small, but numerous, investments was required to enhance and adapt production. 
Because of their growing armour production, by 1897 John Brown and Cammell faced  a
strategic problem. They had invested a lot to keep their  armour  production technologically up to
date. At the same time, military technology had became so complex that it was impossible to rapidly
adapt armour making plants to civilian business. Swings in the demand for amour plates could thus
result in large losses. British naval spending was on the rise, but new firms were rumoured to be
interested in entering the field. It was with the aim of reducing uncertainty and gain a secure outlet
for their armour plates that John Brown and Cammell, as it will be covered in chapter VI, decided to
vertically integrate, acquiring shipbuilding and, later, gun making capabilities. 
 
Armstrong
In the years from 1882  to 1897, Armstrong experienced  rapid growth. In 1882 Armstrong
was already a large firm, employing around 4,000 workers and posting a net profit of £146,120. By
1897, however,  it had become much  bigger: it  employed around  18,000 workers  and  its profits
reached £442,868.61 Armstrong's position was unique, because until the late 1880s it was the only
private  firm producing large naval guns and, until 1897, the only armaments company combining
gun making with naval shipbuilding. Armstrong certainly benefited from Britain's increasing naval
budgets  but his success cannot  simply be reduced to external circumstances: the firm displayed a
remarkable capacity to develop new technologies, adapt to new trends, acquire new markets and
enter into new productions. 
In 1882 Armstrong merged with Mitchell to create the Sir William Armstrong and Mitchell
58 Iron and Coal Trade Review, 28 December 1894, 814.
59 A. D. Stacey, A Historical Survey of the Manufacture of Naval Armour by Vickers Sons & Co., and their Successors 
1888-1956, 12, VA, f. 1153, 22.
60 WAS, Cammell, Minutes, 29 July 1896.
61 T&W, Minutes of the Annual Shareholders' Meetings 130/1329 and 1346.
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Company, with a capital of £2,000,000. 6,650 £100 shares were offered to for subscription, raising
the  capital  needed to finance two major investments.62 The first was the erection of a steel plant:
until then Armstrong had purchased hoops and forgings from other firms, especially Cammell and
John Brown.  The  introduction  of  steel  guns,  however,  pushed Armstrong towards  internalising
production so to have full control over the quality and supply of the metal. To run the steel plant,
Armstrong hired Colonel H. Dyer, who had worked for seven years  with Whitworth  and was an
authority on the production of high-quality steel.63 In addition, Armstrong also convinced William
Siemens, another leading steel expert, to join the board, although he died only a few months after
having taken up his post. The initial layout of the  steel  plant consisted  of 3 rotary furnaces (later
cancelled)  and  2  12  ton  open  heart  Siemens  furnaces,  plus  gas  producers  and  other  ancillary
components. The total estimated cost was initially  put at £15,000.64 Continuous investments were
made to the steel plant and to the ordnance department. Already in 1883 a new boring machine
(costing £1,560) and a travelling crane (£770) were purchased.65 One year later, £6,800 were spent
for several new machines.66 By 1885, steel output ran at 120 tons a week. The executive committee
soon decided to  invest £31,000 to  quadruple the output. A 30 ton melting furnace and a forging
press (costing alone £10,000) were purchased.67 The firm could now count on a reliable and high-
quality  supply  of  forgings  and  other  steel  pieces,  and  the  share  of  the  output  not  consumed
internally was sold on the open market. Armour plates, however, were not manufactured at Elswick,
but the firm kept buying them.
The second investment was the creation of the Elswick yard  exclusively devoted to  naval
shipbuilding (before 1914 just 7 merchant vessels were built there versus nearly 100 warships). In
1885 the Panther, an Austro-Hungarian cruiser, was the first vessel to be completed there. At first
glance, building a new yard seems an odd choice for a company which had just merged with a
shipbuilding  firm.  Actually,  the  construction  of  Elswick  yard  was  the  key step  which  allowed
Armstrong to rapidly secure a leading position in the world armaments trade.68 
The yard, designed by Mitchell, simplified the firm's logistics: it was located on the riverside
in front of the artillery plant, whereas Low Walker was several miles downstream. At the beginning
of the 1880s a positive trend in merchant shipbuilding was keeping Low Walker busy. To divert its
activities to naval shipbuilding would have meant losing business opportunities. 
62 The Times 18 November 1882, 11.
63 T&W Rendel Papers, 31/6538, 10 October 1882.
64 T&W, 130/1264, Minutes of Meeting of the Board, 9 March 1883 and 26 March 1884.
65 Id., 25 October 1885. 
66 Id., 30 January 1884.
67 Id., 29 July 1885. 
68 VA 1157 contains documents on the construction of the new yard.
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Figure  3.9  : Plan of the Elswick yard, circa mid-1880s. The Steel works are immediately north of the
yard.
Source: http://www.tynebuiltships.co.uk/Armstrong-Mitch-Elswick.html 
In addition, commercial reasons justify this investment: as pointed above, in the early 1880s
artillery was rapidly evolving and Armstrong enjoyed an outstanding reputation as maker of naval
ordnance. Some foreign customers, such as Italy, for example, purchased from Armstrong ordnance
and  mountings  but undertook  naval  shipbuilding  at  home;  other  countries,  however,  such  as
Argentina or China, had to buy abroad both vessels and their artillery because they lacked a modern
domestic shipbuilding industry. By acquiring the capacity to built warships, Armstrong became able
to  complete warships:  a foreign government could, then, with a single contract, purchase a fully
armed naval vessel, simplifying and speeding up its procurement. Until the 1890s only Armstrong
was able to offer such a “ship plus guns” package. This explain why of the 179,685 tons of warships
made by Armstrong in the period 1882-1897 more than 80% was purchased by foreign customers. 
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Figure  3.  10  : major purchasers of warships laid down in Elswick and Low Walker in percentage of
the total tons of warships produced, years 1882-1897.
Source: VA 818, List of ships built at Elswick and Walker yard.
The bulk of Armstrong's production was made up of medium size vessels such as cruisers,
rather than  large capital ships.  The average displacement of  the  vessels built in the period 1882-
1897 was 2,787.6 tons, and only 5 out of 62 displaced more than 5,000 tons (four of which were
made after 1893). A tendency towards larger vessels was evident, though. The average displacement
increased from 1,825 tons in the years 1882-1889 to 3,982.6 in the period 1890-1897. Armstrong's
focus on these kinds of vessels was a direct consequence of the fact that the firm sold them mainly
abroad. Foreign navies usually had modest budgets. Battleships were too expensive for them, while
cruisers were a more affordable investment. This suited Armstrong perfectly: cruisers had none or
limited protection (the company had no armour making capacity) while  guns represented a larger
share of their final cost (usually a third of the total).
Armstrong's ordnance  production  was more balanced between domestic and foreign sales.
The company's records preserve data on payments for works in progress in the period 1884-1895. In
the  absence  of  better  data,  they  help  to  assess  the  relevance that  various  customers  had  for
Armstrong.  In  those  years,  the  British  Admiralty  and  War  Office  accounted  for a  total  of
£3,993,030, that is 36.23% of the total payments received by the firm.69 Given that the payments
69 For a full breakdown of payments, see Figure 5.2 in chapter V.
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referred also to shipbuilding activities, and the Admiralty ordered only a few vessels to Armstrong,
this demonstrates how important the British demand for gun and mountings became for Armstrong
in the 1880s and 1890s.70 Foreign governments provided Elswick with large orders, but there was
no guarantee that they would keep buying in the future. They could face financial difficulties, as, for
example happened to Turkey, or switch, for political or commercial reasons, to a different supplier,
as China did when it started to buy from Germany. At the opposite, to become a regular supplier to
the largest navy in the world meant gaining a substantial and regular stream of orders. 
It took years, however, for Armstrong to secure a position as an important supplier for the
Royal Navy. In 1877, for instance, an internal report by the Navy concluded that the new German
medium artillery was performing better than the comparable British one.71 Equally, French vessels,
despite being of inferior quality, carried more powerful guns.72 Inside the Admiralty some officers
accused Woolwich of being too slow in adopting new innovations such as breech loading. Others,
however, displayed a more conservative attitude and helped delay the transition to breech-loading
artillery.73 In 1878 Armstrong directly approached the Admiralty:  he submitted the designs of new
breech loading guns,  and “offered any assistance in  the investigation which may take place.”74
Armstrong's proposal was opposed by the War Office, at that time still responsible for the supply of
artillery to  the  Navy,  which favoured Woolwich.  In  1879, after  the incident  on board of  HMS
Thunderer  proved the superiority of breech-loading guns, the Admiralty wrote to the War Office
that  it  “inclined  towards  Armstrong-design  breech-loading  guns  for  Colossus,  Majestic,  and
Conqueror.”75 The War Office replied recommending, on the contrary, to equip the new battleships
with the 43 ton breech-loading gun designed by the Royal Gun Factory. 
Woolwich, however, was not able to provide a final design for the new 12 in. guns breech-
loading guns  until February 1882. This  resulted in long delays: several ironclads entered service
without all their major guns fitted on board.  While Woolwich was still designing the new breech-
loading loading gun, Armstrong started manufacturing 13.5 in. and, a little later, the larger, but less
successful 16.25 in. breech-loading guns.  It was during the transition to breech-loading artillery,
which was much more complex and difficult to produce, that Armstrong started to enjoyed a clear
technical edge over Woolwich. From mid-1880s, therefore, Armstrong received a steady stream of
orders from the Navy,  a trend reinforced after 1888, when the Admiralty finally gained control of
70 M. J. Bastable, Arms and the State. Sir William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 1854-1914 
(Aldershot, 2004), 188-189.
71 NA, ADM 1/6422, 26 June 1877.
72 NA, ADM 1/6424, 15 November 1877, report of Captain Nicholson, naval attaché in France,.
73 Beeler, Birth, 83-84.
74 NA, ADM 138/60.
75 Id., 28 August 1879.
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the procurement of artillery for the Navy. For instance, of the 22 large calibre guns which arming
the six vessels of the Admiral class, 18 were ordered from Elswick, and just 4 were supplied from
Woolwich. Elswick's success in this period can be gauged by the continuous rise of its profits,  as
shown in figure 3.11. The decline in profitability in the early 1890s was the result of a protracted
series of strikes, rather than of a decline of sales.
Figure  3.1  1  : Armstrong's final year profits, 1883-1897 (in current pounds).
Source: T&W, Printed annual reports, 130/1329-1344.
While external circumstances greatly helped the growth of Armstrong, the core of the firm's
success  rested  on  its continuous attention to  innovation  and  its ability to  acquire  the technical
capabilities it required from outside the firm. For instance, it was Andrew Noble who, together with
Frederick Abel,  started to experiment with slow burning explosives in the late 1870s, and they
developed  one  of  the  various  brown  powders  whose  patent  the  firm  retained.76 Slow  burning
explosives were, as it has been said  above, crucial to accelerate the transition to breech-loading
artillery. Before that, Armstrong had demonstrated its technical capacity producing massive breech-
loading 100 ton guns, a feat which the Royal Gun Factory could not replicate. 
The firm also played a key role in the development of quick-firing guns. Small artillery with
76 HCPP,  Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the System Under Which Patterns of Warlike
Stores are Adopted and the Store Obtained and Passed to Her Majesty's Service (1887), qs. 8169-8172.
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high  rates  of  fire  had  already  been  devised  by  the  French  firm  Hotchkiss.77 Armstrong's
management was aware that the absence of effective anti-torpedo boat countermeasures reduced the
effectiveness  of  warships  to  the  point  that  the  idea  of  keeping  to build  them was  questioned,
something which could seriously damage its large ordnance business. In order to gain the technical
know-how it  required,  and to dispose of a potential rival, Armstrong purchased in 1883 the small
London gun making firm of Josiah Vavasseur, an engineer who in 1877 had patented a new design
for  hydraulic mountings but who lacked the resources to organise large-scale production and the
contacts needed to market his  wares.78 Vavasseur became a director of  Armstrong and  replaced
Stuart Rendel as the firm's representative in London.79 Vavassuer's patents were used by Armstrong
to design the first quick-firing  naval  gun  (with a calibre of 4.7 in.) which proved an immediate
success and was widely adopted by many navies.80
Vickers
Vickers  was founded in Sheffield in 1829  as  Naylor, Hutchinson, Vickers & Company, a
family firm operating in the steel business. The steel trade was a fast growing sector and the firm's
operations expanded greatly in the 1840s,  when it started to supply the American market. By the
end of the decade, Vickers  ranked among the largest firms in Sheffield.81 Thomas and Albert,  the
son of Edward Vickers, the founder of the company, were sent to Germany to study chemistry and
gain a first-hand knowledge of new production processes.82 Such a decision indicates how Edward
was well aware of the need to position Vickers in the high-quality end of the market, differentiating
it from the many other steel firms in Sheffield: technology was the key to gain, and retain, such a
position. 
Thomas Vickers was a talented metallurgical engineer who personally held several patents
relevant for the company's business. When he took control of the firm he decided to develop the
engineering  side  of  the  business.  Until  then,  Vickers  had  mainly produced steel  by  crucible
technology; now, the firms moved into the production of semi-finished and finished goods such as
propellers, steel tyres, shafts and heavy forgings, which rapidly became the core activity of Vickers.
77 See P. Smithurst, ‘Hotchkiss 37mm revolving cannon’, in Royal Armouries Yearbook, vol. 2 (Leeds, 1997), 90-106.
78 See Vavasseur's obituary, The Times 25 November 1908, 20. 
79 T&W, 130/1264, Minutes, 25 January and 22 February 1883.
80 Brook, Warships, 11; Campbell, ‘Naval armaments’, 163.
81 G. Tweedale, Steel City. Entrepreneurship, Strategy, and Technology in Sheffield, 1743-1993 (Oxford, 1995), 51.
82 Id. ‘Vickers, Thomas Edward and Albert’, ODNB.
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In the 1860s Vickers was regarded as “the best specimen of mechanical engineering at present in
existence [in Britain]” by the American industrialist Abram Hewitt.83 
In 1867 Vickers went public as Vickers, Sons & Co. with a capital of £155,000. Already in
1871 the  authorised  capital  was  raised  to  £360,000;  in  1878  to  £500,000.84 Judging  from this
yardstick, Vickers was a fast growing firm,  though still smaller than Cammell and John Brown
because  their  involvement  in  the  capital-intensive  armour  making  required  a  higher  level  of
capitalisation.  In the 1870s,  high tariffs reduced access to the American market,  but  the firm was
able  to  find  new  markets  and  develop  new  line  of  products.  For  instance,  Vickers  started  to
manufacture naval hardware such as screw propellers, marine shafting, etc.  to take advantage of
booming merchant constructions. In 1881 Vickers raised its capital to £750,000. Through constant
investments and a  focus on quality,  the firm had gained a  leading position in  the British steel
industry. As Clive Trebilcock underlines: “well before the transition to the armaments specialism
was commenced, the Vickers concern was operating at the peak of contemporary technical practice
within its sector: its qualification for refined industrial work were already well attested.”85
Until  the  1880s,  Vickers's  involvement  in  military  production  was  limited:  it supplied
Woolwich and Armstrong with steel hoops, tubes and forgings for guns, but did not carry out any
specifically military production. Vickers decided to enter into the armaments sector as a response to
the changing circumstances in the steel industry. In the 1870s, Vickers distributed dividends of more
than 10% on average.86 The firm's position at the top end of the steel market helped it to thrive in a
period during which Sheffield's steel industry was suffering from both internal competition from
other British regions (Middlesbrough and South Wales, especially)  which had access to cheaper
coal and better connections,  and from foreign producers  in Belgium, Germany and France. From
1884  onwards  competition  intensified  and  Vickers's  profitability  plummeted  (dividends  fell  to
4%).87 Even though the minutes of the board are often just  a few sentences – Thomas and Albert
Vickers had a very autocratic management style – they made clear that the company was looking for
new  businesses  to  enter.  Under these  circumstances  the expanding  demand  for  armaments
represented a large source of potential demand. Vickers was in a very good position to successfully
expand into this new field: it was a well known firm which  enjoyed a good reputation for high-
quality products. It  could  then easily raise capital  and use its name as a guarantee of  excellent
products.  Having supplied Woolwich  and Armstrong for years it was familiar with government's
83 J. C. Carr and W. Taplin, A History of the British Steel Industry (Oxford, 1962), 47. 
84 J. D. Scott, Vickers. A History, 17.
85 C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers. Armaments and Enterprise, 1854-1914 (London, 1977), 29.
86 VA 768, Annual Reports and Accounts, various years. 
87 VA 1470, Minutes of the General Meeting with Shareholders, 1884.
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technical requirements. It is likely that Vickers informally approached the government to assess if
there was room for an additional private supplier  of guns and armours.  The answer was certainly
positive: Armstrong was struggling to keep up with the rapidly expanding demand for guns and, at
the same time, Woolwich was judged by the same War Office as poorly equipped.88 In 1887 the firm
doubled its capital, issuing an additional £750,000 of shares  to finance the investments needed to
enter into armaments production. The reasons behind such a decision were neatly explained in the
firm's report to the shareholders the following year: 
The Directors have to report that during the first six months of the present
year the works have been fairly employed, although, owing to the severity
of the competitors, the prices obtainable for works have not been as
satisfactory as they should have been. On the other hand, the Directors are
glad to report that they are on the point of concluding an important contract
for a number of finished heavy guns, and though the execution of this
contract will involve a considerable outlay in special machinery, yet when
the plant is once established, this branch of the business should continue to
be a permanent and profitable one.89
 
The following year the company's first armour plates  was successfully  put  on trial.  As a
result, “[Vickers's] name has been put upon the Admiralty list of armour plate makers, and we have
in consequence secured contracts.”90 In  1890  the  firm  produced  its  first  naval  heavy gun.
Favourable market conditions and the firm's technical capabilities resulted in Vickers's rapid success
in the armaments trade. For example, Vickers, which was not bound to an old technology, was the
first company to show interest for the Harvey patent in Britain. Until 1897, however, Vickers was,
in  the  definition  of  Scott, a  “half-way house”.91 It  was  a  steel  firm with  a  foot  in  armaments
manufacturing,  and,  in  comparison with  Armstrong,  it  lacked both  the capacity to  build small,
quick-firing, armaments, and warships. 
Figure 3.12 compares the dividends paid by Armstrong, Vickers, John Brown and Cammell
in the period 1883-1897  while  Figure  3.13 shows the average and the standard deviation  σ2 (a
measure of dispersion of the values from the average) of the dividends paid by the major four
88 Directory of Army Contracts, ‘Report, 1888-89’, passim.
89 Id., 17 August 1888.
90 Id., 16 August 1889.
91 Scott, Vickers, 43.
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armaments companies.
Figure  3.1  2  : Dividends, as percentage of issued capital, paid by Armstrong, Vickers, Cammell and
John Brown, 1883-1897.
Source:  Armstrong:  Financial  Times 28 January 1898,  3;  Vickers:  Scott,  Vickers,  389-90;  John
Brown and Cammell: Tweedale,  City, 124-125; data from  Stock Exchange Year Book have been
used for missing years.
Figure  3.1  3   Average and standard deviation of dividends paid by Armstrong, Vickers, Cammell and
John Brown in the years 1883-1897.
Armstrong Vickers Cammell John Brown
Average 10.24 9.9 9.5 6.85
σ2 1.38 4.5 2.27 1.56
Source: see figure 3.12.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 highlight how Armstrong paid on average the highest dividends, and
also how stable was their level (Armstrong's σ2 was the lowest). The fact that Armstrong was active
in  various  military  productions  (large  ordnance,  shipbuilding,  quick-firings)  favoured  the  firm
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which could count on a large market and on limited competition. The three Sheffield companies, at
the opposite, were on average less profitable and their dividends more irregular. All these firms still
retained  large  civil  businesses  which  were  subject  to  stronger  competition.  Vickers  paid  high
dividends  in  the  early  1880,  but  then  its  profitability  plummeted.  The  need  to  finance  large
investments to enter the armaments trade partially explain the low level of dividends in the late
1880s and early 1890s. Vickers returned to pay large dividends, higher than Armstrong's, in the
second half of the 1890s. John Brown and Cammell's involvement in military production was in
these years limited to armour plates, whose demand had a significant impact (the peak in the late
1880s was caused by the additional demand for armour generated by the Naval Defence Act) and
they too had to spend large amount of resources to modernise their plants. In general, Cammell paid
higher dividends than John Brown.
Clyde  naval  shipbuilding firms  
The  Clyde  shipbuilding  cluster  is  the  last  case  analysed.  Between  1889  and  1914
shipbuilding firms based on the Clyde built 793,481 tons of warships for the Royal Navy, that is the
44,56% of the total tonnage contracted by the Admiralty.92 The Clyde represented, then, the single
largest private supplier of warships for the Royal Navy in the twenty-five years before 1914. This
part covers the early development of the Clyde shipbuilding industry, that is before the integration
of various shipbuilding and armaments companies in  late 1890s. Until that moment, Clyde-based
firms  were  exclusively  active in  the  production  of  hulls  and  engines  for  warships.  These  two
productions  were less  “military”  in  nature  than  armour  or  gun making:  building  the  hull  of  a
warship was more difficult and complex than that of a merchant ship, but with little problem and
limited investments the same yard could undertake, technically, if not economically,  both  civilian
and military works.
The first  yard to carry out naval shipbuilding on the Clyde was  that of  Robert Napier.93
Napier  won the tender for the construction of HMS  Black Prince,  the second sea-going British
ironclad,  which was  laid  down  in  1859  and  launched  in  1861.  The  contract  was  part  of  the
Admiralty's strategy of enlisting private yards to rapidly built  ironclads.  Napier did not make a
profit out of this contract: ironclads were a new kind of vessels and it was difficult to forecast the
final cost; moreover, he incurred additional expenditures to produce iron plates according to the
92 Calculations based on Parkes, British Battleship.
93 M. S. Moss, ‘Napier, Robert’, in ODNB.
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Admiralty's  specification.  At  the  end, the  government  compensated  him with  £35,000.94
Notwithstanding the poor financial returns, this first contract provided Napier with good publicity
and he secured additional orders from the  Admiralty and  from foreign governments. The largest
contract was for three frigates for Turkey. The Royal Navy awarded contracts also to a few other
Clyde firms, among which John Elder & Co. (later Fairfield Company) and J. G. Thompson (later,
Clydebank Engineering Company) were the most important.95 
The relationship between the Admiralty and the private shipbuilding industry followed the
same pattern which had shaped the one between the War Office and Armstrong in the late 1850s and
early 1860s. Technical evolution caused a period of crisis for the traditional procurement structures
– the Royal Dockyards or the Royal Gun Factory. This forced military bureaucracies to rely on
private suppliers. As soon as the public structures adapted themselves, however, they were again
favoured, limiting the contracts with private firms. The Clyde did not escape the general reduction
in orders (figure 3.14). The Admiralty kept buying a few vessels (and a larger number of engines),
but the general trend was downward.  At the same time,  private yards themselves tended to  shun
military orders:  during  the  1870s  commercial  shipbuilding  was  booming,  offering  plenty  of
opportunities,  while production for the Admiralty, because of the absence of standard designs and
the continuous  request for  changes and ameliorations,  was longer and  more  costly.96 The  overall
effect was that works for the Admiralty lost relevance for the Clyde firms.
Figur  e 3.1  4  : Iron tonnage produced for the Royal Navy, 1859-1884.
 
Years
Royal
Dockyards
(tons)
Private
yards (tons)
% of
private
orders over
dockyard's
Clyde-
based
firms (tons)
% of Clyde
over private
orders
1859-69 64,841 142,905 220.4 34,723 24.3
1869-79 151,268 59,383 39.3 38,691 65.2
1879-84 123,830 29,670 24.0 14,480 48.8
Source: Conway's, All the World Fighting Ships, passim.
94 H. B Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde (Edinburgh, 1987), 12-13.
95 Id., 18.
96 Report  of  the  Committee  Appointed  to  Inquire  into  the  Condition  Under  Which  Contracts  are  Invited  for  the
Building or Repairing of Ships, including their Engines, For Her Majesty's Navy, and into the Mode in Which
Repairs and Refits of Ships are Effected in Her Majesty's Dockyards (1884-85) (Ravensworth Committee),  HCPP,
qs. 262-264, 1535, 1758-1759. 
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The relationship between Clyde firms and the  Admiralty  changed as a consequence of the
naval programmes of the 1880s. More vessels were required, but there was a limit on the number of
warships the Royal Dockyard could build. Therefore orders to private firms escalated. For instance,
in the years 1884-1889, the Royal Dockyard built a total of 103,403 tons, and private yards 95,965
(60,560 as direct consequence of the Northbrook programme), of which 32,870 tons were built on
the Clyde.  This  trend was  greatly  reinforced by the  Spencer  naval  programme,  the subsequent
budget increases needed to preserve the “two power standard” and the contemporary introduction of
torpedo destroyers whose design and construction the Admiralty decided to leave to private firms.97 
The relationship between Clyde-based firms and the  Admiralty  from the 1880s onwards,
however, was very different from that of the 1860s. Then Clyde firms had received orders because
they enjoyed a technological advantage: they could produce iron vessels, while the Royal Dockyard
could not. The advantage was short-lived, though: iron construction was relatively easy to master,
and the Royal Dockyards rapidly acquired the know-how. Twenty years later the Clyde returned to
be an  important  centre  of  naval  shipbuilding,  but  this  time  the  reasons favouring it were not
technological, but organisational. The  Admiralty did not order vessels  because it could not make
them (with  the  exception  of  destroyers).  It  ordered  them because  its  yards  were  too  busy  to
undertake  additional  constructions.  The  higher  level  of  naval  design  standardisation  led to  a
reduction  of  uncertainty.  This  allowed  the  Clyde  to  exploit  the  organisational  capabilities
(flexibility,  high productivity, diffused technical know-how, etc.) which the district had developed
in merchant shipbuilding, and which allowed it to build rapidly and efficiently.98 The Admiralty sent
the designs which Clyde firms followed, introducing virtually no improvements or innovations. As
the First Lord of the Admiralty George Hamilton said in 1890, “Dockyard-built ships of each type
[were given] a sensible start upon contract-build ships of similar type in order that all details might
be thoroughly worked out in Dockyards by naval and professional officers and thus be available for
guidance in the construction of contract ships”.99 
Despite the opportunities offered by the growing naval budget, the ability to acquire orders
was linked to  each single  firm's  capacity.  Thus  a small  group  made up of the  largest firms  –
Clydebank, Fairfield and Scott's – received all the orders for battleships and first and second class
cruisers, precisely because they were the firms equipped to lay down large hulls. At the same time,
government  contracts  usually  offered  positive  returns  despite  the  level  of  profitability  was  not
uniform among companies.100 Orders from the Admiralty were especially sought after in periods of
97 E. J. March, British Destroyers: a History of Development, 1892-1953 (London, 1967), 21-26.
98 Peeble, Warshipbuilding, 137.
99 Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, HCPP (1890). 
100Peeble, Warshipbuilding, 34-39.
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merchant shipbuilding slowdown, as in 1895. 
Two additional  features  of Clyde's  naval  shipbuilding activities  between 1889 and 1897
must be stressed. The first is that Clyde firms exported very little of their warship production.  In
these years  they built  just  6,437 tons for foreign  governments,  a fraction of what Elswick  sold
abroad. This was because foreign customers came to Britain either to acquire the most sophisticated
components (guns, mountings, etc.)  or complete warships.  Therefore it was  the  more  integrated
armaments  companies which gained foreign orders,  rather than simple  naval  shipbuilding firms.
The second is that naval construction represented an additional, usually profitable, side activity for
the largest firms, but warships represented only a small fraction of the total Clyde output (although
it certainly represented a higher percentage in terms of value), as data showed in figure 3.15 make
clear.
Figure  3.1  5  : warship and merchant tonnage as a percentage of Clyde's total output, 1889-1897.
Warship
construction
(in tons)
% of warship
construction
over total
construction
Merchant
construction
(in tons)
% or merchant
construction
over total
construction
Total output
1889 6,810 2.03 328,391 97.97 335,201
1890 9,690 2.68 352,488 97.32 362,178
1891 14,300 4.4 311,177 95.6 325,477
1892 22,817 6.78 313,597 93.22 336,414
1893 0 0 280,160 100 280,160
1894 840 0.25 340,045 99.75 340,885
1895 42,112 11.7 318,040 88.3 360,152
1896 24,425 5.8 396,416 94.2 420,841
1897 13,665 4.01 326,372 95.99 340,037
134,659 2,966,686 3,101,345
Source: Calculations based on data in Peebles, Warshipbuilding, appendix A.
3.4 Conclusions.
The  British  armaments  industry  grew substantially  in  the  last  two  decades  of  the  19th
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century. Two major trends explain this. The first was the extensive application to naval armaments
of  the  technologies  which  characterised  the  second  industrial  revolution  (especially  steel  and
chemicals).  This  resulted  in  more  complex and expensive  hardware  whose  production  requires
large, continuous investments which only heavily capitalised firms could undertake. The second
was  the  substantial  expansion of  the  British  naval  budget  which  generated  plenty  of  new
opportunities for firms manufacturing military goods. For example, both Vickers and  the  Clyde
shipbuilding firms took advantages of the ballooning military spending. 
At the end of the century,  however, the  British armaments industry was still fragmented.
Only Armstrong had already integrated military shipbuilding and gun making  into one company.
This fact explains why the Newcastle-based company enjoyed such a long-standing success in the
export markets. At the same time, Vickers, John Brown and Cammell had invested large amount of
money  to  modernise  and  enlarge  their  plants,  but  they  still lacked secure  outlets  for  their
productions, because they did not control yards which could absorb their output. In a still different
position were the Clyde shipbuilders, which were active in the less technologically complex phases
of military production – the  making of hulls and engines  – and lacked any integration with other
military productions. 
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Chapter IV
The Development of the Armaments Industry in Italy, 1880-1900
This chapter focuses on the development of the private armaments industry in Italy in the
last  two decades  of  the  19th century. In this  period,  the  Italian  armaments  industry developed
considerably:  in 1884 Terni, the first modern Italian  steel company, was created specifically  with
the aim  to make armour plates for the  Navy. A year later, Armstrong established a plant for  the
manufacture of guns at Pozzuoli,  near Naples, the first private gun making firm in Italy. This was
the largest foreign direct investment ever made by Armstrong in its history, and probably the single
largest ever made by any armaments company before 1914. The creation of Pozzuoli, because of its
relevance for  both the history of the armaments  industry in  Italy and for  the impact  it  had on
Armstrong, is the subject of a more in-depth analysis in the next chapter. Taking advantage of the
fact that the Italian naval budget rapidly expanded in the 1880s, also Ansaldo and Orlando increased
their activities in military shipbuilding. In the 1890s naval expenditures fell, even though remained
at a level higher than that of the 1870s.
Support private firms to allow them to expand their operations and free Italy from the need
to import military hardware was the linchpin of the strategy of Benedetto Brin, Italian Ministry for
the Navy for the majority of the 1880s. The  Navy backed  private investments  by using various
means: financial  advances, long-term  contracts etc.  As it  will  be shown, such a policy was not
unanimously popular among military officers  but, at the end, Brin's opinion prevailed. The result
was that, while until the late 1870s a proper Italian armaments industry did not exist, at the end of
the 19th century several firms were  active in  military production.  The orders for warships which
Ansaldo and Orlando received from various foreign governments at the end of the century were a
signal of the Italian armaments firms' growing capacity to compete in the international markets. 
The chapter is structured as follow: the first part considers the Italian naval budget and naval
policy.  The  second  deals  with  the  creation  of  Terni  and  explains why  the  Italian  Navy  kept
supporting it, despite financial and technical difficulties experienced by the firm. The third analyses
the  growing activities of Ansaldo and Orlando. The  fourth part  addresses the impact that  Italian
protectionist policies had on the armaments sector. 
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4.1 Naval budgets and naval policy, 1880-1900.
During the 1880s, the Italian naval budget increased significantly. In this decade the balance
of power in the Mediterranean represented the central  foreign policy  preoccupation of  the  Italian
governments.1 The relationship between Italy and France had grown increasingly confrontational in
the course of the 1870s. Worryingly for Italy, French naval construction's budget tripled during the
second half  of the 1870s though, admittedly,  from a low starting level.2 The French seizure of
Tunisia in 1881 caused a new peak of tension.3 Italy had harboured the idea of transforming Tunisia
into a colony: Tunisia lies only 90 miles away from Sicily and there were around 20,000 Italians,
who  had been able to integrate in the local urban economy without generating much antagonism
among the local population,4 versus only around 200 Frenchmen.5 In addition, the Bey of Tunis had
granted railway concessions –  an instrument of commercial penetration routinely  used by the
would-be colonial powers to assert their interests – to a consortium in which Italian interests were a
majority.6 France, however, could not accept that another  country would  be  in  the  position  to
menace Algeria;  thus in 1881, it invaded Tunisia  and  forced the Bey  Muhammad III as-Sadiq to
grant France a protectorate over the country. 
The French coup de main generated loud cries of protest in Italy, but in vain. Britain wanted
two different, and competing, powers to hold the opposite  coasts of the Sicilian Channel, which
divided West and East Mediterranean. If Italy had controlled both Tunisia and Sicily, she could have
been able to cut the Gibraltar-Malta-Alexandria route.7 Bismark saw Italian anti-French feelings as
a useful way to lure Italy towards a central European alliance. African expansion, moreover, could
1 B. Sullivan, ‘The Strategy of the Decisive Weight: Italy, 1882-1922’, W. Murray, M. Knox and A. Bernstein (eds.),
The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge, 1994), 316-317; D. Grange, ‘La Méditerrenée dans les
Rapports Franco-Italiens au Début du 20th Siècle’, M. Perticcioli (ed.), Verso la Svolta delle Alleanze. La Politica
Estera dell'Italia ai Primi del Novecento (Venezia, 2004), 13-15. 
2 T. Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904 (Annapolis, 1987), 75.
3 W. L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890 (Cambridge, 1939), 217-250; A. J. P. Taylor, The
Struggle for Mastery in Europe (London, 1954), 272-275.
4 J. Clancy-Smith,‘Marginality and Migration: Europe's Social Outcasts in Pre-Colonial Tunisia, 1830-81’, E. Rogan
(ed.), Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East (London, 2002), 149-182.
5 On the relationship between Italy and Tunisia before and after the French annexation M. Choate, ‘Tunisia Contested:
Italian Nationalism, French Imperial Rule, and Migration in the Mediterranean Basin’, California Italian Studies 1
(2010), 1-20.
6 L. Del Piano, La Penetrazione Italiana in Tunisia (1861-1881), (Padova, 1964), 25. 
7 This was exactly what happened during the Second War World, G. Giorgerini, La Guerra Italiana sul Mare. La
Marina tra Vittoria e Sconfitta 1940-43 (Milano, 2001), passim.
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divert France from the idea of regaining Alsace and Lorraine.8 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
in 1882 Italy secretly joined Germany and Austria to form the Triple Alliance. This was a nominally
defensive military agreement which for Italy had the virtue of securing the country powerful allies
in case of new disagreements with France.9
The conflict with France led Italy to expand  its  military budget. Military expenditure had
been on the rise since the early 1870s. In 1871 the total military budget (that is the sum appropriated
for both the Navy and the Army) was 190 million Lire. In 1877 it arrived at 250 million Lire and it
stayed at this level until 1880. Such a rise  had been to a significant degree  unavoidable: in the
second half of the 1860s total military expenditure had been cut, for the sake of balancing the
budget, well below 200 million Lire a year. Such a low level of expenditure led to questions about
the real capability of the armed forces to defend the country. The French-German War of 1870-71
stimulated a first wave of reforms:  under the  plan drawn by General Ricotti Magnani, the Italian
army adopted a new organisation structure based on the German model of universal conscription.10 
The rise in military expenditure, however, became more pronounced in  the 1880s.  By the
end of the decade, total military expenditure was around 420 million Lire (although expenditure did
not stay at such a level for long). New fortifications were erected on the North-West  frontier and
around Rome, to protect the capital from a French landing.11 At the same time the total number of
military personnel increased by 35%, from around 165,000 to more than 230,000. The majority of
this increase was the result of the enlargement of the Army from ten to twelve corps, but the number
of seamen increased proportionally more.12 Figure 4.1 shows naval expenditure in Italy from 1880
to 1900.
In 1880 the government's spending for the Navy totalled around 45 million lire. By the mid
1880s the budget had doubled. As Prime Minister Francesco Crispi said in October 1887, “We need
a stronger  Navy, to make our influence in the Mediterranean more evident and appreciated.”13 In
1889 the budged touched the sum of 160 million lire, an increase of more than 300% in just a
decade. The 1889 balance was characterised by very large extraordinary expenditures, but ordinary
8 W. L.  Langer,  W. L., ‘The European Powers  and the French Occupation of  Tunis,  1878-1881’, The American
Historical Review 31 (1925), 55-78, and id. 31 (1926), 251-265.
9 The standard history of the Triple Alliance is L. Salvatorelli,  La Triplice Alleanza,  Storia Diplomatica 1877-1912
(Varese,  1939); see  also  G.  Candeloro, Storia  dell'Italia  Moderna, vol.  6, Lo  Sviluppo del  Capitalismo  e  del
Movimento Operaio 1871-1896 (Milano, 1978), 156-164. 
10 J. Whitman, Storia dell'Esercito Italiano (Milano, 1979), 160-164.
11 E. Cajano (ed.), Il Sistema dei Forti Militari a Roma (Roma, 2006) offers a detailed description of the fifteen forts
erected around the city.
12 G. Rochat and G. Massobrio, Breve Storia dell'Esercito Italiano dal 1861 al 1943 (Torino, 1978), 112-113.
13 F. Crispi (edited by T. Palamenghi-Crispi), Politica Interna. Diario e Documenti, (Milano, 1924), 189.
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expenditures alone doubled in the course of the 1880s, from around 50 million to 100 million Lire. 
Figure   4  .1  : Italian naval budget, 1880-1900 (in thousands of current Lire).
Source: Raccolta delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno d'Italia, various years.14 
Around 1888, the Italian economy entered a period of economic slowdown, characterised by
a serious crisis of the banking and construction sectors.15 Government expenditures were cut across
the board,  and naval expenditures  did not escape. The cuts, however, occurred in a different way
from that of the late 1860s. In that period, both extraordinary and ordinary expenditures were cut.
This  time, extraordinary  expenditures  bore  the  core  of  the  cuts:  from 1884  to  1889  they had
averaged 15-18 million Lire a year, after 1891 they accounted for around 5 million Lire a year.
Ordinary expenditures, in contrary, were less hit and they never fell to less than 95 million Lire a
year during the decade. The expansion of the 1880s had transformed the Navy: the more numerous
and larger ships which had been introduced required more resources to be maintained in operation,
more seamen had been enlisted, and arsenals  enlarged. Therefore  ordinary expenditures could be
14 In 1884 the government budget moved from being based on solar years, to be divided in periods going from 1 July,
to 30 June of the following year. The parliament approved a special half-year balance covering the first six months
of 1884 which, for reasons of consistency, is not included.
15 G. Toniolo, Storia Economica dell'Italia Liberale 1850-1918 (Bologna, 1998), 139-157.
137
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
Ordinary expenditures Extraordinary expenditures
reduced only if the size of the fleet was significantly reduced, something which did not occur. The
decline lasted  until 1892-93  and naval  expenditures stagnated until  1896-97.  The  situation was
reversed at  the end of the decade when the naval budgets started again to grow, a trend which
continued  to  1914.  The  expansion  was  again  dominated  by ordinary expenditures  which  were
increased of 20 million in the years from 1897-98 to 1900-01.
4.2 The creation of Terni.
Benedetto Brin held the position of Minister for the Navy from 1884 to 1891. As it has been
said above, while he was in office naval spending grew from 80 million Lire to 160 million in 1888-
89. Whereas in the previous ten years extraordinary expenditures had represented just a small share
of  the  budget,  during  Brin's  tenure,  extraordinary expenditures  became much more  significant,
climbing to a proportion of the total expenditure which had not been seen since the early 1860s. In
1887 the Parliament approved a multi-year law providing 85 million Lire for naval construction (37
million), purchases of guns and torpedoes (29 million) and improvements to the arsenals (19).16
Brin  used the large amount of resources available to  reshape the Italian Navy.17 The Navy was
significantly enlarged: the number of seamen  was increased from 12,000 in 1880 to  more than
20,000 in 1890;  at the same time the combined displacement of the  Navy doubled from 158,000
tons to 312,000 tons.18 Brin, who had designed the large battleships Duilio and Dandolo during the
1870s, favoured the introduction of large, technologically advanced, powerfully armed, fast capital
ships  as the most effective way to check the  French Navy: while France could count on a larger
fleet, a screen of qualitatively superior Italian warships could offer a high-sea defence of the Italian
costs, along which lay major industrial regions and strategic railways.19 Consequently, a series of
new powerful battleships were built to form the core of the Italian Navy, while smaller crafts such
as torpedo boats and cruisers entered into service  as auxiliary ships. Brin's preference for large
battleships, regardless of whether such a strategy was coherent with the economic resources of the
16 ‘Nuove Spese Straordinarie per la Marina negli Esercizi dal 1887-88 al 1896-97 per la Somma di Lire 85 Milioni”,
Law 10 March 1887. 
17 F. M. Baratelli, La Marina Militare Italiana nella Vita Nazionale (Milano, 1983), 162.
18 I. Ceva, ‘Forze armate e società civile dal 1861 al 1887’, in 1861-1887. Il Processo d'Unificazione nella Realtà del
Paese. Atti del L Congresso di Storia del Risorgimento italiano (Bologna, 5-9 novembre 1980) (Roma, 1982), 347-
355.
19 E. Ferrante, Il Pensiero Strategico Navale in Italia (Roma, 1988), 13-27. 
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country, influenced Italian naval thinking until the Second World War.20 
The  reason why the  Italian  governments  were  able  to  finance such a  naval  policy was
simple: the economy was  growing.  Despite cereal farming suffered from the competition of non
European producers, the cultivation of other crops such as lemon and grapes offered good returns.
Industry was going through a phase of vibrant expansion.  In 1883 the forced circulation of paper
money, or “corso forzoso”, that is the suspension of the possibility to exchange notes into gold, was
revoked and the country returned to a de facto gold standard. This increased the confidence in the
Italian currency and, as a result, foreign capital flowed into the country. The increased availability
of capital generated a strong growth of investments, especially in industry,21 and also stimulated real
estates  and  financial  activities.  The  positive  economic  trend  translated  into  higher  government
revenues, with public expenditures (excluding railways investments) growing by 34% from 1882 to
1887.22 
In  1880  the  Italian  parliament  approved  the  creation  of  a  committee  of  inquire  on
shipbuilding and maritime trade  which was chaired by Paolo Boselli, an MP from Savona and a
leading supporter of shipbuilding interests in parliament (and future Prime Minister during the First
World War).23 The conclusions of the committee were published in seven volumes in 1882. Among
other  topics,  the  committee addressed  the  problem of  whether  the  government  should support
shipbuilding and engineering firms. It concluded that the government, using the contracts awarded
by the Navy, could play a decisive role in helping the national industry to develop and modernise
itself. The commission thus suggested that the Navy should reserve the construction of the hulls of
new vessels  to private yards, sell some of its own yards and focus the activities of the remaining
ones on repairs and maintenance. 
Stimulated by these conclusions, the Minister for the Navy Ferdinando Acton established in
1882  a  “Commission for the mechanical industries and shipbuilding”. The  chairman of the
20 During the 1930s, the Italian Navy concentrated the majority of its budget on building or modernising battleships, G.
Giorgerini,  Da Matapan al  Golfo Persico.  La  Marina  Militare  Italiana dal  Fascismo alla  Repubblica  (Milano,
1989), 98-99.
21 E. Corbino, Annali di Economia 1881-1890 (Milano, 1982), 332 offers a critical assessment of the abolition of the
“corso forzoso”. On the financial boom of the 1880s, V.  Zamagni, The Economic  History  of  Italy  1860-1990
(Cambridge, 1993), 141-143; for its effect on banking A. Confalonieri, Banca e Industria in Italia, 1894-1906, vol. 1
(Milano, 1974), 174-198. The best assessment of the links between international financial cycles and the Italian
economy before 1914 is S. Fenoaltea, L'Economia Italiana dall'Unità alla Grande Guerra (Roma-Bari, 2006), 77-
122.
22 G. Brosio and C. Marchese, Il Potere di Spendere. Economia e Storia della Spesa Pubblica dall'Unificazione ad
Oggi (Bologna, 1986), 178.
23 G. Barone, ‘Lo Stato e la Marina Mercantile in Italia (1881-1894)’, Studi Storici 15 (1974), 624-659. R. Romanelli, 
‘Boselli, Paolo’, DBI.
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commission, and the driving force behind it, was Benedetto Brin.24 The commission had the task of
surveying all the major industrial establishments in Italy and to assess which of them were in the
position to undertake works which, until then, had been awarded to foreign firms. The final report
of the commission offered a quite negative assessment. In Italy there were two major engineering
districts: one in Naples and the other in Genoa. In neither of them, however, were firms capable of
manufacturing  high  quality  products at  prices competitive  with  imports.  According  to  the
commission two major problems were responsible for this. First, the cost of raw materials and semi
finished products was  too  high because they had to be imported: Italy's production of coal was
negligible, and also the steel and iron industry was far from being developed. The cheapness of the
workforce  only  partially compensated these disadvantages. The second problem was the lack of
productive specialisation among firms caused by limited and erratic demand: each engineering and
shipbuilding  firm was  forced  to  produce  too  many different  products  –  naval  engines,  boilers,
railways engines and carriages, industrial machineries, etc. without specialising in any. This meant
that firms  could not  obtain economies of experience and were dependent of foreign designs and
technology.  Whereas Italian engineering firms had no problem in satisfying the local demand for
small and medium mechanical products, at the present state they were in no position to undertake
large and complex productions competitively. 
The commission suggested that the government could offer contracts for hulls, naval engines
and machinery to the few largest Italian companies to help them to specialise and strengthen their
operations.25 This was not enough, though.  The commission concluded that, “what is missing [in
Italy]  is  a  large  steel  plant  able  to  supply without  restrictions  all  the  material  required  by the
Navy”.26 The final report was published only in 1885, but Brin, who in 1884 was back as Minister,
had already taken decisive steps to increase the share of orders coming to Italian-based companies.
This  was  the  cornerstone  of  Brin's  strategy,  which  was  much  more  than  a simple change  in
procurement:  Brin  understood  how  industrial  development  and  technological  innovations  were
affecting international relations. Military technology was advancing at a rapid pace. Naval warfare
had  changed  beyond  recognition  in  just  two  decades.  As  a  consequence,  economic  and
technological factors were becoming pivotal in the balance between powers. His personal training
as an engineer,  his  first-hand knowledge of  foreign naval  technology,  his  long experience as  a
24 E. Guaita, ‘Alle Origini del Capitalismo Industriale Italiano: la Nascita della Terni’, Studi Storici 11 (1970), 303. 
25 P. Ferrari, ‘Stato e Sviluppo Industriale, il Ministero della Marina 1884 – 1914’, Italia Contemporanea 197 (1994),
687. See also, L. De Rosa, Capitale Straniero nell'Industria Meccanica del Mezzogiorno 1840-1904 (Napoli, 1968),
125-127.
26 Relazione della Commissione per le Industrie Meccaniche e Navali (Roma 1885), 44. 
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bureaucrat assigned to liaison with private firms, all contributed to make Brin aware of the interplay
between industrial growth and military power, of the changing nature of sea power, of how vessels
and naval ordnance were becoming more expensive and sophisticated.27 
While in the past, the strength of a nation was determined by a numerous army and a large
fleet,  now,  in  an  industrialized  world,  the  cornerstone  of  naval  strength  of  a  country  was  the
capability it had to build and supply an effective and modern military machine. If Italy wanted to
achieve its ambitions  to be a leading power in Europe, it had to strengthen its economy and its
armaments  industry.  Obviously, the continuous reliance on foreign suppliers weakened the  Italian
position, as Brin stated clearly during a parliamentary debate in 1884: “I believe that it would be an
illusion to think  of being a naval power, if we have continuously to resort to foreigners for the
materials we need.”28 
Brin's  assessment of  the  key  role  played by foreign  suppliers was  beyond dispute.  The
Italian Navy was buying abroad all the armour plates and all the large pieces of ordnance  for its
vessels. For instance, in 1877 the  armour plates for  the battleships Duilio and Dandolo were
purchased from Schneider in France, for 10,559,295 Lire (1,800 Lire  a ton).29 In 1881 and 1882,
additional orders were place in Britain with the Cammell and John Brown for 900 tons of iron deck
armour for  the battleship Italia at a price “between 1,900 and 2,000 Lire a ton”.30 These
arrangements  were clearly problematic, considering how strained were the relationships with
France. In 1884, for instance, the Navy needed to order armour plates for the battleships Lepanto
and  Ruggero di Lauria as  soon as possible to avoid delays in  construction.  Brin  thus  wrote to
Pasquale  Mancini,  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  know  if “it  would  be  possible  to  order  so
important supplies of a military nature from French [i.e. Schneider] and British firms [i.e. Cammell
and  John  Brown]; that is if you could assure that, for the next year, there will be no danger  of
running into  difficulties  which  could  cause  the  seizure  of  the  supplies.”  Mancini  replied  that
“nothing  prevents ordering armour plates  from the British firms”,  but he stressed that orders to
Schneider could  be  justified  only  if there  was  no  alternative  way to  avoid  slowing  down the
construction  of the vessel.31 The French government could stop the delivery of plates ordered in
France at any moment, and a blockade by the French Navy could easily delay imports from Britain.
27 M. Gabriele, Benedetto Brin (Roma, 1998), 8-10 and 34-36.
28 Camera dei Deputati. Atti Parlamentari, Discussioni, vol. 10, 10191.
29 Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile (Roma, 1882), vol. 5, passim. 
30 The Times 30 October 1882, 11, and Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla Regia Marina, vol. 2, Relazioni
Speciali (Roma, 1906), 59. 
31 Museo Centrale del Risorgimento, Roma, MCRR/mancini/642/4/18. 
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At the same time, technical innovations occurring in the 1880s – the replacement of iron with steel
for the manufacture of ordnance and armour plates as well as in shipbuilding, etc. – magnified the
crucial role played by a reliable supply of steel which was something Italy lacked.
It was thus natural for Brin to offer his support to the project to create a state-of-the-art steel
plant  in  Terni,  in  Umbria.  The chief  proponent  of  this venture was Vincenzo Stefano Breda,  a
former MP and businessman who was the president of the Società Veneta di Costruzioni, a company
involved in construction and public works which relied heavily on governmental contracts.32 Breda's
vision  was that  of  creating  an  integrated  company able  to  produce  pig iron  from the  iron  ore
excavated  on  the  Elba  island,  and  then  transform pig  iron  into steel  for  both  commercial  and
military purposes.33 Such an ambitious project  would have freed Italy from the need to  import
armour plates. Breda planned to expand a small metallurgic plant, the Cassian Bon company, which
already existed in Terni. The reason why Terni was selected as the location is not completely clear.
The records of the company about its first years are patchy, and what has been preserved does not
clarify  this  point.  Two  reasons  are  usually  regarded  as  having  contributed.  The  first  is  the
geographical location: Terni lies in the southern part of Umbria, far from this risk of being bombed
by the sea. This was certainly an argument which pleased the  Navy, although many other places
were similarly far from the coast.  A second reason which is usually  noted is the presence in the
region surrounding Terni of water falls which could be exploited for industrial  purposes.34 While
later this happened, the use  of water-generated energy during the first years  was limited.  As an
industrial location Terni suffered, however, from a serious drawback: it was not well connected with
the rest of the country. Being quite far from the major Italian ports in the North-West of the country,
the cost in Terni of  coal, iron ore and other raw materials  which had to be transported there was
higher than elsewhere. This problem affected also the price of the final products.
Enrico Guaita has suggested a different  reason.35 The Società Veneta di Costruzioni  had
recently purchased the majority of  the capital  of the Cassian Bon company.36 The  Società  Veneta
was also the main purchaser of Cassian Bon's major production: pig iron pipes for aqueducts. The
Veneta, however, had recently brought to completion the major contracts for which it required such
product. The decision to create the new steel works in Terni enlarging Cassian Bon plant could thus
32 F. Bonelli, ‘Breda, Vincenzo Stefano’, DBI.
33 Id., Lo Sviluppo di una Grande Impresa in Italia: la Terni dal 1884 al 1962 (Torino, 1975), 19-23.
34 R. Covino, ‘Nascita e Sviluppo di un'Impresa. L'Acciaieria di Terni: Uomini, Progetti e Tipologie d'Impresa’, Id. and
G. Papuli (eds.), Le Acciaierie di Terni (Milano,1998), 20. 
35 Guaita, ‘Origini’, 304-7. 
36 On Cassian Bon La Società degli Alti Forni, Fonderie ed Acciaierie di Terni ed i Suoi Stabilimenti (Terni, 1898), 11-
14.
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have been an attempt by the management of the Società Veneta to extricate their company from a
difficult situation. Guaita himself, however, recognises that the origin of the company “is one of the
more obscure moments of the history of the company”,  and that it is likely that a combination of
various reasons concurred to the selection of Terni. 
Whatever  the  reasons  behind Breda's  decision,  on  10  March  1884,  the  shareholder  of
Cassian  Bon  voted to  transform the  old  limited  partnership  into  a  joint-stock company named
“Società degli Alti Forni e Fonderie di Terni’ (SAFFAT) with the initial capital of 3,000,000 Lire,
which was soon raised to 6,000,000.37 Shares in the new firm were subscribed by the major Italian
banks  (Banca  Nazionale,  Credito  Mobiliare  and  Banca  Generale),  plus  by a  group  of  wealthy
financiers and aristocrats from Veneto (such as Baron Alberto Treves and Gaetano Romiati). Breda
and the Società Veneta's major contribution were the assets of Cassian Bon, which were valued at
2,400,000 Lire.  An assessment which, twenty years later,  the Enquiry  Committee on the Italian
Navy which investigated the relationship between Terni and the Navy found to be excessive. 
On 16 May the first contract between the Navy and the new company was signed. The Navy
purchased 8,600 tons of armour, of which 4,700 had to be delivered by 1887, for 16,000,000 Lire.
The government immediately paid Terni 3,200,000 Lire as anticipation of the future delivery to help
set up the plant. Terni was required to provide plates “of the same quality of the ones manufactured
by Mr. Schneider” for a price which “should not be grater than that which is possible to obtain from
foreign firms”.38 Terni's management decided to  install Martin-Siemens open hearth furnaces, the
first in Italy.39 Martin-Siemens process was particularly suitable for making special steel because it
took several  hours  to  melt  and  refine  a  charge,  and thus  it  gave  time  to  monitor  the  process
carefully.40 This aspect became still more important when, in the 1890s, steel alloys were introduced
and the possibility of altering the chemical composition of the metal became crucial. The company
bought five 22 ton furnaces. The pace of investment was rapid: in December 1885 the company's
capital  was  increased  to  12  million  Lire,  and  raised  to  16  million  Lire  in  October  1886.  The
company's board was also authorised to issue up to 16 million Lire in debentures to provide for the
working capital needed to begin production. 
Franco Bonelli has calculated that the  advances on future works paid by the government
37 Id., 17.
38 Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla Regia Marina. Relazione Preliminare (Roma, 1905), 86.
39 G. Papuli ‘Processi, Prodotti e Immagine’, Covino and Papuli (eds.), Acciaierie, 72.
40 A detailed description of the Martin-Siemens process  is in K. C. Barraclough, Steelmaking: 1850-1900 (London,
1990), 142-146.
143
accounted for 19% of all the capital invested by Terni in its first ten years of operations. 41 It is not
surprising, then, that the relationship between Terni and the government created a lot of controversy
from the beginning: the  Navy was paying a significant amount of money to a company whose
works did not exist yet, and whose capacity to manufacture high quality plates was uncertain, to say
the least. It is clear that  for  Breda  it  would have been  much more difficult to realise his project
without the support of the Navy. Breda's incentives, as well as that of all the other shareholders, are
fairly clear: he was a shrewd businessman with plenty of connections among the political elite. He
knew  that  the  creation  of  a  modern  steel  plant  might  potentially  represent  a  very  lucrative
investment, especially if the Navy could be persuaded to award Terni orders for armour plates.
The Navy's paramount preoccupation was that to secure a domestic source of armour plates
and ordnance forgings. Other attempts had been made in the past to create metallurgical plants for
the manufacture of military goods, but with no concrete results: in 1873 the Parliament approved a
law awarding the rights for the excavation of the Elba's iron ore deposits to Francesci Brioschi but
he did not pursue  his plan.42 In  1878 (when Brin was Minister of the  Navy for the first time) the
government tried again to lure private investors to set up an iron works to satisfy the needs of the
Navy by  offering the right for the exploitation of Elba's mines, but, again, the project failed to
attract  any investor.43 What  this  time was  different  was  that  the  Italian  Navy was  enjoying an
unprecedented increase  in its budget: in 1884 the  Navy was building four battleships  –  Lepanto,
Ruggero di Lauria, Morosini, and Andrea Doria – and the armour plates for two of them still had to
be purchased. Moreover, the  Navy had already  drawn up projects for two more battleships, and
additional capital vessels were expected to be built in the future. The forecast consumption in the
following years was of up 10,000 tons of vertical armour and 4-5,000 tons of horizontal plates. This
volume of demand put pressure on traditional suppliers: the risk was that the entrance into service
of the vessels  under construction and of the planned ones might be  postponed by delays in the
delivery of armour plates from abroad. The additional capacity provided by a new Italian-based
plant could address this problem. The magnitude of the expected orders, in addition, was substantial
enough to make attractive to private interests setting up the new works,.
Inside the government bureaucracy, however, not everyone agreed with Brin. For instance,
Giuseppe  Mantellini,  who  from  1876  to  1885  was  the  head  of  the  government  legal  service
41 Bonelli, Terni, 17.
42 Camera dei  Deputati,  Convenzione per l'Accollo e l'Escavazione delle Miniere Terranera e Calamita nell'Isola
d'Elba e per la Vendita del Minerale Escavato. On Brioschi N. Raponi, ‘Brioschi, Francesco’, DBI. 
43 Camera  dei  Deputati,  Erezione di Stabilimenti Siderurgici e per l'Affitto delle Miniere dell'Isola dell'Elba per
Provvedere ai Bisogni della Marina e dei Lavori Pubblici, 20 novembre 1878. 
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expressed doubts about the contract which the Navy had signed with Terni: he feared that “if this
speculation will work, and let's hope God wants this, the company will enrich itself, and, if it does
not  work,  and let's  hope God this  won't  happen,  the  Navy will  lose  all  or  the  majority of  its
advances”.44 Mantellini was concerned about what nowadays is called “privatisation of profits and
socialisation of losses”: in case the venture would prove successful, the profits would accrue to the
firm's  shareholders,  while  if it proved unsuccessful,  the  government  would  lose  its  money.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the  Navy carried on  with  its plan. Breda had assembled behind
him a powerful group of moneyed interests which enjoyed influence in parliament. What is more,
military policy was  an area into which central administration could exercise  limited leverage and
control.
In 1887 Terni was already on the brink of failure, before having delivered a single armour
plate. The company had overstretched itself buying unprofitable coal and iron mines and had lost
money hoarding raw material for fear of facing problems with their supply later on.45 At the same
time the management realised that additional investments were required before it would be possible
to start production. Mismanagement, poor supervision and simple inexperience added to the final
price tag.  The company itself offered  inconsistent estimates of the value of the works:  the 1887
balance sheet of Terni gave to the plant,  the machineries and the buildings  a total  value of 30
million Lire, while in 1888 the value of the plant alone was put at 19 million lire. In 1895, speaking
to  the  Senate,  Breda  claimed  that,  not  considering government's  advances,  the  company  had
invested a total of 44 million Lire. Terni was rescued from its critical position by the Navy, which
signed another contract  (dated  15 December 1887) ordering 2,600 tons of plates and, in addition,
advanced other 5,800,000 Lire to the firm, in anticipation of future deliveries. The problems facing
Terni,  however,  were not immediately solved: “the firm,  a  few months after the 1887 contract,
encountered new problems, and so asked the government for both new subsidies and the assurance
of larger orders in the future”.46 Then in 1888 the Navy signed a third contract for 3,000 tons. As
usual, Terni also received 3,000,000 Lire in anticipation of works it still had to begin. By the end of
1888 Terni had received 12 million lire from the Navy and had accumulated orders for 14,200 tons
of armour plates.
Why did the  Ministry of the  Navy support Terni, despite the company's many problems?
44 Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sulla Regia Marina. Relazione Finale, vol.  1,  Relazione Generale  (Roma,
1906), 117
45 Id.,120. On Terni's hoarding of pig iron B. Stringher, ‘Gli scambi con l'Estero e la Politica Commerciale Italiana dal
1860 al 1910’, Regia Accademia dei Lincei, Ciquant'Anni di Storia Italiana, vol. 3 (Milano, 1911), 36.
46 Inchiesta sulla Marina. Relazione Preliminare, 94. 
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Although the records are silent about this, it is possible to speculate that three reasons played a role.
First,  there was a  strategic reason:  if  Terni  collapsed,  this  would  have slowed down the naval
programme.  Placing orders  abroad for  the  large  amount  of  plates  required  would  have  needed
months-long negotiations with potential suppliers, and then waiting  for several years  before the
delivery of the plates, a serious problem for the Italian Navy which had to counter the French naval
expansion. Second,  the  failure  of  Terni  would  have  had enormous  political  and  economic
consequences:  the  Navy would  have  became embroiled  in  a  scandal  which  could  damage  its
reputation. Only twenty years after Lissa this was something no Minister was willing to risk. Third,
Terni's  owed  millions  of  Lire  to  the  banking  system  and  to  the  general  public,  through  the
debentures it had issued. If the company became bankrupt, this would send a shock wave through
the economy  at the very moment in which the business cycle was turning negative. While each
single reason alone  was not conclusive,  combined they  were decisive. Thus, as a result of Brin's
decision to support Breda in the creation of Terni taken in the early 1880s, the Italian Navy ended
up being locked into supporting the company despite its shortcomings and its poor performance. 
The crisis experienced in 1887-88 had profound consequence on Terni. The ambitious plan
devised in 1884 to create an integrated production cycle, from iron ore to steel passing through pig
iron production, was given up. The plan to make pig iron in Civitavecchia was abandoned with the
result that  it was not produced in Italy for another twenty years. Simply speaking, Terni had not
enough  resources  to  finance  all  these  developments.  Moreover,  it  is  questionable  if  Terni's
management  was up to  the task of realising such a far-reaching scheme,  considering the many
problems experienced by the firm. Thus the steel made in Terni was obtained from pig iron bars
imported from abroad. This fact, while not completely freeing Italy from the need to import foreign
raw materials,  certainly  eased  the  strategic  problems  generated  by the  Italian  naval  expansion
because  pig iron  could  be  imported  from  many  countries,  while  special  armour  plates  were
manufactured only by a small number of companies. Finally, something should be said about Terni's
final year's results (Figure 4.2).
Terni's operating profit floated around 4 million lire for the first 10 years of its operations,
from 1888 to 1897. Admittedly, the regularity of the numbers issuspicious. It is impossible to rule
out the fact that the firm's management massaged the balance sheet in order to present a rosier
picture of the firm to bond holders and the public. There is no doubt, however, that the firm, after
approaching bankruptcy in 1887, became profitable. From 1898 a more prosperous period started,
which was generated by the resumption of naval construction which translated into more orders. 
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Figure   4  . 2  : Operating profits of Terni, 1887-1900 (million current Lire).
Source: AST, FT, Bilanci della Società Terni, various years. 
Dividends, however, were paid only in 1892 and from 1894 onward: depreciation covering
the initial investments took a large share of the profits (from to 35% up to 300% of the  annual
profits,  with an average of 40%) and financial  costs  accounted for another significant  share of
operating profits. Until 1895 the firm delivered in average 1,700 tons of armour plates every year,
an amount which increased to 3,500 from 1896 onwards.47 
The Italian Navy had strongly supported the creation of Terni because it wanted to be able to
rely on a domestic source of high quality armour plates. Armour technology, however,  evolved
substantially in the years after 1884. Terni, thus, was faced with the problem of keeping pace with
technological development. Before 1891 armour plates were either “compound” (that is made of a
steel  layer  superimposed  on an  iron  one)  or  made  using  forged  steel,  which Schneider  had
introduced in 1876. During the first  years of its  operations,  Terni  produced forged steel plates,
following the technology developed by Schneider, its technical adviser. The Navy, however, was not
completely happy with the final  product:  on 27 February 1889 the  Ministry wrote  to  the  firm
pointing  out  that  the  horizontal  plates  (i.e.  plates  used  to  cover  the  deck  of  vessels)  were  of
unsatisfactory quality: Terni was employing up to 25% of metal scrap to make the plates, limiting
the amount of puddled metal to 50% of the total. Such a solution allowed the company to reduce its
costs because it could use the waste material coming from the manufacture of vertical plates, but the
47 Bonelli, Terni, 315.
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final product was weaker than if only high quality metal had been used. The Ministry asked Terni to
redress this mistake immediately. While the Navy could compromise on price and advances, it was
not ready to do so on quality. 
The  early  1890s  saw  a  wave  of  innovations  in  armour  plate  manufacturing.  In  1890
Schneider  introduced nickel-steel  plates,  and in  1892  the first  trial  in  Europe of Harvey plates
highlighted their superiority. Once again, the Italian Navy was facing the problem of gaining access
to the most up-to-date products.48 In 1894 the Navy approached Terni with an order for 9,000 tons.
It put the firm under pressure to undertake the production of plates according to the Harvey system.
In order to to do, the firm had to invest extra resources needed to undertake the time-consuming and
complex hardening process. Once again the Navy supported Terni by advancing the firm 1,000,000
Lire. Terni did not acquire the patent for the Harvey process, however. The records do not contain
evidence of any communication between Terni and the Harvey syndicate. It is therefore impossible
to rule out that Terni tried to acquire the right to use the patent but failed to arrive at an agreement
with the syndicate. At the end Terni developed its own system, which it patented.49 Terni's claim to
have developed an original innovation, however, seems doubtful. Terni's patent for cementing plates
differed  from Harvey's  in  just  one  point:  during  the  process,  while  one  face  of  the  plate  was
hardened,  the  other  was  softened  keeping it  in  contact  with  sand.  Unsurprisingly,  in  1901 the
Harvey syndicate sued Terni accusing it to violating its patent. The controversy was resolved when
Terni agreed to pay a million Lire to join the syndicate.50 
The controversy on the Harvey patent is noteworthy because it highlights two key points: on
the one side it reinforces the view that for the Italian Navy the paramount issue was that of technical
quality. To obtain this, it was ready to keep supporting Terni as long as it was needed. On the other
side,  the Harvey-Terni controversy clearly illustrated to the fact that Italian armaments  firms still
needed to import know-how and technology from abroad. Terni had certainly achieved the ability to
satisfactorily  employ  the  most up-to-date  foreign  techniques,  but  it  lacked  the  ability  to
autonomously develop innovations. 
48 The Italian Navy was well aware of the value of Harvey technology. In 1893 the Rivista Marittima published a
detailed analysis of the properties of the new plates: R. Bettini, ‘Corazze per Navi’, Rivista Matittima 26, 443-445.
49 Inchiesta sulla Marina. Relazione Preliminare, 106
50 Testimony of Ippolito Sigismondi, general director of Terni since 1895, and previously Director General for Naval
Construction at the Ministry of the Navy, to the Enquire Commission on the Navy in 1905: Inchiesta sulla Marina.
Relazione Generale, vol. 2, Relazioni Speciali, 91.
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4.3. Naval shipbuilding.
The creation of Terni and Pozzuoli was a decisive shift in the way in the Italian Navy
obtained key military inputs: instead of having to rely on imports, now large guns and armour plates
were domestically manufactured. Fitting these inputs and building warships was the task performed
by a handful of private shipbuilding firms, and of the public arsenals in Spezia, Castellammare,
Taranto, and Venice.51 In chapter II it has been explained how during the 1860s and 1870s a small
group of Italian firms had started to supply  the Italian Navy with  naval engines and other
mechanical components, partially replacing imports from abroad.  In  addition,  also  naval
shipbuilding  had  started. During the 1880s and 1890s this process of substitution of  imports
continued, although the Navy did not stop to buy abroad, and used its own arsenals to built the
largest capital ships. The increased sophistication of the Italian armaments industry became evident
at the end of the century, when Ansaldo and Orlando were able to sell several cruisers to foreign
governments.
Figure  4.  3  : Total displacement started by year, 1881-1900 (in tons).
Source:  G.  Giorgerini,  and  A. Nani,  Almanacco Storico delle Navi Militari Italiane (1861-1995)
(Roma, 1996), passim.
51 D. J. Grange, ‘Sur les Arsenaux de la Marine Italienne au Début du Siècle’, Istituto di Storia Economica, Università
di Torino (ed.), Studi in Onore di Mario Abrate, vol. 2 (Torino, 1986), 493-511. 
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As it has been said at the beginning of the chapter, the Italian Navy underwent a significant
process of modernisation during the 1880s. The additional resources devoted to the naval budget
translated into supplementary construction.  Figure 4.3 shows the total displacement  of ships of at
least 300 tons started each year in the period 1881-1900.52
The first half of the 1880s was a period in which many vessels were started (in 1885 alone
eleven ships were laid down). This explains the smaller values registered in the second half of the
decade: yards, both private and public were still busy completing previous orders. The first half of
the 1890s saw a reduction in new construction: only three cruisers laid down, all of them in public
arsenals.  There was a significant rebound in the late 1890s. Figure  4.4 shows the data on new
construction divided by yards, both public and private, Italian and foreigners. 
Figure    4.  4  : Total displacement launched  for the Italian Navy in the years 1881-1900, divided by
suppliers (in tons).
Source: see figure 4.3. 
In the years 1881-1900, the majority of the vessels, especially capital vessels, were built by
52 Gunboats Castore and  Polluce (laid down in 1887 and finished in 1889; displacement of 330 tons each)  are not
included: they were purchased from Armstrong by the Army and only later they were taken over by the Navy.
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the Navy in Castellammare di Stabia (77,313 tons), Venice (49,696 tons) and Spezia (47,775 tons).
Taranto's yard built only 2,538 tons because shipbuilding began there only in 1893. Among private
yards, there were only four firms which the Navy regarded as capable of building and fitting ships:
Orlando (in Leghorn), Ansaldo (in Sestri Ponente), Odero (which had two yards, one in Genoa, the
other in Sestri Ponente) and Pattison (in Naples).53 Orlando doubled Ansaldo in terms of tonnage
built (21,258 tons vs. 10,477 tons) for the Italian Navy (if ships built for foreign governments would
be added, Ansaldo would rank first, with around 46,000 tons built versus Orlando's 37,000 tons).54
The other two yards which worked for the  Navy, Odero (based in Genoa) and Pattison (based in
Naples) built much less.55 Orlando and Ansaldo owned the largest and the best equipped yards, and
therefore they received more orders and for larger ships, such as cruisers, medium-sized gunboats,
transport ships, etc. At the opposite Pattison and Odero received orders especially for smaller non-
military vessels, such as pontoons, tug boats, dredgers, etc. In the case of the two smaller yards it is
therefore difficult to consider their production as  specifically  military  in nature. Finally,  Elswick
prevailed  among foreign firms. It built 7,855 tons, while the German Schichau-Werke company
ranked second, with 1,920 tons.  Schichau  only supplied torpedo boats  and, later, destroyers.  The
continuous relevance of the public arsenals is testified to by the increasing number of workers they
employed: from around 8,000 in 1880, to 18,000 in 1890, a value which remained unchanged until
the end of the decade.56 Once again,  it  is important to stress the fact that public arsenals were
building vessels by assembling parts (naval engines, armour plates, guns, but also forgings, shafts,
rudders, etc.) which, in the majority of cases, were supplied by private firms. 
Figure 4.5 shows the temporal dynamics of the purchase of vessels from private suppliers,
highlighting the impact that trends in military spending had on firms. Orders for complete ships
grew during the 1880s,  when the capacity of arsenals was fully employed  building battleships,
leaving room for private yards to build cruisers and small vessels. The hiatus in launching lasting
until the late 1890s is explained by the fact that several cruisers the Navy had ordered from Ansaldo
and Orlando were sold abroad,  and replaced by other vessels,  which were delivered later. It  is
important to notice that larger vessels required years to be completed. So, for instance Orlando's
53 Inchiesta sulla Marina, ‘Elenco delle Ditte Idonee per Forniture alla Regia Marina’, 37.
54 Apart from the two Garibaldi cruisers, Orlando sold abroad the gunboat Bascir to Morocco in 1890, and the cruiser
Adamastor to Portugal in 1896, I Fratelli Orlando e le Costruzioni Navali per l'estero (Livorno, 1898), 15-16.
55 Little has been written on Odero's yard, see  G. Doria,  Investimenti e  Sviluppo  Economico a Genova alla  Vigilia
della  Prima  Guerra  Mondiale,  vol.  2, 1883-1914 (Milano, 1973), 28-29,  36 and 124; on Pattison see De Rosa,
Iniziativa Straniera, 214-15 and 223-25. 
56 Camera dei Deputati, Disposizioni Relative alle Costruzioni Navali e agli Operai degli Stabilimenti Marittimi, 15
November 1900. Other parliament documents report slightly different numbers, but the differences are very small. 
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yard was still working in 1885 on the battleship Italia, which had been ordered in 1876. 
Figure  4.  5  : Displacement of ships launched for the Italian Navy by Italian private yards in the years
1881-1900 (in tons):
Source: see figure 4.3. 
Orders awarded to  foreign yards were motivated by a different reason. They represented
only 3.8% of the total tonnage built or bought by the Navy in these years. What the Navy bought
from Elswick and Schichau was not quantity, but quality. Elswick with the Chilean ship Esmeralda
(laid down in 1881) had introduced a new kind of vessel: a steel-hulled, fast, lightly armed, cruiser
which relied on the speed generated by its compound engine rather than on armour plates for its
defence.57 The Italian Navy coveted this design: Esmeralda was far superior to the cruisers it had in
service. The light armour meant that the supply of plates was less a problem. The  Italian Navy
decided to buy directly from Elswick a cruiser and to use it as a model to be replicated by Italian
yards. Four additional cruisers were built according to the same design, two in arsenals, and two by
Orlando.58 Once again, technical innovations in design and construction developed abroad were
acquired and, later, reproduced in Italy. The same motive – acquired advanced technical features
57 P. Brooks, Warships for Export: Armstrong Warships, 1867-1927 (Gravesend, 1999), 44-5.
58 G.Giorgerini and A. Nani, Gli Incrociatori italiani 1861-1964 (Roma, 1964), 152. 
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which were later could be incorporated in Italian-built ships – was behind the purchase of the other
two cruisers from Elswick: Dogali (laid down in 1885 and delivered in 1886) was the first cruiser to
be fitted with a triple expansion engine, and Piemonte (laid down in 1887 and delivered in 1889),
was the first cruiser to be armed only with the quick-firing guns which Armstrong had developed.59
A similar pattern, from purchase abroad to domestic production, can be found in the case of
destroyers, a new kind of vessel which started to be introduced at the end of the 19th century as
countermeasure to torpedo boats. At the end of the century the Italian Navy ordered several
destroyers from the German firm Schichau, which was recognised as among the best designer of
small warships in Europe.60 The next step was ordering destroyers from Pattison,61 which built the
five small ships of the Nembo class on the basis of the designs purchased from the British firm of
Thornycroft.  The final step  in the process  were the destroyers of the  Soldato class, which were
designed and built by Ansaldo from 1905 onwards.
The data presented above show that Ansaldo and Orlando were the largest private firms
involved in naval construction in Italy.  Both firms took advantages of the opportunities generated
by the Italian naval expansion in the 1880s and 1890s. They followed, however, different strategies.
In 1882 Carlo Bombrini,  the major shareholder of Ansaldo and director of the Banca Nazionale
died.  The firm was taken over by two of his sons, Carlo Marcello and Giovanni.  Their first task,
after buying out the 8% of the capital of the firm  still owned by the heirs of the other original
shareholders was to arrive at an understanding with Giulio Belinzaghi, the new general director of
the Banca Nazionale, about the outstanding debt Ansaldo had accumulated with the bank.62 Now
that Bombrini's influence had disappeared, the bank wanted to close its unfortunate relationship
with the firm. After a long negotiation the new shareholders secured a favourable agreement with
Belinzaghi.  The bank received a payment of 10 million Lire and  agreed to forfeit all its residual
claims (which amounted to additional 6-7 million Lire).63 Probably Belinzaghi, who was himself
involved  in  many financial  ventures  and  real  estate  speculations,  preferred  to  avoid  too  much
publicity on a less than transparent page in the bank's history.
The soaring naval budget, as well as the renewal in 1885 of railways franchises, opened the
possibility of turning around the firm. The new owners decided to heavily invest in new machinery
59 P. Brooks, ‘Armstrong and the Italian Navy’, A. Preston (ed.), Warship 2002-2003 (London, 2002), 101-108.
60 On Schichau's naval activities, see L. U. Scholl, ‘Schichau, Ferdinand’, NDB.
61 Not accidentally Pattison received these orders in a moment in which the Italian government was concerned about
the economic development of Naples and its surrounding region, S. Prezioso and G. Servidio, ‘Industria Meridionale
e Politica Industriale dall'Unità ad Oggi’, Rivista Economica del Mezzogiorno 25 (2011), 561-64. 
62 N. Foà, ‘Belinzaghi, Giulio’, BDI.
63 AFA, FBP, 4/2 Memoriale di Giancarlo Ageno.
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to  expand  the  firm  so  that Ansaldo  could undertake  larger,  and  hopefully  more profitable,
contracts.64 Until  that  moment,  Ansaldo  activities  had  been  mainly  limited  to  engineering
productions, especially large naval engines, carried on at the Sampierdarena  plant.  The firm had
also produced railway engines, carriages and industrial machinery of various nature for the civilian
market. Shipbuilding had represented a secondary activity: the firm did not own a proper yard until,
in 1886, it bought for 335.000 Lire the shipyard of the Cadenaccio brothers in Sestri Ponente (the
town neighbouring Sampierdarena).65 The expanding naval budget meant that Ansaldo could expect
to receive orders from the  Navy for small and medium vessels, if not for the largest battleships.
Ansaldo's expertise in naval engines allowed for synergies between the  engineering activities and
shipbuilding,  strengthening the firm's position. During  the first ten years of  its  activity, Ansaldo's
yard built many different kinds of ships: torpedo boats (based on Schichau design) for the Italian
Navy as well as wooden sailing ships for local merchants. The largest naval vessels it made before
the 1890s were two light cruisers, Minerva (843 tons) and Liguria (2,260 tons), which was based on
the design of the Elswick–made Dogali. They were both laid down in 1889 and delivered in 1893
and 1894 respectively.66 However, until the second half of the 1890s, mechanical activities were still
the core business of the firm. Anna Maria Falchero has calculated that in this period naval engines
and boilers accounted for 58% of Ansaldo's revenues coming from contracts awarded by the Navy,
with naval construction representing 38%.67 To reinforce its position in naval engines production,
and acquire the most up-to-date know-how, Ansaldo reached an agreement with the British firm
Maudslay in 1886 to make use of the designs developed by it in exchange of a fee. This agreement
resulted immediately in the order of the 19,500 HP engines of the battleship Sicilia, evidence of the
fact that the  Navy still regarded British products as superior, at least in the field of the very large
engines.68 Figure 4.6 shows the book value of the firm's engineering plant and yard (that of other,
smaller  plants,  is  not  included), allowing us  to  gauge  the  investments  trend  and  the  growing
importance that shipbuilding was acquired in the course of the 1890s. 
64 Notizie sullo Stabilimento Meccanico e di Costruzioni Navali Gio. Ansaldo & Co. di Sampierdarena (Torino, 1884),
22-25. 
65 E. Gazzo, I Cento Anni dell'Ansaldo 1853-1953 (Genoa, 1953), 317, 322 and 324.
66 For  a complete list of all the ships built by Ansaldo A. Giuntini, ‘Dati Statistici’, Giorgio Mori (ed.) Storia
dell'Ansaldo. Vol. 2, La Costruzione di una Grande Impresa, 1882-1903 (Roma-Bari, 1995), 238-241. 
67 A. M. Falchero, ‘Le Strutture e l'Evoluzione dell'Ansaldo’, Giorgio Mori (ed.) Storia dell'Ansaldo, 51.
68 AFA, FBP, b.8, f. 2. 
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Figure  4.  6  : estimated value of Ansaldo's mechanical plant and yard, 1882-1900 (in current Lire).
Source: AFA, FP, SSM bis 2/3
When the new shareholders  took control of the firm in 1882, they immediately undertook
investments to modernise and enlarge the mechanical plant after years of forced underinvestment.
The value tripled in two years, from one to three million Lire. In the course of the 1880s the rate of
investment slowed down, but it was still positive. In 1889 there was another jump, when the value
of the mechanical plant increased  by one million to 5 million lire. The firm had received several
orders for naval engines and it had to expand its works with additional machines and spaces. In the
course of the 1890s the decline and stagnation of the Italian naval budget translated into a reduced
budget for naval construction. Ansaldo's activities suffered from this, and during that decade the
value of the mechanical plant declined to 4 million Lire, the same value it had in 1888. Whereas the
engineering plant  suffered  from a  period  of  stagnation  in  the  1890s,  Ansaldo's  yard  expanded
considerably in the same period. The firm had already improved the small Cadenaccio yard, but the
real growth occurred in the second half of the 1890s, with the sale of several cruisers abroad. By the
end of the century, the value of the yard stood at little less then 4 million Lire, a value only 600,000
Lire inferior to that of the engineering plant. Data on the firm's workforce confirm this dynamic. By
1889, Ansaldo employed more than 2,000 workers, of whom 1,600 works in the engineering plant.
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In 1892 they had reduced to 800. Similarly, the shipyard's workforce felt from 600 in 1890 to 380 in
1893.  In  1897,  the  engineering plant  employed 1,480  workers,  while  the  yard  had  1,250,  an
additional testimony  of  the  growing  importance  of  naval  shipbuilding  in  comparison  with
mechanical activities.  Finally, a similar trend is  also  detectable  in profits  (figure  4.7).  The 1880s
were a period of growing profits. Profitability, however, collapsed in the early 1890s. The rebound
of activities in the second half of the 1890s increased again profits which in 1897 were more than
3.5 million Lire.  Profits' variability over time was still, however, large, with massive swings year
after year. 
Figure  4.  7  : Ansaldo's reported profits, 1884-1900 (in current Lire).
Source: AFA, FP, Ssm bis, b. 2, f. 3. 
From the mid 1880s, Ansaldo's management was pursuing a strategy of vertical integration.69
Moving from naval engine making into naval shipbuilding was a first step: Ansaldo could exploit its
know-how and connections with the Navy to enter a sector in which there was a smaller number of
competitors. During the 1890s, Ansaldo increased the number of productions it could perform “in
house”, showing a preference for organic growth rather than acquisition: in 1894 it bought Delta, a
69 On vertical integration  as a  business strategy, M. K. Perry, ‘Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects’, R.
Schmalensee and R. D. Willing, Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 1989), 185-255.
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metallurgical supplier  based in Sampierdarena  which had become bankrupt; in 1896 it started the
erection in Campi (in the northern outskirts of Sampierdarena) of a plant to cast the steel pieces it
required, and in 1897 opened an electromechanics unit for the manufacture of electric components.
At the turn of the century two key components were still missing, however, before Ansaldo could
become  a  fully  integrated  armaments  company:  artillery and  armour.  Both  productions,  to be
successfully undertaken,  required large capital investments and could be operated efficiently and
economically only if large economies of scales were achieved, posing a financial problem for any
firm willing to venture into these sectors. At the same time, gun manufacturing and armour plate
production presented many more technical difficulties than shipbuilding or engine making. What is
more, such venture could be successful only if it could rely on a sustained demand. By 1900, the
claim that Ansaldo could “make an entire vessel of the most powerful and large kind” was still an
aspiration rather than a reality.70
While  Ansaldo  had  adopted a  strategy  of  organic  growth,  Orlando  pursued  a  different
direction. Orlando had been active in warship building for much longer than Ansaldo. For instance,
Orlando built Lepanto, the first capital vessel built by a private yard. Orlando subsequently moved
from shipbuilding, its core activity, to naval engineering. The first significant order received from
the Navy in this field were two 7,000 HP engines for the torpedo rams Etna and Vesuvio in the early
1880s, machines which, as in the cases of some of Ansaldo, were based on the designs provided by
a British firm, in this case Hawthorn & Co.71 Naval engines, however, was a niche where Ansaldo
maintained its leadership. In addition, Orlando as well as Odero, built many more merchant vessels
than Ansaldo, and they were therefore able to better weather the fall in naval budget. 
Under the management of Giuseppe Orlando who succeeded his father Luigi at the helm of
the firm, the company started to develop links with other yards (especially with the ones owned in
Genoa by Attilio Odero) as well as, more crucially, with Terni. Terni was Orlando's key supplier of
steel forgings for naval construction and it enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the production of special
steels  for military uses, making armour plates and the steel used by Armstrong to make guns  in
Pozzuoli. The aim of Giuseppe Orlando was to integrate Terni's steel operations with shipbuilding
in order to lower costs, secure supply and gain a  dominant in the market for warships. Giuseppe
Orlando joined the board of Terni for the first time in 1895, but it took ten more years for him and
70 Officine e Cantieri Gio. Ansaldo & C., (Genova, 1900), 6.
71 Commissione Industire Meccaniche, 17.
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Odero to acquire full control of the firm (this topic is dealt with in chapter VII).72 
While the Italian Navy still bought abroad  a  few,  but  technically  advanced,  pieces of
hardware, the Italian naval industry was itself able at the turn of the century to become an exporter
of warships. The growing interest for foreign markets of Ansaldo was signalled in the second half of
the 1890s by the development of a network of agents abroad, mimicking the strategy that Armstrong
and Vickers had implemented in the 1870s and 1880s. The Italian naval budget had declined from
the  peak  of  the  late  1880s,  and  exporting  abroad  could  offer  a  way  to  turn  into  profits  the
investments which had been made. Odero and Orlando probably equally employed foreign agents,
although the records do not  reveal much about this.  In general it  seems that Ansaldo was more
active in  the search  for  foreign customers,  probably because  of  its  higher  exposure to  defence
spending. 
Even though Orlando was able to sell a pair of gunboats to Portugal and Morocco, the real
coup for the Italian armaments industry was the sale of seven Garibaldi-class cruisers. In the early
1890s,  the Italian  Navy ordered two cruisers,  one from  Ansaldo and  one from  Orlando.  These
vessels offered a good combination of speed and armaments with a relatively compact displacement
(7,300 tons each ship, in average).73 They were able to operate either in combination with other
vessels or alone. The project had been a joint venture between Edoardo Masdea,74 the chief Navy
architect, and Ansaldo's designers. 
The first ship of the class, the Garibaldi, was laid down in 1893 and was the largest vessel
ever built by Ansaldo up to that time. Two years later the Italian Navy agreed to sell it and the sister
ship which Orlando had laid down, to Argentina. Ansaldo and Orlando committed themselves to
replace these ships with two new ones for the Italian Navy. At the end, the Italian Navy received its
own  Garibaldi  cruisers  seven  years  later:  in  fact,  five  additional  cruisers  were  built  (four  by
Ansaldo and one by Orlando) and exported. Between 1895 and 1902 Argentina bought four ships,
Japan two and Spain one. In 1896 Brin could proudly say in parliament that “this sale was one of
the most beautiful events of our industry”. There is no doubt that he saw his policy of supporting
Italian firms vindicated.75 
Propitious international circumstances facilitated the sales in South America: since the late
72 AST, Fondo Terni, b. 33, Verbali del Consiglio di Amministrazone, 16 June 1895.
73 E. Bagnasco and A. Rastelli, ‘Le Costruzioni Navali Italiane per l'Estero’, supplement to Rivista Marittima,
December 1991, 35. 
74 M. Gemignani, ‘Masdea, Enrico’, DBI.
75 The debate on the sales of the  Garibaldi cruisers is in  Camera dei Deputati Atti Parlamentari, Discussioni, XIX
Legislatura, vol. 5, (Roma, 1896), 5229-5246. 
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1880s Chile and Argentina had been competing for the possession of Patagonia and its deposits of
coal and guano.76 Both countries strengthened their navies by buying vessels abroad. Elswick itself
sold two cruisers, one to Argentina and the other to Chile.77 Both countries lacked the ability to built
their own ships, thus they had to rely on purchases abroad, and they also needed to acquire vessels
fast,  so to outpace the rival. The two Italian Garibaldi cruisers already laid down could therefore
provide Argentina with a decisive advantage.  Contacts between Argentina and Ansaldo were the
results of the efforts of Ferdinando Maria Perrone, the firm's agent there. Perrone had a decisive role
in convincing the Argentine government to buy the Italian ships, instead of relying on the  more
experienced British yards.78 When in 1902 Chile and Argentina, fearing the escalating costs of the
naval build-up, reached a temporary agreement, the Argentine government sold the two additional
vessels it had bought from Ansaldo to Japan, which was now enlarging its fleet as fast as possible to
be ready to confront the Russian Navy.
There  is  no  doubt  that  international  tensions  created  the  momentum  for  the  sales  of
Garibaldi cruisers, which were in turn facilitated by Perrone's contacts and commercial skills and
the rapid availability of the vessels. It would be wrong, however, to disregard the fact that middle-
size, fast cruisers represented exactly the market niches in which, at the turn of the century, Italian
armaments  firms  could  compete  more  effectively.  In  each  Garibaldi,  hull,  engines  and boilers
represented around 60% of the total displacement, with armour plates 25%, and guns 15%. The fact
that armour plates represented a relatively smaller part of the total displacement that in larger capital
ships meant that Ansaldo and Orlando could successfully compete with foreign firms in assembling
the hull and installing triple expansion engines, both processes in which Italian mechanical firms
had accumulated experience and know-how. Ansaldo was building naval engines since the early
1860s, and was involved in naval shipbuilding since 1886. At the same time, the size of the vessels
did not force the yards to do the investments and improvements which could have been required by
the construction of larger vessels. 
In addition, Ansaldo's yard (and  to a less extent Orlando  as well) was able to drive down
costs  and reduce construction times because  it built a series of similar vessels, one immediately
after the other. While Ansaldo took three years to complete a small 850 tons light cruiser in the
76 S. Collier and W. F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994 (Cambridge, 1996), 186-87.
77 R. Scheina, Latin America: A Naval History 1810-1987 (Annapolis, 1987), 46-7. 
78 The letters exchanged between Perrone and Ansaldo's management detailing the negotiations are in AFA, FP, SSN
30; see also P. Rugafiori, ‘Ferdinando Maria Perrone. Un italiano in Argentina tra Politica, Cultura e Affari (1885-
1900)’, Studi Storici 31 (1990), 709-712. To facilitate the sale, Perrone paid bribes to higher ranking politicians and
naval officers (among them the President of the Republic, Julio Roca). The fact that in his letter he called the bribes
“English oil” points to the fact that, when dealing with South American Republics, this was a common practice. 
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1880s, each Garibaldi (much bigger ships) were finished in less than three years.79 Finally, the fact
that all armaments for these ships came from Pozzuoli, could have made Elswick less pugnacious
about competing with Italian firms in a market, Argentina, in which it had maintained a dominant
position until then because it was still making a profit out of sales. This was especially convenient
at a time when Armstrong was selling Chile the ships it wanted to counteract the Argentina's new
Garibaldi. Using Italian firms as proxies, Armstrong was then able to sell naval armaments to both
countries.
4.4. Protectionism and the Italian armaments industry.
The rise of the Italian armaments industry has usually been linked with the protectionism
policies adopted in the 1880s. Steel production was regarded as the necessary precondition for
industrialisation. Metallurgical production could develop only behind tariff barriers.80 In 1887 the
Italian parliament approved a new law which introduced, or increased, tariffs on several agricultural
and industrial goods. The repercussions that protectionism had on the Italian economic history have
been strongly debated, with some scholars offering a positive assessment, while others being more
critical.81 It seems important, therefore, to offer a brief analysis of the impact that protectionism had
on the Italian armaments sector. 
Terni was certainly a cause celebre against which many Italian free-traders economists, such
as Einaudi and de Viti de Marco, and politicians spoke and wrote. The fact that the government had
introduced in the 1887 tariffs for the protection of the steel and iron industry was regarded a huge
79 Perrone boasted that for Ansaldo it was possible to deliver 3 Garibaldi in sixteen months, see AFA, FP, SSMbis, b.
68, f. 9.
80 F. Amatori, ‘Italy: the Tormented Rise of Organisational Capabilities Between Government and Families’, A.
Chandler, F. Amatori and T. Hikino (eds.), Big Business and the Wealth of Nations (Cambridge, 1997), 255.
81 There are scholars who offer  a  positive  assessment  of  the  tariffs,  underlying  their  positive role in  fostering
industrialisation, even though recognising the ad hoc nature of many commercial decisions; see, for instance, V.
Zamagni, Economic History, 116-17, and G. Sapelli, ‘Technical Change, Microeconomic Evolution and Growth: an
Introductory View of Italian  Industrial  Development’, G. Dosi, R. Giannetti, e P. A. Toninelli, (eds.),  Technology
and Enterpriese in a Historical Perspective (Oxford, 1992), 291-313. By contrast, there are scholars who are highly
critical of Italian protectionism which,  for to them, was detrimental to the economic development of the country;
among them A. Gershenckron,  Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.  A Book if Essays (Cambridge,
1962),  80-83, and S. Fenoaltea, ‘Politica  Doganale,  Sviluppo  Industriale,  Emigrazione: verso una  Considerazione
del  Dazio  sul  Grano’, Rivista  di  Storia  Economica  10  (1993),  65-77.  Finally,  there  are  scholars  who  simply
downplay the significance of protectionism for the economic development of Italy, see G. Federico and R. Giannetti,
‘Le Politiche Industriali’, Imprenditorie e Imprese, vol. 22 of Storia d'Italia (Torino, 1999), 1130-33. For an analysis
of the political economy behind the introduction of tariffs, V. Castronovo, Da Contadini a Operai, vol. 7 of Storia
d'Italia (Torino, 1975), 96-99. 
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mistake which harmed the Italian economy by blocking the development of other sectors, especially
the engineering industry, which was the major user of steel and iron. Terni, because of its size, and
the  many favours  it  had  received  from the  Navy,  was  naturally  highlighted as  the  symbol  of
government intervention in the economy. Terni's establishment had some positive effects, however:
before it was created, the Italian steel industry was, in quantitative terms, small. When Terni started
to produce, national output of steel immediately more than doubled.82 In addition, Terni was the first
to introduce in Italy the most advanced techniques, such as open hearth furnaces. 
More generally, the introduction of trade tariffs and commercial barriers did not seem to
have  played an important role or to have influenced in any significant way the strategies or the
development of Italian private armaments firms. This is for two reasons. First, since the early
1880s, Italian  armaments companies received a growing share of the  procurement contracts
awarded by the Italian Navy. This increase, however, was the result of a specific strategy, rather
than because Italian firms had become more competitive than foreign producers. In other words, the
decision to favour Italian private firms was the product of a change of mind among the military and
political élite of the country, rather than the outcome of the transformed economic circumstances
driven by protectionism.
Secondly, Italian protectionist policy was designed in a way which did not naturally favour
armaments companies. Engineering goods received very light protection. In 1877, 1889, 1897 and
1913 the ratios of effective protection of machinery to the average general rate of protection were
respectively 0.1, 0.3, 0.3 and 0.5.83 Iron and steel, in  contrary, received a higher degree of
protection: their ratios of effective protection in the same years were 1.6, 2.0, 2.8 and 3.2.84 This
meant that Italian armaments firms were forced to purchase steel inputs at a higher price than it
would have been possible otherwise because of the protection enjoyed by steel. These extra costs,
however, were added to the final price paid by the Italian government and thus did not represent an
impediment. The  only  company  which  obtained  a  clear  advantage  –  one,  however,  whose
magnitude is extremely difficult to assess – was Terni, whose civil production was favoured by the
82 Istat, Sommario di Statistiche Storiche (Roma, 1976), 95. While this was a significant increase, the Italian steel
industry was still extremely small in comparison with the foreign competitors: in 1890 Italian steel production
accounted for near 1% of the entire world production, while Britain, Germany, the USA, and France accounted
respectively for 29%, 16,5%, 34,5% and 5,5%. See Ilva, Altiforni e Scciaieri d'Italia. 1897-1947 (Bergamo, 1948),
320-21.
83 See G. Federico and A. Tena, ‘Was Italy a protectionist country?’, European Review of Economic History 2 (1998),
86. 
84 Steel, however, was not as protected as several agricultural goods, whose producers were able to lobby the
government to obtain a much higher level of protection. For instance, the ratio of effective protection on sugar was
on average higher than 15 for the period 1877-1914, peaking at 24.4 in 1897!
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protection.  It  is  difficult  to  conjecture,  however,  the  impact  that  these  extra  profits  had on the
armaments side of the business
It is possible to claim, however, that more expensive iron and steel-made  inputs had an
impact on the competitiveness of Italian armaments abroad. Theoretically exports could have been
damaged by the higher costs induced by protection. There are, however, good reasons to discount
such a view. It is true, as it will be said in the next chapter, that Armstrong lamented that the high
cost of Terni's steel limited Pozzuoli's ability to export abroad. At the same time, however, the most
successful export coup by the Italian armaments  industry –  the sales of several Garibaldi-class
cruisers –  happened at the end of the 1890s, that is in a period  in which protection policies were
already in force. What is more, the crucial steel item required by armaments companies was armour
plates. However,  armour plates  during the 1880s and 1890s evolved to become a much more
sophisticated product, involving the use of special alloys and complex technical practises, thus the
impact that protectionism could have on such a technically advance production was limited, because
the plates' price was mainly driven up by the complexity of their manufacturing process.
The only way in which tariffs helped the Italian armaments industry was probably through
the fiscal channel. Tariffs raised revenues which could be spent by governments to buy new vessels
and guns. It is impossible, however, to offer any precise analysis of this aspect.
4.5 Conclusion.
Three key features characterised the period covered in this chapter. First, the irregular trend
of Italian naval spending. The naval budget grew during the 1880s, but stagnated for the majority of
the 1890s. This fact had an impact on the performance and  the  strategies  adopted by armaments
companies. Naval shipbuilding especially suffered. The ups and downs of the Italian naval budget
explain why, whereas in Britain Armstrong and Vickers were able to collaborate and to achieve a
certain degree of cooperation,  as it will be better explained in chapter VI, this did not happen in
Italy. The competition between Ansaldo and Orlando-Odero was always strong.85 The uncertainty
85 See for example  the letters exchanged between the Bombrini and the naval administration, and between the
Bombrini and their agent in Rome, Francesco Ruffo, price of Palazzolo, AFA, AP, Serie Copialettere, n. 1-3. They
pointed to freemasonry links between Orlando and the Minister of the Navy Morin to explain why Ansaldo did not
received more orders from the government. See also the correspondence with Perrone, equally peppered by strong
judgement against the “Leghorn clique”, “the Southern party supporting Naples industries”, etc., see AFA, FP, SSM
ter, b. 97, f. 7. Unfortunately, the disappearance of Orlando's records deprive us of the possibility of reading their
accusations against Ansaldo.
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about the  future  level  of  expenditure  meant  that  it  was  impossible  for  firms  to  arrive  at an
understanding because there was the danger of dividing too small an amount of orders. The need to
constantly invest in order to modernise yards and engineering plants only exacerbated the problem
of how to saturate the available capacity. Ansaldo and Orlando tried to increase their sales and their
market shares rather than trying to maximize profits. This problem was made more serious by the
fact that during this period the Italian Navy, especially in moments of financial constrains, always
privileged its own arsenals and yards to the detriment of private firms. 
Second, during this  period,  production undertaken in Italy substituted  imports  to a large
degree. The Italian armaments sector as a whole increased its range of production, adding large
calibre guns (Pozzuoli) and armour plates (Terni). In both cases the role of the Navy was decisive in
providing financial support and long-term orders. Because of its importance, and of the size of the
support it received from the government, Terni attracted much controversy. Whatever the economic
cost for the collectivity of its establishment, the  creation of Terni achieved the aim for which the
Italian  Navy had supported it.  Terni, in fact, rapidly supplanted foreign steel makers as the key
supplier of armour plates and gun forgings. Despite its limitations in terms of innovations and its
higher costs, Terni's production was of comparable quality with that of foreign steel mills. In this
respect, thus, the establishment of Terni can be regarded as a success, if not for the general welfare
of the country, certainly for the strategic position of the Italian Navy.86 The substitution of imports
with domestic production was not totally acheived,  however. The Italian government  did not stop
buying from foreign firms, but the order of magnitude of these purchases was much smaller than the
ones occurring in the period 1860-1880. The Navy still acquired specific technological know-how
or hardware from foreign suppliers when this was regarded as  of superior quality. Also in these
cases, however, Italian firms moved swiftly to replicate foreign designs.
Third, the Italian armaments industry underwent a process of growing sophistication which
was highlighted by the sales of various Garibaldi cruisers to Argentina, Spain and Japan, markets
which until then had been dominated by British firms. Selling seven middle-sized vessels abroad
was no mean feat and this immediately put Italy among the most important defence suppliers in the
world. The commercial success of the Garibaldi testified to the many gains that Italian armaments
firms  had  made  in  terms  of  cost  savings,  rapidity  of  construction,  design.  The  experience
86 The creation of the Terni steel plant had a decisive impact on the local community as well: between 1882 and 1901
the annual rate of demographic growth of Terni's municipality was 48.82‰, the second highest in Italy, after Spezia,
R. Covino and G. Gallo, “Le Contraddizioni di un Modello”, id. (eds.) Storia d'Italia dall'Unità ad Oggi. L'Umbria
(Torino, 1989), 83-84.
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accumulated in two decades of shipbuilding for the Italian Navy was now starting to ripe profits.
Italian firms could be competitive in the international armaments  markets,  and  especially  so  in
certain niches.  Their  major  weakness was that  they were still  unable to  autonomously develop
major technical innovations, and they had to rely on foreign companies the access to the most up-to-
date know-how either as semi-finished goods or as designs and plans.
In general, the major difference between the Italian and British experience during the 1880s
and 1890s was the role played by the state. In both countries naval administrations and private firms
developed links and strong relationships (“revolving doors” between the high ranks of the military
and bureaucracy and the armament companies firms were common in Italy as well as in Britain),
but only in Italy these connections played a decisive role in the creation of an armaments industry.
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Chapter V
The Creation of an Armaments Plant in Italy: Pozzuoli, 1884-1900
This chapter  analyses the creation and the first fifteen years of activity of  the gun-making
plant of Pozzuoli which Armstrong established in 1884. In the early 1900s Armstrong reformulated
its strategy about the Italian market. This second period will be addressed in chapter VII. 
Pozzuoli  represents  an interesting  case  study  for  three  reasons.  First,  it  was  the  most
important foreign direct investment ever made by Armstrong in its history, and probably the major
venture  abroad by any armaments  company before 1914.  It  is  thus  essential  to  understand the
reasons behind Armstrong's move and to place it in the context of the firm's growth strategy of the
1880s. Second, Pozzuoli was the only plant in Italy able to manufacture large and middle sized
naval guns until the early 1910s. This made it pivotal in the subsequent evolution of the armaments
industry in Italy. Finally the records about Pozzuoli, despite being incomplete,  cast some light on
the early stages of the erection of a new gun making plant making this case study highly interesting.
The chapter is organised as follow: the first section investigates the reasons why Armstrong
decided to create a branch in Italy; the second discusses the investments carried out in Pozzuoli for
erecting the gun making shop; the third deals with the evolution of Pozzuoli in the second half of
the 1890s. 
5.1 The Origins of Armstrong's Italian venture. 
As it has been said in chapter  I, the Italian government was among the first customers of
Armstrong,  and remained a  loyal  purchaser  for  more  than  two decades.  Italy needed the  guns
Armstrong made because there were no Italian firm (or arsenal) able to make the  naval ordnance
and gun mountings required to arm the country's fleet. However, such a situation, which replicated
the one existing for armour plates, was not fully satisfactory for the Italian  Navy  which faced a
trade-off  between security of supply,  which would be enhanced by the presence of a  domestic
producer, and quality, which Armstrong guaranteed. 
The first time Armstrong's management considered the possibility of expanding the firm's
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operation to Italy was in 1868. In the first half of the decade,  Italy had been a good purchaser of
Elswick's ordnance  for  its  new  fleet  of  ironclads,  therefore  Stuart Rendel suggested that the
company might consider opening a plant somewhere in Italy. The records do not allow us to know
whether Rendel had been informally approached by Italian representatives, or if this had been his
own idea. On the surface, the prospects of such a  venture looked  favourable: after the dramatic
defeat at Lissa two years before,  the Italian Navy needed to be rebuilt, and thus it was rational to
expect significant  orders for  guns.  Moreover,  the  evolution  of  artillery technology was  rapidly
making obsolete the first rifled ordnance, stimulating additional demand for newer guns.
However Armstrong rejected the idea of building a plant in Italy. He stressed that “we have
had experience in our own country of what may be deemed a sort of government concession with
regards to guns, and we are quite sure that the evils we encountered in that case would be ten times
worse in any foreign country.” Moreover, he added, there were other problems which needed to be
taken  into  account: “there is the instability of most foreign governments –  their pecuniary
embarrassments and their jealousy of foreigners.”1 Clearly, Armstrong's previous dealings with the
British government had made him sceptical of the idea of working too closely with a government. It
was one thing to sell guns to customers around the globe, with the company's management in firm
control of the business; it was another to set up a plant in a foreign country, with the concrete risk
that the host country's government could meddle in the running of the operations.
Moreover,  Armstrong refers  between the  lines  of  his  message  to two additional  reasons
militating against  such a proposal.  The first was that  Italy's budget was in a precarious state (the
“pecuniary embarrassment”):  it  was possible  that Italian governments – which had the habit  of
changing very fast2 – could find themselves short of money and therefore unwilling to buy or unable
to pay for guns. In fact the Italian naval budget was drastically cut in the second half of the 1860s to
help rebalancing government finance. Second, Armstrong feared that, in case the hosting country's
government was not able to award the expected amount of orders, a foreign-owned branch could
have difficulties in acquiring contracts  from other governments or from private customers exactly
because of its foreign nature.
The combination of all  these reasons weakened  the bargaining power  which Italy  could
exercise with Armstrong. The Italian government, simply speaking, was in no position to force the
firm to create a plant in Italy: the carrot of future orders was unconvincing because of the perilous
state  of  the  budget,  the  stick  –  the  menace  of  not  buying any  longer from  the  firm  –  was
1 T&W, 130/5375, 28 August 1868. 
2 Between 1861 and 1869, twelve governments alternated in office.
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implausible, because the technical leadership enjoyed by Armstrong in naval artillery manufacturing
made it difficult for Italy to renounce to its products. Such a strong rejection of the suitability of a
multinational organisation was  significant  and had a lasting effect on  the firm: for the next  two
decades it refused to open any foreign branch and continued to operate through its well-established
scheme of agents spread around the world,  while,  in  contrast,  production  was  centralised  in
Elswick, under the direct supervision of the head office. Despite rejecting the idea of establishing a
branch  in Italy, Armstrong and Italy developed  a still  closer relationship in the subsequent years.
During the 1870s  the naval race which involved  Italy against France favoured the sales of guns:
during that decade Armstrong sold guns worth more than 6,000,000 Lire to Italy.  Another sign of
the links which existed was that George Rendel was asked to join a design committee of the Italian
Ministry of the Navy to advise on technical matters.3
Hence, when in 1883 the company received an offer to buy the works of Mr Guppy & Co in
Naples, the board seriously discussed this opportunity. Guppy & Co. was established in Naples in
1853 by Thomas Guppy, a Bristol born engineer who had moved there in the 1840s to work for a
fledging Neapolitan railways company.4 Later, he established an engineering firm which produced
railways material, naval engines and other mechanical products.5 In 1882 he died, and in the months
following  his  demise,  Guppy's heirs  looked  for  a  way  to  monetize  their  inheritance.  Inside
Armstrong's  board,  it  was  especially  Andrew  Noble  who  was  in  favour  in  the  light  of  the
“desirability of the company possessing works of some sort in Italy with the view of retaining the
government connection”.6 In the end, however,  the proposal was rejected due the fact that “the
works being ill adapted for our purpose and not favourably situated”.7 Guppy's plant,  in fact, was
not near the sea (a fact which facilitated logistics, especially in case of heavy and large products),
but several miles inland. 
The following year it was the Italian Navy itself which began to press Armstrong's to start
producing guns somewhere  in Italy The initial  contacts  with Armstrong were  “verbal,  with no
documentation left”.8 This move  fitted in Brin's strategy of fostering the creation of Italian-based
armaments plants to free the country from the need to import the key military components needed in
warship construction.  Trying to convince  Armstrong,  the Navy's exclusive supplier of large naval
3 M. R. Lane, ‘Rendel, George’, ODNB.
4 See Guppy's obituary in The Times 6 July 1882, 6.
5 L.  de Rosa,  Iniziativa e  Capitale  Straniero nell'Industria  Metalmeccanica del  Mezzogiorno 1840-1904 (Napoli,
1968), 51-62.
6 T&W 130/1264, Minutes of the Board, 18 July 1883.
7 Id., 12 and 13 September 1883.
8 Inchiesta sulla Marina Militare, Relazioni Speciali, 155.
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ordnance, was thus a crucial step, as decisive as the creation in Italy of a plant for the manufacture
of armour plates. In April,  a month after Brin had been nominated Minister for the second time,
Armstrong's minutes record that the board replied to a letter from the Italian Ministry of the Navy
stating that it  was ready to give  its best consideration to the matter  of opening a branch in the
country.9 In July, the board decided that a “letter be written to the Minister of the Navy announcing
that the Board accepts the principle of his proposal, and is prepared to enter upon a provisional
agreement  in  the  sense  of  his  communication,  and  that  the  Board  will  despatch  forthwith  a
confidential agent to Italy to report upon the most favourable site.”10 While the board replied to the
Minister, it also wrote privately to Albini –  who,  at that time, still  was the General  Director  for
Ordnance and  Torpedoes  in the  Ministry – to ask  for his opinion. We can  speculate that Albini
underlined how serious were Brin's intentions and strongly suggested accepting his “invitation”.
Why did Armstrong accept now to create a plant in Italy? Why did it venture into making a
large direct investment in a foreign market, after having shunned all previous opportunities to do
so?  The reason  was  that  in  1884  the  leverage  power  enjoyed  by  the  Italian  government  on
Armstrong was much stronger than it had been two decades before. In the 1860s and 1870s Italy did
not have the means to  drive a hard  bargain with Armstrong.  This time,  in contrary, the company
faced a more serious dilemma. Brin threatened to stop buying from Elswick if the company did not
create a plant in Italy. He told the Chamber of Deputy that: “I wrote to the company [i.e. Armstrong]
making known that I did not want to deal with it about ordnance supply any longer, if it did not
engage itself to manufacture ordnance in our country.”11
Figures  5.1  and  5.2  show  how  serious  the  threat  was  for  Armstrong. They report the
instalments received on account of works in progress for the years 1884-1895 (figure 5.1 presents
the total amount paid during the entire period by the major customers, figure 5.2 reports data year
by year). After a government signed a contract, it paid a first instalment, then one or more additional
instalments were paid while the firms carried on production, and a final instalment was paid at the
completion of the contract. The payment of instalments during production helped the firm to self-
finance its operation and to preserve a healthy amount of working capital. Thus, in absence of better
data, the accounts  for works in progress can be used to  assess the amount of works Armstrong
received from different customers and, consequently, the relative importance of various clients for
it. 
9 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 24 April 1884.
10 Id., 3 July, 1884. 
11 Atti Parlamentari della Camera, Discussioni, 6 February 1885, vol. 10, 11483.
168
The data shows clearly how important was Italy: from 1884 to 1895, Armstrong received a
total of £3,993,030 from the British Admiralty and War Office. Italy represented the second most
important  customer,  paying  advances each  single  year  during  this  period  for  a  total  sum of
£3,666,537 (counting advances for works made both in Elswick and, later, in Pozzuoli) but, in the
years  1884-1886 Italy paid  Armstrong more  than  any other  country.  Japan was the  third  most
important  customer,  followed  by  China  and  the  three  major  South  American  naval  powers:
Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Brin could use the  Italian  large purchases  as a bargaining tool  with
Armstrong:  Elswick  had received large orders from Italy, thanks to the increasing naval budget,
whose continuous growth promised further big orders. To retain such a major customer, Armstrong
had no other option but to accept the “suggestion” to build a plant in Italy, hoping, in the process, to
extract the best possible conditions for the investment. The threat made by the Italian government
was not to be taken lightly.
Figure  5  . 1  : Instalments received on account of works in progress, 1884-95 (in current pounds).
Source: T&W Archive, 130/1330-1341.
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The contract between Armstrong and the Italian  Ministry was signed on 12 January 1885.
The Italian government did not commit itself to any payment to Armstrong for the establishment of
a gun plant in the country; by contrast, “the total cost of the plant must be met by the Armstrong
Company.”12 The government's only obligation was to order guns worth £670,482 to be delivered in
the next six years. As an incentive, the Navy agreed to pay 10% more for guns made in Italy than if
they had been ordered in Britain. Considering that the Italian government paid the shipping costs
from there to Italy, the 10% premium represented a lower increase in the final cost for the Italian
government than the simple number would suggest. Additionally  (article 13 of the contract)  the
Navy agreed to pay an addition premium equal to the 10% of the price of a gun, if the firm used
Italian-made steel. This provision was clearly added with the aim of supporting Terni, the only firm
in Italy which manufactured steel gun forgings. 
It is worth reporting extracts from the text of a memorandum dated February 1885 circulated
inside the Italian Ministry of Marine about the contract, a document signed by Admiral Brin and by
admiral Albini.  The report highlighted the strategic, economic and technical reasons behind the
Navy's efforts to secure the establishment of Armstrong in Italy. 
Every state, whose military forces have achieved a certain status, needs to
free itself from dependence upon foreign military production, and it tries […] to
manufacture arms and ammunitions on its own territory. But, if in the past it was
relatively easy, ever for the small Sardinian, Tuscan and Neapolitan States, to set
up ordnance works, now the problems have been greatly increased, because the
war materials are now masterpieces, produced by the most expensive and modern
industries, and it is impossible, without huge expenses and heavy risks of failure,
to try again what Russia has done: the creation of a plant for the manufacture of
steel guns.
We have seen famous firms be unsuccessful in building guns, and, although
many companies manufacture excellent machines and devices, only two in the
world have been able to achieve fame as good and reliable gun-makers: the Essen
[i.e. Krupp] and Elswick shops.
Every government which wants strong and effective guns is forced to turn to
one of these two works. […] it is convenient that the Italian government should
12 Article 18 of the contract, whose text is in Inchiesta sulla Marina Militare, vol. 2, 155-156.
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turn to Elswick to transplant in Italy the manufacture of steel ordnance.
There can be not doubt about the choice. The constant, unanimous votes of
the Supreme Council of Marine and of every technical commission of the Navy
and the recent decision of the Ministry of  War  in favour of the Armstrong guns
suggested it  [note:  the  Italian  Ministry  of War,  in  a  rare  order  for  private
armaments firms, had purchase a few Armstrong guns for the inland defence of
Spezia arsenal]. Armstrong company manufactures naval ordnance as effective
and as reliable as Krupp’s ones, but at half price.
Two ways could be used to obtain the transplantation in Italy of shops like
Elswick: to set up works paid by the Government, as in Russia, or by the
Armstrong company at its own risk and expenditure, the Government committing
itself only to buy a certain amount of production from the new Italian Works.
The first system would expose us to huge expenses and risks. […] for us,
who were going to order a considerable amount of hardware from Armstrong, the
second way was the cheapest and more appropriate.13
According to the Enquiry Committee on the Navy which surveyed the evidence twenty years
later, in reality there was no unanimity inside the Supreme Council of the Navy. Admiral Saint-Bon,
the predecessor of Brin  and his former mentor, was  a  critic of the agreement. He  was so on two
grounds:  first,  the  Ministry – despite this  fact  being not explicitly  stated in the contract – was
morally binding itself to support the firm in the future, thus limiting the freedom to order artillery
from other producers; second, the agreement locked the Navy into making use of specific designs
and projects while it was still unclear what would be its future artillery requirements.14 In addition,
there was also a political undertone in the disagreement: Saint-Bon, who belonged to the traditional
free-trade “historical right”,  while  favouring the strengthening of the Italian  Navy,  did not share
Brin's strategy of directly supporting private companies.15 The critics were overcome, however: Brin
stressed, among the advantages of the deal signed with Armstrong, that the Navy could more easily
monitor the manufacture of guns if it was undertaken in Italy, and that his should reduce the delays
in delivery.
The following year Albini, who had being in favour of the agreement with Armstrong, quit
13 ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti, b. 580, f. 1197, 20 February 1885.
14 Inchiesta, Relazioni Speciali, 156.
15 M. Gabriele, Benedetto Brin (Roma, 1998), 25.
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the  Ministry  to become a  director  of  Armstrong.16 This  was  the  fulfilment of an arrangement
reached  in  1885  between  Albini  and  Elswick:  the  company's  board  had  decided  that  “on  the
termination  of  his  appointment  under  the  Italian  government,  he  [i.e.  Albini]  should  become a
director  of  this  Company  with  special  reference  to  the  Italian  affairs”.17 This  fact  casts  some
suspicions on the indepndence of Albini but it was hardly unique among naval officers.
The contract signed with Armstrong generated anxiety among Italian engineering firms. For
example,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Genoa,  one  of  the  most  influential,  and to  which,  for
instance, both  Ansaldo  and  Odero  belonged, wrote  to  the  Ministry of  the  Navy to  receive
assurances: Italian firms were  worried about facing a strong foreign competitor  in their domestic
market. They feared that Armstrong could expand its production outside ordnance manufacturing to
shipbuilding  and civil engineering, all activities which  Armstrong  carried on at Elswick. Brin
replied that the contract signed with Armstrong was only about setting up an ordnance plant to
“build in the country hardware that we have always bought abroad”. Moreover, the Minister added
that “it has never been a government intention to grant any privilege to this establishment”.18
The combination of promises  of  future  orders  and  threats  to  stop  buying  from  it had
convinced Armstrong to venture in Italy, reversing its policy of not opening branches abroad. Italy
was a crucial  customer for Elswick, and Armstrong did not want  to risk losing it.  Italy's  naval
budget  had been growing since the late 1870s, therefore the venture promised to be profitable. In
combination with the erection of Terni, Armstrong's Italian artillery works strengthened the strategic
position of Italy and reduced its dependence on foreign military suppliers. As in the case of Terni,
the  contract with Armstrong was not unopposed, but the economic and strategic climate  allowed
both ventures to be approved. 
5.2 The creation of Pozzuoli.
During the second half of 1884, Armstrong's management was busy planning the firm's new
venture. In November,  Andrew Noble  travelled to Italy to personally hammer out a compromise
with  the  government.  He  visited  Italy  again  in  January.19 The  first  decision  Armstrong's
16 P. Ferrari, Verso la Guerra. L'Italia nella Corsa agli Armamenti 1884-1918 (Vicenza, 2003),156. 
17 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 4 March 1885.
18 ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti, b. 580, f. 1946, 23 February 1885.
19 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 29 January 1885
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management had to take was whether to enter into the Italian market by a “greenfield investment”
(that is by establishing a plant ex novo), or through acquiring a local firm. As it has been reported
above, Armstrong had had the opportunity to acquire  established firms in Italy, but it declined all
the offers. Buying an existing firm would have speeded up the entrance into the new market because
it would have brought Armstrong a workforce, established links with suppliers, and saved it the time
of  erecting  a  new  plant.  In the  end,  however, Armstrong decided  to  create  its  own plant,  as
happened in the majority of  the foreign direct investments  undertaken before 1914.20 The chief
reason was that there were no suitable targets in Italy. Obviously, no gun making firm existed which
could be bought and enlarged. There were many engineering firms, but few of them were large, or
modern enough, to justify an acquisition. What is more,  it is likely that Armstrong's management
wanted  to  be  in  full  control  of  all  the  organisational arrangements  of  the  new plant  and  thus
favoured the idea of a “greenfield” investment.
Having decided to create a plant somewhere in Italy, the next decision was where to
establish it. The  Ministry  did  not  influence  such  a  decision,  which  was  left  to  Armstrong's
managers.  The board first considered Spezia.  Spezia  offered several advantages: having its  works
near the main base of the Italian Navy could make it easier for the fledging plant to undertake not
just gun manufacturing, but also  reparations and refurbishment works. Moreover, the fact that
Spezia was already the seat of military plants and yards,  could make  it  easier to  recruit skilled
workers and craftsmen. Finally, Spezia lay only 110 kilometres east of Genoa, which was the Italian
port were the price of coal coming from Britain was cheaper21 – and it can be assumed that this was
true for every commodity which was shipped through the straits of Gibraltar; transportation costs in
Spezia  would  then  be lower  than  in  many other  parts  of  Italy.  In  order  to  gain  local  support,
Armstrong's board decided to send 2,000 Lire (£80) to the mayor of Spezia “towards the relief of
the poor, who are suffering in consequence of the cholera visitation.”22
The firm's board, however, soon changed its mind and started to look for a different place.
There is no archival evidence which explains why Armstrong decided to choose another location
over Spezia. Given that many local entrepreneurs feared the competition of Armstrong, as it has
been reported above, it is possible that Armstrong faced local opposition to setting up its plant there.
It is also possible that the armed forces did not like the idea of a foreign-owned plant nearby the
20 G. Jones,  Multinationals and Global  Capitalism: from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century  (Oxford, 2005),
148-149.
21 C. Bardini, Senza Carbone nell'Età del Vapore. Gli Inizi dell'Industrializzazione Italiana (Milano, 1998), 31-33. 
22 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 18 September 1884.
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major naval base of the country,  or that they were worried  that an excessive concentrations of
workers could generate political and social risks.
Whatever the reasons, Armstrong's board now  focused its attention in the region around
Naples. Once again, the management tried to win over the local community: the 8 October it
decided to send £160 to the mayor of Naples “to help the poor of the city.”23 The strategy of offering
financial support for local welfare projects seems to be a constant of Armstrong's “public relations”
policy. Although the only source available to trace these kinds of donations are the minutes of the
board – which probably report only the largest payments – it is evident that the company employed
again and again the same policy to make itself well accepted. By January 1885 Armstrong had
narrowed  its  options  to  three  places:  Castellammare  di  Stabia  (where  the  Navy  managed  an
important yard) on the south shore of the gulf of Naples, the island of Nisida in front of Bagnoli and
Pozzuoli, on the north-west part of the gulf.24
In the end Pozzuoli was chosen and on 4 March 1885 the contract between Armstrong and
the Italian government was ratified. Pozzuoli lays approximately 15 kilometres west of  Naples. It
was one of the most important ports in Southern Italy during the Roman age, as impressive ruins
testify nowadays, but in 1885 it was a small city of about 12,000 inhabitants, in majority fishermen
and farmers.25 As a location for manufacturing, Pozzuoli presented both advantages and
disadvantages. Naples's hinterland being neither very prosperous nor industrialized, could not offer
a large pool of skilled workers. Moreover Pozzuoli was not well connected with the main road and
rail networks. However, the price of land was  low, and the  workforce was cheaper than in other,
more economically advanced, parts of Italy. Finally, Pozzuoli city council offered tax exemptions to
attract Armstrong.26
The choice of Pozzuoli was also discussed during a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in
Rome. During  the  debate, the MP  for Taranto, Dayala-Valva, pressed Minister Brin to force
Armstrong to establish its works inside the city's  arsenal because the naval base could provide a
more satisfactory defence for such a strategic plant.27 All these critics were dismissed by Brin, who
repeatedly stressed that Armstrong was free to choose where to establish its plant: this was a private
enterprise, he said, without any link with the government, and consequently the Ministry could not
impose one location or another. Despite the fact that Dayala-Valva had a political interest in
23 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 8 October 1884.
24 Inchiesta, Relazioni Speciali, 155.
25 On the history of Pozzuoli R. Annecchino, Storia di Pozzuoli e della Zona Flegrea (Pozzuoli, 1960).
26 M. Luongo ‘Lo Stabilimento Armstrong di Pozzuoli’, Revue d'Histoire de la Banque 34-35 (1987), 146-151.
27 Camera dei Deputati, Atti Parlamentari, Discussioni, 23 January 1885, vol. 10, 10902-10907.
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convincing Brin to press Armstrong to set up its branch  in Taranto –  this would have meant
hundreds of new jobs and an easier re-election for him – it is true that Pozzuoli was vulnerable from
naval bombardment. In 1888 Armstrong tried to insure its Italian plant against “war risks” but both
the insurance companies it contacted (unfortunately, the board's minutes do not report their names)
refused to insure the plant against such a threat.28 The fact that in 1888 Italian-French relationships
were at an all-time low did not help.
Armstrong’s board drafted an ambitious plan for Pozzuoli. The cost for the new plant was
initially estimated at £145,000, including the purchase of the land, the cost of building, machineries,
etc.29 Armstrong's main goal was to establish a gun manufacturing plant, but the board decided that
“the Company reserves … a portion of land in case of shipbuilding being determined upon in the
future.”30 In fact, since the beginning,  the Ministry of the  Navy had encouraged Armstrong  to
consider the idea of erecting a yard. Mitchell was asked by his fellow directors to produce a plan for
a shipyard which was approved by the board.  The Board calculated that  it  would cost  at  least
£23,000 to equip Pozzuoli for shipbuilding.31 Armstrong was considering replicating in Italy the
strategy of integrating different military productions which it had adopted in Britain. The directors
also discussed the possibility of  starting the manufacture of boilers and naval  engines.32 No final
decision was taken, however. 
The idea of undertaking shipbuilding was raised for a second time in 1889, in relation to the
possibility of buying the Navy's yard in Castellammare.33 Despite the fact this yard was among the
most important shipbuilding centres for the Navy, the government and the Navy wanted to sell it to
concentrate  the Navy's  shipbuilding activities in  Spezia and Taranto, which were  better protected.
This attempted  sale, however,  did not go through.34. During the board meeting of 11 September
1889 the directors discussed “the subject of shipbuilding [...] in connection with Pozzuoli and the
proposed purchase of the shipyard of Castellammare. It was agreed to abandon the latter scheme for
the reason that the yard was not very capacious, that it was at an inconvenient distance, and it would
involve considerable difficulty in management.”35 In the end, the only ships built in Pozzuoli were
two gunboats,  Castore and Polluce, which the Italian Army bought from Elswick (later they were
28 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 11 April 1888.
29 Id., 29 July 1885.
30 Id., 15 May 1885.
31 Id., 17 February 1886.
32 Id., 28 January 1886.
33 Castellammare is at the opposite side of the Gulf of Naples, about 40 kilometres as the crown flies from Pozzuoli.
34 F.  Degli  Esposti,  Le  Armi  Proprie.  Spesa  Pubblica,  Politica  Militare e  Sviluppo  Industriale nell'Italia  Liberale
(Milano, 2006), 177.
35 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 11 September 1889.
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taken  over  by  the  Navy).36 The  vessels were  shipped  in  pieces  to  Pozzuoli  where  they  were
reassembled. Notwithstanding the fact that no shipbuilding activity was carried there, Armstrong's
plant was popularly known as “Cantieri Armstrong” (Armstrong yard).
Meanwhile, the expropriation of the land in Pozzuoli proceeded slowly: the area required
was secured only in July 1886. At this point the building work began. Elswick sent both  special
machinery and  a group of technicians  to Italy to  supervise the erection of the plant: Josephine
Butler, the feminist activist, while travelling there, mentioned in a letter that Sir William Armstrong
“has sent out of England some 40 or 50 picked men, […] all Northumbrians and choice men in
every respect for bodily strength and high character”, to work at his “great ironworks” at Pozzuoli
“for making ironclads for the Italian government”.37
The distance between Elswick and Pozzuoli also  made it difficult to coordinate
developments from Newcastle for Andrew Noble, notoriously prone to micromanagement: “Captain
Noble reported upon his recent visit to Italy. He considered that it was absolutely necessary for
several reasons that Italian directors should be appointed at once.”38 The directors regarded as
necessary the presence in loco of an experienced management  team, to whom all the operative
decisions  could be devolved, while Elswick retained  strategic planning. Consequently, the board
nominated George Rendel (who had been living in Italy for several years, after resigning from the
Admiralty for health reasons) and Admiral Albini as directors in charge of  the Italian operations.
Albini's brief was  to run the firm's  office in Rome and to take care of the  relationships with the
Italian  Navy: “it was agreed [by the Board] to be desirable  that communications with the Italian
government should come through the Rome office.” Albini had been for years among the highest-
ranking naval officers and he was well-connected with the political milieu  of the capital. George
Rendel, in contrary, could use his engineering skills and his past experience as Elswick's manager to
supervise  production  in Pozzuoli.  Albini and Rendel  were specifically instructed to try to  make
arrangements with Terni about the supply of steel for Pozzuoli.39
The  new  directors  faced  a  difficult  situation.  In  Pozzuoli construction activities were
proceeding slowly. The board in Newcastle required a fortnightly report to monitor improvements
(unfortunately, there is no trace of these communications among the surviving Armstrong's records).
In November, Rendel could report that “three heavy cranes were already fixed in the shop. And a
36 P. Brooks, ‘Armstrong and the Italian Navy’, A. Preston (ed.), Warship 2002-2003 (London, 2003), 108-110.
37 Josephine Butler Archive, The Women Library, London Metropolitan University, 3JBL/25/13, 6 April 1886. 
38 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 27 January 1887.
39 Id., 26 May 1887.
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large proportion of the machinery required was on the ground.” He was still worried, however: he
wrote to his brother Stuart that “I have been very busy about Pozzuoli. Things were going altogether
to the bad there.”40 Nonetheless a crucial step had been achieved: on 28 July the directors approved
the agreement with Terni. Because Armstrong did not to produce steel “in house” at Pozzuoli for the
following twenty years, the firm relied exclusively on Terni or on imports from Britain. 
The difficulties of working at  Pozzuoli  were numerous: local workers were untrained to
perform many common industrial tasks, activity  was often slowed down by the lack of coherent
direction, and linguistic barriers made everything more difficult.41 The seriousness of the problems
can be assessed by the unanimous resolution that the directors passed in praise of the work of their
fellow colleague colonel Dyer: 
Colonel Dyer having now returned from Pozzuoli after an absence of nearly
eight months, and having there rendered at great personal inconvenience and
discomfort, as well as risk to health, most important services to this Company by
organising the establishment and correcting abuses, the Directors thank it right to
express their obligation to him for so ably performing the duty which he
undertook at the request of his co-directors.42 
During a special meeting on 16 April,  the directors discussed the state of Pozzuoli. From
1885  to  1887,  Elswick  had  authorised  expenditures  worth  5,350,000  Lire  (£214,000)  for  the
establishment of the plant. The board approved the additional sum of 3,500,000 (£140,000) Lire for
1888.43 The total sum,  £354,000, doubled the estimate made three years before.  Costs had been
initially  underestimated  and,  at  the  beginning,  construction  activities  suffered  from
mismanagement, however, after years of troubles, in 1888 the main buildings and machinery were
in place. As a sign of the fact that the plant could now be run in a more traditional fashion, and that
frequent trips from Elswick's directors were not required any more, the board appointed captain De
Luca, a former Navy officer, as residential sub-manger, Rendel having made explicit his desire to
40 T&W Archive, 31/2998, 13 December 1887.
41 The memories  of  Herbert  Rowell,  a  young engineer  who worked in Pozzuoli  to  supervise the construction of
Castore  and  Polluce  offers a testimony of these difficulties. While Rowell's vision of Italy and its inhabitants is
undeniably  “orientalistic”,  his  recollection  conveys  the  magnitude  of the  problems  faced  by  Armstrong's
management in setting up Pozzuoli. See E. Rowell (ed.), In Peace and War. Tyneside, Naples and the Royal Flying
Corps (Otley, 1996), 62-94. 
42 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 31 May 1888. 
43 Id., 16 April 1888.
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retire as soon as possible. While De Luca's position was subordinated to Albini's Roman office, it
represented the first stable management enjoyed by Pozzuoli. Newcastle, however, kept monitoring
the Italian branch carefully: “no orders for machinery or work of any kind on capital account be
given without the authority of the Board.”44
Pozzuoli, however, suffered from lack of orders. This was because Armstrong was slow to
shift Italian orders from Elswick to Pozzuoli. While there is no documentation explicitly addressing
this issue, several reasons probably contributed to this: the slowness in the erection of the new
works certainly extended the period before it  became possible  to  move production to  Italy;  in
addition, Elswick's management probably deferred the transfer of orders to keep its British  plant
working at full capacity, rather  than lose part of  its production to  the foreign  branch. Finally, the
lower  costs  and  higher  productivity  of  Elswick  allowed  hardware  to  be  sold  to  the  Italian
government at a higher profit, reducing the incentives to  move production to Pozzuoli. Brin had
been pressuring in this direction since late 1887 when, speaking with Albini, he had pointed to the
desirability of having “Pozzuoli in working order at the earliest possible date, and of having some
manufactured work to show.”45 In a letter dated 25 April 1889 a resentful George Rendel wrote that
“Pozzuoli goes on as well as it can with a lack of work … and it appears at first sight then utterly
unjustifiable that Pozzuoli should have to discharge men while Elswick is stuffed with Italian work
… We have now many of the new machines requested by De Luca in place and ready for work, and
ought to be taking men on”.46 At the same time the management had to refuse works that Pozzuoli
could not carry out: 
A letter from Messrs Crampa & Trigli of Sorrento was read asking the Company
to take an order for a sailing ship to be built at Pozzuoli. The Secretary was
desired to express the regret of the Directors that their present arrangements did
not admit building vessels.47
A positive assessment of Pozzuoli came in 1889 from an official report commissioned by the
Ministry of the  Navy “on the conditions of the metallurgic, mechanical and naval firms in Italy”
redacted by Antenore Bozzoni, who had worked with Brin in the Enquire Committee on Mechanical
44 Id., 27 January 1889.
45 Id., 23 November 1887.
46 T&W Archive, 31/3582, 25 April 1889.
47 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 22 August 1888.
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Industries some years before. Bozzoni pointed to the fact that the Armstrong's plant in Pozzuoli
provided  Italy  for  the  first  time  with  a  “mechanical  industry  of  special  character,  that  is  the
manufacture  of  guns  and  of  all  the  attachments  and  mechanisms  needed  for  their  operation.”
Moreover  the  plant,  despite  not  yet  finished,  generated  “the  impression  of  an  English  shop
transplanted in Italy, for the correctness of its layout, for the perfection of its machinery, and for that
ensemble of order and work distribution which form a distinctive character of industries exercised
by people of long practice and experience.”48
From 1890 Italian orders started to be executed in Pozzuoli. Figure 5.3 shows the advances
received  by Elswick  for Italian work in progress undertaken at both Elswick and Pozzuoli. Until
1890  all  Italian  orders  were  executed  in  Elswick.  From that  year,  Pozzuoli  acquired  a  rising
proportion of the Italian orders (as Elswick was completing the backlog of orders still in hand), and
from 1892 all  Italian orders were executed in Pozzuoli. Judging from this yardstick, Brin's policy
had been clearly successful: Italy had acquired within a few years a gun plant which could satisfy
all the Navy's requests for large, medium and small ordnance.
Figure   5  . 3  : Advances paid by Italy for work in progress  at Elswick and Pozzuoli, 1884-1895 (in
current pound).
Source: Figure 5.1.
48 Relazione a S. E. il  Ministro della Marina sulle  Attuali  Condizioni delle  Industrie  Metallurgiche,  Meccaniche e
Navali (Roma, 1889), 40-47.
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Figure  5  . 4  : Map of the region west of Naples. The “Cantiere Armstrong” is highlighted in red.
Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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In 1890 the outlook for Pozzuoli looked therefore  more positive:  George Rendel informed
the board that “[he] was of opinion that the most serious difficulties connected with the starting of
the establishment had now been overcome, and that notwithstanding the extra cost of taxation,
supervision, and fuel, and the inexperience of the workmen, he had no fear of remunerative orders
being received”.49 For the period 1890-1895 it is possible to provide a detailed analysis  of the
activities and investments carried on at Pozzuoli, thanks to the data reported in Armstrong's balance
books. Expenditures were divided into five categories: land, buildings, machinery, tools and loose
plant and furniture and other expenditure. 
Figure  5  .5  : Expenses to date on land (in current pounds).
Expense Value Percentage change year on year
 at 30 June 1891 20,910 -
 at 30 June 1892 22,225 6.3 %
 at 30 June 1893 25,056 12.7 %
 at 30 June 1894 25,054 0 %
 at 30 June 1895 25,192 0.5 %
Source: 130/1337-1341.
Figure  5.  6  : Expenses to date on building (in current pounds).
Expense Value Percentage change year on year
at 30 June 1891 152,935 -
at 30 June 1892 161,436 5 %
at 30 June 1893 161,457 0 %
at 30 June 1894 164,175 1.6 %
at 30 June 1895 164,186 0 %
Source: Figure 5.5.
49 T&W 130/1264, Minutes, 24 July 1890.
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Figure  5  .7  : Expenses to date on machinery (in current pounds).
Expense Value Percentage change year on year
at 30 June 1891 154,088 -
 at 30 June 1892 160,997 4.5%
at 30 June 1893 162,509 0.9%
at 30 June 1894 166,803 2.6%
at 30 June 1895 172,364 3.3%
Source: Figure 5.5.
Figure   5 .8  : Expense to date on tools and loose plant (in current pounds).
Expense Value Percentage change year on year
at 30 June 1891 14,518 -
at 30 June 1892 17,284 19%
at 30 June 1893 18,507 7%
at 30 June 1894 19,367 4.6%
at 30 June 1895 18,667 -3.6%
Source: Figure 5.5.
Figure  5  .9  : Expense to date on furniture and other (in current pounds) 
Expense Value Percentage change year on year
at 30 June 1891 2,354 -
at 30 June 1892 2,141 -9%
at 30 June 1893 1,928 -9.9%
at 30 June 1894 1,733 -10.1%
at 30 June 1895 1,551 -10.5%
Source: Figure 5.5.
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Figure  5  .10  : Total expenditure to date at Pozzuoli (in current pounds).
Expense Value Percentage change year on year
at 30 June 1891 344,808 -
at 30 June 1892 364,086 5.6%
at 30 June 1893 369,458 1.5%
at 30 June 1894 377,134 2%
at 30 June 1895 381,962 1.3%
Source: Figures 5.5-5.9.
The construction  period  resulted in an impressive plant: the main shop covered an area of
13,000 square meters, and it was served by 16 travelling cranes, whose power ranged from 5 50 70
tons.  The works  were  powered to  the  amount  of  400 horse  power.50 After  this  initial  wave of
spending,  however,  the  investment  trend was  quite flat. This was predictable  for expenditure on
lands and buildings: the company did not expand and therefore little expenditure  was  needed. In
contrary the trend in machinery and tool investment was more positive but the general impression is
that the firm's directors economised on investments. Because in the course of the 1890s references
to Pozzuoli became less and less numerous in the minutes of the board, it is impossible to assess to
what extent it was the Newcastle's head office which opposed new investments or if it was the local
management  which  did  not  see  the  need  for  additional  expenditures.  It  is  sure,  however,  that
Elswick's  directors  were  unwilling  to  commit  large  sums  to  Pozzuoli.  Later  on,  this  lack  of
investment was considered to have been a mistake.
Poor final year results were the reason why Armstrong became dissatisfied with its Italian
investment (Figure 5.11). Until 1891 Pozzuoli did not make any profit. Armstrong had incurred in
large expenditure to erect the plant  in the previous five years, and the works were only slowly
starting production;  more troublesome was that  also  in the following five years Pozzuoli's profits
were disappointing. The picture becomes still less satisfactory if the return on the expenditures are
considered. Because of its poor results, Pozzuoli contributed little to Armstrong's total profit, with a
peak of 6.7% in the year 1893-1894. The decline in the Italian naval budget which started in 1890
was the major cause of the unsatisfactory results. Pozzuoli was completed exactly when the Italian
50 Arms and Explosive, July 1895, 169.
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Navy had to cut the ambitious construction plan it had devised in the 1880s: naval shipbuilding did
not stop, but investments in new construction declined considerably. As a result, Pozzuoli suffered
from diminished orders, after the backlog of works ordered until the late 1880s was cleared. 
 
Figure  5  .11  : Final year results of Pozzuoli 1891-1896 (in current pounds).
Profit Profits (losses) Return on expenditures
Pozzuoli's 
profits as % of 
Armstrong's 
total profits
at 30 June 1891 (15,721) - 4.6% -
at 30 June 1892 9,974 2.7% 3.5%
at 30 June 1893 7,463 2% 2.5%
at 30 June 1894 22,100 5.9% 6.7%
at 30 June 1895 19,074 5% 5.5%
at 30 June 1896 14,442 - -
Sources: T&W, 130/1337-1342.
Figure  5  .12  : Work in progress in Pozzuoli, 1887-1895 (in current pounds).
Year Work in progress 
at 30 June 1887 5,077 
at 30 June 1888 17,866
at 30 June 1889 53,897
at 30 June 1890 78,910
at 30 June 1891 111,164
at 30 June 1892 242,262
at 30 June 1893 280,553
at 30 June 1894 345,671
at 30 June 1895 313,490
Source: T&W, 130/1333-1341.
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The series on the work in progress in Pozzuoli survive for the years 1887-1895. It displays a
more marked rising trend, in line with the tendency to move to Pozzuoli production carried out for
the Italian Navy. However, the fact that orders did not result in a satisfactory level of profits raises
doubt about the efficiency of the works.
In 1896 Armstrong opted to reconstruct the Italian branch as an autonomous company – the
Armstrong Pozzuoli Company Limited  – which was entirely owned by Armstrong. Unfortunately
the records of the Armstrong Pozzuoli Company have been lost and therefore much less information
is available for the period 1896-1914.  The land, buildings and machinery situated in Italy were
transferred to the new company, which had a capital of £185,000, divided into 18,500 shares, of £10
value.51 The directors of the Armstrong Pozzuoli company were the same as those of the Armstrong
Company.52 An autonomous company could more easily enter into agreements or amalgamate with
other Italian firms, without involving Armstrong's capital. Brin had already raised for the first time
in  1889  the  issue  of  the  desirability  of  “employing  Italian  capital”  at  Pozzuoli to reduce the
“foreign” character of Pozzuoli in the eyes of Italian public opinion.53 Armaments was a sensitive
sector, one in which the  nationalistic card could be used  to damage competitors. In  general,
Elswick's interest in Pozzuoli seems to have declined: as Armstrong now received a fixed payment
from Pozzuoli (initially £16,000, which was reduced to £13,000 after two years) rather than more
directly participate in any profits or losses, there was little incentive for it to invest substantial sums
of money to improve Pozzuoli. Another sign of the falling importance of Pozzuoli  in Armstrong's
strategy was that there were virtual no reference to it in the minutes of the board's meetings between
1896 and 1900.
5.3 Pozzuoli in the late 1890s and the problem of steel supply.
Pozzuoli,  as  all the other Italian firms in  the  armaments sector, suffered from the fall of
orders from the Italian Navy. Unfortunately, the loss of Pozzuoli's balance sheets has deprived us of
much relevant  information and statistics  about  the  period  after  1895.  However, data on  output
(Figure 5.13) and on the total number of workers (Figure 5.14) can be found in an official volume
published for the fifteenth anniversary of the foundation of  the  Armstrong Pozzuoli  Company  in
51 NA, Board of Trade 31/31793/46622, 23 January 1896. 
52 T&W, 130/1265, Minutes, 23 January 1896.
53 T&W, 130/1264, Minutes, 29 May 1889.
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1911.54 
Figure  5  .13  : Pozzuoli's total output of ordnance, 1886-1900 (in tons).
Source: Stabilimento Armstrong, 145.
Figure  5.13 shows the temporal hiatus between the trends of naval budget and  the  firm's
output.  Output  rose until mid 1890s  as a consequence of the delayed beginning of production  of
orders already signed. After 1896 production declined and remained flat until the end of the century.
During  the  second  half  of  the  1890s,  dwindling  orders  from  the  Italian  Navy were  partially
compensated by supplying the guns for the ships which Italian yards built for foreign governments.
All the  Garibaldi were armed with Pozzuoli's guns, for instance.55 In contrary,  until the 1910s no
order came for the Army. Figure 5.13, however, do not divide production in different typologies of
guns, but consider its total weight. Therefore it is not possible to ascertain what kind of guns were
54 Lo stabilimento Armstrong di Pozzuoli dal 1896 al 1911 (Bergamo, 1911).
55 Stabilimento Armstrong, 6. 
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Figure  5.  14  : Number of workers employed at Pozzuoli 1886-1900.
Source: Stabilimento Armstrong, 173.
Data on the number of workers employed (figure 5.14) followed a different trend: after an
initial large increase caused by the erection  activities,  Pozzuoli's  workforce declined to less than
1,000 workers. The excessive number of men became evident within a few years after the creation
of the plant.  As early as 1891 Armstrong's board “agreed that a general reduction in the Pozzuoli
staff was imperative”.56 It is interesting to notice how there was no positive correlation between, on
the one side, the output of guns and on the other side  the number of workers. The production of
ordnance was a difficult task, that required skills and competence. It was thus possible to produce
more but with a smaller, more experienced, and more productive labour force.57 This is confirmed
by a note in the Minutes of the meeting of the Armstrong's Board:
56 T&W, 130/1264, Minutes, 30 September 1891.
57 Unfortunately we do not know know if Pozzuoli's workers were paid by the piece or if other financial incentives
were used to raise production. 
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Mr Cruddas laid on the table the report of the auditors [about] working expenses
for 1890 and 1891[at Pozzuoli]. He read some extracts showing that the men had
been reduced from 1120 to 919 in the course of nine months, and that a further
reduction of 100-150 was aimed at. The reduction of men, said the auditors,
appeared favourable to the work, as more work was done with 1/5 less men.
Some comments followed upon the unsatisfactory retention in our employ
officials for whom there seemed no work.58
Armstrong's management repeatedly tried to use the threat of a reduction of the workforce to
put pressure on the Ministry of the Navy and gain additional orders. For instance, in a letter date 2
November 1897, the local manger De Luca wrote to the Minister that:
I'm sad to inform you that we are forced to fire at the end of the next months 300
workers because there is no work, and in the following months we will have to
carry on further significant reductions of personnel. We cannot hope for a remedy
other than in your benevolent intervention, in order to help these good workmen
we are force to dismiss, orders in advance for guns for vessels which will be
commissioned.59
Another  contentious  issue  for Pozzuoli  were  the cost  and availability of  steel.  After the
adoption  of  steel  ordnance,  the problem of gaining supplies of  high quality steel had become
crucial. Special requirements of strength, toughness and resistance, made common steel unsuitable.
Prior to the creation of Terni there was no plant in Italy capable of producing the kind of steel
required for military purposes. As said before, a clause in the contract Armstrong signed with the
Italian Navy to create Pozzuoli, awarded an increase of price in case Pozzuoli made use of Italian
steel,  that is Terni's steel, because Terni enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the special steel alloys for
military purpose.
The  quality of the  gun  forgings purchased  from Terni  was  satisfactory: Andrew Noble
defined Terni's steel as “good”.60 However Terni's steel was not cheap. Armstrong suffered from this
in two ways. First, because Pozzuoli paid a high price for steel, it had to charge a higher price for
58 T&W, 130/1264, Minutes, 29 June 1892.
59 ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti, b. 115, f. 162, 2 November 1897.
60 T&W, 130/1264, Minutes, 9 May 1894.
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the finished gun. Although the higher cost of steel could be passed entirely onto the final price paid
by the government, this meant that the Italian Navy could buy fewer guns, ceteris paribus. Second,
higher  prices  made  guns produced  at  Pozzuoli more  difficult  to  export. As Pozzuoli faced
diminishing orders from the Italian Navy, the problem of steel became  more relevante because
Pozzuoli could only increase its order book by obtaining contracts from foreign governments.61
In  the  absence  of  Pozzuoli's  records,  the fragmented  and  uncatalogued records of the
Ministry of the Navy make it possible to assess some of the difficulties Pozzuoli faced in gaining
foreign customers. The Ministry's records document the efforts made by Pozzuoli to gain the order
for the guns for the Portuguese light cruiser Adamastor which had been laid down to the Orlando
shipyard in Leghorn in 1895.62 The management of Pozzuoli, hoping to secure the contract, started
to lobby the government in Lisbon.63 Eventually, however, the contract went to Krupp. Disappointed
that the contract had not been awarded to the only Italy-based ordnance company, notwithstanding
the fact –  as the Italian charge d'affaire in Lisbon complained to the Foreign Minister –  that the
Italian government had loaded Portuguese politicians and military officers with chivalry orders and
decorations in every possible occasion,64 the Ministry of the Navy decided to investigate, and asked
Pozzuoli and Terni their opinion of why the order had been awarded to Krupp.
The two companies offered very different assessments of what had gone wrong. Pozzuoli's
management believed that the key problem were high costs of production. In fact “the cheapness of
the work force in Pozzuoli is compensated by the major burdens inherent to Pozzuoli, that is higher
taxes, a higher cost of power [i.e. coal] and higher costs for the use of machinery.”  The essential
issue, however, was the cost of steel. In fact “the tariff duty of 9 lire for quintal [for English steel],
while not being prohibitive, is enough to influence the acquisition of orders from abroad … About
manufacturing guns with Terni's steel, Your Excellency knows its prices.”65 If  Krupp had secured
the contract it was because it offered the Portuguese government a better deal. If the Italian
government wanted to help Pozzuoli gaining orders from abroad, maintain the plant busy and the
61 Article n.  14 of the contract between Armstrong and the Italian government allowed Pozzuoli to satisfy orders
coming from foreign governments, provided that these were in “friendly relationships with the Italian government”.
62 The documents relevant for this transaction can be found in ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Direzione Generale
Artiglieria ed Armamenti, b. 115, f. 5.  This  ship  played  a  significant  role  in  Portuguese  history:  during  the
Republican Revolution of 1910 its mutinous crew shelled the Royal Palace forcing King Manuel II to leave the
country, The Times 8 October 1910, 5.
63 ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Letter from Armstrong's Office in Rome to the Portuguese Ministry of the Navy, 22
June 1895. 
64 ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Letter from the Italian Legation in Lisbon to the Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta, 16
August 1897. 
65 ACS, Letter from Armstrong's Italian Office to the Ministry of the Navy, 12 June 1895.
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workers employed, the solution was either to reduce the duty on imported steel, or to convince Terni
to  reduce its  prices.  Terni's  technical office replied offering a completely different assessment.66
Terni's steel could be more expensive, it conceded, but this was only because orders were usually
small and discontinued. As a result, it was difficult to take advantage of the economies of scale
which, otherwise, could have contributed to reduced the price of steel. Additionally, Terni pointed to
the fact that “it is not the first time that the reluctance to make use of Terni's steel by several
companies, and of Armstrong in particular, has been noticed.” Complaining about the price of steel
was just a strategy because “it seems that Armstrong has the interest to send to Elswick, as far as it
is possible, the orders for complete guns or, at least, to avoid the constraint to buy from national [i.e.
Italian] suppliers to favour Elswick and its production.” 
Even though in this specific case it is possible that politics played a role – Portugal, after the
1890 clash with Britain for the possession of the large  territory lying  between Angola and
Mozambique,67 was in no mood to buy from British-owned companies  –  the problem of the high
cost of Terni's steel was a real one, as it is testified by another round of letters exchanged between
Terni, Pozzuoli and the Ministry the following year. On 25  March 1898 the Department for
Ordnance and Armaments of the Ministry of the Navy wrote a message to the Navy technical office
in Terni.68 
This Ministry, having several times asked Armstrong a discount on the quite high
prices that it charges, has always received the answer that this discount could not
be granted, because of the difference between the prices of Terni's steel and
English one; and the company said that it could charge better prices only if the
Ministry would give up the provision that force Armstrong to use Italian steel and
so allow it to use English steel.69
The Ministry asked Terni to provide its own data on the price of steel. The relevance of the
topic is testified by the fact that the letter was signed by Benedetto Brin himself, at that time for the
fifth and last time Minister for the Navy. Moreover, the paper was labelled “confidential”: Brin was
aware that this issue was a  potentially dangerous one  because  of  the  many controversies  that
66 ACS, Letter from Terni's Technical Office to the Ministry of the Navy, 14 September 1897. 
67 R. Hammond, Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: a Study in Uneconomic Imperialism (Stanford, 1966), 100-132.
68 The Italian Navy had offices inside all major armaments  companies  with the task to  verify the quality of final
production. There was a similar office in Pozzuoli. 
69 ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti, b. 160, f. 1286, 25 March 1898.
191
surrounded Terni and its relationship with the  Navy. Therefore he did not want to provide Terni's
critics with the information presented in the document. Figure 5.15 shows the unitary prices and the
prices/weight ratio of different kinds of guns and carriages that Pozzuoli had sold to the Navy and
the prices of comparable kind of artillery which the Army had obtained from Armstrong or other
private manufacturers.
Figure   5  .15  :  Price paid by the  Italian Navy and the  Army for selected pieces of ordnance  and
carriages.
Unitary price (in lire) Weight (kilograms) Price/Weight (in lire)
Artillery
 Krupp gun type 
“9” for the Army
4,360 482 8.862
Armstrong gun 
type “57” 7,500 365 20.548
Armstrong gun 
type “76” 10,300 600 17.166
Armstrong gun 
“120.A.91” 22,000 2,120 10.377
Carriages
Gruson carriage 
“12” for the Army 7,472 5,105 1.464
Armstrong 
platform carriage 
“120”
17,546 3,490 5.0275
Armstrong siege 
carriage “15” for 
the Army
5,000 1,898 2.634
Armstrong 
platform carriage 
“152.A.91”
34,500 5,955 5.793
Source: ACS, Fondo Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti, 25 March 1898.
Such a comparison should be taken with a pinch of salt: naval ordnance tended to be more
expensive than land artillery because it was more sophisticated (all technical innovations in artillery
in  the  period  1860-1914  came  from  naval  guns,  and  only  subsequently  were  applied  to  land
artillery). This was especially true for gun mountings, platforms and carriages which were much
more complex in the case of naval ordnance. In addition, it was possible that companies other than 
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Figure   5  .16  : Comparison of the cost of guns and carriages made by Armstrong  with that by the
Spezia arsenal.
Source: ACS, Fondo Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti, 17 May 1898.
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Armstrong were trying to  sell  at  a  low price  in  order  to  gain entrance into the Italian market.
Nevertheless, it is quite evident that Armstrong's hardware was systematically more expensive than
that produced by competitors; the price/weight ratio is especially revealing on this. In addition, the
naval department for ordnance and armaments submitted another document on 17 May 1898. This
time the prices of some of Armstrong's guns and carriages were compared with the cost of
manufacturing similar hardware manufactured in the Navy's own gun plant inside the Spezia arsenal
(Figure 5.16). To allow a meaningful comparison between the activities of a private firm and that of
a public establishment, an arbitrary mark-up equal to 75% of the workforce cost was added to the
costs  of  materials  and  workforce  sustained  by  arsenals to  account  for  profit, depreciations,
amortizations,  investments,  and other  costs  which  a  private  firm sustained but  which  were  not
included in the accounting data of arsenals. 
This  comparison was again  partially  unfavourable to  Armstrong. All the type of guns or
carriages considered in the figure could apparently be produced more cheaply by the Navy than by
Armstrong. Again, however, the numbers need to be treated with care. The arsenal's administration
had a clear interest in presenting a rosy picture of its activity, a positive assessment which was not
shared by every Italian military expert.70 Moreover, it is unknown if the quality of the products was
comparable. What is more, the value of the mark-up added to equalise arsenal production with that
of private firms might be too small to properly account for all the non operative costs faced by
Pozzuoli. Finally, the list only comprises small to medium calibre guns, while Italian arsenals could
not  manufacture  large  calibre  naval  guns,  which  represented  the major  offensive  armaments  of
warships. Therefore, also if arsenals might be competitive in the production of small calibre artillery
– and this is doubtful – they could not compete with Armstrong in the most advanced and profitable
market niche. Armstrong's management was able, however, to justify its prices by blaming the high
cost of the steel. It sent to the Ministry data to show how expensive was Terni's steel in comparison
with British one (Figure 5.17). 
How to make sense of all  these different, and conflicting, numbers? There is no doubt that
Armstrong, Terni and the Italian arsenal administration all cherry-picked data to support their own
positions. One point, however, seems beyond dispute: Terni's steel was  generally  more expensive
that comparable British steel.  As a consequence, the  Ministry  of the  Navy wrote again to Terni
asking for reductions in the price of steel. The letter ended with a veiled threat: “If the steel works at
Terni will continue to maintain high prices, the Ministry will be forced to authorize Armstrong to
70 Degli Esposti, Armi Proprie, 334-337 for the contrasting evaluations on the quality of arsenals' products expressed
during parliamentary debates in the second half of the 1890s. 
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use English materials.”71
Figure   5  .17  : Comparison  of the prices of several guns and carriages made by Armstrong's using
Italian or British steel (in Lire).
Kind of 
guns and 
carriages
305 
mm/40 
gauges 
gun
203 
mm/45 
gauges 
gun
152 
mm/45 
gauges 
gun
76 
mm/40 
gauges 
gun
47 
mm/40 
gauges 
gun
Four 305 
mm guns 
structure 
without 
casemate
Steel nickel
casemate 
for four 
305 mm 
guns 
structure
Two 203 
mm guns 
structure 
without 
casemate
Steel 
nickel 
casemate 
for two 
203 mm 
guns 
structure
Carriag
e for 76 
mm gun
Price 
using 
Italian 
material
303,300 122,200 54,800 9,700 7,310 1,782,100 628,500 308,100 242,900 8,800
Price 
using 
British 
material
265,050 108,050 47,000 8,700 6,990 1,744,450 551,000 290,000 196,000 8,650
Difference 38,250 14,150 7,800 1,000 320 37,650 77,500 18,100 46,900 150
Price % 
increase if 
Italian 
material is
used
14.43% 13.10% 16.59% 11.49% 4.57% 2.16% 14.065% 6.24% 23.93% 1.85%
Source: ACS, Fondo Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti.
5.4 Conclusions.
Italy had been among the most important customers for Elswick since the first years of the
firm.  The Italian government  had been  happy for  two decades to  buy from Armstrong what  it
required  to  arm  its Navy.  At  the  beginning  of  the  1880s,  however,  a  combination  of  growing
military expenditures,  increased  international  frictions  with France,  and  new mentalities among
high-ranking naval officers led to a change in strategy. The Italian Navy had now the possibility of
driving a bargain with Armstrong: Italy would still be a loyal customer of Armstrong (and Italy was
a very important customer for Elswick during the  first half of the  1880s)  if the firm accepted to
build a plant  somewhere  in Italy. It was  the concern of losing such a potentially lucrative market
71  ACS, Fondo Direzione Generale d'Artiglieria ed Armamenti, b. 160, f. 860, 28 June 1898.
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which convinced Armstrong to undertake the Italian investment,  something which the firm had
refused to do  in the previous decades. The ambitious hopes  Armstrong had  for Pozzuoli rapidly
vanished, however: managing a plant in a different country, thousands of kilometres away, proved
to  be a  daunting challenge. Many problems plagued the  initial  years  of  Pozzuoli  until  a  more
suitable management framework was devised  with  local managers  dealing with production, while
the strategic planning decisions were left in the hands of Armstrong's board in Newcastle.
By the time Pozzuoli achieved full production, Italian military spending had entered a period
of  decline  and  stagnation.  The  naval  budget  was  cut,  and funds  for  new  constructions were
sacrificed. Pozzuoli  was badly affecting. Consequently, Armstrong's board abandoned any idea of
expanding Pozzuoli into other fields, such as shipbuilding. Additionally, Armstrong's Italian branch
found itself involved in controversies  with the Navy  about the price of its  guns. With dwindling
resources devoted to the  Navy, Terni, Pozzuoli and the  government  arsenals battled to retain the
largest share of the available resources. The relevance of Pozzuoli, and the importance of Italy as a
customer,  was further  diminished  in the  eyes  of  Elswick by the  rapid  growth of  British naval
expenditure over the same period, an expansion which offered very large orders and returns.
Fifteen years after the contract for the creation of Pozzuoli had been signed, Italy had freed
itself  from the need to buy abroad the guns required for its  warships.  Brin's  strategy had been
successful, although at the cost of higher prices. At the same time, however, Pozzuoli could hardly
be called an indisputable commercial success. 
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Chapter VI
Acquisitions and Dreadnoughts: the British Armaments Industry, 
1897-1914
This chapter analyses the evolution of the British armaments industry from 1897 to 1914. In
this period, British armaments companies accelerated the process of vertical integration which had
begun in the previous decades. The aim was that to acquire the capability to autonomously produce
all the key components of a warship: hulls, guns and armour plates. The years 1897-98 can be taken
as a watershed: within a few months, Vickers and Armstrong made large acquisitions, entering new
areas of production. John Brown and Cammell rapidly followed by purchasing shipbuilding firms
and,  in the early 1900s,  by forming a third private ordnance firm, the Coventry Ordnance Works
(C.O.W.).  In these years, British armaments firms  retained a leading position in the international
armaments trade, but, in contrast with the previous decades, they became involved in setting up
branches and joint-ventures abroad.
The  chapter  is  organised  as  follow:  the  first  part  summaries the  trend  of  British  naval
spending;  the  second  deals  with  technical evolution;  the  third  part  analyses  armaments  firms'
strategies and results.
6.1 British naval spending, 1897-1914.
In the  years 1897-1914,  the  British naval  budget  more than  doubled, from 22.8 million to
48.3 million pound  (figure 6.1).  Growth, however, was not  even.  Three different phases  can be
identified.  The  first  one,  from  1897-98  to  1904-05,  was the  continuation  of  the  previous
quinquennial: naval spending increased year after year, at an average annual rate of 7.8% until, by
1904-05, it arrived at more than 38 million pound.  During thee second period, from 1905-06 to
1907-08, the naval budget was cut each year. The reduction was especially large (-8.5%) in 1905-06
while cuts were less drastic in the following two years. As a result, on 1907-08 naval spending was
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back  at the  1902-03  level,  around 32.5 million pound.  In the third period,  from 1908-09  to the
beginning of the First World War,  the  British naval budget  started to expand again,  at an  annual
average rate of 6.7%, peaking in 1913-14 (the last budget unaffected by the war) at more than 48
million pounds, an increase of 16 million in six years. 
Figure  6  .1  : British naval spending, from 1897-98 to 1913-14 (in current pounds).
Source: Navy Estimates, HCPP, various years.
Until 1904,  the  Royal Navy's most likely  enemy were  the combined fleets  of  France and
Russia.1 In this context, every expansion of French and Russian naval budgets was counteracted by
increases in British defence expenditure. For example, British naval estimates for 1897-98 financed
the construction of the Royal Navy's first six armoured cruisers (cruisers which had armour plates
protecting their sides, and not only their decks) as a direct response to  cruisers  of the same type
which both France and Russia had start laying down. The following year, the British naval budget
was increased again to respond to a new Russian plan which provided resources for the construction
of seven battleships, nineteen cruisers and fifty smaller crafts.2 Such “tit for tat” dynamic was the
1 A. J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: a History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era,
1880-1905 (London, 1964), 576-581.
2 A. J. Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy (London, 1990), 18.
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reason behind naval expansion.3 The Second Boer War, fought between 1899 and 1902, highlighted
how crucial maritime power  was for Britain.  South Africa  is thousands of miles away from the
British islands and the British government sent there an expeditionary forces of more than 200,000
men. The Royal Navy played two essential roles during the conflict: it  protected the supply lanes
connecting South Africa to  Britain and the rest  of the empire  along which troops  and material
moved, and it guaranteed the inviolability of the British islands while a sizeable share of the British
Army was overseas. Such a display of the advantages of sea power seemed to fully justify Mahan's
theories of the role of  maritime power in history,  especially in the light of the fact that Britain
fought the war in complete diplomatic isolation.4
The fleets' expansion, however, was qualitative as well as quantitative. Even though warship
design did not markedly change until the mid-1900s, new vessels were now built exploiting all the
technical innovations delineated in chapter III. For instance, Krupp plates, combining lightness with
resistance, started to be used to protect ships, such as cruisers, which, in the previous decades had
usually be scantly protected, driving up costs. At the same time, better armour meant that offensive
power had to increase. As a result, warships, especially battleships, started to mount more and larger
guns. Starting from 1901, the Royal Navy began mounting in all its  battleships, in addition to the
main 12 in. guns and the quick-firing 4.7 or 6 in. guns, intermediate batteries of 9.2 in. guns.
These  improvements  resulted  in  higher  costs  for  individual  vessels,  as  it  is  evident
comparing the British construction budgets for the years from 1889-90 to 1896-97 (the period of the
Naval Defence Act and the Spencer Programme) with  those of the  period  between 1897-98  and
1904-05.  In the first period Britain launched 25 battleships,  in the second 27.  Though a similar
number of vessel  was launched, the funds appropriated for their construction increased from 16,8
million to 26.9 million pound, an expansion of 76%. Figure 6.2 shows data on the cost per ton of
the major British battleships started in the decade 1895-1905, the upward trend is evident.
Three factors combined to  favour a  temporary reduction  of naval expenditure  in the  years
1905-1908.  The first  was a change in international relations.  In 1904  Britain reached a general
agreement with France, the “Entente cordiale”. At the same time, Russian naval power was crushed
by Japan, which had been ally with Britain since 1902, during the Russo-Japanese War.5 By 1905, 
3 J. T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 ( (Boston,
1989), 19-21. 
4 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914 (Oxford, 1954), 387-392. 
5 D. Woodward, The Russians at Sea (London, 1965), 122-159; Watts, Russian Navy, 20-32; D. C. Evans and M. R.
Peattie,  Kaigun:  Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, 1997),
99-137.
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Figure   6  .2  :  Cost per tons  (including armaments and armour plates)  of major British battleships,
1895-1905 (in real pound).
Source:  calculations based on  O.  Parkes,  British Battleships from “Warrior” to “Vanguard”. A
History of Design, Construction and Armaments (London, 1957), passim. Costs deflated using the
website http://www.measuringworth.com/.
Britain enjoyed a clear naval superiority over all other powers. The Royal Navy was larger than the
combined  fleets  of the Triple Alliance:  it  could count on 64 battleships, while France fielded 33,
Germany 29, the United States 26, Italy 18, Austria-Hungary 12, Japan 13 and Russia had only 10
left.6 Paul Kennedy is right to point that, notwithstanding the Royal Navy's impressive numbers, at
the early of the 20th century British naval power was already in a phase of relative decline: Britain
was  facing  too  many  commitments,  while  Germany  and  the  United  States  had  the  industrial
infrastructure and financial resources to challenge and potentially overcome its naval supremacy.7 It
is also true, however, that in mid-1900s the Royal Navy enjoyed a level of superiority, at least in the
short term, unmatched since the time of Trafalgar. 
British internal politics was a second factor. The growth of naval expenditures had started to
put  strains on the government's budget  and,  since the late 1890s, the fiscal sustainability of naval
spending started to be questioned.8 The Boer War made things worse, costing around 200 million
6 L. Sondhaus, L., Naval Warfare, 1815-1914 (London, 2001), 191. 
7 P. Kenndy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), 206-215.
8 Sumida, Defence, 22-38; M. Daunton, ‘"The Greatest and Richest Sacrifice Ever Made on the Altar of Militarism":
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pounds,  more than ten  times the amount initially forecast.9 In 1901 the Chancellor  of Exchequer
Michael Hicks-Beach warned that the seemingly endless increase in naval spending would lead the
country “straight to financial ruin”.10 Spending containment, then,  became  an  important political
issue  and  naval  spending  was  not  left  untouched.  For  instance,  between  1905  and  1906,  the
Admiralty axed more than 8,000 arsenal  jobs, reducing  their total  workforce  to around 25,000.11.
Further reductions occurred after the 1906 election, which the Liberal Party won campaigning on a
manifesto which stressed the need for social reforms,  which to be financed required cuts in other
parts of the government's budget.
A third  factor  allowing  a  reduction  of  naval  spending  was  the reorganisation  of  the
Admiralty and the Royal Navy carried out by John Fisher after he was nominated First Sea Lord in
1904.12 Fisher was nominated with the brief of increasing the fleet's efficiency while, at the same
time, cutting  its  expenditure.  To do that he adopted a series of far-reaching policies:  nearly one
hundred obsolete  vessels  were scrapped,  and tens  of  others  were put  in  reserve.  The fleet  was
redistributed, reducing the number of warships stationed abroad. Training, strategy, tactics, gunnery,
were  equally  reformed.  Finally,  Fisher  favoured  the  introduction  of  new  kinds of  warships,
dreadnoughts and battlecruisers, with the aim of reducing costs by employing few, but qualitative
superior vessels.13
Reduction in naval spending, however, did not last long: naval estimates for the year 1908-
09 were already on the rise, a trend which lasted until the outbreak of the Great  War.  The reason
behind this was the naval race which Germany engaged with Britain.14 Germany had already started
to modernise its fleet in the 1890s,  but it adopted a much more aggressive,  and  markedly  anti-
British,  policy after  Admiral  Alfred Von  Tirpitz  became state  secretary  for the  navy in  1897.15
Starting  in 1898,  Tirpitz  shepherded through  the  Reichstag  a  series  of  naval  laws  financing  a
conspicuous enlargement of the fleet based on  the automatic replacement of vessels after a fixed
the Finance of Naval Expansion, c. 1890-1914’, R. J. Blyth, A. Lambert and J. Rüger (eds.), The Dreadnought and
the Edwardian Age (Farnham, 2011), 31-49. 
9 G. Searle, ‘"National Efficiency" and the "Lessons" of the War’, D. Omissi and A. S. Thompson, The Impact of the
South African War (Basingstoke, 2002), 204. 
10 Sumida, Defence, 23.
11 J. Hass, A Management Odyssey: the Royal Dockyards, 1714-1914 (London, 1994),184.
12 E. J. Grove, The Royal Navy since 1815 (New York, 2005), 89-92. R. F. MacKay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford,
1973) is the standard biography.
13 P. G. Halpern, “Fisher, Sir John”, ODNB.
14 For the diplomatic background T. G. Otte,  “Grey Ambassador:  The  Dreadnought and British Foreign Policy”,
Blyth, Lambert and Rüger, Dreadnought, 51-78.
15 L. Sondhaus, Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power before the Tirpitz Era (Annapolis, 1997), 220-225.
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amount of years of service.16 Using this provision, Tirpitz was able to replace obsolete vessels with
modern, and much larger, battleships. German's construction plans were a source of much concern
in Britain, especially when Germany followed Britain in building dreadnoughts and battlecruisers.
Given  that  dreadnoughts  represented a  clear break  in  naval  technology,  dividing capital  ships
between “dreadnoughts” and “pre-dreadnoughts”, their numbers rapidly became the yardstick used
to measure the relative strengths of fleets. In 1909 a war scare generated by the wrong assumption
that  Germany was raising the tempo of its  naval construction,  accelerated the process  of naval
expansion.  Whereas in 1908-09  Britain laid down  only two capital ships,  the 1909-10  estimates
provided for the construction of six battleships and two battlecruisers,  all of them  to be started
before April 1910.17 In the following two years, naval estimates financed the construction of five
dreadnoughts a year. Because of the automatic replacement mechanism of the naval laws, Germany
kept building  battleships despite Tirpitz's hope, that Britain would not have been willing to build
enough warships to preserve its lead over Germany, proved  totally  wrong  (by 1914 Britain had
forty-two new capital ships in service or under construction, versus Germany's twenty-six). Only in
1913, when the German navy was consuming near a third of the country's entire defence budget, did
the German government reduce naval spending in favour of the army.18
Finally, naval expenditure  was driven up by the soaring costs of warships,  which resulted
from growing dimensions, more powerful guns and thicker armour plates. Figure 6.3 shows data on
the displacement of battleships and battlecruiser from 1905 to 1914. For instance, in the nine years
between which passed between the laying down of HMS Dreadnought and of MS Revenge, average
capital ship displacement increased of 54,6%. Such a growth had an impact on the cost of vessels:
according to the cost data in the Naval Estimates, HMS Dreadnought cost £1,785,000; HMS King
George V, which was laid down in 1911, £1,961,000, and HMS Queen Elizabeth, which was started
in 1913, around £2,500,000. It is useful to repeat here the exercise done in chapter III, and look at
the trends of key components of British naval spending in the period 1897-1914. Figure 6.4 shows
the trend of the three major entries: expenditures for shipbuilding carried out in government-owned
dockyards, amount of contracts with private yards for the construction of warships, and spending on
naval armaments.
16 J. Steinberg, Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (New York, 1965), 124-130.
17 M. Seligmann, ‘Intelligence Information and the 1909 Naval Scare: the Secret Foundations of a Public Panic’, War
in History  17 (2010), 37-59; E. L. Woodward,  Great Britain and the German Navy, 1898-1912 (London, 1964),
203-218.
18 D.  G.  Herrmann,  The Arming of  Europe and the  Making  of  the  First  World  War (Princeton,  1996),  190;  D.
Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War. Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford, 1996), 289-291.
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Figure  6  .3  : Displacements of British dreadnoughts (blue line) and battlecruisers (red line) laid down
from 1905 to 1914.
Source: Conway's All the World Fighting Ships, 1906-1921 (London, 1985), passim.
Figure  6  . 4  : Trends of key components of British naval spending, 1897-1914 (in current pounds).
Source: Navy Estimates, HCPP, various years.
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Between 1897 and the early 1900s all three entries grew. From 1902 to 1905, the value of
private contracts increased, while dockyards' activities remained flat: dockyards were working at
the maximum of their capacities; by contrast, private supply was more flexible because the number
of  shipbuilding  firms  which  could  potentially  undertake  warship  construction  was  significantly
larger  than  that  of  the  arsenals  –  by  mid  1900s,  in  Britain  there  were  more  than  thirty  large
shipbuilders.19 Thus, in case of necessity, to rapidly escalate production orders could be awarded to
them. Starting from 1905,  all  three  components  declined  as  a  result  of  the  reduction  in  naval
appropriations. The total  amount of shipbuilding expenditures, contracts and naval armaments fell
from more than 22 million pound in 1904-05, to little more than 16 million in 1907-08, a reduction
of quite 30%. 
Starting from 1908-09, naval expenditures returned to growth. The expansion of the budget
translated to a large extent into a marked increase in the amount of resources devoted to buy from
private suppliers.  The need to rapidly counterbalance  Tirpitz's plan led the Admiralty to  rely to a
significant extent on private shipbuilders. For example, of the eight capital ships laid down in 1909-
10, six were built from private yards, and just two by the Royal Dockyards. At the same time, the
need to equip more vessels  led to  additional resources being appropriated for naval armaments
which,  as it  was already underlined in  chapter  III,  were now predominantly supplied by  a few
private companies. Of the 42 dreadnoughts and battlecruisers begun before the outbreak of the First
World War, 17 were built  by the Royal Dockyards (40,5%), whereas 25 (59,5%) were built by
private  shipbuilders,  a higher proportion than  that  for  pre-dreadnought battleships.  In  general,
between 1897 and 1914, a total of £127,500,000 was spent on shipbuilding carried on at the Royal
Dockyards, while £151,500,000 were spent on contracts with private companies. Naval armaments
totalled  around  £60,000,000.  There  is  no  doubt,  therefore,  that  in  those  years private  firms
strengthened their position as  suppliers of the  Royal Navy. Royal Dockyards still built a sizeable
number of vessels, but the private sector played now an essential role, both by satisfying part of the
“routine” demand for new construction, and by being able to  rapidly expand its output in case of
need.
6.2 Technological evolution.
In terms of evolution of technology, the years from the late 1890s to the First World War can
19 Hass, Odyssey, 176.
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be  divided  into  two  periods.  The  first  one  lasted  until  the  introduction  of  dreadnoughts  and
battlecruisers in mid-1900s, the second from that moment until 1914.
Figure 6.5: Drawing of a 305 mm gun, and its hydraulic gun mounting produced by Armstrong.
Source: Lo Stabilimento Armstrong di Pozzuoli dal 1896 al 1911 (Bergamo, 1911), 102.
In  the  first  period,  the  basic  design  of  vessels  remained  unchanged  but  every  class  of
warships tended to grow in displacement: every improvement in ordnance pushed for the adoption
of thicker armour plates,  and vice versa;  in addition,  to achieve higher speed,  displacement  was
increased to make room for larger engines and additional boilers. By 1905 battleships displaced on
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average 14-15,000 tons, first class cruisers up to 14,000 tons and second class cruisers 5-6,000 tons.
Battleships were still equipped with a mixed armament, made up of four 12 in. guns mounted in two
twin turrets, plus a larger number of medium calibre guns (7.6, 8, 9.2 in.) and  lighter QF anti-
torpedo artillery.
The various components of warships went through a process of incremental evolution, based
on the innovations which had been developed in the previous decade. In ordnance, for example, 12
in. guns remained the main armaments of virtually all the navies in the world (only German vessels
mounted slightly smaller  11.1 in. guns). The average barrel length, however, increased markedly,
from 35.4 calibres in 1895 to 45 calibres in 1905. A longer barrel meant a higher muzzle velocity,
which offered more penetration power, but had the side effect to complicate production. At the same
time,  improvements  in  the  hydraulic  system  of  gun  mountings  increased the  rate  of  fire  by
significantly  cutting  the  time required  to  return  a  gun in  position  notwithstanding  the growing
weight of guns and turrets. If in 1895, a 12. in gun crew could fire a salvo every 72 seconds, in 1905
it required just 30 seconds.20
The introduction of HMS  Dreadnought in 1905 radically altered naval technology.21 Two
features characterised  the new vessel:  the  all  big guns armament  and the use of  turbines  (Figure
6.6). Since the early 1900s the idea of a vessel armed exclusively by large guns had been advanced
by, among other, by the Italian naval architect Vittorio Cuniberti and Andrew Noble of Armstrong.22
Uniform calibres simplified firing because it was easier to adjust the targeting of a single salvo of
same calibre guns, rather than the multiple splashes of mixed armaments. The Russo-Japanese War,
the first conflict involving modern fleets after 1866, provided some additional lessons on gunnery.
The predominant opinion among naval experts was that long-range artillery duels occurring at more
than 6-8 kilometres of distance would become the main way to engage the enemy in the future.23
HMS Dreadnought was laid down in Portsmouth Dockyard in 1905, on the base of a design
produced by a special committee inside the Admiralty working under the auspices of Fisher. Thanks
to generous premiums and ample use of overtime hours, the vessel was commissioned less than a
year  later,  an unprecedented feat which was never  replicated for any other  dreadnought vessel.
HMS Dreadnought was armed with 10 12 in. guns in five twin turrets, making it the most heavily
20 J. Campbell, ‘Naval Armaments and Armour’, R. Gardiner (ed.), Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The Steam Warship
1815–1905 (London, 1992), 165.
21 For a technical and strategic assessment, J. Brooks, ‘Dreadnought: Blunder of Stroke of Genius?’, War in History
14 (2007), 157-178. 
22 J. Roberts, The Battleship Dreadnought (London, 1992), 8-9.
23 P. Towle, ‘The Evaluation of the Experience of the Russo-Japanese War’, B. Ranft, Technical Change and British
Naval Policy, 1860-1939 (Sevenoaks, 1977), 65-79. 
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armed  vessel  in  service  in  the  world.  Long-range  centralised fire  required  the  development  of
systems capable of  calculating the trajectories of projectiles.  Various fire-guidance systems (basic
analogue computers) were developed but this necessity was not satisfactorily revolved until the end
of the First World War, and proved a source of much controversy.24
The vessel's propulsion system was based on  four-shaft  Parsons turbines.  Turbines had
several  advantages  over  traditional  reciprocating  engines:  they were lighter,  smaller,  simpler  to
maintain, and generated much less vibration. Adopting turbines, however, was a risky move because
until then turbines had been used only in destroyers and in a few merchant vessels, none of them as
big as a battleship. Turbines, however,  were selected because they could generate higher speeds
than multiple-expansion engines: in fact HMS Dreadnought could achieve a peak speed of 21 knots,
fast enough, that is, to overcome every other warship, but also the many torpedo boats.25 Overnight,
HMS  Dreadnought made all previous capital ships obsolete.  Together with dreadnoughts, Fisher
introduced the battlecruiser, a class of vessels which had the same displacement and armaments of a
dreadnought battleships, but which were able to achieve 25 knots of speed thanks to a much lighter
protection. Despite  the fact that  Fisher regarded battlecruisers as the real innovation  – in fact he
favoured  a gradual  replacement  of  battleships  with  a  mix  of  battlecruisers,  submarines  and
destroyers –  before 1914 only Germany and Japan followed Britain in building battlecruisers; by
contrast, dreadnought battleships proved much more successful.26
As soon as the basic design  of dreadnoughts was introduced,  incremental  improvements
started to be added. As figure 6.3 clarifies, the displacement of subsequent classes of dreadnoughts
and battlecruisers increased. Because the length of the barrel of a 12 in. gun could not be more than
45 times  the length of  its calibre or it tended to bend, larger calibres started to be  developed to
increase ordnance penetration power.27 In 1912 Vickers  introduced a  13.5 in. gun, while Elswick
proposed 14 in.  artillery.  Such  a  trend was not confined to Britain, but it occurred in  all major
navies, with every new class of dreadnoughts being larger, faster, better protected and more heavily
armed than the previous one.28
24 For a synthesis of the debate:  J. Brooks,  Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland. The  Question of  Fire
Control (London, 2005).
25 D. Griffiths, Steam at Sea: Two Centuries of Steam-powered Ships (London, 1997), 142-145.
26 J. T. Sumida, ‘Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Source of Naval Mythology’, Journal of Military History
59 (1995), 619-637;  N. A. Lambert,  ‘Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909’,
Journal of Military History 59 (1995), 639-660; and id. Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Columbia, 2002).
27  P. Hodges, The Big Gun. Battleship Main Armament 1860-1945 (London, 1981), 61.
28 For the evolution in warship's design, N. Friedman,  Battleship Design and Development, 1905-1945 (Greenwich,
1978); D. K. Brown, The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development, 1906-1922 (London, 1999).
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Figure 6.  6  : Postcard featuring HMS Dreadnought's features and cost, 1906.
Source: http://www.seayourhistory.org.uk
Another field which rapidly evolved in the decade before 1914 was submarine technology.
In these years,  submarines evolved from mechanical curiosities to  proper  instruments of war.29 A
first important innovation was the introduction of heated torpedoes. Torpedoes used compressed air
as source of energy. In the early 1900s, it was discovered that if the compressed air was heated by
means of some liquid fuel, torpedoes' speed increased. On the eve of the Great War, torpedoes could
travel up to 4,500 meters at a speed of 30-32 knots.30 In the 1880s the Swedish inventor Thorsten
Nordenfelt had  designed the first submarine  armed with torpedoes. By the early 20th century, all
major naval powers had started building submarines: the Royal Navy purchased its first submarines
in  1901,  Russia  in  1902,  Italy  in  1903,  Japan  in  1904,  and  Germany  in  1906.31 Submarines'
performance improved thanks to the adoption of the safer and more efficient diesel engines, but
they still  suffered from short ranges because little fuel and provisions could be stored  on board.
Therefore, until 1914,  submarines were confined to coastal defence duties,  rather than for ocean
operations.
29 For a detailed history of the evolution of submarines before 1914, P. Akerman, Encyclopedia of British Submarines,
1901-1955 (Penzanze, 2002).
30 D. Van der Vat, Stealth at Sea: the History of Submarine (London, 2002), 43.
31 E. W. Osborne, ‘Submarine, Evolution of’, S. C. Tucker (ed.), Naval Warfare. An International Encyclopedia (Santa
Barbara, 2002), 976-978.
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Despite  improvements  in  submarines and  torpedoes,  the  introduction  of  dreadnoughts
reinforced the view that large battleships were the linchpin of naval warfare and an embodiment of
national  prestige.  As  Sondhaus  remarks:  “Like  nuclear  weapons  in  the  latter  decades  of  the
twentieth century, possession of dreadnoughts meant that a country counted for something in global
or regional balances of power, and the ability to build them from one’s own domestic resources
became the measure of true great power status.”32 By 1914, all major European powers, as well as
Japan and the  United  States,  were  actively building  dreadnoughts. In  addition,  second ranking
powers were also investing large sums to acquire the most up-to-data naval technology: Spain was
building its own fleet of dreadnoughts, while both Greece and Turkey had ordered battleships from
yards  abroad,  and  the  three  major  south  American  countries,  Brazil,  Chile  and Argentina,  had
equally contracted the construction of two dreadnoughts each to foreign companies. 
6.3 The evolution of British private armaments industry.
 
In  the  period from 1897 to 1914,  two major  trends  shaped the evolution of  the  British
armaments industry. The first one was the entrance of new firms in the armaments industry.  The
second was the tendency of armaments companies towards creating, by mergers, acquisitions, and
new investments, vertically integrated organisations able to produce the majority of, if not all,  the
components of a warship. The differences which existed between the British armaments industry in
the late 1880s and the one of the 1900s were summarised by William White, the former Admiralty's
Director of Naval Construction, in an article he wrote for The Times in 1906:
Instead of two armour-plate works [John Brown and Cammell] existing in
1888, whose annual output was about 8,000 tons, Great Britain possessed in 1902
five  first-class  factories  [John  Brown,  Cammell,  Armstrong,  Vickers  and
Beardmore],  whose united possible  annual  production  amounts  to  about  50,000
tons of armour.  Messrs Armstrong were practically the only firm making heavy
guns and gun-mounting in 1889; the government arsenal at Woolwich produced
some heavy gun-mountings, but took no part in the work for the Naval Defence
battleships.  Efforts  were  made  at  once  to  extend  source  of  supply  for  gun-
mountings, and Messrs Whitworth developed this branch of manufacture. Messrs
32 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 201. 
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Vickers followed, and have attained a commanding position both in gun and gun-
mounting manufacture. Messrs Beardmore have since taken up similar work; and at
the present time the associated firms of John Brown, Cammell Laird, and Fairfield
are  constructing  great  ordnance  works  at  Coventry  and  on  the  Clyde.  As  a
consequence  the  manufacturing  capability  of  the  country  in  guns  and  gun-
mountings will be raised to as great a position as its armour-plate works reached
four  years  ago  …  All  this  has  been  done  by  the  enterprise  of  private  firms,
encouraged by the government orders no doubt, but taking the inevitable risks of
fluctuations in employment and diminution or absence of returns on the enormous
amount of capital invested in plant and buildings.33 
Figure  6.7 shows a  schematic representation  of  the  major  British  firms  active  in  the
armaments industry in the early 1910s following the same criteria adopted for figure 3.8 in chapter
III.  Comparing the  figures,  two things are immediately evident: on average, the number of firms
active in each production increased; at the same time, more firms came to be heavily dependent on
armaments production.
Figure  6.  7  :  British armaments industry in the early 1910s.
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The growth of the  British naval budget  (it  doubled in less than twenty years  before 1914)
33 The Times 16 November 1906, 17.
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proved  a  strong incentive for  firms to  venture  into  armaments  production.  The introduction of
dreadnoughts and battlecruisers in 1905 generated a large demand for new construction by both the
Royal Navy and foreign governments which  wanted to rapidly acquire the new  warships.  There
must be caution, however, before claiming that defence contracts necessarily offered a higher level
of profitability  than  civil  production.  Shipbuilding  is  the  only field  for  which  it  is  possible  to
compare  roughly  similar civil  and  military  productions.  Different analyses,  however,  have  not
offered unanimous results: whereas More in his study of Fairfield claims that the firm's returns on
military contracts were significantly  higher than that over merchant shipbuilding, Arnold,  in his
analysis  of  the  activities  of  the major  naval  shipbuilders, stresses that  their  average level  of
profitability was not unusually large.34 These analyses  are useful  but partial.  Several naval yards
belonged to large armaments firms which supplied  them with  inputs  such as  armour plates  and
guns,  whose relative  prices  they could  manipulate,  others were independent  firms.  In  addition,
accounting practices were far from being uniform, even inside the same sector. At the end of this
chapter the performances of the  largest  armaments firms  are compared using  the  dividends  they
paid  as yardstick. While this is a less than perfect method, it  does allow  the assessment of the
relative profitability of the major British armaments firms in their entirety.
The other major trend  shaping British armaments industry  was vertical integration. In the
period from the late  1890s to the early 1900s,  a series of mergers and combinations markedly
increased the concentration inside the armaments sector. These were the major arrangements:
• In 1897 Vickers purchased the Naval Construction and Armaments Company in Barrow-in-
Furness in 1897 for £425,000 and the Maxim Nordenfelt Company for £923,334.35
• The  same  year  Armstrong  merged  with  Whitworth,  creating  the  Sir  W.  G.  Armstrong
Whitworth Company, with a capital of £4,000,000. 
• In  1899 John  Brown purchased  Clydebank  Engineering  and  Shipbuilding  Company for
923,255.36
• In 1902 Vickers purchased 50% of the  capital of Beardmore, a Scottish firm involved in
armour making and naval shipbuilding, through an exchange of shares: 389,500 £1 shares of
34 C. More,  ‘Armaments and Profits:  the Case of  Fairfield’, Business  History  24 (1982),  175-186;  A.  J.  Arnold,
ʿRiches beyond the dreams of avarice? Commercial Returns on British Naval Construction, 1889-1914’, Economic
History Review 54 (2002), 267-289.
35 The Times 17 November 1897, 4.
36 K. Warren, Steel, Ships and Men: Cammell Laird, 1824-1993 (Liverpool, 1998), 105.
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Vickers were exchanged for 750,000 £1 share of Beardmore.37
• The same year, John Brown acquire 7/8 of the capital of Thomas Firth & Son, a Sheffield
firm manufacturing large steel forgings for guns.38
• In 1903 Cammell purchased the small Mullinger-Wingley ordnance factory in Coventry for
around  £140,000.39 This plant  was  subsequently enlarged  and  the  company  renamed
Coventry Ordnance Works (C.O.W.). Part of its capital was sold to John Brown.
• Later the same year Cammell merged with Laird Brothers shipbuilding company, creating
Cammell Laird, with a total capital of £2,500,000.
• In  1905,  Cammell  Laird  acquired  50%  of  Fairfield  of  Glasgow,  a  shipbuilding  and
engineering firm, which invested £187,500 in C.O.W. 
• In 1907, John Brown acquired an interest in Harland & Wolff in Belfast, a yard specialised
in merchant vessels and passenger liners.40
Several factors pushed British firms toward vertical integration. The first was the nature of
technological development.  Armaments production became  increasingly complex because of the
use of more sophisticated materials  (steel alloys) and because the sizes of guns,  armour plates,
warships,  etc.  kept  increasing.  Only  highly  capitalised  firms  could  undertake  the  large-scale
investments  required  to  adapt  production  processes  to  the  advancing  standard  of  military
technology,  increasing the size of a firm by enlarging the perimeter of its activities made easier
made this easier. A second reason, was that vertical integration guaranteed a market for the various
productions of a firm, and it  reinforced its commercial appeal. If a company won a contract for a
warship,  its yard  could obtain armour plates, large forgings and ship plates from the firm's steel
works and guns and mounting from the ordnance works.  Vertically integrated firms could  then
increase  the  rapidity  of  construction  –  because  internalised  exchanges  reduced  asymmetry  of
information and the length of  negotiations, and because internal orders usually received priority
over  other  contracts  – and  offer  their customer  a  “full  package”  (i.e.  an  entire,  fully  armed,
warship),  an  option  which  was  especially  attractive  for  customers rather  than  having  to sign
separate contracts with various suppliers.  A third reason was  the desire to internalise transaction
costs.41 Suppliers of high-quality, sophisticated products, such as artillery or armour plates, enjoyed
37 H. W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in the British Industry. A Study of Business Organisation (London, 1907), 42.
38 A. Grant, Steel and Ships. The History of John Brown's (London, 1950), 38.
39 History of Coventry Ordnance Works (Coventry, 1910), 5.
40 The Times 29 June 1907, 7 and 15.
41 On transaction costs and vertical  integration,  O. E. Williamson,  ‘The Vertical Integration of Production: Market
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a high degree of bargaining power over their customers which had, therefore, the incentive to enter
into those productions to internalise the profits enjoyed by their oligopolistic suppliers (obviously,
such a move needed to be weighted against the costs and difficulties of entering into a new field). A
fourth reason was that, after  competitors started to vertically integrate,  a firm active in the same
sector had little option, if it did not want to be left out in the cold, but to replicate to such moves by
adopting the same strategy. 
The result of this wave of integration was that, by mid 1900s, the British armaments industry
was made up of firms which,  to acquire economies of scale  and expand their  productions, had
heavily invested to enlarge their perimeters. As a result, they faced large fixed costs which could be
covered only by keeping their plants working constantly. The combined demand generated by the
Royal Navy and by foreign customers,  however,  was not sufficient  to achieve this, and not all
British armaments firms were equally successful in the fifteen years before 1914.
The sub-sections  below present  a  brief synthesis of  the  evolution  of  the various  British
armaments companies, an assessment of their foreign operations and of the level competition which
existed inside the armaments industry.  A comparison of the profitability of the various firms is
offered in the conclusion.
Armstrong
In 1897 Armstrong merged with Whitworth.  Though Whitworth had died ten years before,
the firm still retained a small ordnance business which could take advantage of the growing British
naval  budget. Already  in  1896,  Armstrong's  board  had  decided  to  approach  Whitworth  to
“unofficially ascertain whether in the tenders for the 12 in. mountings of battleships an approximate
uniformity of price in our mutual tender could be secured, without any obligation for the future.”42
Armstrong was keen to avoid the rise of another rival, after Vickers. Buying Whitworth, thus, would
reinforce  Armstrong's  position  and  eliminate  a  potential  competitor.  This  was  the  same  tactic
Armstrong had used in the past, for example, when it had purchased Vavasseur's ordnance business.
Two other  reasons,  however,  were  behind Armstrong's  decision.  The  first  was  Vicker's
purchase of the Barrow shipyard and of Maxim-Nordenfelt. These two acquisitions, happening one
Failure Considerations’, American Economic Review 61 (1971), 112-23. 
42 T&W, 130/1266, Minutes, 22 April 1896.
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after  the  other,  rapidly  transformed  Vickers  by greatly  expanding  its  armaments  business.
Armstrong feared that Vickers might  also acquire Whitworth.  By  buying  Whitworth,  Armstrong
could deny Vickers access to its technological know-how. As Andrew Noble wrote to Stuart Rendel:
“by rescuing Whitworth we can effectively checkmate them [i.e.  Vickers] as it  would be years
before they can obtain the machinery and experience necessary for the construction of guns and
mountings. I confess it would give me also great pleasure to check moves of our friends at the
Admiralty who are fostering Whitworth at our expense.”43
An additional reason was that, by buying the Manchester-based rival,  Armstrong obtained
crucial components for armour making, a production which Armstrong lacked but which the firm
wanted to acquire.  As Lord Armstrong  summarised in a letter to  Stuart  Rendel: “Vickers minus
Whitworth is not to be feared”, at the opposite, “what we gain by absorbing Whitworth is a duration
of our supremacy”. In addition, “the Whitworth shops  [at Openshaw]  are very spacious and have
room for great expansion of plant. At Elswick the shops are already over-crowded. Whitworth [has]
already finished the most powerful forge press in the world for making armour plates for the supply
of which our expenditure is at the present enormous.”44 In January 1897 the  two  boards finally
approved the amalgamation,  creating the Sir  William Armstrong Whitworth & Co.  Ltd.  with a
capital of £4,000,000, of which three quarters came from Armstrong. The difference between the
two  firms  at  the  time  of  the  amalgamation  is  made  even  more  evident  by  comparing  their
workforce: Armstrong employed around 19,000 workers, Whitworth less than 2,000.45 
The first preoccupation of the new firm was to start armour plate production. Whitworth had
taken some steps in that direction, but much still had to be done. After more than one year of careful
planning,  the  members of the special  subcommittee  for  armour  plates  created  inside  the  board
reported that they were “unanimously of the opinion that armour plate works should be erected with
the least possible delay at Openshaw. They estimate the total cost of the erection of these works at
from £250,000 to  £300,000,  of  which  sum an  approximate  expenditure  of  £100,000 has  been
already incurred … in the erection of the large 10,000 tons press and its accessories.”46 To ascertain
how to best erect the works, Vavasseur toured various armour plate shops in Europe, among them
the Terni plant in Italy. Erecting the armour plates mill, however, was more complex than expected:
43 T&W, 31/7595, Rendel Papers, 8 December 1896.
44 T&W, 31/7595, Rendel Papers, 22 December 1896.
45 Financial Times 29 December 1896, 4 and 25 January 1897, 5. Armstrong had no interest in Whitworth's machine
tools business which was sold to Craven Brothers Limited of Manchester, A. E. Musson, ‘Joseph Whitworth and the
Growth of Mass-production Engineering’, Business History 17 (1975), 149.
46 T&W, 130/1266, Minutes, 9 June 1898.
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after a few months, the special armour plate committee suggested that the firm should adopt rolling
rather than forging (at that time the universal practice in Sheffield and on the continent) to make
chrome steel plates. The committee proposed the erection of a rolling mill capable of reducing a 60
ton ingot  into  a  40 ton  plates  in  40-50 minutes.  The final  cost  of  the  armour  plate  plant  was
reckoned to have now increased  to £450,000,47 an evaluation which the board revised upward to
£490,000.48
The expanding British naval budget resulted in large profits for  Armstrong. In 1897, for
example, “Sir Andrew Noble remarked [during a meeting of the board] that the year now ending has
proved the most favourable in the history of the Company. The total of orders for the ordnance
works had been reached which amounted for the year approximately to five and a half millions.”
The Second Boer War provided additional substantial orders, especially for shells, fuzes, sights, etc.
For some goods, production increased  by more than 75% over that of the previous year.49 At the
same time, however, high demand and  endless  technical evolution  forced the firm to  carry on a
constant stream of investments. In 1901, for instance, Armstrong spent £737,583 – up to £283,304
the previous year – in capital investment and new machinery to replace the worn-out old ones.
Investment remained at a very high level  to keep pace with the evolution of armaments
technology: for instance, in 1905, new lathes had to be purchased because the old ones “were not
long  enough  to  take  the  large  calibre  guns.”50 In  1912,  the  board  decided to  invest  between
£220,000 and £250,000 to modernise Openshaw. Starting from 1910 the firm recognised the need to
replace Elswick yard with a larger one. The growing displacement of warships required additional
space,  and  Elswick  could  not  accommodate  ships  longer  than  650  ft.  This  put  the  firm  at
disadvantage in comparison with Vickers, John Brown or Beardmore. In 1910 the board estimated
the cost of the new yard planned at New Walker,  a location east of Newcastle, at no less than
£500,000.51 Within  eighteen  months,  the  price  was  revised  upward  to  £820,000.  Despite  its
staggering price, the new yard was essential for Armstrong to retain its ability to supply the Royal
Navy  and  foreign  governments  with  the  largest  warships,  as  Noble  explained  during the
shareholders' meeting of 1912.52 In 1913 the keel of the of the super-dreadnought HMS Malaya, the
first vessel built at the new yard, was laid down.
47 T&W, 130/1280, Minutes of the armour plate committee, 20 March 1899.
48 T&W, 130/1266, Minutes, 21 March 1899.
49 Id. 18 September 1899.
50 The Times 30 September 1905, 6.
51 T&W, 130/1267, 17 February 1910.
52 The Financial Times 19 April 1912, 5.
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Starting from the 1890s the domestic market  grew more and more  crucial for Armstrong.
Foreign orders remained important, but, as it will be explained below, Armstrong and the other
British armaments firms increasingly moved from being sellers of armaments to becoming partners
in  local  joint-ventures.  The  impact  of  British  orders  can  be  gauged  by  looking  at  the  firm's
workforce. Figure 6.8 shows the number of employees in various divisions of the firm from 1904 to
1914. In the years from 1905 to 1908, that is the period during which British naval appropriations
were cut, the firm  axed more  than 8,000 jobs.  The ordnance  plant  and Elswick yard  were  hit
especially hard. At the opposite, armour plates production remained more stable. Starting from 1908
onwards, the trend reverted but the workforce of the ordnance plant never returned to its 1905 level.
Figure  6.  8  : Number of workers employed by Armstrong in various productions, 1904-1914.
Source: T&W, 130/1266, 130/1267 and 130/1268. Total employment is calculated adding also the
workforce of the units  of the firm (engine works,  Low Walker  yard,  steelworks,  and Pozzuoli)
which are not reported here.
Vicker  s and Beardmore  
By  the mid-1890s  Vickers  was  an  important  producer  of  armour  plates,  guns  and  gun
mountings. In comparison with Armstrong, however, it lacked shipbuilding capabilities, something
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which put Vickers  at a disadvantage  in the export markets. In the years 1896-97 Vickers moved,
thanks to its bold acquisitions of the Barrow shipyard and Maxim-Nordenfeldt, from being a civil
company with an interest in the armaments business to  being an armaments company with also a
civil business. The timing of these purchases was especially fortunate because the Second Boer War
generated  a  large  demand  for  the  small  artillery and machines  guns  which  Maxin-Nordenfeldt
produced.  The  war  caused,  in  the  world  of  Clive  Trebilcock,  “an  unparalleled  commitment  of
industrial resources.”53 According to what Colonel Dawson – a Vickers's director – stated in front of
the  Royal Commission on the War in South Africa,  between 1898 and 1903 Vickers invested 2
million pound in new productive capacity and improvements, or more than £300,000 a year.54 Until
1899  Vickers  had  produced no  field  artillery,  and  it  suddenly  received  orders  for  hundred  of
pieces.55
With end of the war, domestic demand contracted, as Albert Vickers stressed in 1909 when
speaking at the shareholders' meeting: “the Company's finance has been seriously inconvenienced
by the lean years which commenced with the cessation of demand at the conclusion of the Transvaal
War”.56 At the same time, the firm suffered from a lull in the order of warships from the Royal
Navy. Data presented below in figure 6.9 highlights how the fall in naval shipbuilding,  which the
Admiralty concentrated in its yards, did not result in a fall in orders for gun mountings which only
private firms could supply. From 1910 onwards domestic orders returned to represent the largest
share of naval shipbuilding occurring in Barrow.
Figure  6.  9  : Percentage of Barrow's work in hand represented by British orders, 1903-1910. 
Year 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
% warships 100.0 76.3 50.1 31.1 27.7 41.8 28.5 89.9
% mountings 100.0 92.2 53.1 80.2 77.3 96.5 92.9 71.3
Source: VA 1116, VA 589, 1104.
The fall  in  domestic  orders was  compensated,  at  least  partially, by orders  from abroad:
53 C. Trebilcock,  ‘War and the failure of industrial mobilisation’, J. M. Winter,  War and  Economic  Development.
Essays in memory of David Joslin (Cambridge, 1975), 141.
54 Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, HCPP, q. 20945.
55 Id., qq. 20908-20914.
56 Arms and Explosives, April 1909.
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between 1903 and 1910 Barrow built warships for foreign customers worth a total of £5,135,037.57
This  fact demonstrated the success of  the  firm's strategy of vertical integration:  Vickers was  now
able to compete with Armstrong in selling battleships and cruisers to foreign customers because it
was in the position to offer to supply an entire warship, from the hull to the guns. That Vickers sold
various vessels to Japan testifies to the fact that the firm had been able to match Armstrong in its
ability to offer an attractive “package” to foreign customers.
In 1902 Vickers purchased 50% of the shares of Beardmore, a Scottish steel firm based near
Glasgow. Since the 1870s, Beardmore's major business was supplying ship plates and large forgings
to the Clyde shipbuilding industry. In the late 1890s, attracted by the potential returns, Beardmore
started to implement an ambitious plan for the development of armour and gun-making capabilities.
For example, in 1896 the firm purchased a 12,000 tons press, the largest in the world to start the
production of armour plates. Beardmore's management, however, had still more ambitious plans and
it purchased the old yard of Robert Napier with the aim of entering into naval shipbuilding. Because
Napier's yard was not large enough to accommodate battleship construction, Beardmore started the
construction  of  a  much larger  yard in  Dalmuir.  The firm's  breakneck expansion did  not  result,
however,  in  large  orders.58 Even  though  the  British  demand  for  armour  plates  and  guns  was
growing, it was not expanding rapidly enough to accommodate the new large capacity created by
Beardmore. In addition, the Admiralty was certainly cautious in offering large contracts to a firm
which, regardless of the prices it might quote, was a new entrant, with a very limited experience in
such complex productions as armour plates and guns. By 1901 Beardmore  had  run out of credit.
Vickers intervened and purchased half of the company for £750,000. 
The Economist commented that “the financial advantage to either company of the projected
co-partnership  is  not  obvious”.59 In  fact  the  two  firms  manufactured  to  a  large  extent  similar
products.  The reason behind Vickers's  move, however,  were strategic rather than economic.  By
acquiring this interest, Vickers was able to check the rise of a potential rival in the armaments
business.  Given that the armaments market in Britain in 1902 was suffering  from the end of the
boom generated by the Second Boer War, limiting competition was crucial.  Associating the firm's
name to Vickers was, for Beardmore, a way to improve its image and attract more orders. The link
with Beardmore proved expensive for Vickers, though: the Scottish firm was unable to secure many
contracts until  the 1910s,  and Vickers's  representatives often  clashed with the rest  of the board
57 VA 589, Barrow Works Foreign Warships Built (1900-1930).
58 J. R. Hume and M. S. Moss, Beardmore. The History of a Scottish Industrial Giant (London, 1979), 51.
59 The Economist, 25 January 1902, 114-115.
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trying to limiting expenditure and investments: between 1902 and 1909 Beardmore invested around
2,8 million pound to enlarge its armour making plant and yard, while, at the same time, it paid very
small dividends.60 In 1910 Vickers tried to convince Armstrong to acquire an interest in Beardmore,
but Armstrong's management declined the offer.61
Vickers demonstrated its foresight when it decided to enter into submarine production in the
early 1900s. No British firm had ever undertaken such a production before, and, initially, there was
plenty of scepticism about the real value of submarines in warfare. The Engineer stated that there
was no doubt that “they can never be a serious danger to ships in rapid movement”.62 The arrival of
Fisher to the Admiralty,  however,  signalled a change in mentality and submarines started to be
regarded  as  capable  of  playing  a  significant  role  in  naval  warfare,  at  least  in  coastal  defence.
Vickers recognised that the best course of action to rapidly enter into the field was to acquire the
expertise it needed from an established producer: it thus signed an agreement with the American
Electric  Boat  Company  –  producer  of  the  Holland  submarines  –  which  granted  Vickers the
exclusive right to use its patents and design in Britain.63 Vickers then proceeded to sign a contract
with the Admiralty in 1904 which gave the firm the virtual monopoly of the production of all the
submarines  of the Royal Navy, a monopoly which lasted until 1911. Whereas submarines were
much cheaper than battleships – they cost around £41,000 each64 – they offered a return on costs of
near  50%  and  required  little  additional  investment.  Trebilcock  calculated  that submarine
construction produced a total profit for Vickers of £1,250,000 between 1902 and 1914.65
Finally, Vickers and Armstrong teamed up in 1906 to acquire for £200,000 each a dominant
interest  in  the  Whiteheat  Torpedo  company  which  had  been  put  up  for sale.66 With  such  an
acquisition both firms nearly completed the range of naval armaments they could produce.
John Brown, Cammell Laird  and the Coventry Ordnance Works  
John Brown and Cammell followed the steps of Armstrong and Vickers in pursuing a policy
60 T&W Rendel Papers 31/6489, Memorandum of the Financial Affairs of William Beardmore & Co, for the Directors
of Armstrong Whitworth & Co., 29 July 1910. 
61 T&W 130/1267, Minutes, 5 May, 4 August and 6 October 1910.
62 The Engineer, 9 Mach 1901, 5.
63 Scott, Vickers, 63-65. 
64 VA 739, Submarines, Costs and Quotation (1903-1906) and VA 740, Submarines built at Barrow (1902-1947).
65 C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers. Armaments and Enterprise, 1854-1914 (London, 1977), 107.
66 T&W, 130/1267, Minutes, 17 May 1906.
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of vertical integration by  acquiring the control of shipbuilding companies.  In 1898 John Brown
purchased Clydebank, one of the major yards on the Clyde which had already built warships for the
Royal Navy. In 1903 Cammell merged with the Laird Brothers yard in Birkenhead. Laird Brothers'
yard had expanded significantly in the 1890s thanks to orders coming from the Royal Navy. In that
decade, 62,4% of its output was made up of warships (up to 9.7% in the 1880s).67 Between 1892
and 1901 the yard launched four major battleships. The wave of mergers of the late 1890s, however,
risked leaving Laird out in the cold, without links to any major supplier of armour plates and steel
forgings. At the same time, in the early 1900s Cammell was the only armaments firm which did not
own  a  yard  which  could  absorb  its  production.  The  merger  between  the  two  firms  was  thus
something natural because the two activities  – armour making and naval shipbuilding –  “might
advantageously be worked in conjunction”,  as stated by Laird's management.68 The new concern
had a capital of £2,500,000 the majority of which came from Cammell (£1,750,000). The merger
between Laird and Cammell, however, proved less successful than that between John Brown and
Clydebank. A first problem was that between 1902 and 1911, Laird's share of naval construction felt
behind that of all the other major armaments group, as shown in figure 6.9. 
Figure  6.9  : Major naval constructors, 1902-1911
Company Total tonnage
Vickers 112,185
Armstrong 104,350
John Brown 82,550
Fairfield 71,050
Palmer 50,500
Thames Ironworks 41,550
Beardmore 37,150
London & Glasgow 30,450
Scott 20,000
Cammell Laird 14,000
Source: HCPP, Naval Estimates, various years.
67 Calculations based on the List of Laird launchings Warren, Steel, 95-99.
68 Financial Times 24 September 1903, 3.
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In addition to the fact that the merger  occurred exactly before British naval expenditures
were cut,  Laird's yard was too small and inefficient to compete with the larger and more modern
yards owned by other armaments firms. To partially solve the problem, in 1905 Cammell Laird
purchased  50%  of  Fairfield,  another Clyde-based  shipbuilder  and  engine  makers  which  was
markedly more successful than Laird in gaining orders from the Admiralty, although it still built less
than its major competitors.69
Cammell Laird, however, went through still more serious problems in the years 1906-08. In
late 1906, the chief inspector of Woolwich advanced doubts about the quality of some of the firm's
products, especially its armour plates. The first preoccupation of the War Office and Admiralty was
the  quality  of  the  products,  thus  in  1907  they  removed  Cammell  Laird  from the  list  of  their
contractors.70 This was a serious problem because, as Elgar, the firm's chairman, stressed in the
letter he sent to the Admiralty a year later to ask for Cammell Laird to be reintegrated in the list, if
the Company was not trusted by its  own government,  it  had not hope  of securing  any foreign
contracts.71 The  firm  regained  its  position  only  after  a  reshuffle  of  its management,  and  a
reorganisation of the works which guaranteed a better control of the final quality of its productions.
The  major  constraint John Brown and Cammell  suffered  from was  the  absence  of  any
autonomous  gun and gun mountings  capability.  Whereas  armour  making  remained a  profitable
trade, the number of firms active in that field in the 1900s was larger than it was ten or twenty years
before,  when  the  two  Sheffield  firms  completely  dominated  the  market.  At  the  same  time,
competition in naval shipbuilding was still fiercer, because the number of firms which could make
warships was large. At the opposite, gun making was a field still exclusively controlled by just two
firms which, because of this, dominated both exports and domestic supply. In 1902 Cammell bought
Mullinger-Wingley, a small firm in Coventry which manufactured components for artillery. In 1905
this small firm was transformed into the Coventry Ordnance Works after Cammell sold half of its
share to John Brown, and another 25% to Fairfield (Figure 6.11). The shareholders started to pump
money into C.O.W. to transform  it from a small producer of ordnance component into a serious
competitor for the more established producers in all kinds of artillery.
Armstrong  and  Vickers  joined  forces  to  damage the  new  entrant,  whose  presence  was
especially worrisome at a time when the British naval budget was being cut. They adopted a two-
pronged strategy. On the one hand they used their market power to limit C.O.W.'s market share. As
69 Id., 23 November 1905, 5. 
70 The Financial Times 9 November 1907, 5, and 8 April 1909, 8.
71 Warren, Steel, 131. 
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a War Office report in 1910 stated there was a suspicion that C.O.W.'s competitors “had quoted
cutting rates in order to stifle the development of competition for gunwork which Coventry had
taken up for the first time in connection with the rearmament of the field artillery.”72 Though the
government could have been in favour of enlarging the number of suppliers, it could hardly justify
awarding contracts to a company which  systematically  offered higher prices.  On the other hand,
Armstrong  and  Vickers  lobbied  hard  to  prevent the  designs  of  weapons  they  had  previously
submitted to the Admiralty and War Office to be passed to C.O.W. As Noble wrote to the Admiralty,
“That we should receive royalties upon certain patented details is quite inadequate compensation for
the injury done to us by continuing to raise up at our expense rivals who, without either expenditure
or experience, are enable to compete with us, not only in England but in foreign countries.”73
Figure  6.1  1  : C.O.W. corporate structure. 
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Given the technical complexity of the trade, and the opposition coming from the established
producers,  it  is  not  surprising  that  C.O.W.  proved  to  be  a  source  of  disappointment  for  its
shareholders. Equipping the plant was very expensive: the few records which survived do not allow
a precise estimation, but the costs certainly amounted to several hundreds of thousands of pounds.
The fact that the firm did not receive orders from the British government for several years after it
was established strongly  limited the appeal  of  its  production to foreign customers,  which were
certainly suspicious of a firm whose products were not purchased by its government.  In addition,
because gun making required large capital investments, the less the firm produced, the higher was
the price it was forced to quote to cover its fixed costs, or it had to bear large losses. As a result,
C.O.W. remained unprofitable: between 1910 and 1913 it accumulated total losses equal to the sum
72 Directory of Army Contracts, Report, 1910, p. 7.
73 NA, ADM, 1/7758, 4 September 1903.
222
John Brown Cammell Laird Fairfield
C.O.W.
Figure 6.1  2  : Advertisements of various armaments firms which appeared in Brassey's Naval Annual
in the period 1912-1915. Notice how Armstrong and Vickers stressed the variety of hardware they
could supply.
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of £432,263.74 It was only in 1914, which C.O.W., thanks to the orders which the Royal Navy had
started awarding it in the context of the naval rearmament of 1912-1914 years, posted for the first
time a profit (£58,441).
Foreign ventures and  domestic  alliances.  
Until  the  beginning  of  the  20th century  few  British  armaments  firms  set  up  foreign
subsidiaries or, more generally,  invested in production facilities abroad. Apart from  Armstrong's
investment in Pozzuoli,  another case was that of the Placencia de las Armas, which, despite its
name, was a British company created in 1887 for the manufacture of ordnance in Spain.75 Vickers
gained the full  control over the firm as a result  of its merger with  Maxim-Nordenfelt  in 1897.
Placencia produced only small guns (up to 100 mm of calibre), gun mountings and projectiles in its
plant in the  Basque country.  Spain's  limited military budget meant that the Placencia remained a
small firm – it had an authorised capital of only £40,000. In 1903 Vickers considered liquidating the
firm, but it  changed  its mind. In the following years Placencia's turnover averaged just £8,500  a
year and the firm did not make any profit from 1894 to 1910, when it owed Vickers £150,000.76
By contrast, from the early 1900s onwards foreign subsidiaries and joint-ventures involving
British armaments firms  increased  both  in number and  in the amount of  capital  involved.  British
armaments  companies moved  from  selling  to  foreign  customers  to  become  partners  in  local
ventures. Such a process did not occur overnight:  British firms still  dominated the international
armaments trade in warships and naval ordnance before the First World War (Trebilcock calculated
that between 1900 and 1914, the market share of British firms was equal to 63,2% of total world
sales,  with  French  firms  distant  seconds  with  a  share  of  just  9.4%).77 The  introduction  of
dreadnoughts boosted exports in the short-run because British firms were among the few in the
world  which  had actually  built  them,  and  thus  they could  guarantee  better  construction  times.
Before 1914 British firms received orders from abroad for 8 dreadnoughts (one from Australia), not
counting  the  vessels  built  in  Spain  (see  below).  In  addition,  both  Austria-Hungary and  Russia
ordered turbines in Britain for domestically-built dreadnoughts.78 The tendency towards a different
74 Warren, Steel,149. 
75 The Times 27 March, 1934, 21.
76 VA 1209, Placencia de las Armas Co., Minute Books (1888-1931); and VA 57, Documents Submitted to the Royal
Commission on Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms, f. 19 
77 Trebilcock, Vickers, 123.
78 G. C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge, 2007),
27.
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market structure, however, was pronounced.
Vickers did its first large investment abroad in Italy. In 1905 the firm invested £86,625 to set
up, together with Terni, the Vickers-Terni company for the manufacture of artillery (a more detailed
reconstruction of the Vickers-Terni's development is in the next chapter).79 A few years later, three
of the largest British armaments companies  jointly contributed to set up an armaments plant in
Spain: after its defeat during the Spanish-American war, the Spanish government decided to rebuild
the country's fleet using the most up-to-date naval technology.80 To achieve this aim, however, Spain
decided  not  to  purchase  the  three  dreadnoughts it  planned  abroad,  but  to  produce  them
domestically.81 In 1908  the  government  awarded  the  contract  for  the  modernisation  of  the
government's yard in Ferrol and the construction of the dreadnoughts to a new firm, the Socieded
Espanola de Construccion Naval.82 This company was  created by Armstrong, Vickers and John
Brown (each  of them paying £31,450),  together  with local  interests  (among them the  shipping
company Compania Transatlatica and the country's major banks) which accounted for 70% of the
initial capital of the firm.83 Thanks to the contracts received from the government, the firm rapidly
turned profitable, starting to pay a dividend of 6-7% a year from 1910 onwards. In addition British
shareholders received also  payments  for the technical support they provided to the new firm. For
example,  the  Sociedad paid Vickers  on average  £800-900 a year  for  the designs  and technical
advices it supplied.
The investment that Armstrong and Vickers jointly  undertook in Japan  followed a similar
pattern.  In the  course of the 1880s and  1890s Japan had became a very important customer for
British armaments companies. After the war with Russia, the Japanese government decided that the
development of a domestic armaments industry was essential to enhance the strategic security of the
country.  The  Japanese  Navy  had  fought  the  war  knowing  that  every  vessel  it  lost  was  not
immediately  replaceable  because  the  country  lacked  a  modern  armaments  industry.84 While
Japanese firms could produce  basic  hardware, ordnance, gun mountings and large steel forgings
needed to be imported from Europe.85 To favour the transfer of the technology required to produce
them, the two major British suppliers to Japan, Armstrong and Vickers, were asked to contribute to
the creation of a modern domestic armaments industry. Thus in 1907 Armstrong and Vickers joined
79 VA 683 Vickers-Terni. 
80 P. G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908–1914 (Cambridge, 1971), 280-285.
81 Sondhaus, Warfare, 215.
82 The Manchester Guardian, 1 February 1909,12.
83 VA 57, f. 30 Id. La Sociedad. 
84 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun., 159-161.
85 Id., 63-64.
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the Japanese Hokkaido Coal and Steamship Company to create the Japan Steel Works at Muroran.
Each of the two British shareholders paid £250,000, an amount much larger than the one they paid
in Spain, a testimony of the scale of the Japanese efforts. In addition, Vickers and Armstrong bound
themselves “to give to the Japanese company all such information and advice as may be required in
regard to the establishment of the new works and to the working of its business”. In compensation
for  such  technical  advice  “the  British  companies  were  to  receive  the  preferential  right  to
manufacture or  supply all  the  machinery,  appliances,  etc.”  required.86 In  1911 the plant  started
production and soon became profitable.87 In 1913 the company's profits stayed at £58,320.88
Vickers equally profited from the Russian naval rearmament policy which started few years
after the end of the conflict with Japan. In 1911 Vickers began to  supply the  Nicolayev shipyard
based in Mykolaiv, the major shipbuilding centre on the Black Sea, with designs; the British firm
also provided technical assistance.89 The  following year Vickers took the step of directly entering
the Russian market:  forming a syndicate with two Russian banks (the Petrograd International and
Commercial  Bank and the Banque d'Escompte de Petrograd), it  prevailed over the combination
between Schneider and Putilov, a local  armaments company,  to receive from the government the
contract for the erection of a new gun plant in Tsaritsyn (later known as Stalingrad).  The Russian
government also promised to award the new firm contracts worth 6-8 million of roubles a year for
the following six years.90 Vickers paid one third (5,000,000 roubles) of the new firm's capital, which
was  known  as  the  Russian  Artillery  Works  Company.  The  value  of  this  investment  was  later
assessed by Vickers at £321,937.91 Vickers also agreed to supply the new firm with technical know-
how, designs, etc. in exchange for a 10% of the profits of the company. At the outbreak of the First
World War, the Russian company was still busy erecting the works. 
The  last  major  investment made  abroad  by  British  armaments  firms  before  1914  was
Vickers, John Brown and Armstrong's joint  venture in Turkey.92 In 1913 the three British firms
supplanted Ansaldo, which had been expelled from the country because of the Italy-Turkish war, in
the  management  of  Constantinople's arsenal.93 The  Turkish  government,  which maintained the
86 VA, 57, f. 18, Nihon Seiko Sho (Japan Steelworks).
87 T&W, 130/1268,  Minutes,  14 December 1911; see also  Conte-Helm,  ‘Armstrong's, Vickers and Japan’, I.  Nish
(ed.), Britain and Japan. Biographical Portraits (Folkestone, 1994), 99-101.
88 T&W, 130/1268, Minutes, 23 April 1914. 
89 The text of the agreement in VA, 735, see also VA, 1219.
90 E. R. Goldstein, ‘Vickers Limited and the Tsarist Regime’, The Slavonic and East European Review 58 (1980), 567-
568.
91 VA, 1219.
92 The relevant documents are in VA, 26-31.
93 T&W, 130/1268, Minutes, 16 October 1913.
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controlling share in the new joint-venture,  immediately pledged £1,000,000 a year for four years,
and promised additional orders in the future.94 The British firms' task was to modernise the arsenal
and the annexed yard to  make possible the construction of modern warships  which,  until  now,
Turkey had contracted abroad. The outbreak of the war, however, blocked the scheme.
In addition to the major investments  actually  undertaken,  other foreign direct investments
were proposed or developed by British armaments firms without being actually carried out. In 1910,
for  example, Armstrong  was  approached  by  John  Brown  with  a  plan  for  “designing  and
superintending the building and arming of warships in Russia.” Elswick, however, declined to enter
into the agreement  because it was unsure about the value of the Russian market,  and the project
collapsed.95
Despite their different order of magnitude, Placencia and Pozzuoli had in common the fact
of being companies which were fully owned by their  British shareholders,  who managed them in
complete autonomy.  By contrast, the wave of investments and agreements  of the 1900s and early
1910s was  based on a  completely different  model,  characterized by  two features.  First, British
armaments firms  did not operate autonomously,  but  entered into agreements with local partners
which usually owned the controlling interest in the newly created  joint-ventures.  Second, British
firms mainly contributed technology and know-how, while it was the local partners which provided
the majority of the capital and took care of the sales and management of the operations.
These arrangements  highlight  two  important  aspects.  The  first  was  the  high  level  of
appreciation that the technical skills of British firms enjoyed in armament production, especially of
naval hardware, as it is demonstrated by the fact that all projects which were primarily focused on
naval armaments saw a British firm among the participants. The second point was the changing
nature of the international armaments market  in the early 20th century. Until well into the 1890s,
outside  the few European  great  powers  which  could  count  on  a  domestic  armaments  industry
formed by a mix of private and public establishments, and the United States, no country  in the
world  had  either  the  financial  resources  or  the  industrial  capabilities  to  produce  the  most
sophisticated pieces of military technology.  Governments which wished to reinforce their armed
forces had to import armaments, if not directly buy fully equipped vessels.
Italy in  the course of  the 1880s was the  first  country to  try to foster  the  creation  of a
domestic armaments industry  which could replace  external sources  of supply.  Starting from the
1900s, countries such as Japan, Spain and Turkey all tried  to  achieve the same: moving, more or
94 Scott, Vickers, 85-86.
95 T&W, 130/1268, Minutes, 3 November 1910 and 17 November 1910. 
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less successfully, from the position of purchasers of armaments technology, toward one in which at
least part of the more complex production activities were carried on inside their borders. This was
because these countries were either becoming richer (Japan), or because they decided to heavily
invest in the modernisation of their armed forces (for example, Turkey). For strategic and political
reasons it became unpalatable to keep relying on armaments imported from outside.
Under  these  circumstances,  the  role  of  the  companies which  until  then  had  provided
armaments  moved,  thus,  from that  of  suppliers  of  finished  goods  toward  that  of  providers  of
technology and know-how to local partners. Such a trend involved not only British firms – although
their predominance in the international market of armaments meant that they ended involved in
many joint-ventures and agreements – but also French and,  to a less extent, Italian companies.96
These agreements  could potentiality damage  the operations  of established armaments makers by
fostering new competitors, and thus private firms tried to reduce their scope by adding, for example,
clauses which limited the export activities of the new joint-ventures. For instance, the agreement
between Vickers and its Russian partners limited the export activities of the Russian Artillery Works
to  Serbia,  Montenegro  and  Bulgaria,  all  countries  in  which  Russia  enjoyed  a  high  degree  of
influence  and were had never been important customers of Vickers. In general, the reasons why
private armaments firms accepted to enter into these agreements have been effectively summarised
by  Peter  Gatrell  speaking  about  the  Russian  case:  “Companies  such  as  Vickers,  Krupp  and
Schneider  knew  that  they  could  never  flood  the  Russian  market  with  weapons  and  ships
manufactured abroad. The only sensible strategy was to participate in the creation or reorganization
of Russian firms, using foreign financial resources and technological lead as bargaining counters.”97
Exactly because of their leading position in the international armaments market, British firms were
in danger of losing the most if governments which in the past had been a good customers decided to
foster  a  domestic  armaments  industry.  They were  also  aware  that,  in  case  they  would  refuse,
companies  from other  countries  would  have  certainly been willing  to  take  their  places.  It  was
preferable, therefore, to participate in this process by entering into agreements with local firms and
try to squeeze the best possible deal out of such arrangements.
Apart from these joint-ventures and foreign ventures,  British armaments firms participated
96 For example, on Schneider's ventures in Russia see C. Beaud,  ‘De l'Expansion Internationale à la  Multinationale
Schneider en Russie (1896-1914)’, Histoire, Économie et Société 4 (1985), 575-602.
97 P.  Gatrell,  Government,  Industry  and  Rearmament  in  Russia,  1900-1914.  The  Last  Argument  of  Tsarism
(Cambridge, 1994), 235. 
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to the two major international agreements  involving armaments firms: the Harvey and the Nickel
syndicates.  The Harvey syndicate, whose origins have been described  previously, maintained the
control  of  the  patents  needed  for  the  manufacture  of  Harvey  and  Krupp  armour  plates. The
importance of these patents is made evident by the fact that among the first thing Armstrong did
when  it  started  to  undertake  armour  production  was  to  apply  for  membership  of the  Harvey
Syndicate. As the minutes of the company's special committee on armour plate report: “Falkner [the
firm's secretary and a member of the board] had been sent to Germany to speak with Mr Krupp to
enquire  whether  Armstrong  can  gain,  and  on  what  terms,  membership  in  the  syndicate  which
controls  Harvey and Krupp patents.”98 Armstrong  eventually  gained membership to  the Harvey
syndicate, although after protracted discussions which, presumably, revolved around the amount of
money Armstrong had to pay to the Harvey company.99 Armstrong  needed to gain access to the
patents to produce the most advanced armour plates:  Armstrong could potentially have tried to
come out with its own manufacturing system, but this would have been an uncertain and costly
process. At the same time, it was much more convenient for the shareholders of the various Harvey
companies to accept a new partner, rather than risking to foster a competitor. The various Harvey
companies,  which  had  gone  through  a  process  of  partial  consolidation,  were  put  in  voluntary
liquidation in 1911, when Harvey and Krupp's patents expired.
The second international agreements  in which British armaments firms  were involved was
the Nickel  syndicate.  Nickel  was  an  essential  component  for hardening armour  plates.  Armour
makers were the largest consumers of nickel before 1914 and thus had a crucial interest in securing
a reliable source of supply. Until 1914, the great majority of nickel consumed in the world was dig
either in New Caledonia or in Canada.100 In 1901 Vickers, John Brown, Beardmore, Cammell and
Armstrong formed the Steel Manufacturers' Nickel Syndicate Ltd., to pool their purchases of nickel
from La Société de Nickel, the French firm controlling the New Caledonia nickel mines.101 Such an
arrangement  allowed  these firms  to  obtain  better  and more  stable  prices and  more  favourable
conditions.102 Vickers  was  entrusted  with  the  administrative  tasks of  the  syndicate.103 All  the
syndicate's  members  apart  from Armstrong  also  established the  Anglo-French Nickel  Company
98 T&W, 130/1280, Minutes of the armour plate committee, 24 November 1898.
99 T&W, 130/1266, Minutes, 14 September 1900. 
100 F. B. Howard-White, Nickel: A Historical Review (London, 1963), 130-131.
101 G. Boyce, ‘The Steel Manufacturers' Nickel Syndicate Ltd., 1901-1939: Assessing the Conduct and Performance of
a Cooperative Purchasing Organisation’, Australian Economic History Review 38 (1998), 157.
102 Unfortunately, the records of the Syndicate for the pre-1918 period have only partially survived. For example, data
on purchases and the text of the agreement between the syndicate and the La Société de Nickel are lost. 
103 VA 57, 3 November 1903.
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which  owned a nickel refinery in Swansea which supplied them with the majority of the refined
metal they needed. In the years from 1901 to 1908 Schneider, Krupp, Terni and a few other firms
joined the syndicate.104 Whatever the divergences between the various European governments, the
decision to open the syndicate to the major firms of other countries was rational, because the more
firms belonged to the syndicate, the stronger it would become its market power versus La Société
de Nickel and the few other nickel suppliers. 
A peculiar feature of the British armaments industry before 1914 was  the high degree of
collaboration  which  existed  between  the  various  firms.  This  was  a peculiarity  of  the  British
armaments market.  At the opposite, for example, both in Italy and in Germany, armaments firms
strongly competed against each other.105 The above discussion on foreign joint-ventures had already
pointed to the many occasions in which Armstrong and Vickers collaborated, sometimes  also  in
agreement with John Brown.
The  large  expansion  of  Vickers  after  1897  was  a  reason  of  concern  for  Armstrong's
management.  The fact that Vickers had expanded to naval construction meant that Armstrong lost
its position as the only armaments firm with an autonomous shipbuilding capacity in Britain. As it
has been said before, one of the reasons Armstrong decided to merger with Whitworth was exactly
to prevent the Manchester-based firm being bought by its Sheffield rival. Vickers rapidly evolved in
the early 1900s while Armstrong was hampered by the fact that, after the death of Lord Armstrong
in 1900, its  board was split between two competing groups.  Both firms, however, recognised that
excessive competition could damage their operations.
It  is  important  to  draw a  distinction  between  the  domestic  and  the  foreign  markets.  In
Britain,  starting from the late  1890s,  the allocation of orders  was not  exclusively the result  of
market  dynamics.  The  Admiralty  awarded  contracts  taking  into  consideration  the  estimates
submitted  by  the  firms  competing  for  contracts,  but it  also aimed  to enlarge the  number  of
companies producing certain kind of products, so as to increase competition and drive down prices
and also to make possible, in case of war, for the private sector could rapidly escalate production.
This  explains, for example, why the Admiralty  favoured the enlargement  first of Whitworth and
later of the C.O.W.: it wanted to be able to count on an additional gun making firm. Obviously, the
104 VA 1198, Minutes of the Board of the Steel Manufacturers' Nickel Syndicate (1901-1935), passim.
105 For  the  Italian  case  see  next  chapter.  In  Germany a  working agreement  between Krupp and the  major  naval
shipbuilders was reached only in 1913, M. Epkenhans,  ‘Military-Industrial Relations in Imperial Germany, 1870-
1914’, War and History 10 (2003), 18-19.
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Admiralty maintained strict quality requirements which had to be meet by potential suppliers, as
Cammell's  temporary exclusion from the list  of suppliers testify.  This fact  meant that  domestic
competition in Britain was somehow tempered. Firms had the incentive to develop technical know-
how so as to maintain, or gain, a leading position in certain niches (as Vickers was able to do for
submarines for a while, or as Armstrong and Vickers did for gun mountings for large naval guns),
but  non-economic  considerations  played also a role.  As the  trade journal  Arms and Explosives
suggested: “the orders of a given year must be distributed so as to maintain private factories in
efficient condition, during periods of limited demand. Capital must be maintained intact, and staffs
must not be dissipated.” For this reason collaboration between firms was required “to maintain
manufacturing facilities intact for the time when the strain of exceptional demand arises.”106
It was especially important to arrive at some sort of agreement about foreign markets. At the
turn of the century, Ansaldo and Orlando  had  sold cruisers to Argentina, Chile, Spain and Japan,
markets  which  had been usually supplied  exclusively by British companies.  At  the  same time,
French and German firms, and later also American ones, were trying to conquer a larger share of the
world market for naval constructions and artillery.  In 1906 Armstrong and Vickers arrived at an
understanding about foreign orders. As stated in a confidential  report  produced for Armstrong's
board, presumably in 1913:
The arrangements with Vickers … have been made so far as possible with a view of
dividing the work equally between the two firms. … The object underlying them is,
of course, to prevent unnecessary cutting of prices and, where possible, to bring the
work to England. This policy has been successful in particular in Spain, Turkey and
latterly in  Chile.  It  was  suggested  that  figures  should  be prepared  to  show the
advantage gained by the firm by entering into such arrangements, but it appears
impossible  to  do so.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  in  their  absence,  competition
between  the  two  firms  would  reduce  profits  to  vanishing  points.  Italy  may be
instanced as a particular example.
The document continues presenting the various arrangements which existed in relations to
different countries. 
106 Arms and Explosives, October 1913, 139.
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ITALY:  comparison  of  prices  only.  The  government  at  present  divides  orders
between Vickers-Terni group and ourselves equally. 
GREECE:  agreement  between  Armstrong  and  Vickers.  The  maker  pays  [to  the
other] 2% of the price of the hull, £6 per ton on hull armour, £15 per ton for shield,
10% on guns and mountings. Nothing on machinery.
CHILE: agreement between Armstrong and Vickers. The builder pays [to the other]
12.5% on armaments, £6 per ton on hull armour, £15 per ton for shield, 7.5% on
coast defence guns and mountings. 
TURKEY: agreement between Armstrong, Vickers and John Brown. Vickers build
hull and machinery, Armstrong and Vickers divide armaments [among themselves],
Armstrong, Vickers and John Brown divide armour, Armstrong and John Brown
divide shafting, etc. Vickers will stand out of hull and engines of the next ship.107 
Armstrong and Vickers also collaborated to split the Argentine orders for two dreadnoughts
among themselves.108 British armaments makers were at  the forefront  of naval  technology,  their
vertically integrated structures helped them to be competitive in the international markets. At the
same time, however, their relative position was reinforced by agreements among themselves. 
6.4 Conclusions.
The  wave  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  of  the  late  1890s  deeply  reshaped the  British
armaments industry. Both new entrants and established firms tried to vertically integrate production,
from gun and armour making to  naval  shipbuilding.  The growing British naval  budget  offered
potential new large business opportunities. Moreover, the introduction of dreadnoughts offered the
chance to gain additional orders from both the Royal Navy and foreign governments. An additional
development which occurred in the decade before 1914 was the growing number of foreign joint-
ventures  involving British  armaments  firms,  especially  Armstrong  and  Vickers,  which  in  the
previous decades had been the most active companies on foreign markets. 
At  the  same  time,  not all  British  armaments  firms  were  equally  successful  in  their
integration  of  various  productions,  or  equally  profitable. Acquiring  and  developing  technical
107 VA 551.
108 T&W 130/1267, Minutes, 21 January 1909; and VA, 1005, Letter Book n. 31, 14, 15 and 31 December 1909.
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capacity in the most complex fields – gun and armour making – proved to be difficult and costly, as
the case of Beardmore shows: the large expansion plan which the firm pursued translated in few
orders and poor returns. An analysis of the dividends paid by the major British armaments firms in
this period offers a partial, but still useful, way to assess their different performances (figure 6.13). 
Figure 6.1  3  :  Dividends paid by major British armaments firms as percentage of the firms' capital,
1898-1912.
Year Armstrong Vickers CammLa J. Brown Beardmore
1898 15 15 15 6.66 -
1899 20 20 17.5 10 -
1900 20 20 17.5 15 -
1901 12.5 15 15 20 -
1902 15 12.5 10 15 0
1903 15 10 7.5 10 7.5
1904 15 12.5 7.5 8.33 6
1905 15 15 10 8.33 6
1906 15 15 10 10 0
1907 15 15 2.5 10 0
1908 10 10 0 10 0
1909 10 10 0 7.5 0
1910 10 10 7.5 7.5 0
1911 12.5 10 7.5 7.5 5
1912 12.5 10 10 7.5 5
1913 12.5 12.5 2.5 7.5 5
Average 14.1 13.1 8.75 3.4 9.75
σ 2.91 3.27 5.45 2.92 3.93
Source: Vickers, John Brown, Cammell Laird: G. Tweedale, Steel City. Entrepreneurship, Strategy,
and  Technology  in  Sheffield,  1743-1993  (Oxford,  1995),  124-125;  Armstrong and  Beardmore:
Warren, Armstrongs of Elswick: Growth in Engineering and Armaments to the Merger with Vickers
(Basingstoke, 1989), 161. For missing years: Stock Exchange Yearbook, various years.
At the turn of the century, the combination  between the Second Boer War and the British
naval build-up resulted in an unprecedented high level of profitability for all the major armaments
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firms, a level which which was not matched until the First World War. By contrast, the second half
of the 1900s was a less profitable period because of the fall in naval appropriation. In addition to
this, Cammell Laird suffered from its temporary exclusion from the list of suppliers for the Navy
and the Army. Armstrong and Vickers paid in average much higher dividends than the other firms.
Their  presence in foreign markets and their  strong  export activities  helped them to weather far
better  then their rivals  the ups and downs of the domestic market.  Finally, Beardmore is a clear
outlier among the armaments firms: it paid very low dividends throughout the entire period. 
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Chapter VII
 In Search of Vertical Integration: The Italian Armaments Industry, 
1900-1914 
This chapter analyses the evolution of the armaments industry in Italy from the early 1900s
to 1914. Several key trends characterised this period. First,  as in Britain,  technological evolution,
the  search  for  economies  of  scale  and the  desire  to  add  additional  productions pushed  Italian
armaments firms towards making large investments and integrate vertically. By contrast, however,
Italian firms fiercely competed  among  themselves: any attempts to reach an agreement between
them failed. 
Second, despite  their  technical  progress,  Italian firms still  needed to import  cutting-edge
technology and know-how. The importance of access to foreign technology was magnified by the
appearance of dreadnought vessels. However, the way in which foreign technology was introduced
in the country changed: while in previous decades foreign technology had been mainly introduced
as semi-processed or finished goods, in these years, alliances, joint ventures and licences became
the most common ways to gain access to it.
The years covered in this chapter can be divided into two periods: one from the early 1900s
to 1908, the other from 1908 to 1914. During the first period a general reorganisation of the sector
occurred:  both  Ansaldo and  Terni  changed ownership,  and  Armstrong entered into a temporary
alliance with Ansaldo.  During the second period, the Italian navy budget grew significantly, and
both Ansaldo and the Terni fully pursed vertical integration: by 1914, both major Italian armaments
groups were able to produce all the components of a battleship: hulls, engines, armour plates and
guns.
The chapter is structured as follow: the first part presents the trends of Italian naval spending
and the military and strategic context which influenced it. The second offers a general summary of
the evolution  of  the sector  during this  period  addressing the  evolving strategies  of  the various
armaments firms.
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7.1 Italian naval spending 1901-14.
In the period 1901-14 Italian naval spending tripled (Figure 7.1). Naval  spending can  be
divided into three periods. The first  ran  from 1901 to 1906. During these years  the  naval budget
remained around 120 million Lire, the level it had  reached  in the late 1890s.  In 1902, Italy and
France  arrived  at an  understanding  about  their  respective  spheres  of  interests  in  Morocco  and
Libya.1 In 1906, Britain and France recognised the pre-eminence of Italian interests in Ethiopia.2
These agreements eased the tension with France,  which translated into moderate naval spending. 
 
Figure  7  .1  : Italian naval spending 1901-1914 (in current Lire).
Source: Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, Il Bilancio del Regno d'Italia negli Esercizi Finanziari dal
1862 al 1912-13 (Roma, 1914), and id.  Il  Bilancio dello  Stato dal 1913-14 al 1929-30 (Roma,
1931), passim.
The second period, between 1907 and 1910, was characterised by increases averaging 10% a
year. In 1907 the budget reached for the first time a level higher, in real terms, to the previous peak
in 1889. The annexation of Bosnia rekindled Italian hostility against Austria, despite both countries
1 S.  Romano,  ‘Il  Riavvicinamento  Italo-Francese  del  1900-1902:  Diplomazia  e  Modelli  di  Sviluppo’, Storia
Contemporanea 9 (1978), 105-114. 
2 C. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870-1925 (London, 1967), 362.
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belonged to the Triple Alliance.  In 1909 Italy laid down its first dreadnought, the Dante Alighieri
(the first capital ship in the world equipped with turrets mounting three guns each), starting a naval
race with Austria in the Adriatic Sea.3 By 1910 the naval budget exceed 150 million Lire. During
the third period, from 1911 to 1914,  the naval budget  rose to unprecedented levels until, in  fiscal
year 1913-14, it exceeded 350 million Lire, more than twice the amount of 1909.
In the years 1910-1914 the naval race with Austria-Hungary intensified. At the end of 1910
Italy ordered  three  additional dreadnoughts:  Conte  di  Cavour  (built  by the  Spezia  arsenal),
Leonardo da Vinci (Odero) and Giulio Cesare (Ansaldo). These vessels deployed 13 12 in. guns and
displaced around 23,000 tons,  a  75% increase over  the last  Italian pre-dreadnought battleships.
Austria replied by laying down two dreadnoughts in 1910 (Viribus Unitis and Tegetthoff) and two
more  in  1912 (Prinz  Eugen  and  Szent  István).  Italy responded by ordering  two ships  in  1912,
Andrea Doria (built in Spezia) and Caio Duilio (Castellammare). In 1914 both countries planned to
built super-dreadnoughts displacing more than 30,000 tons but the outbreak of the war stopped their
construction.
An additional reason which drove up Italian naval expenditure was the Italo-Turkish war in
1911-12.4 As in the case of the Boer War, this conflict highlighted the crucial role played by naval
power: the Italian expedition force in Libya was unable to overcome the resistance in the interior of
the country  (until the 1920s, Italian control was limited to the coast).5 The war was brought to a
rapid conclusion by the naval operations in the East Mediterranean which included the occupation
of Rhodes.6 The war momentarily reversed the rapprochement with France and Britain, and drove
Italy again closer to its partners in the Triple alliance (although it did not stop the naval race in the
Adriatic).
As in Britain, the Italian naval budget changed in composition while it expanded. The less
detailed data available do not allow to repeat the analysis done for the British budget, but it is
possible to calculate that, starting from 1908, the resources allocated for the construction of vessels
from private yards exceeded those used to carry out construction in public arsenals (Figure 7.2).
3 L. Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914 (London, 2001), 209-213; id. The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-
1918: Navalism, Industrial Development, and the Politics of Dualism (West Lafayette, 1994), 191-203; M. N. Vego,
Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904-14 (Portland, 1996) 1-3 and 66-113..
4 A. Del Boca,  Gli  Italiani in Libia: Tripoli  Bel  Suol d'Amore, 1860-1922 (Roma-Bari, 1986), T. W. Childs,  Italo-
Turkish  Diplomacy  and  the  War  Over  Libya,  1911–1912  (Leiden,  1990),  and N.  Labanca,  Oltremare.  Storia
dell'Espansione Coloniale Italiana (Bologna, 2007), passim.
5 A. Del Boca,  Gli  Italiani in Libia: dal  Fascismo a Gheddafi  (Roma-Bari, 1986),  chapters 1-3, N. Labanca,  La
Guerra di Libia 1911-1931 (Bologna, 2012). 
6 M. Gabriele, La Marina nella Guerra Italo-turca (Roma, 1998).
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Figure  7  .2  : Italian navy shipbuilding expenditures, 1905-1912 (in million of current Lire). 
Source:  Rendiconto  Generale  Consultivo  dell'Amministrazione  dello  Stato,  from  1904-1905  to
1910-1911.
In the early 1900s the Italian navy ordered few new vessels. This explains the low level of
expenditure in 1905. In 1906 and 1907 additional resources initially benefited government arsenals.
In 1908 private firms  started to enjoy an unprecedented rise in orders,  mainly generated by  the
construction of the new dreadnoughts. In contrary, the share of resources going to arsenals remained
flat. The relative decline of arsenals is also highlighted by the dwindling number of their workforce
from 1900 onwards (Figure 7.3). 
Arsenal workers fell from 17,000 in 1900 to 12,000 in 1914, a reduction of near 30%. The
large expansion of arsenals during the 1880s had been halted in the 1890s. A reduction of workforce
was  unavoidable,  because  there  were  too  many  arsenals,  which  were  therefore underused.7 In
addition, because of the growing share of constructions carried on by private firms, arsenals focused
more on repairs and general maintenance, reducing the need for a large workforce. For political
7 The Ministry calculated that to keep all arsenals busy the construction budget should have doubled and be entirely
spent there, see Ministero della Marina, Ufficio del Capo di Stato Maggiore, Annali della Scuola Navale di Guerra,
1908 (Roma, 1908), 205.
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reasons,  however, it was  difficult to close or sell any arsenal  outright,  but the  Navy cut costs by
reducing personnel. All arsenals saw a decline in their workforces, but the  one in  Venice was the
most hit: it was too old, difficult to defend, and the lagoon was too shallow to be easily navigated
by the largest vessels. Workers there felt from more than 3,300 in 1900 to less than 2,000 in 1913. 
Figure  7  .3  : Number of workers employed by Italian naval arsenals, 1900-1913.
Source:  Camera dei Deputati,  Stato di  Previsione della  Spesa per l'Esercizio  Finanziario 1913-
1914. 
9.2 The evolution of the armaments sector, 1900-14.
In the decade before 1914, both Ansaldo and Terni integrated vertically, increasing the range
of  productions they  could make “in  house”.  The  organisational,  technological,  financial  and
commercial reasons behind this  strategy were the same which explain the similar moves made by
British  armaments  companies  with,  in  addition,  the  fact  that  foreign  firms  provided  Italian
companies  with  a  model  they  could  follow. It  must  be  stressed,  however, that  despite the
managements of Terni and Ansaldo  repeatedly expressing their intention to  increase the range of
their productions, both firms achieved  their aims only in the early 1910s.  This was because  such
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strategy was costly: technical capabilities and know-how had to be gained, complex organisational
challenges had to be solved and large financial costs sustained.
Odero, Orlando and Terni
A series of changes in the ownership of the major Italian armaments firms occurred in the
early 1900s. In the late 1890s, Giuseppe Orlando and Attilio Odero started to acquire shares of Terni
taking advantage of the desire of several shareholders to to cash their investment.8 Their aim was to
link Terni with their shipbuilding activities: their yards were among the major  purchasers of steel
forgings  and armour  plates,  and  a  combination  could greatly  reinforced  them. Terni's  share  of
national production had been falling since the early 1890s. In 1903 it produced 18,637 tons of steel
(half of it was for military purposes), representing 11.35% of Italian  total  steel production. The
firm's strength, however, did not lie in the quantity of output, but in its quality and its monopoly of
military  goods. Terni was tuned to  perform high-quality production:  it was the only firm in Italy
which had Bessemer converters in operation, which were the most suitable process for making the
special steel alloys employed in armaments,  because  they allowed  to precisely alter the  chemical
composition of steel during production.9 
In 1898 Terni's shares started to be quoted on the various Italian exchanges. During the first
months of 1899, because of large acquisitions, their price moved up from around 1150 Lire to more
than 1650 in just a few months.10 The 1899 shareholders' meeting revealed the presence of a group
of investors organised by Odero and Orlando.11 From  1899 to 1903,  the year Breda died, major
disputes took place in the firm's board between Breda,  on one side,  who wanted to keep Terni
independent, and the Orlando-Odero group, which, at the opposite, was in favour of stronger links
between  Terni  and  the  shipbuilding  firms.12 Eventually,  in  1904,  Terni  acquired  Odero's  and
Orlando's yards.
To  gain the control of Terni, Odero and Orlando  allied themselves with a group of stock
8 By 1899 Attilio Odero had invested around 1,6 million Lire in Terni's shares, G. Doria,  Investimenti e  Sviluppo
Eonomico a Genova alla Vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale, vol. 2, 1883-1914 (Milano, 1973), 667-670.
9 R. Giannetti, Tecnologia e Sviluppo Economico Italiano, 1870-1990 (Bologna, 1998), 87.
10 The on-line archive of La Stampa offers the possibility to check the price of Terni's shares at the Genoa stock
exchange on a daily basis.
11 AST, Fondo Terni, Verbali dell'Assemblea degli Azionisti 1899. Because Terni's statue initially limited the number of
delegations which each participant could have, that year twenty four shareholders participated in representation of
one hundred and three investors. Subsequently, these limits were cancelled, allowing the pooling of large numbers of
shares.
12 F. Bonelli, Lo Sviluppo di una Grande Impresa in Italia: la Terni dal 1884 al 1962 (Torino, 1975), 69-82.
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exchange  speculators,  among  them Eugenio  Scartezzini  e  Ferruccio  Prina.13 Their holdings  of
shares guaranteed Odero  and Orlando  a  majority  in  the  assembly.  The  new controlling  group,
however,  did  not  have  a  coherent  design.  Whereas  Odero  and  Orlando's  primary  aim  was
integrating the operations of Terni with that of their yards, Scartezzini and Prina  wanted Terni  to
distribute large dividends, also out of borrowed resources, which they could used to finance stock
exchange speculations. As a result, between 1899 and 1906 the share of Terni's profits distributed to
shareholders jumped from 11,7% of the firm's profits (in average 700,000 Lire a year from 1893 to
1898) to 44,2% (in average more than 3 million Lire a year). 1905 was a record year: 4,35 million
Lire were returned to the shareholders, the higher absolute value ever registered before the First
World War.14 To finance this  generous policy,  depreciations were halved.  In  addition the firm's
liquidity was “lent” to Scartezzini and Prina to pursue financial operations: in the period 1903-1906,
financial returns accounted for more than 40% of the firm's profits. As Franco Bonelli has written:
“the management of Terni between 1899 and 1906 is the convulsed history of the alliance between
stock exchange, banking and industrial interests.”15 The import role of these financiers is testified by
the fact that, between 1904 and 1906, Ferruccio Prina was Terni's chairman. In general, during the
period 1900-1906, the industrial side of the Odero-Terni-Orlando nexus was sidelined in favour of
financial engineering, at least until first Scartezzini (in 1901) and later Prina (in 1906) were forced
to leave because of the large losses they had incurred in their trading speculations.16
The early years of Odero and Orlando's management were also complicated by the outbreak
of the “Terni scandal”: in 1903 the socialist MP Enrico Ferri mounted an attack from the columns of
the  socialist  newspaper  L'Avanti against  the  Minister  for  the  Navy  Giovanni  Bettolo  and  the
management of Terni. Ferri accused Bettolo of having illegitimately favoured Terni by awarding the
company contracts for armour plates which commanded unjustified high prices. The fact that Terni
was distributing high dividends seemed to confirm this. In addition, Ferri implied that Bettolo had
personally gained from speculating on Terni's shares. Bettolo sued Ferri for defamation (he won the
trial), claiming that Ferri was motivated by political reasons.17 The Ferri-Bettolo controversy led the
following year to the creation of a parliamentary  inquiry commission  on the  Navy's procurement
13 On the activities of these financiers see Doria, Investimenti e Sviluppo, 314, 389, 555, 654 and 716-17 (which offer a
list of Prina's investments up to 1906).
14 F. Bonelli, Terni, statistical appendix.
15 Bonelli, Terni, 71.
16 On Prina's  operations,  which  left  Terni  with  a  loss  of  600,000 Lire,  see  La Stampa 25 October  1906;  on  his
resignation La Stampa 19 November 1906, 3.
17 R. Guêze,  ‘Bettolo,  Giovanni’, DBI; and G. Sircana,  ‘Ferri,  Enrico’, DBI. F.  M. Baratelli,  La Marina Militare
Italiana nella Vita Nazionale (1860-1914) (Milano, 1983), 326-327.
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activities, which was followed three years later by an analogous commission on the Army.18 These
commissions were the only opportunity MPs had to  scrutinize the internal affairs  of the armed
forces,  a topic which was usually considered “unpatriotic” to discuss,  before the end of the First
World War.19
The final report of the  Inquire Commission criticised Terni  for having overcharged  in the
past the government for its supply of armour plates. The commission also stigmatized high ranking
military officers who, after retiring from service, went to work for the same firms with which they
had dealt with while in office (for example, the last three general directors of Terni were all former
naval officers).  The  conclusions  reached by the commission  were widely reported  in  the  press
(Figure 7.4), but the polemic was rapidly sidelined by other events and the control exercised by the
parliament over the armed forces and their budgets remained feeble.20 For instance, the efforts of the
Advisory Commission on State  Procurement – a body created in 1912 inside the prime minister's
office  –  to  rationalise  armaments  spending  by increasing the exchange of  information  between
government offices, private industries,  and parliament  led to nothing. Also the attempt made in
1913 to cut the links between civil suppliers and the government bureaucracy by making illegal for
any former civil  servant and military  officer to do business with the public administration,  was
equally frustrated.21
Discussing the conclusions  of the  Inquiry Commission,  Orlando and Ordero claimed that
Terni was the target of a  slanderous campaign organised by the socialist party and supported by
industrial rivals – it is evident they were thinking off Ansaldo.22 It is hard, however, to believe this:
Ansaldo and Armstrong had equally been criticised by the Commission because of the presence of
Albini in their boards.  During the meeting it was also suggested that  Terni could make public its
balance sheets so  as  to  demonstrate  the correctness  of  the prices  it  quoted to  the  government.
Orlando  and  Oddero  opposed  the  motion, however.  In  fact,  Terni's  accounts  were less  then
transparent. For example, there is no trace in the minutes of the price Terni paid in 1904 to purchase
70% of the capital of Orlando and Odero's yards. Between 1903 and 1904, however, the value of the
18 R. Chiarini,  ‘Ambizioni e  Difficoltà di un  Progetto  Riformatore’,  id.  (ed.),  Alle  Origini dell'Età  Giolittiana. La
Svolta Liberale del Governo Zanardelli-Giolitti 1901-1903 (Venezia, 2003), 49 and 51-52 offers an explanation of
Gioliti's support for the enquire, even though it was strongly opposed by the king and the Navy.
19 P. Ferrari, Verso la Guerra. L'Italia nella Corsa agli Armamenti 1884-1918 (Vicenza, 2003), 166-182.
20 Id., ‘Amministrazioni Statali e Industrie nell'Età Giolittiana. Le Commesse Pubbliche tra Riarmo e Crisi Economica
1911-194’, Italia Contemporanea 180 (1990), 451-479.
21 Id.,  ‘Corruption  in  Italy:  a  Structural  Approach’, S.  Tiihonen  (ed.),  The  History  of  Corruption  in  Central
Government (Amsterdam, 2003), 165-178.
22 AST, FT, b. 71, Verbali del Comitato Esecutivo, 7 May 1906, and b. 38, Verbali del Consiglio di Amministrazioni, 7
May 1906. 
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Figure   7  .4  : The front page of the newspaper  La Stampa, 1 May 1906. The title is “New serious
revelations of the Enquiry on the navy”. The subtitle refers to “Scandalous favours for Terni. Price
increases of million, beyond the agreed one”.
Source: http://www.archiviolastampa.it. 
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entry “industrial holdings” in Terni's balance sheets increased from 4,273,028 Lire to 14,023,046.23
According to Giorgio Doria, who made use of contemporary journalistic sources, Odero's two yards
in Genoa were paid a total of 3,2 million Lire.24 This means that Orlando's yard could have been
paid up to 6,8 million Lire, although the price was probably a bit lower. Terni left the managerial
control over the yards' operations to their previous owners, which were paid part in cash and part in
newly issued Terni's  shares.25 Orlando and Odero  thus  gained twice  from the  sale  because,  in
addition to the money, they strengthened their control over Terni by increasing their shareholdings. 
Among the survived records, there is no trace of the final year results of the different units
(steel works, yards, etc.) of Terni. Fragmented data on intra group sales show that the price at which
transfers of  forgings,  plates and armours were  recorded  varied  considerably.  Sometimes  yards
bought supplies from the steelworks at high prices  while,  in other occasions, they did not pay at
all.26 While it is impossible to arrive  at any precise conclusion about the final year results of  the
yards,  something can be said  about  their  constructions  activities.  After  the  delivery of  the last
Garibaldi cruiser, the number of ships built for foreign governments felt significantly: Odero built
two gunboats (1,200 tons each) for the Mexican government in 1903,  but from that moment it
exported nothing.  The performance of  Orlando's yard was brighter:  in 1909 it  sold an  armoured
cruiser originally intended for the Italian navy to Greece for £950,000 (that is 23,750,000 Lire).27
The Georgios Averof (10,000 tons) is still the largest ship ever built in Italy for a foreign customer.28
Italian orders, therefore, came to represent the major source of military works. In this field,
the  Odero  yard obtained more orders than Orlando. In fact  after Orlando launched in 1907 the
armoured cruiser Pisa and two 10,000 tons auxiliary vessels, it only built several destroyers of 800-
900 tons each. Only in 1914 Orlando was awarded the contract for one of the super-dreadnoughts
whose construction was cancelled during the war. Odero, at the opposite, built for the Italian navy
the dreadnought Leonardo da Vinci (a contract worth 70 million Lire),29 plus destroyers, submarines
and torpedo boats.  Despite the absence of  any evidence, it  is highly probable that  Orlando and
Odero  had an  agreement  on how to  divide shipbuilding  activities  among themselves.  In 1911,
23 AST, Fondo Terni, b. 308.
24 Doria, Investimenti, 667. 
25 AST, FT, bb. 37 and 38, Verbali del Consiglio di Amministrazione, 26 January and 23 February 1904.
26 Bonelli, Terni, 104.
27 G. F. Martorelli, ‘La Industria delle Costruzioni Navali in Italia (1861-1911)’, Rivista Marittima 43 (1911), 16. The
Georgios Averof is now as a museum ship, the only pre-dreadnought capital vessel still in existence which has not
been largely reconstructed. 
28 E.  Bagnasco  and  A.  Rastelli,  ‘Le  Costruzioni  Navali  Italiane  per  l'Estero’,  special  issue  of Rivista  Marittima,
December 1991.
29 G. Giorgerini and A. Nani, Le Navi di Linea Italiane 1861-1961 (Roma, 1962), 121-22.
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Orlando yard employed around 2,800 workers, and, with an extension of 150,000 square meters, it
had tripled the surface it occupied in 1866. In the same year Odero two yards in Genoa had a total
workforces of 2,900 and a overall surface of 110,000 square meters.30
The few references which can be found in Terni's records  about the yards' activities make
clear that Odero and Orlando invested to modernise and keep their yards up to date. For instance, in
1905, Orlando bought the rights  for the use  in Italy  of  the steam turbine designed by the Swiss
company  Escher  Wyss.31 HMS  Dreadnought had  pioneered  the  introduction  of turbines  as
replacement of triple-expansion engines in battleships, and the Italian yards (Ansaldo had secure the
right  to  use  Parson's  design)  rapidly  responded  to  this  development,  by  acquiring  the  new
technology from established foreign producers.
Between 1904 and 1910 large investments were undertaken to increase the output of the
steelworks. In 1904 the board approved the erection of a plant able to produce 3,000 tons a year of
Krupp plates,  which was later  expanded to 5,000 tons.32 This investment was followed by a new
Martin-Siemens foundry and two 45 ton furnaces. In addition a 4,500 ton Davy press was installed
to allow working larger forgings and, finally, a 16,000 HP rolling mill was also purchased.33 Large
investments were also made to increase the production of hydroelectric power: in 1911 Umbria was
the first region in Italy in terms of installed power capacity per worker, a result which was entirely
due to Terni.34 This investment spree  created a potential capacity  which, however, was not fully
utilised until  the First  World War.  This  was a  recurrent  issue for  armaments firms:  in order  to
achieve economies of scale they had to set up large works,  works whose minimum efficient size
grew with the development of military technology. However, because every firm was pursuing the
same strategy, potential capacity was often a source of concern. In 1913 Terni produced 16,540 tons
of steel, less than ten years before (and equal to a just 1,9% of the national output),35 but virtually all
the production was  now  devoted to armaments production  as well as to supply yards with large
forgings.
30 Martorelli, ‘Industria’, 254, 256, 257.
31 AST, FT, b. 38,Verbali, 26 January 1905. The only publication in English on Escher Wyss is  the commemorative
volume B. Fehr, Escher Wyss, 1805-1955. 150 years of development (Zurich, 1950).
32 AST, FT, b. 38,Verbali, 16 June 1904.
33 A description of the steelworks in this period is in La Società degli Alti Forni, Fonderie ed Acciaierie di Terni ed i
Cantieri Navali Fratelli Orlando & C. di Livorno, N. Odero & C. – Genova (Foce), N. Odero fu A. & C. – Sestri
Ponente (Roma, 1911).
34 V. Zamagni, Industrilizzazione e Squilibri Regionali in Italia, Bilancio dell'Età Giolittiana (Bologna, 1978), 92-93
and 228-229.
35 See G. Scagnetti, La Siderurgia in Italia (Roma, 1923)., 215-238, and Ilva, Altiforni e Acciaieri d'Italia. 1897-1947
(Bergamo, 1948), 352-353.
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Terni's final years results are shown in figure 7.5. It is difficult to assess how accurate is the
representation of the firm's activities provided by  Terni's balance sheets. Changes in the level of
depreciations and other accounting practices were certainly used to smooth the level profits and to
allow the distribution of dividends. The surge of profits in 1904-5 is connected with stock exchange
operations carried on by Prina, whereas Terni's increased profitability from 1908-09 onward was a
consequence of the increasing Italian naval budget. 
Figure  7  .5  : Terni's final year results (in millions of current Lire):
Source: AST, Fondo Terni, Relazioni dell'Assemblea degli Azionisti, various years.
With the formal purchase of Odero and Orlando yards, Terni was one step away from being
able to manufacture all the military hardware required for building a warship. Only the capacity to
make guns was still lacking. To rapidly enter into artillery production, Terni could either purchase
an already functioning gun making plant,  or erect  a new plant  with the help of  an established
producer willing to offer its technical expertise. In the first case, the only possible target in Italy was
Pozzuoli.  In  the  second case,  the  difficulty  was  to  find a  suitable  and  willing partner.  Terni's
management had already thought about venturing into gun making some years before: in 1901 Terni
discussed  with  Schneider  the  possibility  of setting up  a  plant  for  gun  making.36 The  fact  that
36 AST, FT, Verbali, b. 37, 12 December 1901.
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Schneider had provided  Terni with  technical support  in the 1880s probably explains why Terni
initially turned to it for assistance. Because of the scant records, it is impossible to say how serious
were the overtures made by Terni, though.
The  following  year  Terni's  managers  met  with  Armstrong's  representatives  to  discuss  a
possible agreement about Pozzuoli. Armstrong, as it will be explained below, was looking for a way
to increase the sales of its Italian branch. Terni offered to purchase half of the plant.37 Once again,
however, no agreement was reached. Armstrong was at the same time negotiating a joint acquisition
of  Ansaldo  with  Ferdinando  Maria  Perrone.  Even  though  in the  end  the  Ansaldo-Armstrong
combination did not offer the results hoped for by the  two  partners,  it increased the pressure on
Terni to find a way to enter into gun making: Terni feared that Ansaldo would gain privileged access
to the only plant in Italy able to make large and medium sized naval guns. Terni's board was equally
worried about the fact that Armstrong had erected “a Martin-Siemens furnace and a forge plant” in
Pozzuoli.  These investments meant that Pozzuoli  might stop  to  exclusively  rely on Terni  for its
steel.38
With the Ansaldo-Armstrong agreement removing the  possibility  of gaining control over
Pozzuoli, Terni's only way to acquire gun making capabilities was to set up a new plant with the
technical support of an established producer. Terni finally succeeded in 1905 when Terni reached an
agreement with Vickers to create a new plant for the manufacture of artillery in Italy. At the meeting
of 7 July 1905 the board discussed the project. The chairman (Prina) underlined how such a step
represented  “the  last  part  of  the  vast  programme outlined  by the  board”.  Such a  development
occurred after “several attempts had been made by the firm's subsequent boards to arrive to an
understanding  with  Armstrong.” Orlando  presented to  his  fellow  directors  the  scheme  of  the
agreement. Terni  and Vickers  were  to  create a  new firm,  the  Vickers-Terni  Società  Italiana  di
Artiglierie e Armamenti, with an initial capital of 2,500,000 Lire.39 The aim of the new firm was to
“erect a plant based on the most modern principles for the manufacture of naval and land artillery
based on the patents owned by Vickers and Terni.”40 Shares of the new company were subscribed by
Terni,  Vickers,  the  Orlando  and  Odero  yards  as  well  as  Attilio  Odero  and  Giuseppe  Orlando
personally. The board of the new company had an Italian majority. Albert Vickers was its chairman.
Vickers controlled a minority stake in the new firm (it contributed 22.5% of the initial capital), but
37 AST, FT, id, 30 August 1902.
38 Id., b.38, 21 March 1904.
39 L. Segreto, ‘More trouble than profit: Vickers' investments in Italy 1906-39’, Business History 27 (1985), 316-337. 
40 AST, FT, Verbali, b. 38, 7 August 1905.
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it  offered  what  Terni  coveted  more:  technical  know-how.  Vickers  supplied the  new firm  with
drawings, patents and training  opportunities in Britain  for technicians and engineers.  Moreover,
Vickers received 10% of the firm's annual profits as a royalty in addition to its share of dividends.
Terni,  by contrast, provided the majority of the capital, gun forgings at discounted prices, and the
unquantifiable, but  crucial contacts with the Italian military  hierarchy. Despite Vickers  controlled
only a minority stake, it is likely that its name was put first in the name of the new firm to capitalise
on a brand which was well known in the armaments industry. 
The partners  decided to  erect  a gun plant  in  Spezia.  Until  1908,  bureaucratic  problems
delayed the construction.41 Erection of the works took five years: in 1911 Orlando could inform the
fellow directors that “the great Vickers-Terni plant in Spezia was nearly finished”,42 and in 1912 the
first  guns  were completed.43 Vickers-Terni faced now the problem  of  recruiting enough skilled
workers:  it was difficult,  in fact, “to find serious and capable mechanics. Vickers-Terni had hired
many of them from the Leghorn yard [of Orlando] and hopes to receive more of them from Odero
and Terni”.44 The costs of erecting the plant increased significantly in the course of the years: during
a meeting of Terni's board in late 1909, the capital of Vickers-Terni was raised to 5,000,000, 72% of
the increase being covered by Terni and its directors.45 Other increases followed in the subsequent
years; the new capital was used to a large extent to finance the expansion of the works (Figure 7.6).
The capital infused in Vickers-Terni came in the majority from the Italian shareholders. It is not by
chance  that  the largest  injections  occurred after  1911,  when the Italian  naval  budget  started  to
expand at a very rapid pace and the advances paid by the government to the various firms belonging
to the Terni group were partially used to finance the expansion of Vickers-Terni.
Despite the delay in the erection of the plant, Vickers-Terni started to receive orders from the
navy already in 1910, the most important being that for the thirteen 305 mm guns for the Andrea
Doria. The navy was keen on increasing the number of potential suppliers of guns on which it could
rely, however, because the plant was not yet ready, production was carried out in Britain by Vickers
(thus it is doubtful that Vickers pushed for a rapid completion of the Spezia plant).46 
41 Id., 24 March 1908.
42 Id, Verbali, b. 40, 19 January 1911.
43 O. Calamai,  Annuario della Marina Mercantile e delle  Industrie  Navali in Italia  (Genova, 1912), 305-7,  offers a
description of the works.
44 Id., 27 April 1911.
45 AST, FT, Verbali del consiglio d'amministrazione, b. 39, 12 October 1909.
46 Segreto, Troubles, 320.
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Figure  7  .6  : Vickers-Terni capital and assets, 1909-1914 (in current Lire).
Year Capital Value of works
1909 2,500,000 1,000,000
1910 5,000,000 2,100,000
1911 5,000,000 10,600,000
1912 7,500,000 14,000,000
1913 12,500,000 17,300,000
1914 15,000,000 18,100,000
Source:  Archivio  delle  Società  Commerciali,  Tribunale  di  Roma,  f.  262/08,  quoted  in  Doria,
Investimenti e Sviluppo, 539.
In 1912  Vickers-Terni received an order from for  field artillery the War ministry, the first
significant  order  that  the  Army  awarded to  an  Italian  private  firm  since  the  1860s.  Until  that
moment, the  Army had either  relied on its arsenals or  on purchases abroad,  as in 1906, when the
Army bought field ordnance from Krupp.47 The Krupp field artillery, however, was not regarded as
fully satisfactory and the Army started to plan for its replacement.48 In 1912 a consortium of Italian
firms formed around Vickers-Terni won the contract for the construction in Italy of a new model of
field artillery based on a design developed by colonel Deport for the French Army.49 Once again,
Italian  firms had  to  rely  on  foreign  know-how and  expertise  in  order  to  produce  competitive
military hardware.  The production of the new guns  suffered from conspicuous  delays, probably
because  it overstretched  Vickers-Terni's resources  and  internal  capacities,  and  because  of  the
difficulty of coordinating the activities of the firms involved. The guns started to be delivered only
in 1914, on the eve of the war.50 
Armstrong  Pozzuol  i 
On  21  February 1900 Armstrong's directors met for a “special meeting” to “consider the
present situation of the Pozzuoli works”, the first significant reference to Pozzuoli which appears in
47 G.  Rochat  and  G.  Massobrio,  Breve  Storia dell'Esercito  Italiano dal  1861 al  1943  (Torino,  1978),109,  and  F.
Cappellano, Le Artiglierie del Regio Esercito nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale (Parma, 1998), 85.
48 C. Montù, Storia dell'Artiglieria Italiana, vol. 7 (Rome, 1941), 1358.
49 The Piedmontese entrepreneur Dante Ferraris played a key role in organising the consortium for the manufacture of
the Déport gun, E. Orsolini, ‘Ferraris, Dante’, DBI.
50 Ferrari, Verso la Guerra, 203-4.
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the minutes of the board since the creation of the Armstrong Pozzuoli company in 1896. 
The  question  of  providing  Pozzuoli  with  work  has  been  a  very  serious
responsibility during the last  few years.  Prospects of orders have,  at  all  times,
been uncertain, and periods of  slackness and consequent discharge of workmen
have been experienced.51 
Armstrong directors admitted that a recent order of approximately 9 million Lire (£360,000)
had improved the  short  term  position of the company,  reducing the  need to  find an immediate
solution.52 In addition, it was recognised that the management carefully run the plant, and that the
production was of good quality. Problems lay somewhere else: 
[T]he future prospect of Pozzuoli must be considered as gravely uncertain.
After  its  first  establishment it  has never commanded the active support of the
government,  except  of  the  Minister  of  the  Navy,  partly  because  more  strictly
national competitors have sprung up and partly because we ourselves have not
perhaps developed Pozzuoli so fully as the government hoped. 
From the  period of  their  completion – about  eight  years  –  the  works  at
Pozzuoli  have  remained  practically  stationary.  Every  other  department  of  our
works  has  been  enormously  extended,  but  we  have  hesitated  to  pursue  any
progressive policy at Pozzuoli through a feeling of uncertainty as to a consistent
support of the government. 
When  Pozzuoli  was  started  there  was  some  idea  of  our  eventually
constructing  a  shipbuilding  yard,  and plant  for  making ammunition,  but  these
projects  have  not  been  carried  out:  the  place  remains  entirely  dependent  on
outside sources for its guns steel, and we do not make shells or ammunition. We
have, in fact, from one cause or another pursued a half hearted policy with regard
to Pozzuoli, looking upon it as a place in which we have sunk a great deal of
money without much certain hope of return, and feeling a decided disinclination
to embark any further capital in it.
51 This and the following quotations come from T&W 130/1266, Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors, 21
February 1900.
52 Considering the timing, it is likely that the order refers to the guns of one of the Garibaldi-class cruiser.
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This  paragraph  underlines  the various Pozzuoli  suffered  from.  First  of  all,  the  limited
demand for guns: Pozzuoli was built at the peak of the Italian naval expenditures,  but when the
plant  entered  production  the Italian naval  budget  started  to decline,  disappointing  Armstrong's
managers hopes of a thriving business.  The ordnance plants in the arsenals of Spezia, Venice and
Naples did were not serious competitor: altogether they could manufacture 3 203 mm guns every
two years,  18 76 mm guns a  year,  plus  a  few dozens of  47 mm guns.53 Considering that,  for
example, a cruiser of the Garibaldi-class was armed with 1 254 mm gun, 2 203 mm guns, 14 152
mm guns,  10 76 mm guns and 6 47 mm guns,  or  that  the  pre-dreadnought  battleship  Vittorio
Emanuele  (laid down in 1901) was equipped with 2 305 mm guns, 12 203 mm guns, 16 76 mm
guns and 10 47 mm guns, it is evident that it was not competition from the arsenal plants which
Pozzuoli had to fear.  In addition, the growing importance given to large calibre artillery favoured
Pozzuoli, which could manufacture 254 mm and 305 mm guns, whereas arsenals were not equipped
to do that. The crux of the problem was that the orders  received from the Italian  Navy were not
enough to saturate the potential capacity of Pozzuoli. This issue was magnified by the fact that the
Italian Army, a potential large customer, did not buy from Pozzuoli.
The second problem identified was the lack of investments. Data on investments presented
in chapter V pointed to a substantially flat trend after the plant was set up. The decision of reducing
investments was a rational one in the short term: it was better to employ resources where the returns
were  higher,  that  is  in  Britain,  rather  than  in  Italy.  In  the  medium-long  term,  however,
underinvestment meant that the technological leadership in the Italian market could no longer be
taken for granted, the productivity of the works stagnated and that it became increasingly difficult to
attract foreign orders to Pozzuoli to counterbalance the weak domestic demand.
Pozzuoli  suffered also from the fact that it could manufacture only guns.54 The strategy of
combining various armaments productions that had worked so well for Elswick was not replicated
in Italy.  To  create a  steel  plant  or a  shipyard would have represented a  huge  expenditure with
uncertain returns. Moreover, no  Italian  company before  the early  1900s had embarked on such a
strategy. Recently, however, the competition had become fiercer:
Other  establishments,  concluding  that  Elswick  will  never  pursue  any
vigorous expansive policy in Italy, have continuously extended their own works.
53 Inchiesta sulla Marina, Relazione Finale, vol. 2, Relazioni Speciali, 180-183.
54 Despite the fact that no proper shipbuilding activities was ever carried on there, the plant was known as “Cantiere
Armstrong” (Armstrong's shipyard). 
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Thus [the directors of] Ansaldo of Genoa have last year erected steel works, have
tendered to the government for the forgings for the field guns, and say they will
make  guns  outright  if  the  government  wish.  Terni  is  making  shells  and  has
decided to make guns. It has refused already to supply us with forgings for shell
which we are anxious to make, and may at any time refuse to supply us with gun
steel. In that case the government will not allow us to use Elswick steel, because
they can not do so in face of the country. It is important to note that we have
hitherto not been in the position to make the ammunition for any of the armaments
we  have  manufactured  at  Pozzuoli,  and  have  therefore  entirely  lost  the  large
profits to be made on such orders.
The threat that  competitors could undermine Armstrong's  monopolistic position in naval
ordnance still laid in the future: in 1900 Italian firms lacked the experience and skills  required to
assemble guns of the same quality that Armstrong could offer.  However, despite its technological
competitive  advantage,  Armstrong  could  find  itself  in  a  difficult  situation  if  Terni,  its  unique
supplier of steel,  would  enter into ordnance making. The directors  also emphasised  an additional
weakness of Pozzuoli: 
The  fact  of  Pozzuoli  not  being  an  Italian  firm has  been  always  raised  as  an
obstacle to placing orders with us and the growth of the national sentiment in Italy
makes it continually more difficult for any ministry to give large orders to what is
rightly or wrongly considered a foreign firm. This difficulty has recently become
more accentuated, and the Minister of Marine has been practically forced to give
his  support  to  a  combination  of  Italian firms.  The ministry suggested that  the
combination  should  approach  us  with  a  view  to  including  [Pozzuoli]  in  the
scheme. 
It would seem that there are three decisions possible:
a) join the combination;
b) to ourselves vigorously expand Pozzuoli at a probable cost of ... [no amount is
written in the minutes];
c) to let matters go on as they are.
In the last case we run a grave risk of being gradually edged out by more active
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competitors. 
It is evident that all the three options were unsatisfactory. Because in 1900 the conditions of
the Italian armaments market gave no sign to improve in the short term, the third option did not
seemed practical. The second was equally unacceptable: the combination the directors refer to was
a projected agreement between the Italian companies Florio (a family concern involved especially
in shipping)55 and Hawthorn-Guppy  and the French firm Schneider  aiming at setting up a naval
yard.56 The idea of participating in such a project – which never materialised – was hardly attractive
for Armstrong: the two Italian companies were small and their yards on the gulf of Naples were tens
of kilometres away from Pozzuoli.  At the same time,  Schneider  was an uncomfortable  partner
because it was a major rival in the international markets. Armstrong was in danger of providing the
joint-venture  with  a valuable asset – the gun manufacturing plant –  while receiving in exchange
only a minority participation. The  best  solution did appear to lie in an agreement with an Italian
partner, a link which could soft the uncomfortable foreign identity of Pozzuoli. At the same time,
however,  Armstrong's  directors  wanted  to preserve  full control  over the  plant  which  was,
strategically, if not economically, a crucial asset, being the only company able to make large naval
guns in Italy.
The first move of the board was that “authority should be given to Sir Andrew Noble to
commence negotiations with the Minister of the Navy for the acquiring of the arsenal of Naples.”57
By 1900, the Italian Navy had decided to reduce the number of arsenals it owned, and to focus its
investments on  Spezia and Taranto.  The arsenal in Naples, small and located in the city centre,
represented a financial burden for the government, which wanted to “privatise” it. Armstrong then
approached the Minister with a proposal:
We  understand  that  your  Excellency's  government  has  under  its
consideration the re-organization of the Royal  Italian Arsenals,  and that  in  the
scheme of rearrangement it is contemplated to entrust the Neapolitan Arsenal to
private management. If it is so, we shall be glad if your Excellency will allow us to
make  formal  application  for  the  concession.  We  trust  that  in  making  this
55 R. Candela,  I  Florio (Palermo,  1986),  and  id., L'Economia dei  Florio,  una  Famiglia di  Imprenditori  Borghesi
nell'800 (Palermo, 1991). 
56 T&W, 130/1266, Minutes, 21 February 1900.
57 Id., 25 April 1900.
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application it is unnecessary for us to make mention of the position of our firm, or
of those intimate relations which have so long existed between your Excellency's
government and ourselves. We will therefore confine ourselves to saying that in
asking for this concession we do not seek any great profit for ourselves, but we
wish to extend our operations in Italy, and to draw closer the bonds between the
Italian government and our firm.58
The firm's assertion to be interested more in deepening the link with the government than in
profits was rhetoric,  but perhaps not completely insincere:  by obtaining the management of the
arsenal,  Armstrong could expanded its  activities in Italy to shipbuilding and other  productions,
increasing its chances to gain additional orders from the Navy. The following months were devoted
to this project: first of all Armstrong secured the co-operation of three Italian firms based in Naples
– Hawthorn-Guppy, Pattison, and Carmine de Luca – to make the deal more palatable to the public
opinion.59 Then, it put pressure on the government by informing that without new orders Pozzuoli
could  not  avoid  “discharge  of  workmen  and  attendant  excitement  and  riots.”60 However,  the
Ministry and Armstrong did not reach an agreement on the sales of the arsenal. Armstrong wanted
the  Ministry  to  pledge to  provide  the  arsenal  with  enough  work  to  keep  it  busy.  If  this  was
impossible, the government was to cover the salary of the workmen and the losses of the company.
The government  refused  to  accept  such  a  provision  which,  while  favouring Armstrong  in
comparison with all the other firms working for the Navy, would not have reduced the Navy's costs.
The board was informed that its tender had been refused.61
After this failure, Armstrong took two important decision in 1902. First, it decided to reduce
its dependence on Terni by equipping Pozzuoli  with steel works.62 Second,  he joined Ferdinando
Maria  Perrone  in  acquiring an interest  in  Ansaldo.  The agreement  with Perrone is  analysed in
details below, in the paragraph which dealing with Ansaldo; here it is discussed only in reference to
the history of Pozzuoli. Pozzuoli was not part of the agreement with Perrone. Apparently this was
an illogical move: Armstrong had acquired a large share of Ansaldo exactly to gain a sure outlet for
Pozzuoli's  guns  and  a  merger  of  Ansaldo  and  Pozzuoli  would  have  facilitated  that.  It  seems
plausible to speculate,  however, that Armstrong  did want to preserve the control of Pozzuoli not
58 ACS, Fondo Marina Militare, Gabinetto (1893-1910), b. 6, 19 April 1900
59 Id., 2 June 1900.
60 T&W, 130/1266, Minutes, 22 November 1900.
61 Id. 
62 Id, 28 May 1902.
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because of the profits  it  produced (which,  despite  the lack of data,  seem to have been in  that
moment limited), but because – exactly as Terni for armour plates –  Pozzuoli enjoyed a  de facto
monopoly in naval artillery.  If Pozzuoli was too strongly connected with a certain firm, or group,
this fact could generate the creation  by rival Italian armaments firms of another artillery plant,
which inevitably  would eat into Pozzuoli's market share, as in fact happened later with Vickers-
Terni.
Pozzuoli seldom appeared in Armstrong's records after in 1908 Armstrong ended in all but
name its involvement with Ansaldo. The only source which provide substantial  information about
Pozzuoli's activities in the years up to the First World War is the commemorative volume published
by  the  Armstrong  Pozzuoli  company  in  1912  to  celebrate  the  fifteenth anniversary  of  the
establishment  of  the  Armstrong Pozzuoli.63 Pozzuoli's  fortunes  started to  improve from 1905-6
onwards, as output and workforce increased thanks to the rising naval budget (Figure 7.7). Between
1904 and 1911 Pozzuoli more than doubled its employees, from less than 1,500 to around 3,700. At
the same time, production quadrupled, arriving in 1911 to exceed 4,000 tons of ordnance. 
The decision to set up steel works had been especially fortunate because it had solved one of
the major problems which had previously affected Pozzuoli:
The most important expansion has been the creation a grandiose plant for
making  all  the  required  metals,  steel,  pig  iron  and  bronze,  and  for  their
processing, melting and forging … While before the firm had to supply itself from
other companies for the majority of the semi-worked materials … now Armstrong
exclusively buy raw materials in the market.64
63 Lo Stabilimento Armstrong di Pozzuoli dal 1896 al 1911 (Bergamo, 1911).
64 Stabilimento Armstrong, 7-8.
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Figure  7  .7  : Pozzuoli's workforce and output (in tons), 1900-1911.
 
Source: Stabilimento Armstrong, 145 and 173.
The  steel  plant  was  equipped  with  2  10  ton  and  3  30  ton Martin-Siemens  furnaces.65
Pozzuoli could also make the  crucible steel  used for special components and tools. In addition, a
4,000 ton press to forge the steel ingots used for gun making had been implanted.66 While the lack
of  data  makes  it  impossible to  quantify  the  resources  used  to  finance these investments,  by
surveying the map of the works which appears in the 1912 commemorative volume (figure 7.8) it is
possible to assess their results: in 1911 the gun making plant covered an area of around 17,600
square meters (it is the large building at the centre of the map), while the metal works covered an
area of little more than 10,000 square meters (it is the other large building at the west of the gun
shop). The plant was served by several kilometres of tracks and a 160 ton crane at the top end of the
pier allowed embarking the finished guns.  The result of these investments was that, by 1911, the
capital value of Pozzuoli was assessed by Armstrong's management as around 1 million pounds.67 
65 Scagnetti,  Siderurgia, 197,  reports the presence of  four Martin-Siemens furnaces in 1913, while  the 1912 official
volume describes five Martin-Siemens furnaces. It seems more likely that Scagnetti made a mistake rather than that
one of the furnaces being dismantled in the course of 1912.
66 Stabilimento Armstrong, 15.
67 T&W, 130/7746, 13 November 1911.
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Figure  7  . 8  : Plan of Armstrong Pozzuoli, 1911.
Source: Stabilimento Armstrong, figure out of text.
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Ansaldo
In  1903  Ferdinando  Maria  Perrone  with  the  substantial help  of  Armstrong  purchased
Ansaldo from the Bombrini family. Since the late 1890s Perrone had become the the most important
foreign agent of the company. This had been just the last turn in his eventful life. Born in 1847 from
a servant in the royal palace in Turin, Perrone had twice fought in his youth with Garibaldi and he
had been involved in various murky affairs.68 He later managed to secure a position as administrator
of agricultural estates in the Padana Valley until,  in 1885 he moved to Argentina. Here Perrone
became an  important  figure  inside  the  Italian  community,  developing contacts  with journalists,
bankers and politicians of the ruling criollo élite. He also started several economic activities which
made him much wealthier than he was before moving to South America.69
Perrone became involved with Ansaldo in 1894, thanks to his brother-in-law, Antonio Omati,
the managing director of Ansaldo's mechanical plant.70 Perrone  rapidly established himself as the
driving force behind the plan to conquer new markets for Ansaldo's  vessels.  Using his contacts,
Perrone  was able to convince the Argentina  government to  order four  Garibaldi-class cruisers in
1895-96 (two built by Ansaldo and two by Orlando), followed by other two (both built by Ansaldo)
in 1901-02  which Argentina  sold to  Japan before  they were completed  and participated to  the
Russo-Japanese  War.  Perrone's  skills  were  not  that  of  the  engineer:  he  had  neither  technical
education, nor he  displayed any  strong  interest in mechanics.  By contrast,  Perrone was good at
rapidly sizing favourable circumstances to exploit his network of contacts (such as the Argentine
on-off president, general Julio Roca) to create business opportunities.71 As Paride Rugafiori states:
“the non-industrial Perrone … had clear in mind the need for public relations activities.”72 These
skills, which were decisive in his early business carrier as Ansaldo's chief salesman, were, however,
much less useful later on, when he found himself at the helm of the firm. 
The success in Argentina was followed by the sale of two more cruisers to Spain.73 In 1901
68 P. Rugafiori,  Ferdinando Maria Perrone  (Torino, 1992), 1-5. In 1869 the young “paperhanger” Ferdinando was
sentenced few months in prison for fraud and assault. 
69 Id., 57-63. On the economic grow of Argentina in the late 1890s, see A. Ferrer, La Economia Argentina. Las Etapas
de sur Desarollo y Problema Actuales (Buenos Aires, 1987). 
70 The correspondence between Ansaldo and Perrone, some of them ciphered, is in AFA, FP, SSN b. 30. 
71 Perrone's attempt to gain  the favour of Crispi,  the Italian  prime minister in 1893-96, was less fortunate: Perrone
“presented” Crispi with 150,000 Lire to help him  to  repay some personal debts. Such a  donation became  public
when Crispi ended involved in a trial for peculation which later resulted into a parliamentary investigation. Perrone
risked, once again, to face trial. See C. Duggan, Francesco Crispi 1818-1901. From Nation to Nationalism (Oxford,
2002), 717-18, and, for a contemporary evaluation of the events, D. Farini,  Diario di  Fine  Secolo, vol.  2 (Roma,
1961), passim.
72 Rugafiori, Perrone, 83.
73 AFA, FP, SSM ter b. 97. The order for the second one was later cancelled.
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Perrone, now back to Italy, was nominated Ansaldo's general director for foreign markets, and the
subsequent year he acquired a 1/18 of the  capital of the  firm for 600,000 Lire. In 1903, Perrone
approached Armstrong about the possibility to jointly acquire the control of Ansaldo by purchasing
a majority interest in the firm. Perrone had first meet Armstrong's representatives when Pozzuoli
was awarded the contract for the guns for the Garibaldi cruisers. Albini, who was a director of both
Armstrong and Armstrong-Pozzuoli, played a key role in this negotiation.74 Elswick set up a sub-
committee to investigate  Perrone's proposal which arrived while Armstrong was trying to find a
way to reinforce Pozzuoli's position inside the Italian market. The special sub-committee reported to
the directors that:
The firms of Messrs Ansaldo, shipbuilders and engineers of Genoa, consists
of three partners, two brothers Bombrini and Mr Perrone. Mr Perrone has a large
interest  and  the  opportunity  now  presents  itself  of  buying  out  the  Messrs
Bombrini.  The present proposal  is  that  we should find half  the capital  for Mr
Perrone to effect this  purpose.  The purchase value is stated at  18 million  Lire
[£720,000] and our share would be one half [£360,000]. The business would then
be placed before the Italian public with a capital of 25 million Lire [£1,000,000].
It is thought that the shares would be readily taken up, and the Credito Italiano –
an Italian bank – would be willing to underwrite shares to the amount of 6 million
Lire.75
To define Perrone's interest “large” was an overstatement (he owned only 5.5% of the firm),
but there is no doubt that he was the driving force behind the project. One of the attractions of the
plan for  both  Perrone and Armstrong was  that  it  could  provide  a  solution  for the  problem of
importing semi-finished and finished products from Britain: a company in which Italian investors
owned at least half of shares could hardly be labelled as “foreign”. Therefore it could more easily
buy from abroad  crucial  components,  freeing  Ansaldo  from the  need to  rely on  costly  Italian
hardware. As the Elswick's directors stressed:
A possible difficulty in obtaining armour plate was discussed, Terni holding
under the  armour  plate  convention [presumably this refers to  the agreements of
74 AFA, FP, Misc., b. 5/3-4.
75 T&W 130/1266, Minutes, 17 June 1903. 
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the Harvery syndicate] a monopoly for the supply of armour plates in Italy. But it
is  thought  probable  that  if  we possessed a  controlling  interest  in  Ansaldo,  we
should be allowed to supply our own armour plates from Manchester.76
After some initial resistance, Perrone was able to convince the Bombrini brothers to agree to
the sale to him and Ansaldo of the controlling interest in the firm.77 The Bombrini were attracted by
the price Perrone offered: they were less bullish about the possibility of  additional large orders
(while Perrone maintained ambitious plans) and they had large business interests outside Ansaldo –
public works, real estate and other industrial ventures – in which they could reinvest the profit of
the sale.78 
In December 1903 the Società Anonima Italiana Gio. Ansaldo Armstrong & Co. was created
with a capital of 3 million Lire, half of it paid by Armstrong, and the other half by Perrone, Albini
and other Italian shareholders, among them the Bombrini.79 The interest of the Credito Italiano did
not materialise, though. Elswick appointed as directors Admiral Albini (who was elected chairman),
John Falkner and John Noble; the Italian shareholders appointed Ferdinando Maria Perrone (who
was the company's chief executive) and Carlo Bombrini.80 The new company then bought for 18
million Lire all the works, patents, designs and other assets of the old Gio. Ansaldo Company. The
Bombrini would receive 4,888,786 Lire immediately, plus 17 million in shares of the new company.
Armstrong – after a due diligence of the assets of the company – subscribed half of the increase in
capital of the new company.81 Who, however, was to be at the helm of the company was clear: “The
said  Commendatore  Perrone  shall  become  and  remain  a  managing  director  of  the  proposed
Company for a term of five years from its incorporation, at a reasonable remuneration”.82
The  two  new  partners  in  Ansaldo,  Armstrong  and  Perrone, had however  diverging
objectives. – a divergence which explains why the collaboration between them did not produce the
results hoped, and why it was terminated in all but name after only four years. Perrone did not have
the resource to acquire the control of Ansaldo by himself, he needed a parter, and Armstrong offered
76 Id. 
77 Rugafiori, Perrone, 139-140.
78 M.  Calzavarini,  ‘Bombrini,  Giovanni’, DBI; G.  Doria,  Investimenti  e  Sviluppo, 664-665.  A.  M. Falchero,  ‘La
Costruzione di  un  Gruppo  Industriale  Integrato’, P.  Hertner  (ed.),  Storia dell'Ansaldo.  Vol.  3, Dai Bombrini  ai
Perrone, 1903-1914 (Roma-Bari, 1996), 146-148.
79 AFA, FP, SSM bis, b. 2/1.
80 T&W130/1267, Minutes, 15 October 1903.
81 In AFA, FP, SSB, b.854/2 there are two copies – one in Italian,  the other in English – of the memorandum of
understanding between the three parts involved.
82 AFA, FP, SSMbis, 2/2.
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its  support.  Perrone,  however,  wanted  something  more  from  Armstrong: British  armaments
manufacturers enjoyed a technological leadership in the sector  and Perrone  wanted  Armstrong to
help Ansaldo to gain a leading position in the armaments business by sharing with it technologies
and  designs  and  transferring  sophisticate  expertise  and  know-how.  In  addition  Pozzuoli  and
Openshaw  could  supply,  respectively, guns  and  armour  plates  at  discounted  prices,
counterbalancing the advantages that Odero and Odero had gained from their control of Terni. At
the same time,  his  personal experience had made Perrone conscious that  foreign markets  were
crucial  for the fortunes of Ansaldo, given the limited  size of the domestic Italian market.  Once
again, Armstrong could help Ansaldo by making it its “junior partner” in tenders for foreign ships
(especially in South America).
What Armstrong's board hoped to gain through its connection with Ansaldo was a more
stable stream of orders for  Pozzuoli,  while, at same time, leaving the plant free to supply all the
Italian yards. Time and again, the foreign ownership of Pozzuoli had been raised as problematic,
given the strategic nature of its production.  The Ansaldo Armstrong combination was a possible
answer to this problem; in fact in the 1904 report to the shareholder the agreement was presented as
a  move  undertook  “in  order  to  strengthen  [Armstrong's]  position  at  Pozzuoli  and  in  other
quarters”.83 A letter sent by Perrone on 24 September, 1903 summarised the realities behind the
agreement: 
I  formally  bind  myself,  in  name  of  the  Gio.  Ansaldo  and  Armstrong
Company,  to  purchase  exclusively from the  Company Armstrong  Pozzuoli  or
possibly from Elswick all the ordnances and ammunitions, and all the other items
which could be needed, on top of all other suppliers, for all its works and orders
from foreign countries as well as from Italy. 
Thus Given the communion of interests existing at the moment among the
two  companies  and  the  excellent  relationship  which  is  the  result  of  such  a
communion,  the  two  companies  promise  each  other  assistance,  using  where
needed one the foreign agents of the other to in order to protect and develop their
own business.84 
83 Financial Times 20 September 1904, p.2.
84 AFA, SSB b. 854/3.
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It  is  evident  that  the  first  paragraph  looked  especially  promising  to  Elswick,  while  the
second encapsulated the hopes of Perrone who certainly was pleased that both Ansaldo Armstrong
and Pozzuoli had the same chairman, Admiral Albini.
Figure   7.  9  : Ansaldo and Armstrong's managers visiting the mechanical  plant of Ansaldo in 1904.
Ferdinando Maria Perrone is the third man from the right. At the centre of the picture is Sir Andrew
Noble, his arm in that of Pio Perrone.
Source: AFA.
The first years of the Ansaldo Armstrong were dominated by two crucial  issues:  to  secure
orders, and  to  expand  the range of productions. Until 1909 orders coming from the Italian navy
were relatively sparse: four sets of naval engines for capital ships, plus the fitting of the battleship
Napoli built at Castellammare  were the major contracts Ansaldo undertook. At the same time,  to
keep  the  yard  active, Ansaldo  built  several  destroyers  for  speculations,  vessels which  were
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purchased by the Italian navy. All these works seem to have generated little profit for the firm.85
Perrone, however, maintained high hope, for foreign orders: Ansaldo Armstrong participated to the
competitions organised  by Spain, Argentina, Russia, Brazil and Chile (to name the most relevant
customers) to select the private firms to which order new dreadnoughts and cruisers.86 The firm,
however, did not gain any major contract, a striking comparison with the success of the 1895-1905
period.
Perrone acquired the control  of Ansaldo  Armstrong two years before naval warfare was
revolutionised by the introduction of a cluster of new technologies (turbines, oil burning boilers,
etc.)  of which  the dreadnought  design represented the most  visible  aspect.  Ansaldo,  as well  as
Odero and Orlando, lost immediately much of the ground which they had conquered in the previous
decades  of incremental innovation  and which had led them to so successfully export  Garibaldi
cruisers to various foreign countries.  Suddenly larger,  faster,  more heavily armed and protected
vessels became the norm and, as it is common in the case of the introduction of new technologies or
design, the first movers, in this case the British armaments firms enjoyed a significant advantage; in
fact before 1914 Armstrong and Vickers gained the majority of the orders for dreadnoughts built in
private yards for foreign customers. The key reason why Ansaldo Armstrong (and the other Italian
firms)  saw a decline in foreign orders for large vessels was that  it lacked the technical expertise
required: Italian yards had to be enlarged to accommodate the kennels of the new dreadnoughts,
they machinery modernised,  licences for turbines acquired, etc. This  was  without considering the
problem of the supply of guns and armour plates which were dominated in Italy by two monopolies,
Pozzuoli  and Terni.  Other circumstances might  also  have played a role,  such as the absence of
contacts with powerful personalities inside governments and armed forces,  and the fact that no
Italian yard built a dreadnought until 1909 weakened their chance to acquire orders abroad. Despite
his personal contacts, and his remarkable ability as salesman, Perrone had no chance to successfully
compete with the major British armaments firms which could quote lower prices, guarantee shorter
construction time and, moreover, collaborated among each other.
During this  period, the only important foreign customer was the Ottoman  Empire  which
awarded Ansaldo Armstrong the  contract for modernising some units of the imperial fleet  and, in
addition, purchase nine torpedo boats.87 What is more, the Turkish government signed an agreement
85 AFA, SSNB, b. 955. Minutes of the Board, 31 March 1908. The minutes are quite explicit on the fact that the profits
of  those  years  resulted  from creative  bookkeeping  (negative  or  positive  items  were  regularly  put  forward  or
backward, generous assumption about future payments were made, etc.).
86 M. Doria, Ansaldo. L'Impresa e lo Stato (Milano, 1989), 83-90.
87 Bagnasco and A. Rastelli, ‘Le costruzioni Navali Italiane per l'Estero’, special issue of Rivista Marittima, December
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with Ansaldo Armstrong which gave the firm the management of the major arsenal of Istanbul, with
the aim of transforming it into a modern establishment. The Turkish government, however, was an
unreliable payer which took months to deposit any due instalment. Eventually the Libyan war ended
a  relationship  which  had  generated  plenty  of  correspondence,  but  meagre  profits.88 Ansaldo's
position improved substantially after 1908-9, when the growing Italian naval budget provided the
firm with a substantial stream of orders, the largest being that for the construction and the engines
of the dreadnought Giulio Cesare.
Perrone was equally frustrated in his aim of increasing the range of Ansaldo's production or,
at least, to obtain the material which Ansaldo did not produce at discounted prices. Already in 1905
Ansaldo's  management  planned  to enlarge the  steelworks  so  to make armour  plates  and break
Terni's monopoly in this field. Until that moment, the steelworks had been a small plant whose main
task was that of produce semi-finished goods for the mechanic plant.89 An armour plant would have
been a crucial step toward the creation of an integrated company, freeing Ansaldo from the need to
purchase plates on the market. Albini took the matter to the attention of Noble, asking for Elswick's
technical support. Noble replied that a plant of the kind of Openshaw, with a capacity of 3,500 tons
of armour per  annum would cost around £500,000 (12,5 million Lire).90 The high price forced
Perrone to  delay  this  investment, which,  at  the  same  time,  necessitated  of  the  support  of  an
experienced partner, considering the sophisticated nature of armour making. At the same time this
project suffered from another limit: how would have been possible for Ansaldo to sell thousands of
tons of armour a year when Terni was equally investing to increase its productive capacity to 5,000
tons of Krupp plates a year?  Ansaldo's investment would have near doubled Italian output in a
moment in which foreign orders were declining and the domestic demand still flat.
The relationship between Italian and the British shareholders soon deteriorated: the interests
of  the  two  groups  were  too  distant  to  make  possible  an  easy  collaboration.  Ansaldo  wanted
Armstrong  to  sell  it  armour  plates  and guns  at  discounted  prices,  while  Noble  offered  only a
reduction of 5-6 %.91 The support of the Armstrong's board to the ambitious projects of Perrone of
transforming  Ansaldo  into  a  fully  integrated  armaments  company was,  at  most,  lukewarm.
Armstrong was happy to help Ansaldo as far as the Italian market was concerned, but, being a
1991, 34.
88 A.  F.  Saba,  ‘L'Attività  dell'Ansaldo  nell'Impero  Ottomano’, P.  Hertner  (ed.),  Ansaldo,  93-110;  T.  Row,  Il
Nazionalismo Economico nell'Italia Liberale. L'Ansaldo, 1903-1921 (Bologna, 1997), 61-90.
89 M. Doria, ‘Dal Progetto di Integrazione Verticale alle Ristrutturazioni dell'IRI: la Siderurgia Ansaldo (1900-1953)’,
Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi 17 (1985), 411-453, details the evolution of Ansaldo's steel activities.
90 AFA, FP, SSM b. 7/3.
91 AFA, FP, SSM 7/1, 5 June 1905, and AFA, FP, SSNB 955.
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dominant player in the international markets, it regarded as unwise to strength too much a company
which, however smaller, could in the future erode Armstrong's market share. In this respect there is
a relevant letter which Perrone wrote to Andrew Noble – which, even if undated, can be dated to the
last months  of  1906  –  in  which  he  lamented  the  fact  the  “since  the  combination,  which  was
especially designed to help the expansion of all the activities of Ansaldo, the condition of the new
company  in  reference  to  the  freedom  of  production  and  action  had  worsened  as  a  result  of
international  illiberal  industrial  combinations.”92 Frustrated  especially  by the  inability  to  obtain
armourer plates, Perrone stated once again his desire to establish “a plant to manufacture the plates
Ansaldo had hoped to obtain from its associate … in order to have a homogeneous and powerful
organism whit which to contrast the actions of Vickers [and Terni].”93 Perrone equally suggested
that Ansaldo was willing to purchase Pozzuoli, but, once again, Armstrong rebuffed his overtures
preferring  to  preserve  full  control  over the  plant  which  was  finally  going  through  a  positive
moment.  Armstrong's  attitude  toward  its  Italian  partner can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  it
discounted  the  possibility  that  Terni  and  Ansaldo  would  autonomously  enter  into  gun
manufacturing:  “The  probability  that  both  [i.e.  Ansaldo  and  Terni]  should  start  the  same
manufacture [i.e. gun making] is excluded because a madness cannot be supposed.”94 Armstrong
believed  that  the  Italian  market  was  too  small  to support  an  enlargement  of  the  artillery
manufacturing capacity.
Under  these  circumstances,  the  collaboration  between Perrone  and  Armstrong could  not
continue. In 1908, after Perrone's sons Mario and Pio inherited the control of the firm after the death
of their father, Armstrong sold to them the majority of its shares. The final balance of the agreement
with Armstrong was meagre: after five years of efforts, Ansaldo was still in the same position it had
been in 1903: without autonomous gun making or armour plate manufacturing capacity. Mario and
Pio initially adopted the strategy of arranging temporary ad hoc agreements with various suppliers
of armour and guns  so  to  be able to  compete for foreign orders, although  no order was secured.
Ansaldo's archive conserve the many letters which the firm exchanged with practically all the major
armaments  companies: Cammell  Laird (after  having been  temporally excluded from the  list  of
Admiralty and War Office suppliers, the firm was especially keen on gaining foreign orders which
could improve its results) and Skoda were contacted in 1908 in relation with a tender for Spain.95 In
92 AFA, FP, SSB n.854/35.
93 Ibid.
94 AFA, FP, SSNB, 1082/11.
95 AFA, SSM n.5 f.17
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1910,  to  compete  for  the  construction  of  two  Chilean  dreadnoughts,  Ansaldo  contacted  Italian
(Terni  and  Pozzuoli)  British  (Vickers,  C.O.W.),  French  (Schneider  and  Marrel  Frères),  and
American (Bethlehem Steel) firms.96
The continuous  inability  to  gain  conspicuous  foreign  orders,  compounded  by the  rising
Italian naval budget, convinced Mario and Pio Perrone to change strategy and start focusing more
on  the  development  of  internal  capabilities by  directly  entering  into gun  and  armour  plate
manufacturing. Terni was rapidly becoming able to manufacture all the components needed by a
modern warship, and Pozzuoli was still under sole control of Armstrong which had no intention to
share it with any partner.  Establishing a systematic relationship with a foreign parter which could
provide all the missing components at discounted price and in time, had proved a strategy difficult
to implement, as the bitter experience with Armstrong had made clear.
The adoption of a strategy of vertical integration still left open the issue of how to acquire
the technical know-how needed to make guns, gun mountings and armour plates. This problem was
solved  by  entering  into arrangements  with  foreign  partners  whose  involvement,  however,  was
strictly limited to a pure advisory role: the Perrone wanted to exercise full control  over the firm's
strategy.97 In 1910 Ansaldo obtained the help of Schneider to set up a gun plant. This was a simple
technical accord which involved no financial links.98 A year later Pio Perrone could communicate to
the board that Ansaldo had  also  solved the problem of armour plate manufacturing, thanks to a
technical agreement with another French firm, Marrel.99 Both these firms had no business in Italy,
therefore they had no previous interests which could be threatened from the rise of Ansaldo and thus
they were willing to provide the Italian company with their expertise in exchange for technical fees
and royalties. Schneider,  in addition, benefited  from the fact that, when Ansaldo in 1911 gained
orders for naval guns which it could not yet manufacture, the construction was diverted to it.100
The  adoption  of  a  vertical  integration  strategy  meant  that  Ansaldo  had  to  invest  large
resources. Ansaldo financed its investments in two ways: by retaining earning and by making use of
96 The fruitless contacts between Ansaldo and American firms are described in F. Fasce,  ‘Strategie Imprenditoriali e
Mercato Mondiale degli Armamenti: i Rapporti tra l'Ansaldo e la Siderurgia USA nel Primo Novecento’, Società e
Storia 38 (1987), 915-947. 
97 This is also evident from the composition of Ansaldo's board: after the representatives of Armstrong resigned in
1908, Mario and Pio Perrone packed it with the managers of the firm and, in addition, convened it few and few
times.
98 C. Beaud, ‘Investissements et Profits du Groupe Multinational Schneider’, Histoire, Économie et Société 7 (1988),
134.
99 AFA, FP, SSNB 955 and AFA, FP, SSR 81/3 for the agreement with Marrel. On this firm see M. S. Smith,  The
Emergence of Modern Business Enterprise in France 1800-1930 (Cambridge, 2006), 188 and 195-196. 
100A. Curami, ‘L'Ansaldo e l'Industria Bellica’, Italia Contemporanea 195 (1994), 277-278. 
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the anticipations it received from the Italian government. A close look at the balance sheets point to
how crucial the anticipations  were. Between 1909 and 1913 (anticipations did not appear in the
balance sheets before 1909)  the evaluation of the firm's  physical assets (plants and machineries)
doubled,  passing from  a little  more  than 20  million  Lire  to  more  than  40  million  Lire.
Notwithstanding these numbers could have been affected from inflated assessments, the trend is too
strong to be  misinterpreted.  Such large  and fast growing  investments, however, were not paid by
increases of the firm's capital, which during all this period remained at 30 million Lire, the level of
1905.  By contrast it was  the  anticipations which financed the expansions of Ansaldo's assets:  the
trend of investments, in fact, closely follow that of anticipations (Figure 7.10).
Figure  7  . 1  0  : Assets and liabilities of Ansaldo, 1904-1913 (current Lire)
Source: AFA, FP, SSNB 955 and SSR 45.
The first years of Ansaldo Armstrong saw an increase of the workforce and of profits. The
orders for the last two Garibaldi were keeping the yard busy. At the same time, also the engineering
plant, whose main production were naval engines and boilers, increased its workforce. In 1906,
however,  the  previous  growth  in  employment  reversed  itself;  in  the  years  1907-08  this  was
especially pronounced for naval shipbuilding and naval fitting, activities which were directly hit by
the decline in the number of orders for warships. In contrary, mechanic production weathered much
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better the negative moment thanks to the orders for engines coming from the Italian Navy. Profit,
which between 1904 and 1906 had been over 1.5 million Lire a year,  plummeted, and in 1907 and
1908 there would be no profit at all if the board had not authorized to postpone some costs to future
exercise and to reduce the amount of resources appropriated for covering risks.
Figure  7  . 1  1  : Ansaldo's workforce (right axis) and profit (in million of current Lire, left axis), 1904-
1913. 
Source: AFA, FP, SSR 388/5 for number of workers (“Total workforce” is obtained by also
adding workers employed in divisions not reported in the figure); AFA, FP, SSNB 955 for profits. 
Starting  from 1909  Ansaldo's  fortunes decisively  improved.  The  workforce  increased
substantially,  until  in  1913  Ansaldo employed around 8,500 people.  The expansion occurred in
every department of the firm, with the steel works experiencing the largest increase in relative terms
(400%) between 1910 and 1913: this was the result of the investments in armour and gun making,
both production requiring steel as basic input.  The two waves of expansion – 1904-06 and 1909-
1913 –  had, however, very different origins:  before 1906 Ansaldo  was chiefly occupied building
warships for foreign governments; after 1908, in contrary, Ansaldo worked quite exclusively for the
Italian armed forces, supplying the Navy with engines and a dreadnought. In the late 1900s profits
equally returned to the pre-1907 level, a little less than 2 million Lire. From 1910 onward, however,
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they remained flat. This was because a sizeable amount of the profits were used to self-finance the
investments required to enlarge the steel works and set up the new gun making factory.
7.3 Conclusions.
In  the  years  from 1900  to  the  First  World  War  the  Italian  armament  industry  rapidly
evolved.  At  the  turn  of  the century  both Terni  and Pozzuoli  enjoyed a  de facto  monopoly in,
respectively, armour plates and large naval artillery. In 1914, by contrast, Ansaldo had joined Terni
in armour plate production, and Vickers-Terni and Ansaldo both had set up gun making plants.
Italian  firms  still  had  to  rely on  foreign  technology and expertise  to  acquire  the  capability  to
manufacture the most sophisticated products. 
Pozzuoli's evolution was partially different: at the turn of the century Armstrong had not yet
achieved the results it  expected when it  had decided to invest there.  Various reasons explain this:
for  years  the  Italian  Navy's  demand  had  been lower  than  initially  expected,  after  the  initial
construction period the company had invested too little, and Pozzuoli was focused exclusively on
producing artillery. Armstrong's first response was an alliance with Ansaldo, but also the agreement
with the Perrone family  did not produce  satisfactory results, and Armstrong reverted to a stand-
alone strategy for  Pozzuoli.,  a strategy more suited  to its quasi  monopolistic  position in  naval
artillery. This time, however,  there was a crucial difference with the previous period: significant
investment were made to increase and modernise the plant.  The combination of new investments
with the  pre-eminence of large artillery in naval  warfare magnified the competitive advantage of
Pozzuoli: government arsenals were certainly not able to produce large guns and mountings. At the
same time, private competitors were only slowly starting production: Vickers-Terni in 1912 and
Ansaldo in 1914.
The  cluster  of  technologies  linked  with  the  dreadnought  design  damaged  Italian  firms
which, suddenly, lost much of the ground which they had gained since the 1880s.  In fact,  Italian
companies enjoyed  much more success on foreign markets in the period 1895-1905 then in later
years, when it was the Italian military expenditure which principally sustained their activities. New
technologies favoured the introduction of larger vessels with powerful guns and improved armour
plates, warships which the Italian firms were at disadvantage to manufacture.
Both  Terni  and  Ansaldo  made  use  of  alliances,  joint-ventures  and technical  sharing
agreements to acquire foreign  know-how. At the same time, however, these agreements worked
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only  in  few  occasions  because  the  interests  of  the  various  parts  were  seldom aligned:  in  an
oligopolistic sector, incumbents did not desire to prop up potential rivals. This is why the Ansaldo-
Armstrong alliance did not work,  but the Vickers-Terni joint-venture  functioned (Vickers had no
previous interest in Italy, and the Odero-Terni-Orlando combination was less actively looking for
foreign markets than Ansaldo).
It is questionable, however, if  by 1913-14  the Italian armaments  industry had achieved a
stable  configuration. The large investments made to take advantages of the growing Italian naval
budget had led to a remarkable expansion of the  industry's  productive capacity.  Technology had
pushed  up  the  minimum  size at  which plants  for  armour  plates  and ordnance  could  generate
economies of scale. While Terni in the 1890s made around 2-3,000 tons of armour a year, in the
1900s the firm's capacity has risen to around 10,000 tons a year. In the early 1910s Ansaldo added
5-6,000 tons a year of additional potential production. Unsurprisingly, production capacity was not
saturated until the country entered in war in 1915. Similarly, it is unlikely that Pozzuoli, Vickers-
Terni  and  Ansaldo's  gun plants would  have  all  been  able  to  prosper  without  the dramatically
increased in the demand for ordnance.
.
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Chapter VIII
Conclusion
This thesis has offered an explanation of the rise of private armaments firms in Great Britain
and Italy in the period from mid-19th century to 1914, and so has advanced the understanding of the
growth  of  the  armaments  industry  in  the  decades  before  the  First  World  War,  a  period  when
armaments  companies became  major  actors in most  advanced economies.  This development
occurred in  virtually  all  the major  industrial  countries before 1914.  By  adopting a comparative
approach  focused on  Italy  and  Britain  –  countries  economically,  socially,  politically and
strategically very different  one from the other  – it  has better highlighted the underlying common
dynamics as well as the peculiarities characterising each experience.  
The  magnitude  of  the  changes  which  occurred  can  be  appreciated  by comparing  the
armaments industries in Italy and Britain in the 1850s with those of 1914. In the 1850s there were
no private firms manufacturing heavy military hardware in either country: market conditions and
the state of technology limited the scope for private initiatives, while favouring government-owned
arsenals and yards, whose  output of was sufficient to meet  the  demand for armaments. Stagnant
military technology limited the problem of technical obsolescence: guns and warships could be
retained in service for decades, reducing the overall demand for armaments. Governments could
enlist the help of private firms in case of protracted military engagements (as occurred in both Great
Britain  and  France,  for  example,  during the  Napoleonic  wars).  As  soon  as  hostilities  ended,
however, governments cancelled contracts with private firms and returned to relying exclusively on
their traditional procurement channels. 
By contrast,  after six decades, in 1914,  the private armaments industry had moved from
being  a  non-existing  industrial  sector  to  become  the  crucial  actor  in  military  procurement.
Companies  such  as Armstrong,  Vickers,  Ansaldo  and  Terni  were  indeed the  key suppliers  of
advanced military goods to governments around the world. Arsenals and government-owned yards
still produced guns and warships, but their output was not sufficient to satisfy the demand of the
armed forces. In addition, government plants did not manufacture certain crucial components – such
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as,  for instance,  armour plates and large-calibre naval guns (in the case of Italy) – which were
exclusively supplied by the private sector. 
Increasingly rapid innovations in  military technology were crucial  in  revolutionising the
armaments industry  in this period. As  pointed out in chapter I, the introduction of ironclads and
rifled ordnance in the late 1850s radically changed naval warfare. This was not, however, a simple
“one-off” technological change, but, on the contrary,  it was the beginning of decades of sustained
innovation  in military technology. The fact that by the mid-19th century military technology had
lagged  behind  civilian  technology  created  room  for  rapid  improvements,  whose  pace  was
accelerated  from  the  1880s  onwards  by  the  application  to  the  armaments  industry  of  many
innovations developed in the steel and chemical industries.
Access  to  up-to-date  technology  started  to  be  seen  as  a crucial  factor,  dramatically
increasing the opportunity cost for governments of  not fielding modern military hardware.  At the
same time, rapid technical innovation translated into a high rate of technical obsolescence which
generated a constant demand for armaments.  Guns and warships now  usually  had to be replaced
after just a few years in order to keep pace with technology. Countries wishing to have an effective
naval  force had  no  option  but  to  acquire  advanced  military  goods,  and  to  do  so  repeatedly.
Government  yards  and  arsenals,  however, did  not  produce,  or  were  not  able  to  make, all  the
components required to build modern warships.  This fact, and the constant demand for military
hardware, generated unprecedented business opportunities.  As a result, in the course of the years
private armaments firms were able to acquire a dominant, if not outright monopolistic, position, in
certain areas. For example, armour plates were routinely purchased from private suppliers from the
1850s onwards, because government were unwilling to expand arsenals' activities into steel making,
and because private firms were able to satisfy the need for armour plates. Similarly, gun mountings
for large guns were supplied by just a handful of private companies because their complexity made
them difficult to manufacture.
The  growth  of  private  armaments  companies  was  not  a  linear  process,  however.  For
instance, Armstrong, after the British government suddenly terminated its contract with the firm in
1863, did not receive another major order from it until the 1880s. In the course of the intervening
years  Armstrong exclusively  relied  on foreign customers. Likewise, British yards stopped being
awarded large numbers of  contracts after the Royal Dockyards had been modernised in  course of
the early 1860s. At the same time, Ansaldo's attempts to become a supplier of the Italian Navy were
repeatedly frustrated in the 1860s and 1870s because of the insufficient amount of orders received,
and the firm's incapacity to produce modern hardware. In general, what emerges from this thesis is
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that the armaments industry in both Italy and Great Britain was very diverse and articulated: until
the late 1890s, fragmentation still predominated, with different firms producing different goods, and
many companies involved in both civil and military productions.
Staring  from the  1880s,  the relative position  of  arsenals  and government  yards  towards
private  firms started to  further  deteriorate.  In the course of  that  decade,  both Italy and Britain
markedly  increased their naval spending.  In addition to this, a new wave of technical innovation
reshaped naval technology. Governments realised that the only way  they had  to rapidly escalate
military production was to  award contracts to private firms.  Contracts which, however, were now
not exclusively limited to  hardware  which government plants did not produce, but also  covered
those activities, such as shipbuilding, which government arsenals and yards did carry out. It was in
this context that a second group of private firms, among which the most important were Vickers and
Terni,  ventured into armaments production. Thus, a combination of technological evolution  (the
introduction  of  breech-loading  guns,  steel  vessels  and  slow-burning  propellants)  and  specific
historical events  (foreign and domestic policy crisis in Italy and Great Britain)  generated a new
procurement system, one in which private firms played a very prominent role.
In  the  two  decades  before  1914,  naval  guns  became  bigger,  gun  mountings  more
sophisticated, armour plate more complex and warships larger and more expensive. This trend had
an impact on the  internal organisation of the armaments industry in both Italy and Great Britain:
these technical  developments,  in  fact,  favoured the creation of highly capitalised and vertically
integrated companies which could sustain the never-ending stream of investments needed to keep
their works up-to-date: for example, the price of an armour making plant increased fourfold from
the late 1860s to the late 1890s. Thus, all the major firms active in military production tried, more
or less successfully, to consolidate themselves and increase their size by acquiring the capability to
produce  guns,  armour  plate,  warships,  etc.  This  was  obtained either  by means  of  mergers  and
acquisitions  with  other  companies  or  by  internal  organic  growth.  The  growing  complexity  of
military technology, however, meant that it became impossible for armaments firms to use their
military plants also for civilian productions. This explains why, for example, Vickers, John Brown,
Cammell  and  Ansaldo  moved from  being  firms  with  just  a  foot  in  military  production  to
concentrating more and more of their investments and efforts into armaments manufacturing.
Also the relationship between private  armaments  firms  and governments  evolved in  the
course of the decades. A comparison between the British and Italian experiences of the early 1860s
with that of the 1880s and 1890s provides evidence to generalize Volker Berghahm's insights about
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the role that rapid increases in military spending had in the creation, and later preservation, of a
private-based procurement system in Germany. In the 1860s governments drastically limited their
dealings with private firms after they had modernised their own arsenals. The British government,
for example, had no problem in stopping buying from Armstrong, even though this decision put the
survival of the firm at risk. The government could do that not only because Woolwich manufactured
artillery of similar quality, but also because of Elswick's  still relatively limited  size. Armstrong's
fortunes, that is, could easily be ignored because the firm was quite small. By contrast, after private
firms greatly expanded their operations in the course of the 1880s to respond to sudden increases in
naval spending, governments found themselves in the position of being unable to drastically cut
their involvement with the private sector. Orders could sometimes be limited and military spending
momentarily  cut, but the basics of the new procurement system remained unchanged: the private
armaments industry had now acquired a dimension which made it simply too important a part of the
economy to be deprived of orders. While it was easy to cut links with Elswick when it employed
less than one thousand workers, it became impossible to do the same when it directly provided near
twenty thousand jobs.  Equally,  the Italian Navy could not ignore that  thousands of  workers  in
Genoa, Leghorn and Naples who were dependent on contracts being awarded to private firms, as
local  politicians  and city bureaucrats  continued to  stress  in  their  endless  request  to  the central
government for additional orders. 
The dynamics  briefly  summarised  above  explain  why  private  armaments  firms  rose  to
prominence in all the major  industrial economies before 1914. Although the final outcome was
similar in both  Italy and Great  Britain,  the  experiences  of the armaments industries in  the two
countries differed in various key aspects: the relationship between governments and private firms;
the  role played by financial institutions in supporting the growth of armaments firms; the  impact
and nature  of  technological  innovations;  and the level  of competition and cooperation between
private firms.
In Britain, the government exercised little influence over private firms' activities. It tried to
convince several firms to enter armaments production and to undertake certain investments, but in
general  it avoided interfering with their activities, or directing their strategies. It left British firms
free to sell their products to virtually every government willing to pay for them. For example, when
Italy purchased from Elswick several 100 ton guns  potentially  able to overcome Malta's defence,
the British government did not block the sale, but, instead,  it  purchased from Armstrong a few of
the same guns to be deployed in Malta. Behind such a laissez-faire approach there was the idea that
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it was actually in the interest of Britain, which boasted the largest and most modern armaments
industry in the world, that the country's private armaments firms kept selling their wares abroad. In
case of war, Britain could thus count on a modern and well-developed industry which could rapidly
be mobilised. 
By contrast, the Italian government, especially the Ministry of Marine under the leadership
of Benedetto Brin in the 1880s, displayed a much more active and interventionist attitude. The chief
reason motivating this different approach was that, for strategic and military reasons, the Italian
government wanted to develop a domestic armaments industry in order to free the country from the
need to import crucial hardware. The acquisition of a national armaments production capability was
seen as part of the state-building process,  an aim which could not be judged in purely economic
terms. To achieve this end, the Italian Navy adopted various measures: it convinced Armstrong to
create a branch in Italy by threatening to stop buying from it  at a time when Italy was among
Armstrong's major customers; it provided essential financial support for the establishment of Terni's
steel plant by offering the firm large advances; in general, it favoured domestic firms, even thought
their wares were more expensive. Such a policy was costly in the short-term, because the prices
paid for products made in Italy were  often  higher than that of imported hardware  and the Italian
government proved to be a very accommodating customer, accepting delays and forfeiting penalties
for  late  deliveries.  However,  it  substantially  achieved  its  long-term  aim  of  fostering  the
development of a domestic armaments industry even though the Italian armaments industry did not
enjoyed the same level of technological sophistication of the British one (more on this below). The
approach adopted by Italy was, by and large, the same followed by other ‘second comers’ powers.
Japan, for instance,  also  moved from importing entire warships  (usually purchased from British
yards)  to  investing large resources for the creation of a local industry able,  thanks to links with
foreign companies (again, in the majority British), to  develop an autonomous capacity to produce
modern, up-do-date military hardware.
It  is  evident  from what  has  been discussed in  this  thesis that  the relationships  between
governments  and the  armaments  industry cannot  be  easily  classified  as  one  in  which  one  part
necessarily  prevailed over  the  other.  Certainly,  as  Trebilcock  stressed  in  all  his  contributions,
governments enjoyed much leverage over the activities of armaments firms which, eventually, were
depending on their orders. However, the magnitude of this influence varied significantly between
periods and among countries. The Italian case offers an interesting example of how looking at the
government-business  relationship  as  constant  and immutable  is  misleading:  in  the  1880s,  for
instance, Brin convinced Armstrong to establish Pozzuoli; but a few years later Armstrong decided
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not  to  enlarge  Pozzuoli's  activities  to  include  naval  shipbuilding  even  though  the  Italian  navy
pressured them in that direction. This was because the fall in the size of the Italian naval budget had
significantly reduced Italy's bargaining power vis-a-vis Elswick. Similarly, in the early 1910s Japan
was able  to  convince Armstrong and Vickers to set  up an armour making plant  in the country
exactly using its large naval budget as a leverage, repeating twenty-five years later the strategy Brin
had used.
Even though the thesis does not address  in detail the theme of the different nature of the
relationships which existed between private armaments companies and financial institutions in Italy
and in the United Kingdom, it is possible to advance some general remarks. The records of the
British firms never point to any problem in raising resources for financing investments. Armaments
firms  were  generally  able  to  draw  on  self-financing  mechanism:  the  sustained  profitability  of
armaments sales generated a strong positive cash flow, to which the anticipations paid by customers
should be added. Large investments, however, such as the erection of a new armour plate mill, or
the enlargement of a yard, required the rapid mobilisation of very large resources, especially from
the 1890s onwards. In these cases, the sophisticated British financial system easily provided firms
with the required capital. The balance sheets of Vickers and Armstrong, for instance, record the
issuing of debentures for millions of pounds while,  at  the same time, the minutes of the firms’
boards hardly mention these operations. The logical conclusion is that even raising large sums does
not appear to have been a problem for British armaments firms which, especially after the beginning
of  the  German-British  naval  arms  race,  could  rely  on  a  large  and  growing  demand  for  their
products. 
The Italian case is slightly different. Italian firms were also able to rely on self-financing
which represented for many decades the major channel for raising capital. In this respect, the late
1890s were  a  very positive moments,  thanks to  the large  profits  generated by the sales  of  the
Garibaldi. In addition to self-financing, family wealth was another important source of capital. The
case of the Bombrini family is especially revealing: in the early 1880s they financed the expansion
of Ansaldo using money coming from other investments accumulated by the family. Before the 20th
century, Italian armaments firms were still relatively small, and their financial requirements could
be met by employing these traditional channels. From 1900, however,  Ansaldo’s records  mention
various instances when the management  of the firm was worried about  being able  to  raise the
capital  needed  for  new  investments.  The  Perrones  often complained  how  the  major  Italian
commercial banks offered only limited support to the company. This discrimination was motivated,
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at least according to the Perrones themselves, by political reasons. On the contrary, there is no doubt
that Terni’s links with the Italian Commercial Bank made less difficult for this conglomerate to raise
the resources  it  needed,  even though the patchy nature of Terni's  archive does not  allow us to
investigate this issue much further, at least from the point of view of the firm's management.1 Again,
however, it seems difficult to conclude that Ansaldo's development was significantly delayed by the
supposed  “antipathy” than Italian banks had toward the Perrones.  
What appears to have been the most significant difference between Britain and Italy was the
role of financial markets.  In Great Britain, well developed financial markets made  it  possible for
armaments  firms to raise  large sums by issuing debentures  and other  financial  instruments.  As
stated above, by 1914 debentures and other non-banking financial instruments played a crucial role
in the financing the expansion of the industry.  In contrast,  from the balance sheets of the Italian
firms what appears evident is that Italian firms relied much less on these instruments. More research
is needed, however, to understand whether this choice was the result of the less advanced nature of
the Italian financial markets which deterred Italian firms from exploiting this avenue, or if this was
a deliberate strategy of Italian armaments firms to avoid more scrutiny of their internal activities.
Another aspect  which  differentiated the  British  and Italian  armaments  industries  was
technological  innovation.  The  analysis  of  the  links  between  the  Italian  and  British  armaments
industries allows a dynamic reassessment of the model of armaments transfer developed by Krause
which has been highlighted in the Introduction. In the period from the 1850s to 1914, there is no
doubt that Britain was a “first tier” country, one, that is, whose armaments industry was able to
autonomously develop and produce sophisticated military technology.  British firms were at  the
forefront of technological innovations in naval warfare: they developed and improved large artillery
and quick-firing ordnance, pioneered the use of slow-burning explosives, etc.2 
Italian companies were, by contrast, at the receiving ends of technological innovation. In the
1860s Italy was, to adopt the labels used in Krause's model, a “third tier country” because it had to
import from abroad the great majority of its military hardware:  for instance, in the early 1860s it
purchased a large number of already fitted and armed ironclads from foreign companies because its
domestic armaments industry could not manufacture them. This trend continued until the 1880s:
1 In  fact,  when  in his  multi-volumes history of  the relationship between companies  and  banks  in  pre-war  Italy
Antonio Confalonieri deals with the Terni-Commercial Bank links he makes exclusively use of the bank's records. 
2 This point has recently been restated by G. C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts
to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge, 2007), 29-54; and D. Edgerton,  Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge,
2005), who, despite focusing on a subsequent period, highlights how the successful performance of the post-1920
British armaments industry were partially the result of its technological leadership in the pre-1914 period. 
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Italian armaments firms  kept importing foreign technology, mainly from Britain, in the form of
finished or semi-finished goods. From the 1880s, however, Italian firms steadily improved their
technical capabilities to the point that, by the late 1890s, they were able to export mid-size warships
to countries which, until then, had been exclusively supplied by British firms. Italy, that is, had
became a “second tier country”, whose military industry was capable of making more sophisticated
military goods which could be sold to “third tier countries” such as Argentina. The introduction of
dreadnoughts,  however,  reinforced  British  technical  supremacy  and  damaged  Italy  armaments
companies  which  had  to  start  again  the  process  of  acquiring  new  crucial foreign-developed
technologies. Italian firms quickly responded by importing again the required know-how although,
this  time,  through the  creation  of  joint-ventures  and alliances  with  other firms  rather  than  the
purchase of finished products. 
Only on the eve of the First World War, after Ansaldo and Terni completed their process of
vertical integration, could Italy be defined as a “first rate country”, as its success in coping with the
needs  of  armaments  production  during  the  First  World  War showed.  This  was  not  a position,
however,  which Italy was able to maintain in the course of the following decades,  as the poor
performance in terms of technological evolution which characterized the Italian armaments industry
in the 1930s and, especially, during the Second World War, demonstrated.3
In the course of the decades before the outbreak of the First World War, Italian armaments
firms proved apt at replicating  and adapting  foreign technologies;  for example, Terni was able to
develop modern  armour  plates  of  a  comparable  quality with the ones  produced abroad.  Italian
companies,  however,  did  not autonomously develop  any  significant  innovations. This  limited
capacity to produce technical innovation was not an exclusive feature of the armaments industry,
but  also characterised  virtually all major  Italian  industrial sectors in the pre-1914 period.4 While
many reasons might have contributed to this general outcome, a few of them appear to have been
especially important in the case of the armaments industry.  The first one  is that for many years
Italian  firms  did  not  have  the  sheer  dimension  to  mobilise  large  resources  for  research  and
development. They were simply too small to do that. Even though, for instance, trying to improve
the composition of a steel plate or of a gun barrel was not necessarily very complex, the many trials
needed represented an additional high cost which Ansaldo and Terni could less well withstand than
the largest British (or German or French) firms. 
3 P. Ferrari,  Verso la Guerra. L'Italia nella Corsa agli Armamenti 1884-1918 (Vicenza, 2003),  235-247, offers an
interesting comparison between the contrasting performance of the Italian armaments industry during the First and
the Second World War.
4 This is a feature which characterised the  virtually all Italian  industries in the pre-1914 period, see R. Giannetti,
Tecnologia e Sviluppo Economico Italiano, 1870-1990 (Bologna, 1998).
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Another difference between Italian and British  companies was that the latter were run for
long periods by men (like Armstrong, Noble, the Vickers brothers, etc.) who were themselves very
skilled engineers and innovators.  In constrast, Italian firms were mainly managed by people who
lacked this technical background. The Bombrini brothers, the Perrones or the Orlandos were more
skilled  in  commercial  negotiations  and  dealings  with  governments  rather  than  in  engineering
matters.  In  addition,  before  1914  the  ownership  of  Italian  armaments  firms  changed  numerous
times, something which certainly affacted the strategies and plans of firms. In addition, the ups and
downs of Italian armaments spending, which had a direct impact on armaments firms' fortunes, did
not favour the necessarily long-term accumulation of technical expertise.  This fact explains, for
instance, why even by 1914 Italian yards, despite they significantly improved their building times,
were still slower than British yards. The irregular path of orders meant that firms such as Ansaldo or
Orlando were not able to fully exploit the potentiality of their yards and of their workers who often
found themselves unemployed for months. Not by chance, Ansaldo's yard reached the peak of its
efficiency (at least in terms of construction times) when it have lined up one after the other the
Garibaldi cruisers. The case of government yards was different: we lack systematic analyses of
their activities, but it seems credible to speculate that  their slow building tempo was caused by a
generally poor management (they were run by naval officers, not managers), and by the fact that
their workforce enjoyed a much stronger legal protection than the workers employed in the private
industry (at least this is the impression conveyed by many sources published in the 1880s, and there
are no indications that things changed during the following decades).
However, the single most important reason why Italian armaments firms were less prone to
invest large resources in R&D activities, but relied mainly on technological transfers from abroad,
was that this strategy suited best the strategic position of Italy. The Italian fleet needed to be up-to-
date, but the Navy was also concerned that its warships were reliable. Thus, rather than to invest
precious resources in patronising uncertain research attempts, a better strategy was that of pushing
Italian firms to rapidly acquire any foreign innovation that had already proved to be successful.    
Italian  and  British  experiences  diverged  also  in  another  key  aspect:  the  degree  of
cooperation/competition  inside the  private  armaments  industry  sector.  In  Britain  military  firms
tended  to  collaborate  among  themselves.  While  certainly  new  entrants  threatened  established
producers, but it is remarkable how British firms were able to coordinate their efforts both at home
and on foreign markets (see. chapter VI) to reduce the risk of excessive competition. In comparison,
the  two  major  Italian  armaments  firms,  Ansaldo  and  the  Orlando-Terni-Odero  group,  strongly
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competed against each other and showed remarkably little  desire to coordinate their efforts  and
strategies. For example, they failed to join forces to gain a foot in foreign markets in the 1900s. The
contrasting trajectories of Italian and British naval spending (rather than the absolute size of their
naval budgets) in the years 1861-1911 (an interval which allows a uniform comparison) explain
such difference (Figure 8.1).
Figure  8  . 1  : British and Italian real naval expenditure, 1861-1911 (1861=100 for both countries).
Source:  for Britain, figures 1.5, 3.2 and 6.1; for Italy figures 2.1, 4.1 and 7.1.  British values are
deflated using the website http://www.measuringworth.com/. Data on Italian spending are deflated
using Istat coefficients of transformation (http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/32752). 
British naval spending remained more or less constant until the mid-1880s, when it started
growing, a process which was only briefly interrupted in the mid-1900s. This regular trend gave
British  firms  an  incentive  to  collaborate:  they  could  predict  the  future  level  of  spending  with
confidence, and judge their investments accordingly, enabling them to maintain constant production
in  their  works.  The  collaboration  extended  to  foreign  markets  where  British  firms  were  the
dominant  suppliers  and  faced  competitors  based  in  other  countries.  By  contrast,  Italian  naval
spending was much more irregular, peaking in the early 1860s, in the late 1880s, and in the last few
years before 1914. This irregular trend meant that Italian armaments firms faced a highly unstable
domestic demand, on which they relied quite exclusively. In addition, with armaments production
becoming more and more capital-intensive, the firms' key preoccupation became that of keeping
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their plants busy so to cover their growing fixed costs. Under these circumstances Italian firms had
no  incentive  to  collaborate;  rather  they  tried  to  gain  the  largest  share  of  the  orders  to  cover
themselves  against  the  likely  reduction  of  expenditures  in  the  future.  Once  again,  a  careful
comparison  between  the  Italian  and  British  cases  highlights  how,  before  1914,  to  define  the
armaments industry in both countries as monolithic “military-industrial complexes” is misleading.
By contrast, they were highly complex and nuanced sectors which rapidly evolved and adapted to
changing external circumstances.
In the space of sixty years, private armaments industries moved from being none-existent to
become among the  largest  components  of  the  industrial  sector  of  many economies;  something
which happened, for example, in both Britain and Italy. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that
the great majority of firms now active in the defence industry in Europe directly descend from
companies which were established in the pre-1914 period.
For the first time in centuries, non-governmental institutions started to play a determining
role in military affairs. The level of autonomy and self-organisation enjoyed by private firms meant
that  a  key function  inside  the  sphere  of  military affairs  –  the  design  and production  of  heavy
armaments – started to fall, at least partially, outside the direct control of government bureaucracies.
A shift made still more significant by the fact that, because of the growing role of technology in
warfare,  armaments  design  and  production  became absolutely central.  The  private  actors,  who
entered the armaments industry, approached it with a commercial and business-like mindset. This
was, again, a radical departure from the previous centuries when armaments production had been
carried on as bureaucratic tasks by government and military officials.
The  decades  covered  by  this  thesis  were  thus  the  crucial  moment  during  which  the
contemporary armaments procurement system, based on private firms supplying the majority of
military  hardware  required  by  governments,  was  created.  A process  of  commercialization and
privatisation which nowadays is developing even further, with private companies playing a growing
role in many other areas of military affairs.
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